O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 34-8-158 (2019)

Financing benefits paid employees of governmental entities and nonprofit organizations

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) Organizations covered. Benefits paid to employees of governmental entities and nonprofit organizations shall be financed in accordance with this Code section and Code Sections 34-8-157 and 34-8-159 through 34-8-162. For the purpose of this Code section, a nonprofit organization is an organization or a group of organizations described in Section 501(c)(3) of the United States Internal Revenue Code which is exempt from income tax under Section 501(a) of such code. For the purposes of this Code section, a governmental entity is an organization or group of organizations described in subsection (h) of Code Section (b) Payments in lieu of contributions. Governmental entities and nonprofit organizations which, pursuant to Code Section 34-8-35, are or become subject to this chapter shall pay contributions under Code Sections 34-8-150 through 34-8-157 unless they elect to make payments in lieu of contributions in accordance with this subsection. All entities which elect to make payments in lieu of contributions shall pay to the Commissioner for the unemployment fund the full amount of regular benefits which are attributable to the service of individuals in their employ during the effective period of election or subjectivity to this chapter. (c) Procedure for payments in lieu of contributions. (1) For claims filed prior to January 1, 1992, governmental entities described in subsection (a) of this Code section which elect to make payments in lieu of contributions shall pay the Commissioner for the unemployment fund 100 percent of extended benefits paid which are attributable to the service of individuals in their employ during the effective period. Nonprofit organizations which elect to make payments in lieu of contributions shall pay to the Commissioner for the unemployment fund 50 percent of extended benefits paid which are attributable to the service of individuals in their employ during the effective period; provided, however, that for the first week of extended benefits paid, the reimbursement to the unemployment fund shall be 100 percent of the extended benefits paid. (2) For claims filed on or after January 1, 1992, an employer who has elected to make payments in lieu of contributions shall pay to the Commissioner for the unemployment fund the amount of benefits paid to former employees when such entity is determined to be the

‘‘most recent employer’’ as defined in Code Section 34-8-43. Extended benefits paid, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of Code Section 34-8-157, shall be financed in their entirety by governmental entities. Nonprofit organizations shall reimburse 100 percent for the first week of extended benefits paid and 50 percent of extended benefits paid after the first week when any of such entities is determined to be the most recent employer. (d) Notice of election. (1) Those entities described in subsection (b) of this Code section may elect to become liable for payments in lieu of contributions for a period of not less than two full calendar years, provided that a written notice of such election is filed with the Commissioner within 30 days of the date of the determination of liability under this chapter. Such election shall consist of the remainder of the calendar year in which the election is made and for not less than the two full ensuing calendar years. (2) Those entities described in subsection (b) of this Code section which elect to make payments in lieu of contributions will continue to be liable for such payments unless a written notice terminating such election is filed with the Commissioner not later than 30 days prior to the beginning of the calendar year for which such termination shall first be effective. (3) Any entity described in subsection (b) of this Code section which has been paying contributions under this chapter for at least two full calendar years may change to a reimbursable basis. The change in status shall be accomplished by the filing of a written notice of election to become liable for payments in lieu of contributions not later than 30 days prior to the beginning of the next calendar year. Such election shall not be terminated by the organization for the next two calendar years. (e) Commissioner’s discretion to extend period with respect to written notice of election or termination. (1) The Commissioner may at his or her discretion extend the period within which a notice of election or a notice of termination must be filed and may permit an election to be retroactive. (2) The Commissioner, in accordance with such regulations as the Commissioner may prescribe, shall notify each governmental entity or nonprofit organization of any determination relative to its status as an employer and of the effective date of any election which it makes or of any termination of such election. Such determination shall be subject to reconsideration, appeal, and review.

History

(Code 1981, § 34-8-158, enacted by Ga. L. 1991, p. 139, § 1.)

Annotations

Law reviews. - For survey article on recent developments in Georgia administrative law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 393 (1982).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code Section 34-8-123 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Constitutionality. - Fact that an employee is entitled to benefits based on employment by the hospital bears a substantial relationship to the purpose of these provisions. Compulsory contributions for employment security are, like many other taxes, payable without regard to fault; an employee’s eligibility for ben-

efits and the hospital authority’s resulting liability do not offend the due process clause of Georgia’s Constitution. Caldwell v. Hospital Auth., 248 Ga. 887, 287 S.E.2d 15 (1982) (decided under former § 34-8-123). Hospital authority may become a contributing employer by terminating its election to be a reimbursable employer. Caldwell v. Hospital Auth., 248 Ga. 887, 287 S.E.2d 15 (1982) (decided under former § 34-8-123).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 76 Am. Jur. 2d, Unemployment Compensation, §§ 23, 28. C.J.S. - 81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, §§ 293, 339 et seq., 343 et seq.

ALR. - Nonprofit charitable institutions as within operation of labor statutes, 26 ALR2d 1020.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 14 cases, 1983–1994 · leading case: Millen v. Caldwell, 317 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. 1984).
Millen v. Caldwell, 317 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 8× “The Board of Review of the Employment Security Agency, of the Georgia Department of Labor, denied the appellant unemployment benefits, based upon OCGA § 34-8-158 (2): “failure to obey orders, rules or instructions or .”
Holstein v. North Chem. Co., 390 S.E.2d 910 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 8× “OCGA § 34-8-158 (2) (B) expressly authorizes the Commissioner of Labor to promulgate certain rules and regulations to assist him in making those statutory determinations required therein.”
Tanner v. Golden, 377 S.E.2d 875 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 8× “This court then granted these discretionary appeals, consolidated because both involve the identical issue of whether failure of the TCT could constitute valid cause for disqualification of unemployment compensation benefits.”
Lamb v. Tanner, 344 S.E.2d 534 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 8× “The second hearing officer’s decision disqualifying appellant for benefits for a five-week period pursuant to OCGA § 34-8-158 (2) was affirmed by the Board and by the Superior Court of DeKalb County.”
Roberson v. Tanner, 329 S.E.2d 210 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 12× “” On appeal to the Board of Review of the Employment Security Agency, the hearing officer’s ruling was affirmed by a vote of 2 to 1, and the superior court affirmed the decision of the board of review.”
Bulloch Academy v. Cornett, 360 S.E.2d 615 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 4× “See OCGA § 34-8-158 (1); Moore v. Tanner, 172 Ga.”
Powell v. Dougherty Christian Academy, Inc., 451 S.E.2d 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 2× “Since Riverview is a non-profit corporation which elected to make payments to the labor commissioner in lieu of contributions pursuant to OCGA § 34-8-158, it is obligated to reimburse the state dollar for dollar for all unemployment benefits paid to its employees.”
Moore v. Tanner, 324 S.E.2d 772 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 2× “A hearing was held, wherein the sole issue presented for resolution was whether appellant had quit his job under the “disqualifying condition” provided in OCGA § 34-8-158 (1). The administrative hearing officer found that appellant “did not have a good work connected cause for…”
Caldwell v. Amoco Fabrics Co., 302 S.E.2d 596 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 2× ““Unless there is fault (an ‘offense’) chargeable to the employee there is no disqualification under [OCGA § 34-8-158; former Code Ann. § 54-610].”
W. Elec. Co. v. Ellison, 317 S.E.2d 595 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 2× “Held: OCGA § 34-8-158 (1) disqualifies an individual for unemployment compensation benefits who has quit his most recent employment voluntarily and without good cause.”
Blair v. Poythress, 440 S.E.2d 261 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 2× “Our legislature has not statutorily defined the term good cause, but this court has interpreted OCGA § 34-8-158, which contained similar language, and applied the term in various factual settings.”
Troup Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Daniel, 381 S.E.2d 586 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 2× “Application was granted to Troup County Board of Education, the employer, and the Commissioner of the Department of Labor to appeal the Superior Court’s reversal of the decision of the Department of Labor Board of Review which had affirmed the hearing officer’s finding that…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.