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Provided, however, that the exclusion provided in this paragraph shall not apply to any such employment on behalf of an employing unit defined in subsection (h) or (i) of this Code section;
(Code 1981, §34-8-35, enacted by Ga. L. 1991, p. 139, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 323, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 97, § 34; Ga. L. 1994, p. 640, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1717, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 1200, § 1/HB 520; Ga. L. 2006, p. 822, § 1/SB 486; Ga. L. 2007, p. 394, § 1/HB 443; Ga. L. 2012, p. 580, § 6/HB 865.)
- Pursuant to § 28-9-5, in 1991, "this subsection" was substituted for "subsection (n) of this Code section" at the end of paragraph (n)(15).
- Section 3306(c)(7) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, referred to in subsection (h), is codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(7). Section 15(g) of the federal Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, referred to in subparagraph (m)(2)(C), is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1141j(g). The federal Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 1963, referred to in subparagraph (m)(4)(A), was codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2041-2055, before it was repealed in 1983. The federal Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, referred to in paragraph (n)(5), is codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 351-369.
- For note on 1993 amendment of this Code section, see 10 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 152 (1993). For annual survey of labor and employment law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 211 (2006). For survey article on labor and employment law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 233 (2007). For article, "The Uber Million Dollar Question: Are Uber Drivers Employees or Independent Contractors?," see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 461 (2017).
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L. 1937, p. 806 and former Code Section 34-8-40 which was repealed by Ga. L. 1991, p. 139, § 1, effective January 1, 1992, are included in the annotations for this Code section.
- Subsection (o)(11) of former § 34-8-40 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-8-35) did not deny equal protection in exempting independent salespersons such as real estate agents, and insurance agents and solicitors, while not exempting securities salespersons, in the absence of proof that securities salespersons were in fact similarly situated to the real estate and insurance agents who were exempted. Stuart-James Co. v. Tanner, 259 Ga. 289, 380 S.E.2d 257 (1989) (decided under former § 34-8-40).
- It does not matter that the federal Employment Security Agency has construed a contract as not bringing the parties under the federal law. This chapter describes its own coverage, and the test of coverage or noncoverage is made under those provisions only. McNeel, Inc. v. Redwine, 90 Ga. App. 345, 83 S.E.2d 33 (1954) (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 806; see O.C.G.A. Ch. 8, T. 34).
- Since the requirements here are stated conjunctively and not disjunctively, all three of these elements must be established in order that an employer working an individual for wages may be exempted from this chapter. Young v. Bureau of Unemployment Comp., 63 Ga. App. 130, 10 S.E.2d 412 (1940) (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 806; see O.C.G.A. Ch. 8, T. 34).
- Since former § 34-8-51 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-8-49) defines "wages," and did so without reference to the status of the parties (i.e., employer-employee versus independent contractor), the statutory definition of "wages," rather than common-law principles, must be used. Sarah Coventry, Inc. v. Caldwell, 243 Ga. 429, 254 S.E.2d 375 (1979) (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 806).
- It makes no difference whether the relationship between the parties is one of employer-employee or the "dealers" are independent contractors. The test, and the question for decision, is whether the status between the parties falls within the meaning of employment as defined by this chapter. McNeel, Inc. v. Redwine, 90 Ga. App. 345, 83 S.E.2d 33 (1954) (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 806; see O.C.G.A. Ch. 8, T. 34).
- Burden of proof falls on the defendant to prove that an individual's services come within the exceptions of this section. Moore v. Williams, 95 Ga. App. 309, 97 S.E.2d 718 (1957) (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 806; see O.C.G.A. § 34-8-35).
Cited in Huiet v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 66 Ga. App. 602, 18 S.E.2d 693 (1942); Royal Cigar Co. v. Huiet, 195 Ga. 852, 25 S.E.2d 810 (1943); Brewster v. Huiet, 69 Ga. App. 593, 26 S.E.2d 198 (1943); Huiet v. Brunswick Pulp & Paper Co., 74 Ga. App. 355, 39 S.E.2d 545 (1946); Blackstock v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 95 Ga. App. 369, 98 S.E.2d 48 (1957); Williams v. Summerour, 98 Ga. App. 212, 105 S.E.2d 489 (1958); Williamson v. Southern Regional Council, Inc., 223 Ga. 179, 154 S.E.2d 21 (1967).
- Services of a warehouse owner who, for commission based on the hundred weight of freight handled by the warehouse owner, picked up, stored and delivered freight for common carrier, presumptively comes within the statutory definition of employment until the defendant carrier shows conjunctively that the warehouse owner has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the performance of such services, both under the warehouse owner's contract of service and in fact; that the warehouse owner's service is either outside the usual course of the business for which such service is performed, or that the warehouse owner's service is performed outside of all the places of business of the enterprise for which such service is performed; and that the warehouse owner is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business. Benton Rapid Express v. Redwine, 87 Ga. App. 584, 74 S.E.2d 504 (1953) (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 806).
- Real estate salespeople working under a broker, as provided by the Act of this state regulating real estate brokers, are employees rendering services for the broker, and fall within the provision of this chapter which provides that, for such employees, the brokers shall make contributions. Babb v. Huiet, 67 Ga. App. 861, 21 S.E.2d 663 (1942) (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 806; see O.C.G.A. Ch. 8, T. 34).
- Exclusion for carriers of printed materials did not apply in the case of a book salesperson who was compensated on the basis of the difference between the retail price and the amount the salesperson remitted to the company, not on the basis of the number of deliveries accomplished. American Book Display v. Poythress, 223 Ga. App. 899, 479 S.E.2d 198 (1996).
When a book salesperson was required to report to the office weekly and turn in sales receipts, the salesperson's services were not performed outside the place of business of the company. American Book Display v. Poythress, 223 Ga. App. 899, 479 S.E.2d 198 (1996).
- When one obtains a city franchise as a common carrier under the provisions of which one operates under a firm name as a taxicab company, and owns and operates a place of business with a waiting room for patrons and telephone switchboard, including telephone relay system to inform the drivers of calls, pays all license fees, taxes, and insurance, owns all taxicabs and has them uniformly painted with the name and telephone number of the company, and reserves and exercises the right to dismiss drivers for discourtesy, reckless driving, or other causes, an arrangement between such person and the drivers whereby the drivers pay a fixed sum per diem to the company and retain all sums in excess thereof paid to them as fares (the rate of such fares being also fixed by the owner) is not a mere rental agreement, but such drivers are the employees of the company under the terms of this chapter. Redwine v. Wilkes, 83 Ga. App. 645, 64 S.E.2d 101 (1951) (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 806; see O.C.G.A. Ch. 8, T. 34).
- Superior court erred in reversing an administrative determination that the employer was not exempt from the payment of unemployment compensation taxes when there was sufficient evidence presented to show that the services performed by the employee were within the usual course of the employer's janitorial business, and that those services were performed at one of the designated places over which the employer could maintain some element of control. Tanner v. Brooks, 190 Ga. App. 228, 378 S.E.2d 405 (1989) (decided under former § 34-8-40).
- Definition in Employment Security Law, O.C.G.A. § 34-8-1, of "farm laborer" was applied to that same term under the Workers' Compensation Act in order to reach the determination that when an employee for an alligator farm cleaned out the pens, the employee was caring for wildlife and thus performing "agricultural labor" pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-8-35(m)(2)(A), but as the employer was not a "farm" because alligators were "wildlife" and "game animals" under O.C.G.A. § 27-1-2(34) and not "livestock or fur-bearing animals" pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-8-35(m)(3)(A), the employer did not fall within the exemption provided by O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2(a) with respect to the employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits; the trial court erred in holding that the employer was exempted from the Workers' Compensation Act's coverage. Gill v. Prehistoric Ponds, Inc., 280 Ga. App. 629, 634 S.E.2d 769 (2006).
Because an employer who was in the business of breeding, rearing, and slaughtering alligators to sell the meat, hides, and head was not a farm, as alligators were "wildlife," not livestock or fur-bearing animals, the employer did not fall within the exemption from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act provided by O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2(a). Cook v. Prehistoric Ponds, Inc., 282 Ga. App. 904, 640 S.E.2d 383 (2006).
- Former provisions of this section, which exempted the services of commission agents of common carriers did not exempt the services of commission agents in general from the definition of employment, but only of those commission agents engaged in disseminating information with respect to transportation of persons or property, those engaged in selling transportation of persons or property, and those engaged in maintaining facilities incidental to the dissemination of information with respect to transportation of persons or property, or those engaged in maintaining facilities incidental to the sale of transportation of persons or property. Redwine v. Refrigerated Transp. Co., 90 Ga. App. 784, 84 S.E.2d 478 (1954) (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 806; see O.C.G.A. § 34-8-35).
- Since certain fashion directors had no territorial assignments or geographical restrictions, no prescribed number or time of hours to work, no minimum number of orders to be obtained, and no prohibition against selling other companies' products or holding other employment contemporaneously with that of the plaintiff corporation, and had to furnish their own models and sales gimmicks, if they chose to use them, and their own transportation, the fashion show directors were free from any significant control or direction over the performance of their services so as to establish employment. Sarah Coventry, Inc. v. Caldwell, 243 Ga. 429, 254 S.E.2d 375 (1979) (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 806).
- When an employee was free to sell the products of other companies, even of competitors of the employer company, the fact that the contract between the employee and the company recognizes this freedom, plus the fact of an intermittent and almost casual relationship between the employee and the company indicated that it was the common practice for such individuals to be "customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business." Sarah Coventry, Inc. v. Caldwell, 243 Ga. 429, 254 S.E.2d 375 (1979) (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 806).
- Paint salespeople who were paid the difference between what the paint cost them and what they sold it for to the consumer were in business for themselves. When they were not required to work any number of hours in any particular day, or to see any number of persons on any one day, week, or month, or to make reports when sales were made, and had no territory designated for them, and had no employment of their time or services, they were not employees. Zachos v. Huiet, 195 Ga. 780, 25 S.E.2d 806 (1943) (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 806).
- Vocational placement service is exempt from contributions to the unemployment trust fund for "field specialist" counselors. Vocational Placement Servs., Inc. v. Caldwell, 168 Ga. App. 198, 308 S.E.2d 618 (1983) (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 806).
- Superior court erred in affirming the decision of the Georgia Department of Labor that a limited liability company (LLC) was required to pay unemployment compensation taxes on the wages paid to a co-pilot because the co-pilot was not an employee of the LLC pursuant to the Employment Security Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-8-35(f)(1); the LLC established that the LLC lacked significant control over the co-pilot because the co-pilot was free to accept or reject offers to fly, did not have a prescribed number of hours or flights to work, could vacation whenever the co-pilot chose, and was free to fly for other companies. Sky King 101, LLC v. Thurmond, 314 Ga. App. 377, 724 S.E.2d 412 (2012).
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 806, are included in the annotations for this Code section.
- Extending the coverage of workers' compensation to persons "in the employ of the state or any of its instrumentalities or any political subdivisions thereof," the General Assembly intended to include within its expanded scope all school teachers employed under the normal one-year teaching contract, whether or not a teacher is "tenured." 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-45 (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 806).
- "Substitute teacher" is an "employee" of the local school board using the substitute teacher's services for purposes of the workers' compensation law. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-45 (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 806).
- Licensed nurses (registered professional nurses or licensed practical nurses), performing nursing services within the scope of their statutory authority, in a private home for wages, are not performing "domestic services" nor do the services constitute employment within the meaning of the law. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-34 (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 806).
- 76 Am. Jur. 2d, Unemployment Compensation, § 20 et seq.
- 81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, §§ 292, 305, 332 et seq.
- One in general employment of contractee, but who at time of accident was assisting or cooperating with, an independent contractor, as employee of former or latter for the time, 55 A.L.R. 1263.
Who is an independent contractor rather than an employee within social security acts or unemployment compensation acts, 124 A.L.R. 682.
Industrial homeworkers as within social security, unemployment compensation, fair labor standards or workmen's compensation act, 143 A.L.R. 418.
Who is "member of a crew" within meaning of Social Security and Unemployment Compensation Acts, 161 A.L.R. 842.
Taxicab driver as employee of owner of cab, or independent contractor, within social security and unemployment insurance statutes, 10 A.L.R.2d 369.
Salesman on commission as within Unemployment Compensation or Social Security Acts, 29 A.L.R.2d 751.
Professional personnel such as physicians, surgeons, dentists, lawyers, and the like, as "employees" within Social Security Act, 88 A.L.R.2d 979.
Insurance agents or salesmen as within coverage of Social Security or Unemployment Compensation Acts, 39 A.L.R.3d 872.
Unemployment compensation: trucker as employee or independent contractor, 2 A.L.R.4th 1219.
Who are "agricultural laborers" exempt from coverage of National Labor Relations Act § 2(3) (29 USCS § 152(3)), 130 A.L.R. Fed. 1
Total Results: 1
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-11-23
Citation: 298 Ga. 175, 780 S.E.2d 339, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 906
Snippet: (unemployment benefits) statute. See, e.g., OCGA § 34-8-35 (1) (“The term ‘employment’ shall include domestic