O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-84 (2019)

Assignability of claims

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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No claim for compensation under this chapter shall be assignable, and all compensation and claims therefor shall be exempt from all claims of creditors.

History

(Ga. L. 1920, p. 167, § 22; Code 1933, § 114-302.)

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article, ‘‘Consumer Bankruptcy Panel: Hot Consumer

Bankruptcy Plan Issues,’’ see 28 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 333 (2012).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Purpose. - All laws exempting any portion of one’s earnings from the process of garnishment are primarily based upon the necessity of exempting in behalf of a debtor, even against the debtor’s just debts, something with which to care for the debtor’s family or dependents as well as oneself; this is the only principle upon which a debtor should be permitted to withhold money within the power of the court from a creditor, the justness of whose claim is undisputed. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 159 Ga. App. 214, 283 S.E.2d 18 (1981). Jurisdiction when constitutionality in question. - If constitutionality of this section was drawn in question, the Supreme Court of Georgia, and not the Court of Appeals, had jurisdiction of the case. Smith v. Georgia Granite Corp., 57 Ga. App. 245, 194 S.E. 908, rev’d on other grounds, 186 Ga. 634, 198 S.E. 772 (1938). Exemption only for benefit of residents. - The exemption from the claims of creditors, as declared in this section was a mere privilege and not an absolute right. It was provided only as a matter of state policy for the benefit of residents of this state, and cannot be claimed either by

or for a debtor who was removed to another state and is no longer either a permanent or a temporary resident of Georgia. Smith v. Georgia Granite Corp., 186 Ga. 634, 198 S.E. 772 (1938). Garnishment. - While ancillary to the main action, a garnishment was a distinct cause of action between different parties, requiring a separate and independent judgment. Accordingly, when the garnishee in an attachment case answered that it was indebted to the defendant in a stated amount, but that such indebtedness arose under the workers’ compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) and was exempt from garnishment under this section, and the plaintiff filed a traverse of the answer attacking the exemption provision as unconstitutional, and alleging that the indebtedness referred to in the answer was not exempt, for the reason that the defendant removed from Georgia and then resided in another state, the questions for determination upon such answer and traverse related only to the claimed exemption from garnishment, and did not include any question as to the liability of the defendant to the plaintiff in attachment, or as to the

assignability of the claim for compensation. Smith v. Georgia Granite Corp., 186 Ga. 634, 198 S.E. 772 (1938). Garnishment to collect a judgment for child support is not precluded by O.C.G.A. § 34-9-84. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 159 Ga. App. 214, 283 S.E.2d 18 (1981); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Moxley, 160 Ga. App. 391, 287 S.E.2d 340 (1981). Workers’ compensation benefits. - Debtor’s workers’ compensation benefits did not constitute property of that debtors’ bankruptcy estate and were beyond the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-84. In re Harvey, 356 B.R. 557 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006), aff ’d, 536 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2008). Because the bankruptcy code allowed

states to choose whether to use federal exemptions or state exemptions, because Georgia had opted out of the federal exemptions, because the State of Georgia had enacted a provision putting workers’ compensation claims beyond a creditors’ reach, and because this interpretation was consistent with the purpose of the statute and other states’ implementation of similar statutes, the court determined that debtor’s workers’ compensation claims were beyond the reach of creditors in bankruptcy. In re Fullwood, 446 B.R. 634 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2010). Cited in West v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 176 Ga. 54, 166 S.E. 761 (1932); West v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 176 Ga. 755, 168 S.E. 766 (1933).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, §§ 460, 667 et seq. C.J.S. - 100 C.J.S., Workers’ Compensation, §§ 840, 841. ALR. - Constitutionality of prohibition of assignment or release of claim under Workmen’s Compensation Acts, 47 ALR 799. Claim for compensation or for assessments or premiums under Workmen’s Compensation Act as provable in bankruptcy, 86 ALR 770. Debtor’s exemption (other than homestead) as applicable in favor of nonresi-

dents or of residents absent or about to remove from the state, 119 ALR 554. Survivability or assignability of claim for accrued and unpaid installments of public relief or pension benefits, 153 ALR 810. Validity, construction, and effect of statutory exemptions of proceeds of workers’ compensation awards, 48 ALR5th 473. What constitutes state or local law that is applicable on date of filing of bankruptcy petition for purposes of applying 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(3)(A) or its predecessor in opt-out states, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 333.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases, 2006–2015 · leading case: Tony W. Strickland v. Richard T. Alexander, 772 F.3d 876 (11th Cir. 2014).
Tony W. Strickland v. Richard T. Alexander, 772 F.3d 876 (11th Cir. 2014). “See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-84 ("No claim for [workers'] compensation under this chapter shall be assignable, and all compensation and claims therefor shall be exempt from all claims of creditors.”
In Re Harvey, 356 B.R. 557 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006). · cites it 2× “Waldron is also pursuing a workers’ compensation claim against Boaen Mechanical, his employer at the time of the automobile collision. Under Georgia law, however, any proceeds from that claim do not constitute property of the Debtors' bankruptcy estate and are beyond the…”
In Re Fullwood, 446 B.R. 634 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2010). · cites it 5× “” O.C.G.A. § 34-9-84. Creditor contends that because this code provision falls outside the confines of the Georgia bankruptcy exemptions, found in O.”
In Re Dean, 470 B.R. 643 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2012). · cites it 3× “Section 44-13-100 provides no specific exemption for worker’s compensation benefits.”
Strickland v. Alexander, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1397 (N.D. Ga. 2015). · cites it 2× “Strickland had a superior claim to the funds because they were workers’ compensation benefits protected from garnishment under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-84. On October 10, 2012, Discover filed a Notice of Opposition to Mr.”
Thigpen v. Cadle Co. (In Re Thigpen), 374 B.R. 374 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007). · cites it 2× “2006) (citing O.C.G.A. § 34-9-84). They used the proceeds of the settlement, in part, to pay off the mortgage on the Property that was owed to First Franklin, an action that elevated the Lien to the senior position on the Property.”
In re Joyner, 489 B.R. 292 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012). · cites it 2× “I found that distinction critical in Ryan because Georgia’s Workers’ Compensation Statute, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-84, uses that term. Furthermore, O.”
Boudreaux v. Sheffield (In re Sheffield), 507 B.R. 400 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2014). · cites it 2× “§ 34-9-84 applied in bankruptcy cases and exempted the debtor’s workers* compensation recovery’ because (1) workers’ compensation awards were protected long before the Georgia bankruptcy exemptions were created in 1980 and (2) O.”
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