O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 35-8-17 (2019)

Effect of peace officer’s failure to comply with chapter generally; civil actions against noncomplying peace officers and law enforcement units

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) Any peace officer so employed who does not comply with this chapter shall not be authorized to exercise the powers of a law enforcement officer generally and particularly shall not be authorized to exercise the power of arrest. (b) The council is authorized to bring a civil action against any peace officer who does not comply with this chapter to enjoin the peace officer

from performing any and all functions of a peace officer, including the power of arrest, until the officer shall meet the certification or registration requirements of this chapter. (c) The council is authorized to bring a civil action against any law enforcement unit which employs or appoints any peace officer who fails to meet the certification or registration requirements of this chapter to enjoin the law enforcement unit from allowing the peace officer to perform any and all peace officer functions, including exercising the power of arrest, until such time as the peace officer shall comply with the certification or registration requirements of this chapter.

History

Ga. L. 1970, p. 208, § 15; Ga. L. 1975, p. 1165, § 11; Ga. L. 1977, p. 713, § 8; Ga. L. 1977, p. 1180, § 3.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Noncompliance with the conditions of this chapter renders an arrest unauthorized. The noncomplying peace officer, however, may be authorized to effect an arrest, under certain circumstances, as a private citizen. Mason v. State, 147 Ga. App. 179, 248 S.E.2d 302 (1978); Williams v. State, 171 Ga. App. 807, 321 S.E.2d 386 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1191, 105 S. Ct. 966, 83 L. Ed. 2d 970 (1985). Defendant’s arrest by a DEA special agent for giving a false name to a law enforcement officer was not illegal merely because at the time of the arrest no writing existed making the agent a county sheriff ’s deputy as required by O.C.G.A. § 35-9-15(b) nor had the agent complied with the requirements of the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act, O.C.G.A. § 35-8-1 et seq. Fajardo v. State, 191 Ga. App. 295, 381 S.E.2d 560 (1989). Objecting to legality of arrest insufficient to question officer’s power to arrest. - Trial court did not err in refusing to give two requested charges on O.C.G.A. § 35-8-17, specifically on the principle that a law enforcement officer who has not been certified pursuant to O.C.G.A. Ch. 8, T. 35 does not have authority to exercise the power of arrest, since, although the defendant made an issue at trial of the legality of the defendant’s arrest, no issue was made of the arresting officer’s authority to exercise arrest powers generally. Gay v. State, 179 Ga. App. 430, 346 S.E.2d 877 (1986).

Certification requirements. - After the arresting officer met all requirements of O.C.G.A. § 35-8-8 and had successfully completed the course required by O.C.G.A. § 35-8-9, the arresting officer was not disqualified to make arrests on ground that the arresting officer had not yet been certified under O.C.G.A. § 35-8-7. Davis v. State, 164 Ga. App. 312, 295 S.E.2d 131 (1982). Evidence seized by uncertified officer suppressed. - Noncompliance with the conditions of O.C.G.A. Ch. 8, T. 35 renders the exercise of any powers of a law enforcement officer unauthorized. Thus, due to an officer’s lack of certification, the officer had no authority to apply for a search warrant, and the evidence seized pursuant to the execution of the illegal warrant should have been suppressed. Holstein v. State, 183 Ga. App. 610, 359 S.E.2d 360, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 906, 359 S.E.2d 360 (1987). Evidence seized by uncertified officer not suppressed. - Trial court erred in suppressing contraband seized by an arresting officer who failed to maintain certification under the Georgia Police Officer Standards and Training statute, codified at O.C.G.A. § 35-8-17(a), as the legislature did not intend to invalidate, nullify, or otherwise make such arrest illegal. After the defendant was speeding in the officer’s presence, the officer could conduct a search and after finding the

defendant possessed marijuana, the officer could arrest the defendant. State v. Pinckney, 255 Ga. App. 692, 566 S.E.2d 325 (2002). Indictment, trial, and conviction of a defendant is not ‘‘proceeding under’’ an arrest. It is inconceivable that the legislature intended to absolve an individual of all guilt of a crime charged merely because the individual’s arrest was illegal. Hunt v. State, 134 Ga. App. 761, 216 S.E.2d 354 (1975). Private civil action not available. - Although a city that formerly employed a police officer failed to disclose the safety violations that the officer committed, which were in the officer’s personnel file, to a hiring city, the parents of a child who was fatally shot by the officer’s service weapon due to the officer’s possible safety

negligence could not assert a private cause of action against the former city for violations of the requirements of the Peace Officer Standards and Training Act, O.C.G.A. § 35-8-1 et seq., as no such civil liability was provided pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 35-8-17(b) or (c). Govea v. City of Norcross, 271 Ga. App. 36, 608 S.E.2d 677 (2004). Cited in Tucker v. State, 131 Ga. App. 791, 207 S.E.2d 211 (1974); Rogers v. State, 133 Ga. App. 513, 211 S.E.2d 373 (1974); Campbell v. State, 136 Ga. App. 338, 221 S.E.2d 212 (1975); Davis v. State, 143 Ga. App. 329, 238 S.E.2d 289 (1977); Lemley v. State, 245 Ga. 350, 264 S.E.2d 881 (1980); Harvey v. State, 165 Ga. App. 7, 299 S.E.2d 61 (1983); City of Pembroke v. Hagin, 194 Ga. App. 642, 391 S.E.2d 465 (1990).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Authority of ‘‘registered’’ or ‘‘exempt’’ peace officers. - ‘‘Registered’’ or ‘‘exempt’’ peace officer who is in compliance with the requirements for certification under the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 8, T.

35, has the same authority and limitations as that of a ‘‘certified’’ peace officer in all respects relevant to law enforcement duties, including the ability to apply for a search warrant. 1999 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 99-7.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees, §§ 48 et seq., 70. C.J.S. - 67 C.J.S., Officers and Public

Employees, § 22. 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative Law and Procedures, § 108 et seq.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases, 1983–2004 · leading case: Williams v. State, 321 S.E.2d 386 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
Williams v. State, 321 S.E.2d 386 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 8× “§ 92A-2115 (now OCGA § 35-8-17 (a)) provides: "Any peace officer .”
Govea v. City of Norcross, 608 S.E.2d 677 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 2× “16 OCGA§ 35-8-17 (b), (c). 17 See generally Reilly v.”
Holstein v. State, 359 S.E.2d 360 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 3× “Under Georgia law, only a law enforcement officer may successfully apply for a search warrant, for OCGA § 17-5-20 provides: “A search warrant may be issued only upon the application of an officer of this state or its political subdivisions charged with the duty of enforcing the…”
Gay v. State, 346 S.E.2d 877 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 2× “Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give two requested charges on OCGA § 35-8-17, specifically on the principle that a law enforcement officer who has not been certified pursuant to OCGA Ch.”
Harvey v. State, 299 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 2× “§ 92A-2115 (a) (OCGA § 35-8-17(a)), the police officers were prohibited from exercising the powers of arrest and any testimony or evidence flowing from such illegal arrest was inadmissible.”
City of Pembroke v. Hagin, 391 S.E.2d 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 35-8-17 authorizes the Georgia Peace Officers Standards & Training Council to bring a civil action against an individual officer who does not comply with the certification requirements (subsection b) as well as against the law enforcement unit employing such an officer…”
Fajardo v. State, 381 S.E.2d 560 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 2× “Because Markonni was thus not “authorized to exercise the powers of a law enforcement officer generally and particularly [was not] authorized to exercise the power of arrest,” OCGA § 35-8-17 (a), he was not a properly constituted Clayton County Sheriffs Deputy, despite his…”
State v. Pinckney, 566 S.E.2d 325 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 35-8-17 (a) provides: “Any peace officer so employed who does not comply with this chapter shall not be authorized to exercise the powers of a law enforcement officer generally and particularly shall not be authorized to exercise the power of arrest.”
— 35-8-17(a) — 1 case
Harvey v. State, 299 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). “§ 92A-2115 (a) (OCGA § 35-8-17(a)), the police officers were prohibited from exercising the powers of arrest and any testimony or evidence flowing from such illegal arrest was inadmissible.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.