Objecting to legality of arrest insufficient to question officer's power to arrest.

- Trial court did not err in refusing to give two requested charges on O.C.G.A. § 35-8-17, specifically on the principle that a law enforcement officer who has not been certified pursuant to O.C.G.A. Ch. 8, T. 35 does not have authority to exercise the power of arrest, since, although the defendant made an issue at trial of the legality of the defendant's arrest, no issue was made of the arresting officer's authority to exercise arrest powers generally. Gay v. State, 179 Ga. App. 430, 346 S.E.2d 877 (1986).

Certification requirements.

- After the arresting officer met all requirements of O.C.G.A. § 35-8-8 and had successfully completed the course required by O.C.G.A. § 35-8-9, the arresting officer was not disqualified to make arrests on ground that the arresting officer had not yet been certified under O.C.G.A. § 35-8-7. Davis v. State, 164 Ga. App. 312, 295 S.E.2d 131 (1982).

Evidence seized by uncertified officer suppressed.

- Noncompliance with the conditions of O.C.G.A. Ch. 8, T. 35 renders the exercise of any powers of a law enforcement officer unauthorized. Thus, due to an officer's lack of certification, the officer had no authority to apply for a search warrant, and the evidence seized pursuant to the execution of the illegal warrant should have been suppressed. Holstein v. State, 183 Ga. App. 610, 359 S.E.2d 360, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 906, 359 S.E.2d 360 (1987).

Evidence seized by uncertified officer not suppressed.

- Trial court erred in suppressing contraband seized by an arresting officer who failed to maintain certification under the Georgia Police Officer Standards and Training statute, codified at O.C.G.A. § 35-8-17(a), as the legislature did not intend to invalidate, nullify, or otherwise make such arrest illegal. After the defendant was speeding in the officer's presence, the officer could conduct a search and after finding the defendant possessed marijuana, the officer could arrest the defendant. State v. Pinckney, 255 Ga. App. 692, 566 S.E.2d 325 (2002).

Indictment, trial, and conviction of a defendant is not "proceeding under" an arrest. It is inconceivable that the legislature intended to absolve an individual of all guilt of a crime charged merely because the individual's arrest was illegal. Hunt v. State, 134 Ga. App. 761, 216 S.E.2d 354 (1975).

Private civil action not available.

- Although a city that formerly employed a police officer failed to disclose the safety violations that the officer committed, which were in the officer's personnel file, to a hiring city, the parents of a child who was fatally shot by the officer's service weapon due to the officer's possible safety negligence could not assert a private cause of action against the former city for violations of the requirements of the Peace Officer Standards and Training Act, O.C.G.A. § 35-8-1 et seq., as no such civil liability was provided pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 35-8-17(b) or (c). Govea v. City of Norcross, 271 Ga. App. 36, 608 S.E.2d 677 (2004).

Cited in Tucker v. State, 131 Ga. App. 791, 207 S.E.2d 211 (1974); Rogers v. State, 133 Ga. App. 513, 211 S.E.2d 373 (1974); Campbell v. State, 136 Ga. App. 338, 221 S.E.2d 212 (1975); Davis v. State, 143 Ga. App. 329, 238 S.E.2d 289 (1977); Lemley v. State, 245 Ga. 350, 264 S.E.2d 881 (1980); Harvey v. State, 165 Ga. App. 7, 299 S.E.2d 61 (1983); City of Pembroke v. Hagin, 194 Ga. App. 642, 391 S.E.2d 465 (1990).

Authority of "registered" or "exempt" peace officers.

- "Registered" or "exempt" peace officer who is in compliance with the requirements for certification under the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 8, T. 35, has the same authority and limitations as that of a "certified" peace officer in all respects relevant to law enforcement duties, including the ability to apply for a search warrant. 1999 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 99-7.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees, §§ 48 et seq., 70.

C.J.S.

- 67 C.J.S., Officers and Public Employees, § 22. 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative Law and Procedures, § 68 et seq.