O.C.G.A. § 35-8-1 (2019)

Annotations

Law reviews. - For annual survey of labor and employment law, see 57 Mercer

L. Rev. 251 (2005); 58 Mercer L. Rev. 211 (2006).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Records of private university’s police force not subject to public records act. - Records of a campus police force of a private university were not subject to disclosure under the Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., as the university was a private institution that did not receive any funding from the state and the campus police were employees of that entity pursuant to the authority of O.C.G.A. § 20-8-2. The fact that the campus police performed a public function did not make their records public records. The fact that the campus police were given authority to perform certain functions by the Campus Policemen Act, O.C.G.A. § 20-8-1 et seq., and the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act, O.C.G.A. § 35-8-1 et seq., did not make them officers or employees of a public office or agency for purposes of the Open Records Act. The Corp. of Mercer Univ. v. Barrett & Farahany, L.L.P., 271 Ga. App. 501, 610 S.E.2d 138 (2005). Construction with Whistleblower Act. - When a port authority officer alleged that the officer was discharged after the officer complained that the port authority was violating the authority’s own rules and O.C.G.A. § 35-8-1, the officer stated a cognizable claim under the Georgia Whistleblower Act, O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(2), (d)(2). Pattee v. Ga. Ports Auth., 477 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 18, 2006). College campus police officers did not qualify for immunity. - Campus police officers employed by a private college did not qualify as a state officer or employee who may assert immunity from tort suits under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., because the officers were not acting for any state

government entity when the officers committed the alleged torts. Hartley v. Agnes Scott College, 295 Ga. 458, 759 S.E.2d 857 (2014). CPR certification not required. - Sheriff ’s deputies and police officers were entitled to official immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d), as the deputies’ and officers’ failure to provide cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) to the son of the parents was discretionary, and no malice was shown; the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act, O.C.G.A. § 35-8-1 et seq., and the departments for which the officers and deputies worked did not require the officers and deputies to maintain CPR certification or to carry CPR equipment and the officers and deputies were not certified to perform CPR, and, even if the deputies and officers moved people away who were trying to help the son, this did not show malice, as the deputies and officers were concerned the people might harm the son. Daley v. Clark, 282 Ga. App. 235, 638 S.E.2d 376 (2006). Reversing reinstatement of officer on basis not raised before administrative body. - In a proceeding wherein a trial court affirmatively granted a peace officer’s reinstatement, the court held that the trial court erred by reversing the decision of the council based on grounds that were never urged before the trial court and that were not raised in the petition for judicial review or at the hearing on the petition. Ga. Peace Officer Standards and Training Council v. Hodges, 330 Ga. App. 145, 767 S.E.2d 286 (2014). Cited in Camp Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2006); State v. Hartsfield, 318 Ga. App. 692, 734 S.E.2d 513 (2012).