CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 12, 1996 | 466 S.E.2d 214
Carley, Justice.
On August 14, 1995, David Insardi brought two separate suits wherein he alleged the unconstitutionality of OCGA §
36-1-19 and sought both declaratory and injunctive relief....
...He filed a motion for a temporary restraining order in both cases and those motions were heard on August 18, 1995. After conducting the hearing, the tried court ruled on Insardi’s motions for a temporary restraining order and also entered orders finding OCGA §
36-1-19 to be unconstitutional....
...A tried court is not authorized to “grant a complaint for declaratory judgment sua sponte, without affording the opposing party notice or an opportunity to be heard.” Smith v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.,
200 Ga. App. 534, 535 (1) (408 SE2d 833) (1991). It follows that the trial court erred in entering the orders declaring OCGA §
36-1-19 to be unconstitutional and those orders must be reversed....
...For Examination &c. of Architects,
244 Ga. 449 (260 SE2d 477) (1979). Thus, if the trial court had been authorized to make a ruling on the declaratory judgment issues presented in these cases and it had ruled only on the issue of the constitutionality of OCGA §
36-1-19, it could then have certified that interlocutory order as final pursuant to OCGA §
9-11-54 (b)....
