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2018 Georgia Code 36-1-21 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 36 LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Section 1. General Provisions, 36-1-1 through 36-1-27.

36-1-21. Civil service system for county employees.

  1. The governing authority of any county is authorized to provide by ordinance or resolution for the creation of a civil service system for employees of the county, other than elected officials or persons appointed to positions for specified terms.
  2. Subsequent to the creation of a civil service system, the county governing authority which created the system may provide by ordinance or resolution that positions of employment within departments subject to the jurisdiction of elected county officers or subject to the jurisdiction of other commissions, boards, or bodies of the county shall be subject to and covered by the civil service system upon the written application of the elected county officer, commission, board, or body having the power of appointment, employment, or removal of employees of the officer, department, commission, board, or body. Once positions of employment are made subject to the civil service system, such positions shall not be removed thereafter from the coverage of the civil service system.
  3. A civil service system created pursuant to the authority of this Code section shall be administered in such manner and pursuant to such rules and regulations as may be provided for by resolution or ordinance of the county governing authority which created the system.
    1. The powers granted to the governing authorities of counties by this Code section:
      1. Shall not supersede or replace any power granted by any local constitutional amendment to the General Assembly to provide by law for a civil service or merit system for any county;
      2. Shall not supersede or replace any law enacted by the General Assembly pursuant to the authority of a local constitutional amendment described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph; and
      3. Shall be in addition to any power granted by local constitutional amendment directly to the governing authority of any county to provide by ordinance or resolution for a civil service or merit system for such county.
    2. As used in paragraph (1) of this subsection, the term "local constitutional amendment" means any constitutional amendment described in subparagraph (a) of Paragraph IV of Section I of Article XI of the Constitution of the State of Georgia which has been continued in force and effect pursuant to the authority of said subparagraph (a) of said cited constitutional provision and which has not been repealed pursuant to the authority of subparagraph (b) of said cited constitutional provision.

(Code 1981, §36-1-21, enacted by Ga. L. 1986, p. 764, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1627, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 4, § 36.)

Code Commission notes.

- Ga. L. 1986, p. 764, § 1 and Ga. L. 1986, p. 1586, § 1 both enacted Code sections designated 36-1-21. The Code section enacted by the latter Act was redesignated as Code Section 36-1-22 [repealed] pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5.

Law reviews.

- For annual survey of local government law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 289 (1986).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Motion to create system.

- Motion adopted by the board of county commissioners creating a county personnel system was a "resolution" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21. Wayne County v. Herrin, 210 Ga. App. 747, 437 S.E.2d 793 (1993).

Inapplicable to system created by General Assembly.

- Because a county tax commissioner's employees were within the county's civil service system, the county was properly granted summary judgment as to that issue, and hence, the county's personnel director was authorized to refuse to implement raises to the employees as the commissioner sought; moreover, the commissioner's reliance on O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21 did not change the result, as that statute expressly applied only to civil service systems created by county governing authorities, and the civil service system at issue was created by the Georgia General Assembly. Ferdinand v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 281 Ga. 643, 641 S.E.2d 787 (2007).

Subsequent ordinance or resolution.

- After the governing body of a county has authorized, by ordinance or resolution, the creation of a civil service commission to cover county employees other than elected officials or persons appointed for a definite term, it may by subsequent ordinance or resolution provide that employees of the departments of elected officials or other county bodies may, by written application of the elected official or other department head, seek to be brought under the civil service commission as well. Burbridge v. Hensley, 194 Ga. App. 523, 391 S.E.2d 5, cert. denied, 194 Ga. App. 911, 391 S.E.2d 5 (1990).

Interim appointed sheriff's attempt, by letter to the county clerk, to have the sheriff's employees covered by the provisions of a civil service ordinance was invalid, since the county had not enacted a second ordinance or resolution pursuant to subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21 providing that employees of elected officials could be made subject to the civil service system by written application of the elected official. Burbridge v. Hensley, 194 Ga. App. 523, 391 S.E.2d 5, cert. denied, 194 Ga. App. 911, 391 S.E.2d 5 (1990).

Resolution of the board of county commissioners that allowed elected county officials to bring portions of employment within their department into the personnel system complied with the dictates of O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21. Wayne County v. Herrin, 210 Ga. App. 747, 437 S.E.2d 793 (1993).

Appointment and discharge of deputies.

- Once positions in a sheriff's office have been made subject to a personnel or civil service system, a sheriff's authority to appoint deputies pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-16-23 is limited to vacancies created by the removal of employees in the manner provided under the applicable personnel or civil service system or vacancies created when employees resign or retire. Wayne County v. Herrin, 210 Ga. App. 747, 437 S.E.2d 793 (1993).

Since the county created a personnel system applicable to the sheriff's department, a newly elected sheriff's termination of current employees without affording the employees due process rights in connection with the employees' dismissal and the sheriff's hiring of employees to replace the dismissed employees was improper. Wayne County v. Herrin, 210 Ga. App. 747, 437 S.E.2d 793 (1993).

Since it was not clearly established at the time in question that a sheriff was bound by a county merit system and that employees of the sheriff had a property interest in the employees' jobs, the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from the employees' claim of wrongful termination from the employee's jobs. Aspinwall v. Herrin, 879 F. Supp. 1227 (S.D. Ga. 1994).

Deputy sheriffs in a county that had not adopted a civil service program were employees at will and lacked a property interest in the deputies' employment. Zimmerman v. Cherokee County, 925 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ga. 1995).

Under O.C.G.A. § 15-16-23, sheriffs have absolute discretion in the hiring and firing of deputies and the only process by which this discretion may be limited is through adoption of a civil service system in compliance with subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21; when a sheriff had not complied with such provision, deputies had no protected property interest in the deputies' positions. Brett v. Jefferson County, 925 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Ga. 1996), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 123 F.3d 1429 (11th Cir. 1997).

Because sheriff had failed to satisfy statutory requirements for placing deputies under a civil service program, the deputies were at-will employees with no protected property interest in continued employment. Brett v. Jefferson County, 123 F.3d 1429 (11th Cir. 1997).

Political patronage of sheriff deputies.

- Deputy sheriff's First Amendment political patronage claim failed because political loyalty was an appropriate requirement for the position of deputy sheriff as Georgia deputies had the same powers and duties as the sheriff; the civil service system, which prohibited the sheriff from making employment decisions on the basis of political affiliation, did not modify the duties of the sheriff's deputies and therefore had no effect on the First Amendment claim. Ezell v. Wynn, 802 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2015).

Termination of employee.

- Employee who was hired by a county solicitor general under O.C.G.A. § 15-18-71 was not an employee of the county, and the solicitor general did not bring the employee into the county's civil service system under O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21(b). Therefore, the employee lacked a protected property interest in the job and could be terminated without cause and without a hearing. Thomas v. Lee, 286 Ga. 860, 691 S.E.2d 845 (2010).

Court clerk not subject to county merit system.

- County merit board can take no action affecting the clerk of the superior court and the clerk's employees unless the clerk of the superior court has asked that the clerk's office be subject to the merit system and the county has provided for such coverage through an appropriate resolution or ordinance. Gwinnett County v. Yates, 265 Ga. 504, 458 S.E.2d 791 (1995).

Clerk of the Superior Court of Gwinnett County is not subject to the Gwinnett County Merit System. Gwinnett County v. Yates, 265 Ga. 504, 458 S.E.2d 791 (1995).

No vested interest in continued employment shown.

- In a racial discrimination suit, the trial court properly denied mandamus relief to the former employee because the former employee failed to show that the employer had a clear legal duty to maintain the former employee as an employee and there was no evidence showing that the former employee was ever a merit system employee with a vested interest in continued employment with the tax commissioner. Cochran v. Kendrick, 297 Ga. 655, 778 S.E.2d 1 (2015).

Cited in Floyd v. Chaffin, 201 Ga. App. 597, 411 S.E.2d 570 (1991); Epps v. Watson, F.3d (M.D. Ga. May 25, 2006).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

5B Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Civil Service, § 2.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21

Total Results: 6  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Gwinnett Cnty. v. Yates, 265 Ga. 504 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 30, 1995 | 458 S.E.2d 791

...Our resolution of the principal issue in this case depends on whether Gwinnett County effectively brought employees of the Clerk of the Superior Court under the coverage of its merit system either through specific legislation passed pursuant to a constitutional amendment or by following the procedure set forth in OCGA § 36-1-21....
...[3] Given this distinction, the language employed in the constitutional *506 amendment authorizing the creation of the Gwinnett County Merit System was insufficient to bring employees of the Clerk of the Superior Court within its coverage. b. OCGA § 36-1-21....
...vernments "covering county employees or county employees and employees of elected county officials." The legislature again preserved this distinction between county employees and employees of elected county officials with the passage in 1986 of OCGA § 36-1-21....
...f the officer, department, commission, board, or body. Once positions of employment are made subject to the civil service system, such positions shall not be removed thereafter from the coverage of the civil service system. (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 36-1-21 (b)....
...ffice, the salaries thereof, or the personnel thereof, except the personnel subject to the jurisdiction of the county governing authority.. . . *508 (7) Action affecting any court or the personnel thereof. Reading this paragraph in harmony with OCGA § 36-1-21 and in light of the central issue in this appeal, we interpret this to mean that a county merit board can take no action affecting the clerk of the superior court and his employees unless, pursuant to OCGA § 36-1-21 (b), the clerk of the superior court has asked that his office be subject to the merit system and the county has provided for such coverage through an appropriate resolution or ordinance....
...Nothing in the original legislation authorizing the creation of the Gwinnett County Merit System specifically provided that employees of elected officials would be covered by the system along with the employees of the county. Likewise, it does not appear that, subsequent to the passage of OCGA § 36-1-21, the superior court clerk requested that his employees be covered by the merit system, [5] or that the Gwinnett County governing authority provided for such coverage by ordinance or resolution....
...after those persons having the power to hire or terminate within those departments made written application for coverage and the county board of commissioners provided for such coverage by ordinance or resolution. Ga. L. 1980, p. 2305 (1). Cf. OCGA § 36-1-21 (b), discussed infra). [4] Recent cases decided by the Court of Appeals illustrate the necessity of following the procedure outlined in OCGA § 36-1-21 (b)....
...is employees was not subject to the county's civil service commission because, even though the county had lawfully enacted an ordinance creating a civil service system, the county had failed to enact a second resolution or ordinance pursuant to OCGA § 36-1-21 (b) which provided that employees of elected officials would be covered....
...597 (411 SE2d 570) (1991), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to a sheriff who asserted that he was not subject to the county civil service system. Again, this holding was based on the fact that the county had not, as required by OCGA § 36-1-21 (b), passed a resolution or ordinance providing that employees of the elected officials would be covered by the system. The court went on to say that under the law that existed prior to the enactment of OCGA § 36-1-21, any attempt by the county and the elected official to make the employees of a department subject to the civil service system would have been invalid. In other words, unless legislation passed by the Georgia General Assembly prior to the effective date of OCGA § 36-1-21 specifically provided that employees of elected officials were covered by a merit system, no subsequent action of the county would have validly extended coverage to those employees....
...Gwinnett County cites Wayne County v. Herrin, 210 Ga. App. 747 (437 SE2d 793) (1993), as support for its position. Herrin is inapplicable since in that case the court specifically found that the "Board and [the sheriff] fully complied with all requirements set forth in OCGA § 36-1-21 (b) necessary to bring employees of the sheriff's office within the personnel system." 210 Ga....
...Our holding does not mean, as the county suggests, that the superior court clerk's power to hire and fire is unfettered. The clerk is prohibited by both federal and state law from basing hiring and firing decisions on improper criteria. Further, OCGA § 36-1-21 (b) provides that "[o]nce positions of employment are made subject to the civil service system, such positions shall not be removed thereafter from the coverage of the civil service system." Thus, should a clerk of the Gwinnett County Supe...
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Thomas v. Lee, 691 S.E.2d 845 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 1, 2010 | 286 Ga. 860, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 515

...vernments "covering county employees or county employees and employees of elected county officials." The legislature again preserved this distinction between county employees and employees of elected county officials with the passage in 1986 of OCGA § 36-1-21. Id. at 506(1)(b), 458 S.E.2d 791. In relevant part, OCGA § 36-1-21 states: (a) The governing authority of any county is authorized to provide by ordinance or resolution for the creation of a civil service system for employees of the county, other than elected officials or persons appointed to positions for specified terms....
...duties and responsibilities pursuant to OCGA § 15-18-71. [3] In addition to the power to hire Thomas and define her duties, Lee also had the option to attempt to bring Thomas under the civil service system by written application to the County. OCGA § 36-1-21(b)....
...Contrary to Thomas' assertions, the mere facts that Lee fired her based on County policies and she received her paycheck and *848 benefits from the County do not alter this outcome. In essence, [Thomas] contend[s] that, even if the statutory requirements [of OCGA § 36-1-21] were not satisfied, a de facto civil service system existed based on [Lee's] adoption and distribution of departmental rules and regulations that integrated by reference the county civil service system....
...While protected property interests in continued employment can arise from the policies and practices of an institution, a property interest contrary to state law cannot arise by informal custom. In the absence of satisfaction of the requirements of section 36-1-21(b), [Thomas was an] at-will employee[ ] with no protected property interest in continued employment....
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Krieger v. Walton Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 506 S.E.2d 366 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 16, 1998 | 269 Ga. 678

...1, 218 S.E.2d 764 (1975) (local act gave chairperson of the Newton County Board of Commissioners the power to hire and fire all employees). [21] 1929 Ga.Laws at 754. [22] 1939 Ga.Laws at 770. [23] 1958 Ga.Laws 2097; 1929 Ga.Laws at 749. [24] See OCGA § 36-1-21 (providing that the county governing authority may create a civil service system for county employees, other than elected officials or persons appointed for specific terms of office)....
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Cochran v. Kendrick, 297 Ga. 655 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 14, 2015 | 778 S.E.2d 1

...5 eliminated and after interviewing for and being rejected for a newly created position. Appellee did not take the steps necessary for his employees to be included in Augusta-Richmond County’s merit system. See OCGA § 36-1-21 (b)....
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Ferdinand v. Bd. of Commissioners, 281 Ga. 643 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 26, 2007 | 641 S.E.2d 787, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 479

...743, 746 (2) (594 SE2d 324) (2004) (“The judiciary has the duty to reject a construction of a statute which will result in unreasonable consequences or absurd results not contemplated by the legislature.”) (citation omitted). Ferdinand’s reliance on OCGA § 36-1-21 does not change the result, as that statute expressly applies only to civil service systems created by “county governing authorities].” Id....
...See Hill v. Watkins, 280 Ga. 278, 279 (1) (627 SE2d 3) (2006) (“In order to place employees under a county civil service system, specific authorizing legislation must be passed pursuant to a constitutional amendment, or the procedure set out in OCGA § 36-1-21 must be followed.”) (citation omitted; emphasis supplied).
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Hill v. Watkins, 627 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 2006).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 27, 2006 | 280 Ga. 278, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 575

...Hill appeals, asserting that the trial court's ruling was erroneous in several respects. Finding no error, we affirm. 1. In order to place employees under a county civil service system, specific authorizing legislation must be passed pursuant to a constitutional amendment, or the procedure set out in OCGA § 36-1-21 must be followed. Gwinnett County v. Yates, 265 Ga. 504(1), 458 S.E.2d 791 (1995). See OCGA § 36-1-21(d)(1)(A) (pursuant to a local constitutional amendment, the General Assembly may provide by law for any civil service or merit system for any county)....