O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 36-1-3 (2019)

County a body corporate; power to sue and be sued generally

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Every county is a body corporate, with power to sue or be sued in any court.

History

Orig. Code 1863, § 463; Code 1868, § 525; Code 1873, § 491; Code 1882, § 491; Civil Code 1895, § 340; Civil Code 1910, § 383; Code 1933, § 23-1501.

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article, ‘‘Quasi-Municipal Tort Liability in Georgia,’’ see 6 Mercer L. Rev. 287 (1955). For

article, ‘‘Actions for Wrongful Death in Georgia: Part Three and Four,’’ see 21 Ga. B. J. 339 (1959). For note discussing governmental immunity from tort liability in Georgia, see 5 Ga. St. B. J. 494 (1969).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS ANALYSIS GENERAL CONSIDERATION LIABILITY OF COUNTIES PROCEDURE General Consideration Extent of power conferred. - County, it is true, is a corporation. But this is only for certain specific purposes. Counties are, in fact, but quasi corporations, and this section of the Code is not to be understood as conferring any powers, except the right to sue and be sued, since the other powers are all conferred and regulated by other statutes and provisions of the Code. Millwood v. DeKalb County, 106 Ga. 743, 32 S.E. 577 (1899). County is a body corporate and may sue and be sued, but the county’s functions are government, and it has no power except as conferred by statute. Town of Decatur v. DeKalb County, 130 Ga. 483, 61 S.E. 23 (1908). This section subjects the counties of this state to suit, but not to suits upon all causes of action. It does not make them generally liable to suits like individuals or as municipal corporations. Being political subdivisions of the state, they cannot be sued unless made subject to suit expressly or by necessary implication. Decatur County v. Praytor, Howton & Wood Contracting Co., 163 Ga. 929, 137 S.E. 247 (1927). Who may sue. - Right to sue a county is not restricted to citizens of this state. Board of Comm’rs v. Hurd, 49 Ga. 462 (1873). Construction with Code Section

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 14 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1988–2024 · leading case: Michael Leslie Lake v. Michael Skelton, 840 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2016).
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Michael Leslie Lake v. Michael Skelton, 840 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2016). · cites it 2× “IX, § I, ¶ I; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-3 and 1-3- 3(7). Instead, the State legislature establishes the powers and duties of sheriffs.”
City of Coll. Park v. Clayton Cnty., 830 S.E.2d 179 (Ga. 2019). · cites it 2× “afforded political subdivisions under Article IX (to the extent, if any, that they are not coextensive), in light of the constitutional text, history, and precedents addressing each of those constitutional provisions; (4) the nature of the constitutional relationships among the…”
Grech v. Clayton Cnty., GA, 335 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2003). “”); O.C.G.A. §§ 36-1-3 (“Every county is a body corporate, with power to sue or be sued in any court.”
Clayton Cnty. v. City of Coll. Park, 803 S.E.2d 63 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 2× “…to be resolved by courts, on the one hand, or by a political or administrative process, on the other. See, e.g., OCGA § 36-1-3.”
Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert Cnty., 368 S.E.2d 500 (Ga. 1988). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 36-1-3 provides that “[e]very county is a body corporate, with power to sue or be sued in any court.”
Walker Cnty. v. Tri-State Crematory, 643 S.E.2d 324 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 2× “Nor has Walker County pointed to any specific statute authorizing the recovery of such costs as compensatory damages in a tort action alleging negligence or public nuisance claims.”
Hall Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. C. Robert Beals & Assocs., Inc., 498 S.E.2d 72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 2× “See OCGA §§ 36-1-3 and 36-82-102. Case No. A97A1941 3.”
Georgia Dep't of Corr. v. Chatham Cnty., 619 S.E.2d 373 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 36-1-3; Self v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga.”
Torres v. Putnam Cnty., 541 S.E.2d 133 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 2× “The county contends OCGA § 36-1-3 provides authority for it to sue in tort as follows: “[e]very county is a body corporate, with power to sue or be sued in any court.”
Jobie Lamar Myers v. Clayton Cnty. Dist. Attorney's Off. (Ga. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 2× “”); OCGA § 36-1-3 (“Every county is a body corporate with power to sue or be sued in any court.”
Smith v. Wayne Cnty., Georgia (S.D. Ga. 2024). · cites it 2× “(quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-1-3). They assert that WCAS is a department of Wayne County and “[n]either the Georgia Constitution[] nor the Georgia Code[] provide[] that a county’s ambulance service is an independent legal entity capable of being sued.”
Clayton Cnty. v. City of Coll. Park (Ga. 2017). · cites it 2× “, OCGA § 36-1-3. 7 this complex and important question.”
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