O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 36-32-1 (2019)

Establishment of municipal court; punishments; selection, election, or appointment of mayor pro tempore or recorder pro tempore

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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(a) Each municipal corporation of this state shall, unless otherwise provided in the local law relating to a particular municipal corporation, be authorized to establish and maintain a municipal court having jurisdiction over the violation of municipal ordinances and over such other matters as are by general law made subject to the jurisdiction of municipal courts. Any such court shall be styled as a municipal court. Any reference in this Code or in any local law to a corporate court, police court, recorder’s court, mayor’s court, or any such court known by any other name which has jurisdiction over the violation of municipal offenses shall be deemed to mean a municipal court. Except in this Code section and in the laws relating to the City Court of Atlanta, the terms ‘‘corporate court,’’ ‘‘corporate courts,’’ ‘‘police court,’’ ‘‘police courts,’’ ‘‘recorder’s court,’’ ‘‘recorders’ courts,’’ ‘‘mayor’s court,’’ and ‘‘mayors’ courts,’’ when such terms refer to a court of a municipal corporation, are stricken wherever they appear in any general or local law of this state and the term ‘‘municipal court’’ or ‘‘municipal courts,’’ whichever is appropriate, is inserted in lieu thereof. The change in the name of any such court as provided for by Article VI, Section X, Paragraph I of the Constitution of the State of Georgia and by this Code section shall not affect the validity of any action or prosecution in such court. (b) The provisions of this chapter shall apply equally to all municipal courts, whether heretofore styled as a municipal court, corporate court, police court, recorder’s court, or mayor’s court or called by some other name and whether established by the municipal corporation under authority granted to the municipal corporation or established by the local law relating to a particular municipal corporation. (c) Each municipal court of this state, unless otherwise provided in the local law relating to a particular municipal court, shall be authorized to impose any punishment up to the maximums specified by general law, including the maximums specified in subparagraphs (a)(2)(B) and (a)(2)(C) of Code Section 36-35-6.

(d) The governing bodies of the municipal corporations of this state having a municipal court are authorized and empowered, either by ordinance or resolution, to select, elect, or appoint either a mayor pro tempore or a recorder pro tempore to hold and preside over such municipal court in the absence or disqualification of the mayor or recorder. While presiding in such corporate courts, the mayor pro tempore or recorder pro tempore shall have such power, authority, and jurisdiction as is given by the charter of the municipal corporation to its mayor or recorder. (e) Subsection (d) of this Code section shall not affect any municipal corporation for which provision is made in the charter for the appointment or selection of a mayor pro tempore or a recorder pro tempore. (f ) Any municipal court operating within this state and having jurisdiction over the violation of municipal ordinances and over such other matters as are by specific or general law made subject to the jurisdiction of municipal courts shall not impose any punishment of confinement, probation, or other loss of liberty, or impose any fine, fee, or cost enforceable by confinement, probation, or other loss of liberty, as authorized by general law or municipal or county ordinance, unless the court provides to the accused the right to representation by a lawyer, and provides to those accused who are indigent the right to counsel at no cost to the accused. Such representation shall be subject to all applicable standards adopted by the Georgia Public Defender Council for representation of indigent persons in this state. (g) Any municipal court operating within this state that has jurisdiction over the violation of municipal or county ordinances or such other statutes as are by specific or general law made subject to the jurisdiction of municipal courts, and that holds committal hearings in regard to such alleged violations, must provide to the accused the right to representation by a lawyer, and must provide to those accused who are indigent the right to counsel at no cost to the accused. Such representation shall be subject to all applicable standards adopted by the Georgia Public Defender Council for representation of indigent persons in this state. (h) Any municipality or municipal court may contract with the office of the circuit public defender of the judicial circuit in which such municipality is located as a means of complying with the municipality’s or municipal court’s legal obligation to provide defense counsel at no cost to indigent persons appearing before the court in relation to violations of municipal ordinances, county ordinances, or state laws.

History

Ga. L. 1922, p. 133, §§ 1, 2; Code 1933, §§ 69-702, 69-703; Ga. L. 1986, p. 784, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 3, § 36;

Ga. L. 2003, p. 191, § 9; Ga. L. 2015, p. 519, § 8-9/HB 328.

Annotations

Cross references. - Constitutional

provisions regarding courts with municipal jurisdiction, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. X, Para. I. Law reviews. - For survey article on local government law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 263 (2008).

For note on the 2003 amendment to this Code section, see 20 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 105 (2003).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Municipal court not a city court or court of record. - Municipal court established as part of the charter for a city was not a city court and was not a court of record authorized to grant new trials. City

of Lawrenceville v. Davis, 233 Ga. App. 1, 502 S.E.2d 794 (1998). Cited in Felix v. State, 241 Ga. App. 323, 526 S.E.2d 637 (1999); Nguyen v. State, 282 Ga. 483, 651 S.E.2d 681 (2007).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Member of General Assembly may not serve as municipal court judge. - While the separation of powers doctrine does not apply where the issues relate solely to municipal officials utilizing municipal powers, it does apply where it concerns a municipal court judge exercising state judicial powers. Because of that,

the exercise of those state judicial powers by a legislator would be a violation of the constitutional prohibition against a member of one branch exercising the powers of another branch of government. Therefore, a member of the Georgia General Assembly may not serve as a municipal court judge. 2014 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U2014-2.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 9 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1988–2025 · leading case: Nguyen v. State, 651 S.E.2d 681 (Ga. 2007).

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Nguyen v. State, 651 S.E.2d 681 (Ga. 2007). · cites it 10× “A municipal court is established and maintained by the municipal corporation it serves (see OCGA § 36-32-1 (a); see also City of Lawrenceville v.”

Wickham v. State, 544 S.E.2d 439 (Ga. 2001). · cites it 4× “This fact also defeats Wickham’s arguments regarding defects in the City Court as a municipal court under OCGA § 36-32-1. Although OCGA § 36-32-1 (a) refers to the City Court of Atlanta, the City Court is not established pursuant to the statute.”

Poole v. State, 494 S.E.2d 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 8× “477, § 18, the legislation creating that court, or in OCGA § 36-32-1, which redefined it as a municipal court, granting exclusive jurisdiction to try municipal violations.”

Ziahonna Teagan v. The City of McDonough, Georgia, 949 F.3d 670 (11th Cir. 2020). · cites it 2× “See Ga. Code Ann. § 36-32-1 (a). But municipal courts also have jurisdiction to adjudicate state-law misdemeanor traffic offenses pursuant to Georgia Code § 40- 13-21(a)-(b) if the defendant waives his or her right to a jury trial.”

City of Lawrenceville v. Davis, 502 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 10× “The enabling legislation permitting the establishment of municipal courts is found under OCGA § 36-32-1 (a), which provides that “[e]ach municipal corporation of this state shall, unless otherwise provided in the local law relating to a particular municipal corporation, be…”

Adams v. State, 375 S.E.2d 642 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 4× “4556, 4557), which in turn is now replaced by the Duluth Municipal Court (OCGA § 36-32-1, and Art. VI, Sec. X, Par.”

Felix v. State, 526 S.E.2d 637 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 2× “Although OCGA § 36-32-1 (a) provides that any such court as authorized thereunder “shall be styled as a municipal court,” that Code section further expressly provides that the change in name of any court previously known as a police court, recorders court, mayors court, etc.”

David Butler v. State of Georgia (Ga. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 4× “”5 While Georgia law grants municipal courts jurisdiction over some misdemeanor charges, such as some traffic offenses,6 the parties do not dispute that the Municipal Court of Atlanta does not have jurisdiction to try a criminal trespass charge.”

John Longo v. City of Dunwoody (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “”); 17-12-24 (a); 17-12-80 (a); see also OCGA § 36-32-1 (establishment of municipal courts).”

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