O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 36-34-1 (2019)

Legislative intent

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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It is declared to be the intention of the General Assembly to vest certain general powers in the governing body of each of the municipal corporations of this state, such powers to be in addition to or cumulative of those which any municipal corporation may now have under its charter or any other special or general law. It is the purpose of this grant of general powers: (1) To provide authority for all municipal corporations to exercise certain common functions of local government; (2) To provide for local self-government to the extent of the powers granted; and (3) To relieve the necessity for special legislative action by the General Assembly to the extent of the powers granted in this chapter.

History

Ga. L. 1962, p. 140, § 1.

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article, ‘‘The Municipal Home Rule Act of 1965,’’ see 3 Ga.

St. B. J. 333 (1967). For annual survey of construction law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 109 (2004).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS The 1962 Home Rule Act was intended to allow municipalities to exercise certain powers themselves, not to define the means by which the cities would and could manage a municipalities’ affairs. Sadler v. Nijem, 251 Ga. 375, 306 S.E.2d 257 (1983). No municipal corporations possess inherent powers; instead, the corporations possess only such powers as are expressly delegated by the legislature. Evidence of express delegation by the legislature is found in the charter of each municipality. Palmer v. Hall, 380 F. Supp. 120 (M.D. Ga. 1974), modified, 517 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1975). Powers and authority of mayor and aldermen derived from city charter.

- Legislature has not enacted general laws giving any general powers to either mayors or aldermen of municipal corporations. Therefore, the powers and authority of the mayor and aldermen are derived from the charter of the city. Palmer v. Hall, 380 F. Supp. 120 (M.D. Ga. 1974), modified, 517 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1975). Conflicting special law unconstitutional. - Georgia Laws 1968, p. 2953, providing for collective bargaining for Chatham County public employees, violates Ga. Const. 1945, Art. I, Sec. IV, Para. I (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV), since it is a special law dealing with matters provided for by the general law under Ga. L. 1962, p. 140, §§ 1 and 2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 36-34-1

and 36-34-2). Local 574, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. Floyd, 225 Ga. 625, 170 S.E.2d 394 (1969). Taxpayer actions. - Local government provisions applicable to municipal corporations do not provide for derivative actions by taxpayers in the name of a municipality. Taxpayers may bring direct actions in mandamus to compel or enjoin city officials to perform a public duty or sue city officials for damages in connection with the unlawful expenditure of public

funds with any recovery to be paid to the city. Common Cause/Ga. v. Campbell, 268 Ga. App. 599, 602 S.E.2d 333 (2004), aff ’d, 279 Ga. 480, 614 S.E.2d 761 (2005). Cited in Allison v. Medlock, 224 Ga. 37, 159 S.E.2d 384 (1968); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. R.D.C., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Paige v. Gray, 437 F. Supp. 137 (M.D. Ga. 1977); CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 196 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (S.D. Ga. 2002).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, § 10.

C.J.S. - 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 139 et seq.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases, 1983–2010 · leading case: CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 588 S.E.2d 688 (Ga. 2003).
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CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 588 S.E.2d 688 (Ga. 2003). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 36-34-1 (“[i]t is declared to be the intention of the General Assembly to vest certain general powers in the governing body of each of the municipal corporations of this state”).”
Precise v. City of Rossville, 403 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. 1991). · cites it 2× “II, and OCGA § 36-34-1 et seq. We have long acknowl *211 edged that municipal corporations have only limited power to enter into contracts.”
H. G. Brown Fam. Ltd. P'ship v. City of Villa Rica, 607 S.E.2d 883 (Ga. 2005). · cites it 2× “Having reviewed the trial court’s order, we do not believe (1) that the court found that the subject matter of the contract was outside the scope of the City’s power to contract, or (2) that the court found that by its actions, the City improperly bound future councils.…”
City of Buchanan v. Pope, 476 S.E.2d 53 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 2× “It “was intended to allow municipalities to exercise certain power themselves, OCGA § 36-34-1 (3) . . . , not to define the means by which the cities would and could manage their affairs.”
Sadler v. Nijem, 306 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. 1983). · cites it 4× “§§ 69-309—69-312, 69-314—316), which granted certain enumerated powers to municipalities, in addition to or cumulative of their charter powers, including “(1) The power to establish municipal offices, agencies, and employments; (2) The power to define, regulate, and alter the…”
Common Cause/Georgia v. Campbell, 602 S.E.2d 333 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 2× “They then maintain that there is no reason for exempting present or former officers of municipal corporations from this type of claim. We are unpersuaded by Common Cause’s arguments.”
CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, Georgia, 196 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (S.D. Ga. 2002). · cites it 2× “”); O.C.G.A. § 36-34-1 (“It is declared to be the intention of the General Assembly to vest certain general powers in the governing body of each of the municipal corporations of this state.”
City of Athens v. McGahee, 341 S.E.2d 855 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 2× “The plaintiffs contended, and the trial court agreed, that because they had contracts with the city which were governed by and reduced to writing in the pension plans and merit systems established by the city under the authority of OCGA §§ 36-34-1 and 36-34-2 and the city…”
City of McDonough v. Campbell, 696 S.E.2d 150 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 2× “See OCGA §§ 36-34-1 (1); 36-35-3 (a). Section 2.”
Wheeler v. City of Macon, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (M.D. Ga. 1999). · cites it 2× “As the City of Macon is a creation of the Georgia Legislature, see O.C.G.A. § 36-34-1, it has no individual authority to establish policy in the area of arrest and probable cause.”
— 36-34-1(3) — 1 case
Sadler v. Nijem, 306 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. 1983). “§§ 69-309—69-312, 69-314—316), which granted certain enumerated powers to municipalities, in addition to or cumulative of their charter powers, including “(1) The power to establish municipal offices, agencies, and employments; (2) The power to define, regulate, and alter the…”
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