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2018 Georgia Code 36-36-1 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 36 LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Chapter 36 information not found

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

36-36-1. Applicability of article.

The procedures set forth in this article shall apply to all annexations pursuant to this chapter and to annexation by local Act of the General Assembly.

(Code 1981, §36-36-1, enacted by Ga. L. 1992, p. 2592, § 3.)

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 36-36-1

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Higdon v. City of Senoia, 538 S.E.2d 39 (Ga. 2000).

Cited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 30, 2000 | 273 Ga. 83, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 4020

...Haynie, Litchfield & Crane, Douglas P. Haynie, Emilie K. Petrovich, Marietta, James F. Grubiak, Kelly J. Pridgen, Atlanta, for amici curiae. THOMPSON, Justice. In these companion cases we are called upon to resolve whether OCGA §§ 36-70-24(4)(C) and 36-36-11 violate the delegation of zoning power under Art....
...t of annexation. It requires that "[a] process shall be established by July 1, 1998, to resolve land use classification disputes when a county objects to the proposed land use of an area to be annexed into a municipality within the county." Id. OCGA § 36-36-11(a) defines a "bona fide land use classification *41 objection" as an objection to a proposed change in land use which "results in a substantial change in the intensity of the allowable use of the property or a change to a significantly different allowable use." OCGA § 36-36-11(b) provides that an annexation is not effective until any bona fide land use classification objections raised by the county relative to the area to be annexed are resolved pursuant to the dispute resolution process required by OCGA § 36-70-24(4)(C)....
...e a mediation process. When, despite suggestions from both parties, they were unable to agree upon a mediator, the City of Senoia filed this action for declaratory judgment in which it challenged the constitutionality of OCGA §§ 36-70-24(4)(C) and 36-36-11. Jim Higdon, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Community Affairs, was granted leave to intervene as a defendant. The trial judge declared OCGA §§ 36-36-11 and 36-70-24(4)(C) unconstitutional in violation of Art....
...The constitutional challenge was properly raised and ruled on below as to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. See generally Blackston v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 255 Ga. 15(1), 334 S.E.2d 679 (1985). 3. In deciding whether OCGA §§ 36-36-11 and 36-70-24(4)(C) violate Art....
...We have also determined that the General Assembly has intended a liberal policy in the area of annexation by municipalities, seeking to leave such matters primarily under local control. City of Gainesville v. Hall County Bd. of Edu., 233 Ga. 77(2), 209 S.E.2d 637 (1974). In the exercise of that authority, OCGA § 36-36-1 et seq....
...power of annexation. One such condition to a proposed annexation by a municipal government requires that any bona fide land use classification objections between local governments be resolved prior to allowing an annexation to become effective. OCGA § 36-36-11....
...All statutes are presumed to be enacted with full knowledge of existing *43 law and their meaning and effect is to be determined with reference to the constitution as well as other statutes and decisions of the courts. Plantation Pipe Line, supra. In this case, we are guided by the legislative statements of intent. In OCGA § 36-36-10, the General Assembly explained the governmental interest furthered by OCGA § 36-36-11: It is the express intent of the General Assembly in enacting the provisions of this chapter to provide for alternative methods for annexing or deannexing an area or areas into or from the corporate limits of a municipality....
...We decline to reject the legislative objectives in this case. It is clear that the statutes under consideration concern annexation procedures over which the General Assembly retains power. Plantation Pipe Line, supra. The prescriptions set out in OCGA §§ 36-36-11 and 36-70-24(4)(C) create a process for attempting to resolve disputes concerning annexation....
...See also O S Advertising Co. of Ga. v. Rubin, 263 Ga. 761, 438 S.E.2d 907 (1994) (municipality has power to zone and restrict use of land within its boundaries), overruled on other grounds, Ashkouti v. City of Suwanee, 271 Ga. 154, 516 S.E.2d 785 (1999). Therefore, OCGA § 36-36-11 does not unconstitutionally infringe on a municipality's zoning rights....
...Judgment affirmed in Case No. S00A1103. Judgment reversed in Case No. S00A1104. All the Justices concur. CARLEY, Justice, concurring. I can concur in the majority's opinion in captioned cases because the Court's only constitutional holding is that OCGA §§ 36-70-24(4)(C) and 36-36-11 do not violate Article IX, Section II, Paragraph IV of the 1983 Georgia Constitution....
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City of Centerville v. City of Warner Robins, 508 S.E.2d 161 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 26, 1998 | 270 Ga. 183, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 3558

...[Cit.]" Kemp v. City of Claxton, 269 Ga. 173, 176(1), 496 S.E.2d 712 (1998) (rejecting a direct exercise of legislative power by the electorate). Nothing in the statutes by which the General Assembly has delegated its legislative annexation power, OCGA §§ 36-36-1 et seq., can be construed to permit a municipality to relinquish its authority to property even by the terms of an agreement with another municipality....
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Signa Dev. Corp. v. Fayette Cnty., 259 Ga. 11 (Ga. 1989).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 2, 1989 | 375 S.E.2d 839