CopyCited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 30, 2000 | 273 Ga. 83, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 4020
...Olson, Cartersville, for City of Senoia. Haynie, Litchfield & Crane, Douglas P. Haynie, Emilie K. Petrovich, Marietta, James F. Grubiak, Kelly J. Pridgen, Atlanta, for amici curiae. THOMPSON, Justice. In these companion cases we are called upon to resolve whether OCGA §§
36-70-24(4)(C) and
36-36-11 violate the delegation of zoning power under Art....
..."minimize inefficiencies resulting from duplication of services and competition between local governments and to provide a mechanism to resolve disputes over local government service delivery, funding equity, and land use." Id. Toward that end, OCGA §
36-70-24(4)(C) provides for a dispute resolution process when a bona fide land use dispute arises between the city and county over the use of land which is the subject of annexation....
...OCGA §
36-36-11(b) provides that an annexation is not effective until any bona fide land use classification objections raised by the county relative to the area to be annexed are resolved pursuant to the dispute resolution process required by OCGA §
36-70-24(4)(C). To comply with the mandate of OCGA §
36-70-24(4)(C), Coweta County and all municipalities incorporated within the county, including the City of Senoia, approved and adopted a written memorandum of agreement ("agreement") establishing a process to resolve land use classification disputes regarding property to be annexed....
...mediator and undertake a mediation process. When, despite suggestions from both parties, they were unable to agree upon a mediator, the City of Senoia filed this action for declaratory judgment in which it challenged the constitutionality of OCGA §§
36-70-24(4)(C) and
36-36-11. Jim Higdon, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Community Affairs, was granted leave to intervene as a defendant. The trial judge declared OCGA §§
36-36-11 and
36-70-24(4)(C) unconstitutional in violation of Art....
...The constitutional challenge was properly raised and ruled on below as to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. See generally Blackston v. Dept. of Natural Resources,
255 Ga. 15(1),
334 S.E.2d 679 (1985). 3. In deciding whether OCGA §§
36-36-11 and
36-70-24(4)(C) violate Art....
...n. One such condition to a proposed annexation by a municipal government requires that any bona fide land use classification objections between local governments be resolved prior to allowing an annexation to become effective. OCGA §
36-36-11. OCGA §
36-70-24(4)(C) furthers that objective by requiring the establishment of a "process" by each county and municipality to resolve bona fide land use disputes concerning an area to be annexed into a municipality....
...We decline to reject the legislative objectives in this case. It is clear that the statutes under consideration concern annexation procedures over which the General Assembly retains power. Plantation Pipe Line, supra. The prescriptions set out in OCGA §§
36-36-11 and
36-70-24(4)(C) create a process for attempting to resolve disputes concerning annexation....
...Judgment affirmed in Case No. S00A1103. Judgment reversed in Case No. S00A1104. All the Justices concur. CARLEY, Justice, concurring. I can concur in the majority's opinion in captioned cases because the Court's only constitutional holding is that OCGA §§
36-70-24(4)(C) and
36-36-11 do not violate Article IX, Section II, Paragraph IV of the 1983 Georgia Constitution....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 5, 2024
...which again failed to resolve the outstanding service delivery issues,
they began to engage in discovery. Prior to the completion of that
process, the County and the City filed cross-motions for partial
summary judgment on the legal issue of what standard should be
used under OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A)6 to determine whether
residents, individuals, and property owners of the incorporated
areas of the County could be charged for the costs of road
maintenance for county roads located in unincorporated areas of the
County. The City argued that under OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A), the
geographic location of the roads, which necessarily is where the
money would be spent to perform maintenance on the roads
determined which County residents, individuals, and property
owners could be charged for the maintenance,7 while the County
6 OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A) provides in relevant part: “The strategy shall
ensure that the cost of any service which a county provides primarily for the
benefit of the unincorporated area of the county shall be borne by the
unincorporated area residents,...
...Thus, the County contended that
municipal residents could also be charged for maintenance of county
roads. The City later filed a second motion for partial summary
judgment, contending that the County’s source of revenue to fund
services for the unincorporated areas was limited to the mechanisms
spelled out in OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B): “property taxes, insurance
premium taxes, assessments, or user fees.”8 In addition, the City
filed a motion to dismiss Count IV, arguing that the issues of
whether the City’s water rate charges to Outside Customers
amou...
...asserting that the County failed to fulfill the statutory requirements for
bringing such a claim, which the City contended should have been brought in
a separate proceeding. The superior court denied that motion, but the City does
not appeal that ruling.
8 Under OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B),
[s]uch funding shall be derived from special service districts
created by the county in which property taxes, insurance premium
taxes, assessments, or user fees are levied or imposed or through
such other...
...s
second motion for partial summary judgment that sought to limit
the sources of revenue for funding services primarily for the benefit
of the unincorporated areas to property taxes, insurance premium
taxes, assessments, or user fees under OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B)....
...8
(1) Is the maintenance of county roads in an unincorporated
area of the County, which connect to roads within the City,
“primarily for the benefit of the unincorporated area” as that phrase
is used in OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A)?
(2) Does OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B) require that funding for
services provided primarily for the benefit of unincorporated areas
come from “property taxes, insurance premium taxes, assessments,
or user fees” levied or imposed with a special service district,...
...peal involves
9
only legal issues, not questions of fact.9 See Raffensperger v.
Jackson,
316 Ga. 383, 387 (2) (888 SE2d 483) (2023).
The parties agree that the resolution of this issue is governed
by OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A), which provides:
The [service delivery] strategy shall ensure that the
cost of any service which a county provides primarily for
the benefit of the unincorporated area of the county shall
be borne by the...
...9 The parties did not submit evidence in the trial court in support of their
summary judgment motions on the issues of where the county roads are located
or who was actually using the roads and focused their arguments on the legal
issue of the standard to be used under OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A).
10
unincorporated area.
On cross-motions for partial summary judgment, the superior
court agreed with the County and determined that the inquiry for
determining who should bear the costs of road maintenance in this
case, “[should be] focused solely on those ‘that receive the service,’”
citing the text at the end of the first sentence of OCGA §
36-70-24
(3) (A), reasoning that the statute makes “no mention of where the
services are located.” In affirming the superior court’s ruling, the
Court of Appeals viewed the text of OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A)
differently, determining that the concepts of road usage and
“benefit,” as used in the statute, are “inextricably intertwined,” and
“the focus of the Act is not on the geographical location of the public
service, but on who uses (and thus benefits) from the service.”10
Winder, 365 Ga....
...meaning in questions of textual interpretation because they are
acontextual, and context is a critical determinant of meaning.”
McBrayer v. Scarbrough,
317 Ga. 387, 394 (2) (d) (893 SE2d 660)
(2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Turning to the text, OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A) explains that the
“cost of any service”—in this case, road maintenance—“which a
county provides primarily for the benefit of the unincorporated area
of the county” shall be borne by persons in the unincorporated are...
...And it is only if it is determined that the unincorporated area is the
primary beneficiary of the service that the “unincorporated area
residents, individuals, and property owners who receive the service”
bear the costs of that service.
We see nothing in the text of OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A) that
supports the County’s argument that the correct standard for
determining the primary beneficiary of a service turns solely on who
uses the service. As we understand it, the County argues that the
phrase “who receive the service” at the end of the first sentence of
OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A) means that those who have access to and
may use the service—in this case, maintenance of county roads—
are, as a matter of law, those who primarily benefit from it under
the meaning of the statute. But this construction ignores the syntax
and structure of OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A) and improperly links two
grammatically unrelated phrases in the text—the phrase “primarily
for the benefit of” and the phrase “who receive the service” at the
end of the sentence—while ignoring the phrase “the uni...
...English grammar, inasmuch as those rules are the guideposts by
which ordinary speakers of the English language commonly
structure their words[.]” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
Nevertheless, the County argues that any construction of
OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A) not based strictly on who uses the county
roads would violate the Uniformity Clause of the Georgia
Constitution, Ga....
...VII, Sec. I, Par. III (a) (“[A]ll
taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the
territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.”). However, to the
extent that the County is challenging the constitutionality of OCGA
§
36-70-24 (3) (A), we need not address that argument in this appeal
because, even though the County raised the issue before the superior
court, the court did not issue a ruling on it....
...constitutional issue was directly and properly raised in the trial
court and distinctly ruled on by the trial judge.” (emphasis omitted)).
Moreover, to the extent that the County is asserting that under the
canon of constitutional doubt we should construe OCGA §
36-70-24
(3) (A) to avoid a potential conflict with the Uniformity Clause, that
canon does not apply to a statute that we have determined to be
unambiguous....
...ed upon to avoid a
“potential constitutional issue” when “we can identify only one
plausible interpretation of [a] statute”).
The County also argues against our plain reading of the text of
18
OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A), which requires an analysis of whether the
service primarily benefits the unincorporated area of the county–not
simply a consideration of who uses the service–because it
contradicts the interpretation of the Act set out in...
...With respect
to county road maintenance, this guidebook stated that, under the
Act, county road maintenance is not provided primarily for the
benefit of the unincorporated area within the meaning of OCGA §
19
36-70-24 (3) (A) because county roads are “available” to all county
residents, thus purporting to dictate that the only factor to be
considered on the question of whether county road maintenance
primarily benefits the unincorporated area is wh...
...legal text at issue.” City of Guyton v. Barrow,
305 Ga. 799, 802 (2)
(828 SE2d 366) (2019). In other words, we only defer to an agency’s
interpretation, if at all, when the text is ambiguous. Because we
discern no ambiguity in the text of OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A), we need
not consider the interpretation set forth in the guidebook....
... roads.13 See OCGA §
36-70-25.1 (d) (2) (“The visiting or senior judge
shall conduct an evidentiary hearing or hearings as such judge
deems necessary and render a decision with regard to the disputed
items.”).14
2. We next address whether OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B) requires
that funding for services provided primarily for the benefit of the
unincorporated area come from “property taxes, insurance premium
taxes, assessments, or user fees” levied or imposed within a special
service district, or, in contrast, it authorizes the County to use other
sources of revenue from within that special service district.
OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B) states that the funding for services
provided primarily for the benefit of an unincorporated area
shall be derived from special service districts created by
the county in which property taxes, insurance premium...
...atutory, and
common law alike—that forms the legal background of the statutory
provision in question.” Langley v. State,
313 Ga. 141, 143 (2) (868
SE2d 759) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). In addition to
“property taxes,” OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B) lists “insurance premium
taxes” as a potential source for revenue, which cuts against the
County’s argument that the term “property taxes” refers to taxes of
any kind because such an interpretation would improperly make the
term “insurance premium taxes” superfluous....
...Sweatt,
315 Ga. 498, 509 (2) (b) (883 SE2d 827) (2023) (noting
fundamental rule of statutory construction that courts should “avoid
a construction that makes some language mere surplusage” (citation
and punctuation omitted)).
Also, OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B) refers to “special service
districts” and makes clear that the listed mechanisms for funding
are to be levied or imposed within a special service district. Thus, in
the legal background of OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B) is the Special
25
Districts Paragraph of the Georgia Constitution, which enables the
creation of special service districts “for the provision of local
government services within such distric...
...That the Special Districts
Paragraph lists the categories of funding sources for county services
as “fees, assessments, and taxes” further supports that when the
General Assembly used the term “property taxes” instead of “taxes”
in OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B), it intended to specify a subcategory of
taxes—ad valorem taxes levied on real or personal property—to the
exclusion of other taxes, including the non-ad valorem taxes on
property that the County claims it can use as funding sources....
...certain language in one part of the statute and different language in
another, the Court assumes different meanings were intended.”
26
(citation and punctuation omitted)).
The County also argues that the term “assessments” in OCGA
§
36-70-24 (3) (B) refers to any kind of revenue measure....
...Thus, these definitions support the County’s
27
broad reading of the term “assessments.”
However, if the General Assembly intended the term
“assessments” to refer broadly to any kind of tax, the legislators’
inclusion of the other specific items in the list in OCGA §
36-70-24
(3) (B) would be surplusage, and, again, courts generally strive to
avoid a construction that “makes some language mere surplusage.”
Camden County, 315 Ga....
...sated for to some extent
in local benefits and improvements, enhancing the value of the
property assessed. Taxes are imposed on the person, assessments
are imposed on the property.”). Accordingly, we construe the term
“assessments” in OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B) as the act of charging a
special payment but not to include fees and taxes....
...This construction
would include “special assessments,” but it is not limited to special
assessments, as it could also include other assessments not
classified as taxes or fees.
Therefore, we conclude that absent an agreement by the
parties, OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B) limits the sources within a special
district that can be used to fund services provided for the primary
benefit of the unincorporated area of the county, that “property
taxes” means ad valorem property taxes, and that “as...
...The Act provides a
detailed framework for local governments to use in negotiating and
crafting their SDS Agreements and the processes and procedures
that may be used in resolving any disputes. OCGA §
36-70-23 lists
the four items that need to be included in every service delivery
strategy,17 while OCGA §
36-70-24 describes the criteria that must
17 Under OCGA §
36-70-23:
Each local government service delivery strategy shall
include the following components:
(1) An identification of all local government services
30
be met in the development of a service delivery strategy. Specifically,
OCGA §
36-70-24 (2) sets out requirements and procedures for
strategies involving water or sewer services....
...ution procedure for local
governments to follow to challenge any alleged arbitrary rate
differentials. That provision allows the contesting governing
authority to hold a public hearing for the purpose of reviewing the
rate differential. See OCGA §
36-70-24 (2) (B)....
...As discussed above, OCGA § 36-70-
25.1 (d) sets out the procedure for an aggrieved party to follow to
petition the superior court for resolution of items “remaining in
dispute.”
Here, after presumably following the procedure laid out in
OCGA §
36-70-24 (2) (B), the County filed its petition in this case
pursuant to OCGA §
36-70-25.1 (d) (2) to resolve the parties’
remaining disputes....
...These issues are clearly matters that must be addressed
in negotiating a new SDS Agreement for the provision of water and
sewage services, and thus disputes about such matters are
considered issues “remaining in dispute” under the Act. See OCGA
§§
36-70-23;
36-70-24;
36-70-25.1 (d) (2).
However, Count IV seeks a determination as to whether the
City’s water charges constitute an illegal tax on the Outside
Customers and whether the City could transfer profits collected
from those customers to its general fund. These are not items that
must be negotiated as part of an SDS Agreement, see OCGA §§ 36-
70-23 and
36-70-24 (2), and thus cannot be considered items
“remaining in dispute” under the statutory process outlined in
OCGA §
36-70-25.1 (d)....
Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 5, 2024 | 275 Ga. 707, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 3315
...which again failed to resolve the outstanding service delivery issues,
they began to engage in discovery. Prior to the completion of that
process, the County and the City filed cross-motions for partial
summary judgment on the legal issue of what standard should be
used under OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A) 6 to determine whether
residents, individuals, and property owners of the incorporated
areas of the County could be charged for the costs of road
maintenance for county roads located in unincorporated areas of the
6 OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A) provides in relevant part: “The strategy shall
ensure that the cost of any service which a county provides primarily for the
benefit of the unincorporated area of the county shall be borne by the
unincorporated area residents, individuals, and property owners who receive
the service.”
6
County. The City argued that under OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A), the
geographic location of the roads, which necessarily is where the
money would be spent to perform maintenance on the roads
determined which County residents, individuals, and property
owners could be charged for the mainte...
...Thus, the County contended that
municipal residents could also be charged for maintenance of county
roads. The City later filed a second motion for partial summary
judgment, contending that the County’s source of revenue to fund
services for the unincorporated areas was limited to the mechanisms
spelled out in OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B): “property taxes, insurance
premium taxes, assessments, or user fees.”8 In addition, the City
7 The City contemporaneously moved to dismiss Count II of the petition,
asserting that the County failed to fulfill the statutory requirements for
bringing such a claim, which the City contended should have been brought in
a separate proceeding. The superior court denied that motion, but the City does
not appeal that ruling.
8 Under OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B),
[s]uch funding shall be derived from special service districts
created by the county in which property taxes, insurance premium
taxes, assessments, or user fees are levied or imposed or through...
...s
second motion for partial summary judgment that sought to limit
the sources of revenue for funding services primarily for the benefit
of the unincorporated areas to property taxes, insurance premium
taxes, assessments, or user fees under OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B)....
...Court of Appeals’s rulings on three questions:
(1) Is the maintenance of county roads in an unincorporated
area of the County, which connect to roads within the City,
“primarily for the benefit of the unincorporated area” as that phrase
is used in OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A)?
(2) Does OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B) require that funding for
services provided primarily for the benefit of unincorporated areas
come from “property taxes, insurance premium taxes, assessments,
or user fees” levied or imposed with a special service district,...
...partial summary judgment is de novo because this appeal involves
only legal issues, not questions of fact.9 See Raffensperger v.
Jackson,
316 Ga. 383, 387 (2) (888 SE2d 483) (2023).
The parties agree that the resolution of this issue is governed
by OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A), which provides:
The [service delivery] strategy shall ensure that the cost
of any service which a county provides primarily for the
benefit of the unincorporated area of the county shall be
borne by the uninc...
...9 The parties did not submit evidence in the trial court in support of their
summary judgment motions on the issues of where the county roads are located
or who was actually using the roads and focused their arguments on the legal
issue of the standard to be used under OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A).
10
whether maintenance of county roads is “primarily for the benefit of
the unincorporated area.” The County argues that if the county
roads are available to anyone in the county to us...
...court agreed with the County and determined that the inquiry for
determining who should bear the costs of road maintenance in this
case, “[should be] focused solely on those ‘that receive the service,’”
citing the text at the end of the first sentence of OCGA §
36-70-24
(3) (A), reasoning that the statute makes “no mention of where the
services are located.” In affirming the superior court’s ruling, the
Court of Appeals viewed the text of OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A)
differently, determining that the concepts of road usage and
“benefit,” as used in the statute, are “inextricably intertwined,” and
11
“the focus of the Act is not on the geographica...
...of ordinary
meaning in questions of textual interpretation because they are
acontextual, and context is a critical determinant of meaning.”
McBrayer v. Scarbrough,
317 Ga. 387, 394 (2) (d) (893 SE2d 660)
(2023).
Turning to the text, OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A) explains that the
“cost of any service”—in this case, road maintenance—“which a
13
county provides primarily for the benefit of the unincorporated area
of the county” shall be borne...
...And it is only if it is determined that the unincorporated area is the
primary beneficiary of the service that the “unincorporated area
residents, individuals, and property owners who receive the service”
bear the costs of that service.
We see nothing in the text of OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A) that
supports the County’s argument that the correct standard for
determining the primary beneficiary of a service turns solely on who
uses the service. As we understand it, the County argues that the
phrase “who receive the service” at the end of the first sentence of
OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A) means that those who have access to and
16
may use the service—in this case, maintenance of county roads—
are, as a matter of law, those who primarily benefit from it under
the meaning of the statute. But this construction ignores the syntax
and structure of OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A) and improperly links two
grammatically unrelated phrases in the text—the phrase “primarily
for the benefit of” and the phrase “who receive the service” at the
end of the sentence—while ignoring the phrase “the unincorporated
area of the county” that comes between them....
...English grammar, inasmuch as those rules are the guideposts by
which ordinary speakers of the English language commonly
structure their words[.]”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Nevertheless, the County argues that any construction of
OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A) not based strictly on who uses the county
roads would violate the Uniformity Clause of the Georgia
17
Constitution, Ga....
...VII, Sec. 1, Para. III (a) (“[A]ll taxation
shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the
territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.”). However, to the
extent that the County is challenging the constitutionality of OCGA
§
36-70-24 (3) (A), we need not address that argument in this appeal
because, even though the County raised the issue before the superior
court, the court did not issue a ruling on it....
...constitutional issue was directly and properly raised in the trial
court and distinctly ruled on by the trial judge.”) (emphasis omitted).
Moreover, to the extent that the County is asserting that under the
canon of constitutional doubt we should construe OCGA §
36-70-24
(3) (A) to avoid a potential conflict with the Uniformity Clause, that
canon does not apply to a statute that we have determined to be
unambiguous....
...of constitutional doubt cannot be relied upon to avoid a “potential
constitutional issue” when “we can identify only one plausible
interpretation of [a] statute” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
The County also argues against our plain reading of the text
of OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A), which requires an analysis of whether
the service primarily benefits the unincorporated area of the
county–not simply a consideration of who uses the service–because
it contradicts the interpretation of the Act set out in...
...Act and does not purport to be binding legal authority. With respect
to county road maintenance, this guidebook stated that, under the
Act, county road maintenance is not provided primarily for the
benefit of the unincorporated area within the meaning of OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A) because county roads are “available” to all county
residents, thus purporting to dictate that the only factor to be
considered on the question of whether county road maintenance
primarily benefits the unincorporated area i...
...legal text at issue.” City of Guyton v. Barrow,
305 Ga. 799, 802 (2)
(828 SE2d 366) (2019). In other words, we only defer to an agency’s
interpretation, if at all, when the text is ambiguous. Because we
discern no ambiguity in the text of OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (A), we need
not consider the interpretation set forth in the guidebook....
...roads.13 See OCGA §
36-70-25.1 (d) (2) (“The visiting or senior judge
shall conduct an evidentiary hearing or hearings as such judge
deems necessary and render a decision with regard to the disputed
items.”). 14
2. We next address whether OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B) requires
13 We emphasize that geographic location and usage of roads are only
two factors that the superior court may consider depending on the evidence
presented by the parties, which could also include traffic studies...
...unincorporated area come from “property taxes, insurance premium
taxes, assessments, or user fees” levied or imposed within a special
service district, or, in contrast, it authorizes the County to use other
sources of revenue from within that special service district.
OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B) states that the funding for services
provided primarily for the benefit of an unincorporated area
shall be derived from special service districts created by
the county in which property taxes, insurance premium
ta...
...atutory, and
common law alike—that forms the legal background of the statutory
provision in question.” Langley v. State,
313 Ga. 141, 143 (2) (868
SE2d 759) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). In addition to
“property taxes,” OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B) lists “insurance premium
taxes” as a potential source for revenue, which cuts against the
County’s argument that the term property taxes refers to taxes of
any kind because such an interpretation would improperly make the...
...Sweatt,
315 Ga. 498, 509 (2) (b) (883 SE2d 827) (2023) (noting
fundamental rule of statutory construction that courts should “avoid
a construction that makes some language mere surplusage” (citation
and punctuation omitted)).
Also, OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B) refers to “special service
districts” and makes clear that the listed mechanisms for funding
are to be levied or imposed within a special service district. Thus, in
the legal background of OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B) is the Special
Districts Paragraph of the Georgia Constitution, which enables the
creation of special service districts “for the provision of local
government services within such districts,” and provides that “fees,
ass...
...That the Special Districts
Paragraph lists the categories of funding sources for county services
as “fees, assessments, and taxes” further supports that when the
26
General Assembly used the term “property taxes” instead of “taxes”
in OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B), it intended to specify a subcategory of
taxes—ad valorem taxes levied on real or personal property—to the
exclusion of other taxes, including the non-ad valorem taxes on
property that the County claims it can use as funding sources....
...uses
certain language in one part of the statute and different language in
another, the Court assumes different meanings were intended.”
(citation and punctuation omitted)).
The County also argues that the term “assessments” in OCGA
§
36-70-24 (3) (B) refers to any kind of revenue measure....
...Thus, these definitions support the County’s
broad reading of the term “assessments.”
However, if the General Assembly intended the term
“assessments” to refer broadly to any kind of tax, the legislators’
inclusion of the other specific items in the list in OCGA §
36-70-24
(3) (B) would be surplusage, and, again, courts generally strive to
avoid a construction that “makes some language mere surplusage.”
Camden County, 315 Ga....
...sated for to some extent
in local benefits and improvements, enhancing the value of the
property assessed. Taxes are imposed on the person, assessments
are imposed on the property.”). Accordingly, we construe the term
“assessments” in OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B) as the act of charging a
special payment but not to include fees and taxes....
...This construction
would include “special assessments,” but it is not limited to special
assessments, as it could also include other assessments not
classified as taxes or fees.
29
Therefore, we conclude that absent an agreement by the
parties, OCGA §
36-70-24 (3) (B) limits the sources within a special
district that can be used to fund services provided for the primary
benefit of the unincorporated area of the county, that “property
taxes” means ad valorem property taxes, and that “as...
...The Act provides a
detailed framework for local governments to use in negotiating and
crafting their SDS Agreements and the processes and procedures
that may be used in resolving any disputes. OCGA §
36-70-23 lists
the four items that need to be included in every service delivery
strategy,17 while OCGA §
36-70-24 describes the criteria that must
17 Under, OCGA §
36-70-23,
Each local government service delivery strategy shall include the
following components:
(1) An identification of all local government services...
...facilitate the implementation of the services and funding
responsibilities identified pursuant to paragraphs (2) and (3) of
this Code section.
31
be met in the development of a service delivery strategy.
Specifically, OCGA §
36-70-24 (2) sets out requirements and
procedures for strategies involving water or sewer services.
Subsection (2) (A) of that statute provides “that water or sewer fees
charged to customers located outside the geographic boundaries of a
ser...
...the statute sets out a dispute resolution procedure for local
governments to follow to challenge any alleged arbitrary rate
differentials. That provision allows the contesting governing
authority to hold a public hearing for the purpose of reviewing the
rate differential. See OCGA §
36-70-24 (2) (B)....
...As discussed above, OCGA § 36-70-
25.1 (d) sets out the procedure for an aggrieved party to follow to
32
petition the superior court for resolution of items “remaining in
dispute.”
Here, after presumably following the procedure laid out in
OCGA §
36-70-24 (2) (B), the County filed its petition in this case
pursuant to OCGA §
36-70-25.1 (d) (2) to resolve the parties’
remaining disputes....
...These issues are clearly matters that must be addressed
in negotiating a new SDS Agreement for the provision of water and
sewage services, and thus disputes about such matters are
considered issues “remaining in dispute” under the Act. See OCGA
§§
36-70-23;
36-70-24;
36-70-25.1 (d) 2).
However, Count IV seeks a determination as to whether the
City’s water charges constitute an illegal tax on the Outside
Customers and whether the City could transfer profits collected
33
from those customers to its general fund. These are not items that
must be negotiated as part of an SDS Agreement, see OCGA §§ 36-
70-23 and
36-70-24 (2), and thus cannot be considered items
“remaining in dispute” under the statutory process outlined in
OCGA §
36-70-25.1 (d)....
