O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 36-82-60 (2019)

Short title

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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This article may be cited as the ‘‘Revenue Bond Law.’’

History

Ga. L. 1937, p. 761, § 1; Ga. L. 1957, p. 36, § 1.

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article discussing

the impact on bond issues of challenges to voting procedures, see 15 Ga. St. B. J. 15 (1978).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Constitutionality. - As applied to the establishment and maintenance of systems of waterworks by counties, the Revenue Bond Law (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36) is not subject to attack on the ground that the law violates the constitutional provision that protection to person and property is the paramount duty of government, and shall be impartial and complete. Nor does the Constitution otherwise prohibit the General Assembly from authorizing such an undertaking by counties. The court did not err in denying an interlocutory injunction. Miller v. Head, 186 Ga. 694, 198 S.E. 680 (1938). See Lawson v. City of Moultrie, 194 Ga. 699, 22 S.E.2d 592 (1942). Certificates not to be charged against general credit. - Revenue Bond Law (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36) is designed to provide for self-liquidating projects and the revenue bonds therein

contemplated are not to be a charge against the general credit of the county or municipality. The liability is to be satisfied only from revenues produced by the undertaking and under the specific terms of the statute, the political division will never be required to aid in its retirement with funds derived from any other source, and is in fact prohibited from doing so. The article is not unconstitutional by virtue of violating the constitutional limitation on municipal debts in Ga. Const. 1877, Art. VII, Sec. VII, Para. I (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I). Miller v. Head, 186 Ga. 694, 198 S.E. 680 (1938). Superior rights not gained by prior proceeding to validate certificates. - There is nothing contained in the Revenue Bond Law (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36) which expressly or by necessary implication gives that municipality which insti-

tutes proceedings first for the validation of the municipality’s bonds, and the confirmation of the security for the payment thereof, superior rights over another municipality which may file proceedings to validate and conform the security for the municipality’s bonds subsequently thereto; this is true although the two proposed districts may embrace the same area or portions of the same area. Dade County v. State, 202 Ga. 191, 42 S.E.2d 439 (1947). City’s proceeding to validate bonds not barred by county filing proceeding to validate bonds for overlapping water district. - When the governing body of a county has fully complied with all the provisions of the Revenue Bond Law (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36) in the creation of a water district and caused proceedings to be filed for the validation of the county’s bonds, the fact that the governing body of a city located wholly within the area embraced in the county’s district has likewise fully complied with all the provisions of the law in the creation of a water district comprised only of the area located within its corporate limits, and caused proceedings to be filed to validate and confirm its bonds, does not constitute a legal reason why the city’s bonds should not be validated and confirmed. Dade County v. State, 202 Ga. 191, 42 S.E.2d 439 (1947). Standing to challenge bond validation. - Appeal filed by challengers to a trial court judgment confirming and validating a city’s bond issuance was dismissed because the challengers failed to present any evidence to establish the challengers’ standing under O.C.G.A.

§ 36-82-77(a) to become parties in the bond validation proceeding; thus, the challengers lacked standing to appeal the judgment in that proceeding. Sherman v. City of Atlanta, 317 Ga. 345, 730 S.E.2d 113 (2013). Trial court properly dismissed a county resident’s preemptive declaratory judgment action challenging the issuance of bonds for a development project on the ground that a bond validation petition under the Georgia Revenue Bond Law, O.C.G.A. § 36-82-60 et seq., in which the resident intervened was the exclusive forum for adjudication of the resident’s claims. Courts are not to render declaratory judgments if other statutory remedies have been specifically provided, as was the case here, and the resident’s claims were adequately addressed and adjudicated in the validation proceeding. Woodham v. City of Atlanta, 283 Ga. 95, 657 S.E.2d 528 (2008). Use of local school taxes for redevelopment. - School system, development authority, and others were properly granted summary judgment in a suit challenging the allocation of school taxes because the 2008 amendments to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VII(b) and O.C.G.A. § 36-44-9(g), governing tax allocation districts, changed the law and retroactively allowed use of local school taxes for general redevelopment purposes. Sherman v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 293 Ga. 268, 744 S.E.2d 26 (2013). Cited in Dade County v. State, 77 Ga. App. 139, 48 S.E.2d 144 (1948); United States v. City of Rossville, 249 F. Supp. 701 (N.D. Ga. 1966); Copeland v. State, 268 Ga. 375, 490 S.E.2d 68 (1997).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations, §§ 13, 74.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 23 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1984–2024 · leading case: Bldg. Auth. of Fulton Cnty. v. State, 321 S.E.2d 97 (Ga. 1984).
Bldg. Auth. of Fulton Cnty. v. State, 321 S.E.2d 97 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 4× “Both the Government Center bonds and the Retardation Center *243 bonds were the subject of validation proceedings brought pursuant to OCGA § 36-82-60 et seq. Charlene Upshaw Johnson intervened and raised several objections to validation.”
Sherman v. Dev. Auth., 730 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 36-82-60 et seq. OCGA § 36-62-1 et seq.”
Jones v. City of Atlanta, 908 S.E.2d 519 (Ga. 2024). · cites it 4× “]” The 1999 Master Bond Ordinance was adjudicated and validated by the Superior Court of Fulton County pursuant to Georgia’s Revenue Bond Law, OCGA § 36-82-60 et seq. This validation was essentially renewed when, in 2021, the Fulton County Superior Court issued an order…”
Nations v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 338 S.E.2d 240 (Ga. 1985). · cites it 4× “Subsequently, the State of Georgia initiated a bond validation proceeding pursuant to the Georgia Revenue Bond Law, OCGA § 36-82-60 et seq. Appellants here were permitted to intervene in the case, and raised numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to the validation of…”
Sherman v. City of Atlanta, 744 S.E.2d 689 (Ga. 2013). · cites it 2× “See generally OCGA §§ 36-82-60 to 36-82-85 (the “Revenue Bond Law”).”
Woodham v. City of Atlanta, 657 S.E.2d 528 (Ga. 2008). · cites it 4× “The State of Georgia instituted a bond validation proceeding under the Georgia Revenue Bond Law, OCGA § 36-82-60 et seq., to confirm and validate the issuance of City of Atlanta Tax Allocation Bonds to finance a project known as the Atlanta BeltLine Redevelopment Plan.”
Haney v. Dev. Auth. of Bremen, 519 S.E.2d 665 (Ga. 1999). · cites it 4× “Thus, in the absence of further legislation, the appellate courts of Georgia will hereafter be required to second-guess each and every order of a trial court requiring an unsuccessful litigant to post an appeal bond pursuant to OCGA § 50-15-2. Because I believe that such an…”
The Med. Ctr. Hosp. Auth. v. Columbus, Georgia Bd. of Tax Assessors, 788 S.E.2d 879 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 2× “Our Supreme Court has held consistently that [the Revenue Bond Law, OCGA § 36-82-60 et seq.] prevents any collateral attack by the county, county residents, or taxpayers who had proper notice of the validation proceedings but chose not to intervene or appeal.”
Citizens for Ethics in Gov't, LLC v. Atlanta Dev. Auth., 694 S.E.2d 680 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 2× “Woodham (“Woodham”) (collectively referred to herein as “Interve-nors”) 1 filed these appeals in connection with two bond validation proceedings filed under the Revenue Bond Law, OCGA § 36-82-60 et seq., involving the Atlanta Development Authority (the “Authority”), 13th Street…”
Ware v. Henry Cnty. Water & Sewerage Auth., 575 S.E.2d 654 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 2× “761-774, now codified at OCGA § 36-82-60 et seq. That law gives the power of eminent domain to local public entities having corporate powers and the right to issue revenue certificates.”
Copeland v. State, 490 S.E.2d 68 (Ga. 1997). · cites it 2× “1 OCGA § 36-82-60 et seq. 2 See OCGA § 36-82-77, which permits intervention by a resident of the governmental body which desires to issue such bonds, and allows an intervenor to appeal from any judgment rendered in the validation proceeding.”
Sherman v. Dev. Auth., 739 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 2× “A bond validation proceeding such as the one at issue is governed by Georgia’s Revenue Bond Law, OCGA § 36-82-60 et seq., and that law allows a private citizen to become a party to such proceedings.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.