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2018 Georgia Code 36-82-77 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 36 LOCAL GOVERNMENT

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ARTICLE 3 REVENUE BONDS

36-82-77. Hearing and judgment on validation; parties to proceedings; right of appeal; review of valuation of existing undertakings.

  1. Within the time prescribed in the order or such further time as he may fix, the judge of the superior court shall proceed to hear and determine all questions of law and of fact in the case and shall render judgment thereof. Any citizen of this state who is a resident of the governmental body which desires to issue such bonds may become a party to the proceedings at or before the time set for the hearing and any party thereto who is dissatisfied with the judgment of the court confirming and validating the issuance of the bonds or refusing to confirm and validate the issuance of the bonds and the security therefor may appeal from the judgment under the procedure provided by law in cases of injunction. Only a party to the proceedings at the time the judgment appealed from is rendered may appeal from such judgment.
  2. Whenever any governmental body values existing undertakings as permitted by law in connection with the issuance of bonds, the superior courts may review such action, which review shall be had in the proceedings to validate the revenue bonds.

(Ga. L. 1937, p. 761, § 13; Ga. L. 1939, p. 362, § 3; Ga. L. 1966, p. 48, § 2; Ga. L. 1987, p. 3, § 36.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

- See Lawson v. City of Moultrie, 194 Ga. 699, 22 S.E.2d 592 (1942).

Duty of trial court to review soundness of venture.

- It is the duty of the trial court on the hearing of an application to validate revenue anticipation bonds to determine from the evidence the fact of whether or not the venture is sound, feasible, and reasonable, and not to review the discretion of the municipal authorities in proposing the venture. Carter v. State, 93 Ga. App. 12, 90 S.E.2d 672 (1955).

Generally there can be but one action to validate either certificates or bonds; in either case all interventions would be heard in the validation proceedings, and the allegation that a declaratory judgment is necessary to avoid a multiplicity of actions is a conclusion of the pleader, contrary to the statutory provisions pertaining to validation of revenue anticipation bonds. Liner v. City of Rossville, 212 Ga. 664, 94 S.E.2d 862 (1956).

This section authorizes intervention of "any citizen of this state, resident of such municipality" in any proceeding to validate revenue anticipation bonds. Liner v. City of Rossville, 212 Ga. 664, 94 S.E.2d 862 (1956) (see O.C.G.A. § 36-82-77).

Standing to challenge bond validation.

- Appeal filed by challengers to a trial court judgment confirming and validating a city's bond issuance was dismissed because the challengers failed to present any evidence to establish the challengers standing under O.C.G.A. § 36-82-77(a) to become parties in the bond validation proceeding; thus, the challengers lacked standing to appeal the judgment in that proceeding. Sherman v. City of Atlanta, 317 Ga. 345, 730 S.E.2d 113 (2013).

Attorney who intervened in a bond validation proceeding pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-82-77(a) and then offered to withdraw the attorney's objections if the developers paid the attorney a substantial amount of money did not violate Ga. St. Bar R. 4-102(d):4.2(a) or Ga. St. Bar. R. 4-102(d):8.4(a)(4) because the attorney's conduct was not fraudulent; a party could intervene for ulterior and personal reasons and still have standing. In the Matter of Woodham, 296 Ga. 618, 769 S.E.2d 353 (2015).

Validity of agreement proper subject for superior court.

- Superior court had authority to adjudicate the validity of a Hotel/Motel Tax Operation and Maintenance Agreement for a stadium project even though the agreement did not act as security for the bonds, based on the court's jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions of law and of fact in the bond validation case and render judgment on those issues, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-82-77. Cottrell v. Atlanta Dev. Auth., 297 Ga. 1, 770 S.E.2d 616 (2015).

No right to jury trial.

- Bond validation proceeding is not one of class of cases, either in terms or by analogy, in which jury trials have ever existed as a matter of right; and it does not fall within Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XV, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XI). Steadham v. State, 224 Ga. 78, 159 S.E.2d 397, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 825, 89 S. Ct. 87, 21 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1968).

Sufficiency of information in engineering report.

- Information contained in engineering report introduced in evidence met the statutory requirements as to certainty and definiteness, in that it showed with reasonable certainty the nature, kind, and location of the improvements and described and defined with reasonable fullness and definiteness the undertaking including the estimated costs thereof. Carter v. State, 93 Ga. App. 12, 90 S.E.2d 672 (1955).

Burden of making out case on intervenors when stipulations make prima facie case.

- When citizens as intervenors file an intervention objecting to the validation of revenue anticipation bonds, the burden is on the plaintiff in the proceeding to make out a prima facie case, but when the parties to such a proceeding by stipulation and other admissions admit sufficient material allegations to make out a prima facie case it is not error for the judge to rule that the burden is upon intervenors to introduce evidence in support of their intervention. Dade County v. State, 77 Ga. App. 139, 48 S.E.2d 144 (1948).

Intervention seeking validation denial for nonconformity with law not subject to dismissal.

- Intervention filed by a resident and taxpayer of the municipality proposing to issue revenue bonds which seeks to have the validation denied and the proceedings dismissed because such petition was not filed in conformity with such laws is not subject to demurrer (now motion to dismiss). State v. Smallwood, 103 Ga. App. 400, 119 S.E.2d 297 (1961).

Intervention in bond validation proceeding.

- Challenger in an action validating and confirming taxable revenue bonds lacked standing to intervene in the action as a result of failing to comply with the intervention procedures set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24(c); and, because the challenger lacked standing to become a party in the trial court, the challenger also lacked standing to appeal the trial court's judgment, therefore, the appeal was dismissed. Sherman v. Dev. Auth., 324 Ga. App. 23, 749 S.E.2d 29 (2013).

Exception must be taken to judgment validating revenue anticipation bonds within 20 days from such judgment, and, when the superior court of a county enters an order validating water revenue certificates of a city on February 16, and exception is not taken to such judgment until March 16, (a period of 28 days), the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to review that judgment. Drury v. City of Woodbine, 96 Ga. App. 158, 99 S.E.2d 550 (1957).

State a necessary party in intervention in validation proceeding.

- On appeal by intervening taxpayers and citizens from a judgment of the superior court overruling their objections and validating the bonds, the state is a necessary and indispensable party, and, it appearing that the state had not been made a party to the bill of exceptions or served with a copy of the bill of exception, the writ of error is properly dismissed. Darby v. City of Vidalia, 75 Ga. App. 804, 44 S.E.2d 454 (1947).

Notice and a hearing required before dismissal of intervention complaints.

- Trial court erred in dismissing a complaint by intervenors objecting to a bond validation proceeding without notice and a hearing on the dismissal issue, although the trial court found that the intervenors had intervened for the improper purpose of seeking $ 1.3 million from developers to avoid the litigation. Citizens for Ethics in Gov't, LLC v. Atlanta Dev. Auth., 303 Ga. App. 724, 694 S.E.2d 680 (2010), cert. denied, No. S10C1350, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 722 (Ga. 2010).

When proper issue of fact is raised as to feasibility of plan to validate refunding bonds, it is for the trial court to determine, under the evidence, such issue. Dade County v. State, 75 Ga. App. 330, 43 S.E.2d 434 (1947); Carter v. State, 93 Ga. App. 12, 90 S.E.2d 672 (1955).

Bond approval not proper.

- Trial court erred by validating taxable revenue bonds for a county development authority as the order validating the bonds failed to set forth sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the court's holdings and, thus, failed to satisfy the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a). Sherman v. Dev. Auth., 320 Ga. App. 689, 740 S.E.2d 663 (2013).

Standard of review.

- When the trial court has concluded the project promoted the statutory objectives and there is evidence to support the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court will find no error. Alexander v. Macon-Bibb County Urban Dev. Auth. & Urban Properties #47, 257 Ga. 181, 357 S.E.2d 62 (1987).

Remand to trial court for preparation of findings and conclusions.

- Judgment granting the state's petition to validate revenue bonds under the Revenue Bond Law, O.C.G.A. § 36-82-60 et seq., was remanded to the trial court because the trial court failed to mention in the judgment the citizen who intervened in the proceedings and to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to various grounds pursued by the citizen as required by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a); prior to the judgment, the citizen requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. Sherman v. Dev. Auth., 314 Ga. App. 237, 723 S.E.2d 528 (2012).

Validation upheld.

- After a trial court required two intervenors to post a bond of $625,000 with regard to the intervenors' challenge to the public improvement bond approved by a city's building authority for a sewer project, the trial court properly validated the bond by following all necessary procedural requirements and the bond did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I(a) since the city's payment for the use of the sewer project was a debt specifically authorized under the constitution pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I(a). Berry v. City of E. Point, 277 Ga. App. 649, 627 S.E.2d 391 (2006).

Memorandum of agreement establishing valuation method part of lease agreement.

- Because a memorandum of agreement establishing the valuation methodology to be used in assessing ad valorem taxes on a leasehold estate was referenced by the lease and dictated the methodology to be used to value a corporation's leasehold estate for ad valorem tax purposes, it constituted an integral part of the lease agreement and was properly before the trial court; in a transaction in which revenue bonds will be paid through lease proceeds, all agreements relating to the lease are properly within the trial court's jurisdiction. Sherman v. Dev. Auth., 317 Ga. App. 345, 730 S.E.2d 113 (2012).

Cited in Gibbs v. City of Social Circle, 191 Ga. 422, 12 S.E.2d 335 (1940); Mays v. State, 110 Ga. App. 881, 140 S.E.2d 223 (1965); Peagler v. State, 223 Ga. 886, 159 S.E.2d 72 (1968); Nations v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 255 Ga. 324, 338 S.E.2d 240 (1985); Youngblood v. State, 259 Ga. 864, 388 S.E.2d 671 (1990).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations, §§ 369, 372.

C.J.S.

- 64A C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, §§ 2139, 2140, 2173.

Cases Citing Georgia Code 36-82-77 From Courtlistener.com

Total Results: 16

Dev. Auth. of Cobb Cnty. v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-06-03

Citation: 829 S.E.2d 160

Snippet: development is to be privately financed. See OCGA § 36-82-77 (a) ("Any citizen of this state who is a resident

Savage v. State of Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-06-29

Citation: 297 Ga. 627, 774 S.E.2d 624

Snippet: trial court’s validation decision. See OCGA § 36-82-77; 13 Greene County Dev. Auth.,

Cottrell v. Atlanta Development Authority, D/B/A Invest Atlanta

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-03-16

Snippet: on those issues. (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 36-82-77. See also Berry v. City of East Point, supra,

COTTRELL Et Al. v. ATLANTA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Et Al.

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-03-16

Citation: 297 Ga. 1, 770 S.E.2d 616, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 179

Snippet: judgment” on those issues. (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 36-82-77. See also Berry v. City of East Point,

In re Woodham

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-02-16

Citation: 296 Ga. 618, 769 S.E.2d 353, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 137

Snippet: (concerning bond validation generally). See also OCGA § 36-82-77 (a) (concerning revenue bond validation) (“Any

in the Matter of John Floyd Woodham

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-02-16

Snippet: (concerning bond validation generally). See also OCGA § 36-82-77 (a) (concerning revenue bond validation) (“Any

in the Matter of John Floyd Woodham

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-02-16

Snippet: (concerning bond validation generally). See also OCGA § 36-82-77 (a) (concerning revenue bond validation) (“Any

Sherman v. City of Atlanta

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2013-06-17

Citation: 293 Ga. 169, 744 S.E.2d 689, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 1818, 2013 WL 2927578, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 556

Snippet: a party under the Revenue Bond Law. See OCGA § 36-82-77 (a) (“Any citizen of this state who is a resident

Woodham v. City of Atlanta

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2008-02-11

Citation: 657 S.E.2d 528, 283 Ga. 95, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 416, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 136

Snippet: and the city of Atlanta, intervened under OCGA § 36-82-77(a) and filed objections. After a series of hearings

Quarterman v. Douglas County Board of Commissioners

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2004-09-13

Citation: 602 S.E.2d 651, 278 Ga. 363, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 2940, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 628

Snippet: validation proceeding without motion pursuant to OCGA § 36-82-77. However, the record does not contain such request

Copeland v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1997-09-15

Citation: 490 S.E.2d 68, 268 Ga. 375, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 3410, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 516, 1997 WL 566261

Snippet: NOTES [1] OCGA § 36-82-60 et seq. [2] See OCGA § 36-82-77, which permits intervention by a resident of the

Youngblood v. State of Ga.

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1990-02-15

Citation: 388 S.E.2d 671, 259 Ga. 864

Snippet: that the notice provisions of OCGA §§ 36-82-76; 36-82-77 (a) are insufficient to meet the requirements

Alexander v. MacOn-bibb County Urban Development Authority & Urban Properties 47

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1987-06-19

Citation: 357 S.E.2d 62, 257 Ga. 181, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 785

Snippet: permitted to intervene in this proceeding. OCGA § 36-82-77. The trial court entered judgment determining

Nations v. Downtown Development Authority

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1986-07-15

Citation: 345 S.E.2d 581, 256 Ga. 158, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 756

Snippet: to intervene in this proceeding[3] under OCGA § 36-82-77 (a). The trial court overruled their objections

Nations v. Downtown Development Authority

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1985-12-11

Citation: 338 S.E.2d 240, 255 Ga. 324, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 1004

Snippet: issuance of the bonds or refusing to do so. OCGA § 36-82-77 (a). These statutory provisions govern the scope

CHARLTON DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. Charlton County

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1984-07-02

Citation: 317 S.E.2d 204, 253 Ga. 208, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 853

Snippet: judgment could have been appealed. OCGA §§ 36-82-76, 36-82-77 and 36-82-78; Miller v. Columbus, 229 Ga. 234