Constitutionality.

- See Lawson v. City of Moultrie, 194 Ga. 699, 22 S.E.2d 592 (1942).

Bonds not debts within constitutional limitations.

- Revenue anticipation bonds issued under the Revenue Bond Law (see O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36) do not subject the political subdivision issuing the bonds to any pecuniary liability thereon and are therefore not debts against such political subdivision within the meaning of the constitutional provision limiting such indebtedness. Fort Oglethorpe v. Catoosa County, 80 Ga. App. 188, 55 S.E.2d 753 (1949).

Contract between county and airport authority.

- Even though, under a contract between county and airport authority for use by the county of an expanded airport facility, the consideration to be paid by the county was not expressed in terms of a definite dollar amount, it was not an unconstitutional "new debt". The contract was a valid intergovernmental contract and the consideration represented the authority's lawful "revenue pledged to the payment of" the bonds. Clayton County Airport Auth. v. State, 265 Ga. 24, 453 S.E.2d 8 (1995).

County was authorized to pledge its taxing authority as security for its obligation to pay for the use of an expanded airport facility under a contract between the county and an airport authority and it was error to deny validation of the authority's revenue bonds on the basis of the county's pledge. Clayton County Airport Auth. v. State, 265 Ga. 24, 453 S.E.2d 8 (1995).

Under a contract between county and airport authority for use by the county of an expanded airport facility, although the county's consideration would not be paid directly to the authority, but paid to the custodian of the authority's sinking fund, the consideration did not lose the consideration's character as "revenue" for the authority and such payment scheme was not a reason to deny validation of the authority's revenue bonds. Clayton County Airport Auth. v. State, 265 Ga. 24, 453 S.E.2d 8 (1995).

Development authority not required to own or operate project.

- Proposed bond transaction did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I and O.C.G.A. § 36-82-66 of the Revenue Bond Law merely because the development authority would not own or operate the proposed stadium; the development authority could use bond proceeds for paying all or part of the cost of any project (O.C.G.A. § 36-62-6(a)(13)), not only those projects the authority developed, and the authority could pay the costs of another government entity's project pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-62-9. Cottrell v. Atlanta Dev. Auth., 297 Ga. 1, 770 S.E.2d 616 (2015).

Cited in Miller v. Head, 186 Ga. 694, 198 S.E. 680 (1938); Stephenson v. State, 219 Ga. 652, 135 S.E.2d 380 (1964); Hospital Auth. v. Stewart, 226 Ga. 530, 175 S.E.2d 857 (1970).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations, § 209 et seq.

ALR.

- Estoppel by recitals in municipal bonds as to lawfulness of issue, 86 A.L.R. 1057; 158 A.L.R. 938.

Subsequent issue of bonds by public body as impairing obligation to prior creditors, 87 A.L.R. 397.

Right of creditor of public body to full or pro rata payment when fund out of which obligation is payable is insufficient to pay all like obligations of equal dignity, 90 A.L.R. 717; 171 A.L.R. 1033.

Validity of municipal bond issue as against owners of property annexation of which to municipality became effective after date of election at which issue was approved by voters, 10 A.L.R.2d 559.

When limitations begin to run against actions on public securities or obligations to be paid out of special or particular fund, 50 A.L.R.2d 271.