No disposal without legislative authority.

- As a general proposition of law a county cannot, without legislative authority, dispose of real estate owned by the county. Head v. Lee, 203 Ga. 191, 45 S.E.2d 666 (1947).

Power not necessarily exclusive.

- This section does not vest in the ordinary (now judge of the probate court) exclusive power of sale of the county's property when the General Assembly confers such powers upon county commissioners of a particular county. Dyer v. Martin, 132 Ga. 445, 64 S.E. 475 (1909) (decided prior to revision of section by Ga. L. 1935, p. 110, § 1; see O.C.G.A. § 36-9-2).

Authority for sale.

- Proper resolution, duly recorded, is the authority by which the county's title for land may be divested by deed. Head v. Lee, 203 Ga. 191, 45 S.E.2d 666 (1947).

In the absence of a recorded order authorizing the conveyance in question, or subsequent ratification of the deed, the purported conveyance by the county did not pass the county's title for the land therein described. Head v. Lee, 203 Ga. 191, 45 S.E.2d 666 (1947).

Failure to comply with O.C.G.A.

§ 36-9-2 not a bar to bona fide purchaser's title. - Although a county failed to comply with O.C.G.A. § 36-9-2 by recording a transfer in the minutes when the county conveyed the county's interest in property, which the county had formerly acquired by eminent domain, to the county development authority, a subsequent purchaser was a bona fide purchaser without notice of this irregularity under O.C.G.A. § 23-1-20, so that the county's title was superior to that of the condemnee's heirs, who sought to repurchase the property under O.C.G.A. § 36-9-3(g)(3)(B). Darling Int'l, Inc. v. Carter, 294 Ga. 455, 754 S.E.2d 347 (2014).

When order not on minutes.

- When county commissioners authorize a conveyance of land brought in by the county at a tax sale, but fail to put the order of authorization on the minutes, as required by this section, it is competent for the commissioners at a subsequent meeting of the board to ratify the deed to the purchaser from the county, and to cause the authorization to be put on the minutes. Braswell v. Palmer, 191 Ga. 262, 11 S.E.2d 889 (1940) (see O.C.G.A. § 36-9-2).

Tax sale not authorized.

- Fact that a purported sale of county-owned property was by tax sale did not operate to negate or otherwise nullify the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 36-9-2. West v. Fulton County, 267 Ga. 456, 479 S.E.2d 722 (1997).

County commissioner is a public officer occupying a fiduciary relationship requiring the commissioner to exercise the utmost good faith, fidelity, and integrity in dealing with county property as a trustee and servant of the people, which the commissioner may not sell without legislative sanction unless the property's use shall have been abandoned by or become unserviceable to the county. If county property be sold by the commissioner, the commissioner shall obtain the most advantageous price. Timbs v. Straub, 216 Ga. 451, 117 S.E.2d 462 (1960).

County property which has become unserviceable may be sold by order of the county commissioners at private sale. Malcom v. Fulton County, 209 Ga. 392, 73 S.E.2d 173 (1952).

Property becomes unserviceable, within the meaning of this section, when the property cannot be beneficially or advantageously used under all circumstances for county purposes. Malcom v. Fulton County, 209 Ga. 392, 73 S.E.2d 173 (1952).

Denial or change of use of property.

- County board of commissioners has right to deny use of any public property if the property is used in a wasteful or ineffective manner. Wheeler v. DeKalb County, 249 Ga. 678, 292 S.E.2d 855 (1982).

When public property is a building constructed from funds of a designated bond issue for a particular use, the board of commissioners may change the intended use of the building when circumstances which gave rise to the bond issue change so that the building constructed from those funds is no longer needed for that purpose, and the property's continued use for that purpose would be a waste of county resources. Wheeler v. DeKalb County, 249 Ga. 678, 292 S.E.2d 855 (1982).

Sheriff had power to modify county-owned property within exclusive use.

- County sheriff had the independent authority to repaint and remark county-owned sheriff's vehicles assigned to the sheriff's exclusive use, but lacked the authority to modify portions of a county-owned building in which the sheriff's office and jail were housed, as the facility was shared with the superior, state, and magistrate courts of Clayton County, as well as the clerks of those courts, the solicitor general, and the district attorney, and hence, not under the sheriff's exclusive use. As a result, subject to compliance with O.C.G.A. § 40-8-91, summary judgment in favor of the county as to the extent of the sheriff's authority was reversed as to the former, but affirmed as to the latter. Hill v. Clayton County Bd. of Comm'rs, 283 Ga. App. 15, 640 S.E.2d 638 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Batson-Cook Co., 291 Ga. 114, 728 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. 2012).

Sale of undivided interest.

- This section does not warrant the sale of an undivided one-fifth of a courthouse and lot in actual daily use for county purposes. Hunnicutt v. City of Atlanta, 104 Ga. 1, 30 S.E. 500 (1898) (decided prior to revision of section by Ga. L. 1935, p. 110, § 1; see O.C.G.A. § 36-9-2).

Lease for ninety-nine years.

- Commissioners cannot lease county property in such manner as to put the property out of the power of the county authorities for 99 years to devote the property to the exclusive use of the county. Equity will enjoin use under such a lease. Town of Decatur v. DeKalb County, 130 Ga. 483, 61 S.E. 23 (1908) (decided prior to revision of section by Ga. L. 1935, p. 110, § 1).

Applicability to lease.

- When a lease of county property ran on a month-to-month basis, giving the lessee only a usufruct with no estate passing out of the county, this section is inapplicable since there was no conveyance of county property. Overlin v. Boyd, 598 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1979) (see O.C.G.A. § 36-9-2).

Nature of duty.

- When a local law gives a board of commissioners exclusive jurisdiction in governing and controlling county property, the commissioners have the duty to maintain control over county property, but this duty coexists with the duty to exercise that control in the manner the commissioners deem most beneficial to the county. Smith v. Board of Comm'rs, 244 Ga. 133, 259 S.E.2d 74 (1979).

Usufruct of airport.

- Contract by a county granting a usufruct of an airport to a private corporation for a period of years is not a disposition of county property requiring the antecedent resolution of county authorities. Southern Airways Co. v. DeKalb County, 102 Ga. App. 850, 118 S.E.2d 234 (1960).

Power of commissioners.

- Those county officers who by virtue of their office have charge of the county affairs may, by proper order to be entered on their minutes, direct the disposal of and execute good and sufficient title to lands belonging to the county which are not necessary for public use. Head v. Lee, 203 Ga. 191, 45 S.E.2d 666 (1947).

Ordinary (now judge of the probate court) had power to lease directly to an individual certain realty for use in operating a filling station as it was then being and had been used for 13 years. Such a lease, having been so executed by the ordinary (now county governing authority) was not void on the ground that the lease was not authorized by law, or that the interest thereby created extended beyond the term of the ordinary (now judge of the probate court) then in office, or that the lease amounted to a commercial transaction in which the county was not authorized by law to engage. Black v. Forsyth County, 193 Ga. 571, 19 S.E.2d 297 (1942).

Signature on deed.

- If the county commissioners authorize the sale of county land, the deed may lawfully be signed by the chair in the name of the board. Braswell v. Palmer, 191 Ga. 262, 11 S.E.2d 889 (1940).

Statute of limitation.

- As the object of O.C.G.A. § 36-9-2 is to give information to the public, the statute of limitation in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 was inapplicable because the action arose from a claim that a public officer had failed to perform the officer's official duty. Dade County v. Miami Land Co., 253 Ga. 776, 325 S.E.2d 750 (1985).

Cited in Atlanta Title & Trust Co. v. Tidwell, 173 Ga. 499, 160 S.E. 620 (1931); Turner v. Johnston, 183 Ga. 176, 187 S.E. 864 (1936); Mayor of Fort Valley v. Levin, 183 Ga. 837, 190 S.E. 14 (1937); McDonald v. Marshall, 185 Ga. 438, 195 S.E. 571 (1938); Clayton v. Taylor, 223 Ga. 346, 155 S.E.2d 387 (1967); Shoemaker v. Department of Transp., 240 Ga. 573, 241 S.E.2d 820 (1978); Building Auth. v. State, 253 Ga. 242, 321 S.E.2d 97 (1984).

Ability of county commissioners to lease county property.

- See 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U77-3.

Permit to build sewer across street.

- County commissioners may grant to a private corporation a permit to construct a sewer across a street dedicated to the county. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-36.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, § 485 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 223 et seq.