Authority exclusively granted to county.

- Authority granted under O.C.G.A. § 36-9-5(a) is given exclusively to the county and is not shared with the city. Therefore, the county does not need the city's approval before condemning property within the city limits when, as here, the condemnation is reasonably necessary to provide a public service. Brunswick Landing, LLC v. Glynn County, 301 Ga. App. 288, 687 S.E.2d 271 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0558, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 246 (Ga. 2010).

Power of commissioners.

- County commissioners with power to levy and tax also have the power to act under this section. Dunn v. O'Neill, 144 Ga. 823, 88 S.E. 190 (1916) (see O.C.G.A. § 36-9-5).

Authority to levy tax.

- Ordinary (now judge of the probate court) had the power to levy an extra tax to carry into effect the provisions of this section, without the recommendation of the grand jury, but the order levying such extra tax should clearly and distinctly state the object and purpose for which the tax is levied. Barlow v. Ordinary of Sumter County, 47 Ga. 639 (1873) (see O.C.G.A. § 36-9-5).

Discretion of county officers.

- Necessities of the various counties in regard to these matters are to be determined by the peculiar conditions surrounding each county; and, therefore, the sound judgment of the county authorities in each case must be relied upon to provide the public with proper buildings on the one hand, and to protect the taxpayer from useless and unnecessary burdens in regard to such matters on the other. Commissioners of Habersham County v. Porter Mfg. Co., 103 Ga. 613, 30 S.E. 547 (1898).

Authority to build courthouse.

- Local Act giving board of commissioners jurisdiction over county matters authorizes the board of commissioners to contract for building of county courthouse. Matthews v. Hussey, 148 Ga. 526, 97 S.E. 437 (1918).

Officers having jurisdiction of county affairs are not deprived of all discretion by this section as to the manner of providing a courthouse or the character of the building or the building's equipment. On that subject the county authorities have broad discretion, which should not be disturbed by the courts except cautiously, nor unless it is clear and manifest that the county authorities are abusing the discretion vested in the authorities by law. Manry v. Gleaton, 164 Ga. 402, 138 S.E. 777 (1927); Cowart v. Manry, 166 Ga. 612, 144 S.E. 21 (1928) (see O.C.G.A. § 36-9-5).

Power to donate to chamber of commerce.

- When the applicable revenue statutes were construed together with Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Para. XII and Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I (see, now, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. VI and Art. IX, Sec. IV), it was held that the statutes did not confer power or authority on a county board of commissioners to donate county funds derived from taxation or from other sources to a chamber of commerce, freight bureau, or convention and tourist bureau even if such donations were intended to accomplish a lawful purpose. Atlanta Chamber of Commerce v. McRae, 174 Ga. 590, 163 S.E. 701 (1932).

Sheriff had power to modify county-owned property within exclusive use.

- County sheriff had the independent authority to repaint and remark county-owned sheriff's vehicles assigned to the sheriff's exclusive use, but lacked the authority to modify portions of a county-owned building in which the sheriff's office and jail were housed, as the facility was shared with the superior, state, and magistrate courts of Clayton County, as well as the clerks of those courts, the solicitor general, and the district attorney, and hence, not under the sheriff's exclusive use. As a result, subject to compliance with O.C.G.A. § 40-8-91, summary judgment in favor of the county as to the extent of the sheriff's authority was reversed as to the former, but affirmed as to the latter. Hill v. Clayton County Bd. of Comm'rs, 283 Ga. App. 15, 640 S.E.2d 638 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Batson-Cook Co., 291 Ga. 114, 728 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. 2012).

County was authorized to exercise the county's right of eminent domain in connection with the expansion of a detention center because the county had jurisdiction over the maintenance of jails in the county under O.C.G.A. § 36-9-5(a), the operation of a jail constituted a public purpose pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. V, and the property owner did not identify any general law limiting the right of the county to exercise the county's power of eminent domain. Brunswick Landing, LLC v. Glynn County, 301 Ga. App. 288, 687 S.E.2d 271 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0558, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 246 (Ga. 2010).

Cited in Atlanta Title & Trust Co. v. Tidwell, 173 Ga. 499, 160 S.E. 620 (1931); Turner v. Johnston, 183 Ga. 176, 187 S.E. 864 (1936); Jackson v. Gasses, 230 Ga. 712, 198 S.E.2d 657 (1973); Wheeler v. DeKalb County, 249 Ga. 678, 292 S.E.2d 855 (1982); Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003); Lawson v. Lincoln County, 292 Ga. App. 527, 664 S.E.2d 900 (2008).

Judges' and clerks' offices at courthouse.

- Judges of the probate courts and clerks of the superior courts, being constitutional county officers, have a right to maintain their offices in the county courthouse, unless special circumstances make it impractical for judges and clerks to be located there. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 78-15.

Office of county school superintendent is not required to be located in county courthouse. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-31.

Storage of records at home.

- It is not proper for a county tax commissioner to store tax records in the commissioner's home. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-75.

Unauthorized poll.

- In the absence of any statutory authority, the board of commissioners would not be authorized to expend county funds to conduct an election in the nature of a "straw vote" or public opinion poll to determine whether to construct a new county building. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-70.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, § 478 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 221.

ALR.

- Applicability of municipal building regulation to state or county buildings, 31 A.L.R. 450.