O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-14-2 (2019)

Permit required for use; use not authorized where officers paid on fee system; operation by registered or certified peace officers

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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(a) The law enforcement officers of the various counties, municipalities, colleges, and universities may use speed detection devices only if the sheriffs of such counties, or the governing authorities of such counties, or the governing authorities of such municipalities, or the president of such college or university shall approve of and desire the use of such devices and shall apply to the Department of Public Safety for a permit to use such devices in accordance with this chapter. (b) No county sheriff, county or municipal governing authority, college, or university shall be authorized to use speed detection devices where any arresting officer or official of the court having jurisdiction of traffic cases is paid on a fee system. This subsection shall not apply to any official receiving a recording fee. (c) A permit shall not be issued by the Department of Public Safety to an applicant under this Code section unless the applicant provides law enforcement services by certified peace officers 24 hours a day, seven days a week on call or on duty or allows only peace officers employed full time by the applicant to operate speed detection devices. Speed detection devices can only be operated by registered or certified peace officers of the county sheriff, county, municipality, college, or university to which the permit is applicable; provided, however, that an automated traffic enforcement safety device may be operated by an agent or registered or certified peace officers of the county sheriff, county, or municipality to which the permit is applicable. Persons

operating the speed detection devices must be registered or certified by the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council as peace officers and certified by the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council as operators of speed detection devices; provided, however, that agents may operate automated traffic enforcement safety devices without such registrations or certifications.

History

(Ga. L. 1968, p. 425, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 2254, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 771, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 586, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1281, § 6; Ga. L. 1997, p. 956, § 1; Ga. L. 1999, p. 1227, § 1; Ga. L. 2018, p. 1057, § 3/HB 978.)

Annotations

Cross references. - Certification of persons employed to use speed detection devices, § 35-8-12. Law reviews. - For note on the 1999

amendment to this Code section, see 16 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 192 (1999). For comment on State v. Tomanelli, 153 Conn. 365, 216 A.2d 625 (1966), discussing judicial notice of radar speedometer guidance, see 18 Mercer L. Rev. 299 (1966).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Use of device not restricted. - Phrase ‘‘in accordance with the provisions of O.C.G.A. Ch. 14, T. 40’’ modifies the application for a permit rather than the use of the speed detection device, and a total and unswerving compliance with the

chapter is not required in such use. Ferguson v. State, 163 Ga. App. 171, 292 S.E.2d 87 (1982). Admissibility in evidence. - See Wiggins v. State, 249 Ga. 302, 290 S.E.2d 427 (1982).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Construction of section. - Ga. L. 1968, p. 425, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-14-2) should be construed in light of the evil it was designed to remedy, which ‘‘evil’’ was the possible abuse of the use of such devices by law enforcement officers who were compensated on a percentage fee basis. 1975 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 75-10.

Eligibility to use detection devices. - Absent independent legal authorization, a county marshal or deputy marshal does not have authority to apply for or use speed detection devices. 2005 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2005-1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 265. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 944 et seq.

C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 19, 28 et seq., 69 et seq., 74. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 1641 et seq.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 3 cases, 1992–2002 · leading case: Stone v. State, 571 S.E.2d 488 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).

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Stone v. State, 571 S.E.2d 488 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 2× “See OCGA §§ 40-14-2; 40-14-3; 40-14-10. The trial court noted that, although he could not tell whether the map showed that the officer was operating in the city limits of Hampton, he would consider the radar detection evidence to be inadmissible.”

Thomas v. State, 560 S.E.2d 745 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 2× “Thomas also claims that the State did not present any proof that the City of Camilla had a permit authorizing its use of a radar unit, as required by OCGA § 40-14-2. Our review of the transcripts, however, reveals that Thomas did not preserve this issue for review.”

Brooker v. State, 426 S.E.2d 39 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 4× “” OCGA § 40-14-2 (a). In the instant case, the State submitted copies of DPS permits issued to the Cobb County Board of Commissioners “for the use of a speed detection device at [certain specifically] authorized location(s).”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.