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Call Now: 904-383-7448As used in this chapter, the term:
(3.1) "Department" means the Department of Revenue.
(9.1) "Natural person" means an individual human being and does not include any firm, partnership, association, corporation, or trust.
The term salvage motor vehicle shall not include any motor vehicle for which a total loss claim has been paid which vehicle has sustained only cosmetic damage from causes other than fire or flood.
(Ga. L. 1961, p. 68, § 2; Ga. L. 1962, p. 79, § 1; Ga. L. 1964, p. 178, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 518, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 644, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 40; Ga. L. 1982, p. 152, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1984, p. 781, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1186, § 6; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1657, § 4; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 3; Ga. L. 1993, p. 1260, § 4; Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, § 4-1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1173, § 1-5; Ga. L. 2004, p. 452, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 334, § 15-1/HB 501; Ga. L. 2007, p. 635, § 1/HB 183.)
- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2007, a comma was deleted following "Code Section 40-1-1" in paragraph (3).
- For note on 1990 amendment of this Code section, see 7 Georgia. St. U.L. Rev. 329 (1990).
- "Lien," as used in Ga. L. 1964, p. 178, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-3-2) , means a lien created by operation of law and not by contract, thus excluding security interests. Atlanta Truck Serv., Inc. v. Associates Com. Corp., 146 Ga. App. 170, 246 S.E.2d 2 (1978).
- Mere holding of title as a lessor of a leased motor vehicle does not give rise to a security interest therein, unless the interest arose under a lease intended as security. First Nat'l Bank v. Strother Ford, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 749, 374 S.E.2d 203 (1988).
- "Security interest holder" is not a purchaser or vendee of, or a successor in title to, the motor vehicle in question; rather, even though in physical possession of the vehicle's certificate of title, the possessor is only the holder of a legally recognized interest therein. Wooten v. G.M.H. Auto Sales, Inc., 187 Ga. App. 331, 370 S.E.2d 165 (1988).
- Automobile lessor does not, merely by initiating a foreclosure action in regard to a vehicle, thereby acquire any status as a secured party for purposes of obtaining a priority over the holder of a prior validly perfected mechanic's lien. First Nat'l Bank v. Strother Ford, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 749, 374 S.E.2d 203 (1988).
- When a seller delivered possession of the automobile to the buyer and the transaction was complete as between them, even though compliance had not yet been made with the applicable recording and insurance provisions, the buyer was the "owner" of the automobile, and the buyer alone, and not the seller or the seller's insurer, was liable to a third party for injuries sustained in an accident while the buyer was driving the automobile. American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 149 Ga. App. 280, 253 S.E.2d 825 (1979).
- Under Ga. L. 1961, p. 68, (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 3, T. 40), the owner of an automobile must necessarily be a natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation. A person doing business in a trade name could be none of these except a natural person. Samples v. Georgia Mut. Ins. Co., 110 Ga. App. 297, 138 S.E.2d 463 (1964).
- Caterpillar 977L Traxcavator does not fall under definition of "motor vehicle" found either in O.C.G.A. § 10-1-31(a)(4) or general definition of "motor vehicle" under O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(33) but does fit the definition of "special mobile equipment" under O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(59). Battle v. Yancey Bros. Co., 157 Ga. App. 277, 277 S.E.2d 280 (1981).
- Motor vehicle which was a welded-together composite of parts of two cars was a "rebuilt motor vehicle" rather than a "salvage motor vehicle." Bill Davidson Buick, Inc. v. Sims, 187 Ga. App. 81, 369 S.E.2d 285 (1988).
- To the extent that a debtor argued that a creditor's security interest had to be in writing, the need for a writing, as contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 40-3-2, was obviated because the debtor admitted on the stand that a vehicle constituted the collateral for the loans the creditor made to the debtor. Allen v. Santana, 303 Ga. App. 844, 695 S.E.2d 314 (2010).
Cited in Wooden v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 852, 162 S.E.2d 222 (1968); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Georgia Steel, Inc., 25 Bankr. 796 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982).
No particular form of "security instrument" is prescribed by Ga. L. 1961, p. 68 (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 3, T. 40), and any written agreement that secures the payment or performance of an obligation should suffice as a "security instrument." 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 308.
- Caterpillar tractor, hyster, and bulldozer used in snaking logs from swamps are "special mobile equipment." 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-109.
- Security interest must first be perfected in accordance with the Uniform Commercial Code (see now O.C.G.A. T. 11), and then in accordance with Ga. L. 1961, p. 68 (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 3, T. 40), for "special mobile equipment." 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-109.
- Mobile home is included under the definition of the term "vehicle" as a mobile home is a device by which a person or property may be transported or drawn upon a highway. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 303.
- 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 38, 47, 50. 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Liens, §§ 1, 3.
- 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 96 et seq., 193.
- Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act (U.L.A.) § 1.
- Who is "owner" within statute making owner responsible for injury or death inflicted by operator of automobile, 74 A.L.R.3d 739.
No results found for Georgia Code 40-3-2.