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(Code 1981, §40-5-69, enacted by Ga. L. 1983, p. 1000, § 1; Code 1981, §40-5-67, as redesignated by Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 4; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2564, § 5; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1600, § 2; Ga. L. 1997, p. 760, § 19; Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, § 5-28; Ga. L. 2016, p. 323, § 1-3/HB 205.)
The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, designated the existing provisions of the introductory paragraph of subsection (b) as paragraph (b)(1); redesignated former paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3) as present subparagraphs (b)(1)(A) through (b)(1)(C), respectively; substituted "45 day" for "30 day" in subparagraphs (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B); designated the ending paragraph of subsection (b) as paragraph (b)(2), and, in paragraph (b)(2), in the first sentence, substituted "A temporary" for "This temporary" at the beginning, and inserted "issued under this subsection", substituted "such temporary" for "the temporary" in the second sentence, and substituted "expiration of a temporary driving permit" for "expiration of the temporary permit" in the last sentence.
- Ga. L. 1994, p. 1600, § 11, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the provisions of the Act shall apply only to cases arising out of arrests occurring on or after January 1, 1995, except that the provisions amending subsection (a) of Code Section 40-6-391.1, restricting the acceptance of a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of violating Code Section 40-6-391, and the provisions amending subsection (c) of Code Section 40-6-391, changing the criminal penalties for violations of the section, shall become effective July 1, 1994, and except that the provisions amending subsection (g) of Code Section 40-5-67.1, relating to the time for requesting a hearing on an administrative suspension, the stay of a suspension pending such hearing, and the early termination of an administrative suspension under certain conditions shall apply to cases pending on July 1, 1994.
Ga. L. 1997, p. 760, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Teen-age and Adult Driver Responsibility Act'."
Ga. L. 1997, p. 760, § 27, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment made by the Act to this Code section shall apply to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1997, and shall not apply to offenses committed prior to that date.
- For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 203 (1997). For note on 1992 amendment of this Code section, see 9 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 298 (1992). For note, "Rodriguez v. State: Addressing Georgia's Implied Consent Requirements for Non-English-Speaking Drivers," see 54 Mercer L. Rev. 1253 (2003).
- Suspension of a driver's license at an administrative hearing is not punishment, nor is the hearing a prosecution for the purposes of double jeopardy. Kirkpatrick v. State, 219 Ga. App. 307, 464 S.E.2d 882 (1995).
- Defendant's constitutional claims to the implied consent statutes were without merit since the defendant, a Spanish speaking person, was not similarly situated to a hearing impaired person and, although similarly situated to an English speaking person, there was a rational basis for requiring the implied consent warnings to be read in English. Rodriguez v. State, 275 Ga. 283, 565 S.E.2d 458 (2002).
- Plaintiff, whose license was confiscated by an officer at the time of arrest for DUI and who was issued a citation allowing the plaintiff to drive pending resolution of the plaintiff's case, did not have standing to challenge the administrative suspension procedures established by O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1. McGraw v. State, 230 Ga. App. 843, 498 S.E.2d 314 (1998).
- Upon conviction for driving under the influence, the defendant was properly required to surrender the defendant's driver's license and temporary permit to the trial court pending appeal; the seizure and forwarding of the license to the Department of Public Safety was not part of the defendant's sentence or a condition of the defendant's bond but a requirement imposed by statute on the court. Wells v. State, 212 Ga. App. 15, 440 S.E.2d 692 (1994).
Due process was not violated by the failure to return the defendant's plastic license following a license suspension hearing which was resolved in defendant's favor since the rationale for confiscation of the license in the first place was a pending charge under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391. Wright v. State, 228 Ga. App. 717, 492 S.E.2d 581 (1997).
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code Section 40-5-69, which was renumbered as Code Section 40-5-67 by Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 4, are included in the annotations for this Code section.
- Georgia law requires that, when a non-resident is convicted of driving under the influence, the court forward the non-resident's driver's license to the Georgia Department of Public Safety with the license to be forwarded to the non-resident's home state along with the record of conviction and record of any action taken by the Department of Public Safety. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U86-15 (decided under former § 40-5-69).
Georgia law requires that, when a non-resident person is charged with driving under the influence, the arresting officer is to take the driver's license, attach the license to the court's copy of the citation, and forward the license to the appropriate court as would be done with a Georgia driver. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U86-16 (decided under former § 40-5-69).
Defense to Charge of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, 17 POF2d 1.
Negligent Failure to Detain Intoxicated Motorist, 1 POF3d 545.
Proof and Disproof of Alcohol-Induced Driving Impairment Through Breath Alcohol Testing, 4 POF3d 229.
Proof and Disproof of Alcohol-Induced Driving Impairment Through Evidence of Observable Intoxication and Coordination Testing, 9 POF3d 459.
Total Results: 20
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2024-01-17
Snippet: admissibility of blood test refusal evidence and to OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b). 315 Ga. at 200-202 (1), (2). On remand
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2022-11-02
Snippet: Georgia’s implied consent statutes, OCGA §§ 40-5-67.1 and 40-6- 392, do not violate the Privileges
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2022-10-25
Snippet: reasoned that, to the extent that OCGA § 40-5-67.1 informs a person that refusing to submit
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2022-01-19
Snippet: tests) under the implied consent law? OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2) (2016). 2 Although it was stipulated
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-06-03
Citation: 829 S.E.2d 126, 306 Ga. 1
Snippet: license suspension hearing pursuant to OCGA § 40-5-67.1 and evidence of a 2011 arrest for DUI. The Court
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-05-06
Citation: 827 S.E.2d 865
Snippet: Georgia implied consent notice pursuant to OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2) but did not give Miranda warnings. Turnquest
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-02-18
Citation: 824 S.E.2d 265, 305 Ga. 179
Snippet: administrative license suspension provided by OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (c) and (d). Additionally, the holding that a
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2018-08-20
Citation: 818 S.E.2d 552, 304 Ga. 259
Snippet: notice for drivers age 21 and older found in OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2) and asked if he would consent to a breathalyzer
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2017-10-30
Citation: 302 Ga. 473, 807 S.E.2d 361
Snippet: implied consent warning in accordance with OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2),1 and Schmitz agreed to a test of his
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2017-10-16
Citation: 302 Ga. 295, 806 S.E.2d 544
Snippet: “[i]mplied consent notice,” as stated in OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2): Georgia law requires you to submit to
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2017-10-16
Citation: 302 Ga. 228, 806 S.E.2d 505
Snippet: that the implied consent notice statute, OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b), is unconstitutional on its face and as applied
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-06-20
Citation: 299 Ga. 232, 787 S.E.2d 745, 2016 WL 3390448, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 422
Snippet: benefit or remotest fear of injury.”); OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (“. . . If any such notice [concerning implied
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-02-01
Citation: 298 Ga. 429, 782 S.E.2d 439, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 109
Snippet: as provided in subsection (h) of Code Section 40-5-67.1 and subsection (h) of Code Section 40-5-64, any
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-03-27
Snippet: for suspects age 21 or over is found in OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2), and states: “Georgia law requires
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-03-27
Citation: 296 Ga. 817, 771 S.E.2d 373, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 197
Snippet: consentnoticeforsuspectsage21oroverisfoundinOCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2), and states: “Georgia law requires
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2013-06-17
Citation: 293 Ga. 165, 744 S.E.2d 735, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 1846, 2013 WL 2928146, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 542
Snippet: the implied consent notice required by OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2).1 For the reasons that follow, we conclude
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2012-05-07
Citation: 291 Ga. 99, 728 S.E.2d 175, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 1595, 2012 WL 1571546, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 440
Snippet: Implied Consent Statutes, *100OCGA§§ 40-5-55 and 40-5-67.1 (b), and was asked whether he would consent to
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2008-06-30
Citation: 663 S.E.2d 203, 284 Ga. 66, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 2147, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 532
Snippet: 21 driving non-commercial vehicles. See OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b)(2). Appellant refused to submit to chemical
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2008-05-19
Citation: 661 S.E.2d 529, 283 Ga. 498, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 1701, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 422
Snippet: which tests) under the implied consent law? OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b)(2). The implied consent notice given to individuals
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2008-03-10
Citation: 658 S.E.2d 592, 283 Ga. 259, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 768, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 254
Snippet: ability to withdraw that implied consent. OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b) requires law enforcement officers to inform