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O.C.G.A.Title 40Chapter 6

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 (2019)

Violations of chapter a misdemeanor unless otherwise stated; maximum fines for speed limit violations

Edition and currency
Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from Release 73 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Aug. 21, 2019) (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020), which replaced the older 2018 print volume for this title. Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTRelease 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session cited 1985–2026 41citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 41 opinions since 1985, 6 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (1 case).

(a) It is unlawful and, unless otherwise declared in this chapter with respect to particular offenses, it is a misdemeanor for any person to do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required in this chapter.

(b) Unless a different maximum fine or greater minimum fine is specifically provided in this chapter for a particular violation, the maximum fine which may be imposed as punishment for a first offense of violating any lawful speed limit established by or pursuant to the provisions of Article 9 of this chapter by exceeding a maximum lawful speed limit:

(1) By five miles per hour or less shall be no dollars;

(2) By more than five but not more than ten miles per hour shall not exceed $25.00;

(3) By more than ten but not more than 14 miles per hour shall not exceed $100.00;

(4) By more than 14 but less than 19 miles per hour shall not exceed $125.00;

(5) By 19 or more but less than 24 miles per hour shall not exceed $150.00; or

(6) By 24 or more but less than 34 miles per hour shall not exceed $500.00.

History

(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 23; Code 1933, § 68A-102, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5; Ga. L. 2001, p. 770, § 1.)

Annotations

Cross references. - For surcharges to or apportionment of fines in certain traffic offense cases, §§ 15-21-73, 15-21-93, 15-21-112, 15-21-131, 15-21-149, 36-15-9, 47-11-51, 47-14-50, 47-16-60, and 47-17-60.

Provision that offenses under jurisdiction of traffic violations bureau shall be classified as traffic violations rather than as misdemeanors, § 40-13-60.

Law reviews. - For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 433 (2004). For annual survey on commercial transportation, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 41 (2017).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Legislative intent. - Legislature has expressly limited the punishment prescribed in Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1. United States v. Walter, 484 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1980).

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 cannot be the sole basis for a charge since the statute does not set out any proscribed conduct, but, instead, specifies the penalty for a violation of any provisions in O.C.G.A. Ch. 6, T. 40 which do not provide their own penalty. State v. Nix, 220 Ga. App. 651, 469 S.E.2d 497 (1996).

State court jurisdiction. - State court has jurisdiction over all misdemeanor offenses in county including violations of the Uniform Rules of the Road Act (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 et seq.). Diamond v. State, 151 Ga. App. 690, 261 S.E.2d 434 (1979).

Compliance did not necessarily show ordinary care. - Compliance with Georgia's Uniform Rules of the Road, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 et seq., did not necessarily demonstrate that a defendant exercised ordinary care; in a case seeking damages for injuries arising from an accident in which an auto struck a parked garbage truck, a trial court did not err in admitting evidence regarding a safer location for the stop of the truck or in refusing to instruct the jury that if the truck's flashing hazard lights were on at the time of the collision then, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-203(c), the driver and the employer could not have been found negligent. Sinclair Disposal Serv. v. Ochoa, 265 Ga. App. 172, 593 S.E.2d 358 (2004).

Familiarity with state highway manual. - Interpretation of signs and signals as provided by the manual of the State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board) is not a matter of which the court can take judicial cognizance, nor one which the court can presume that every motorist is familiar with to the extent of imposing penal sanctions for disobedience thereof. Maxwell v. State, 97 Ga. App. 334, 103 S.E.2d 162 (1958).

Punishment for violations. - Punishment schemes contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 are: (1) punishment for violations of sections that have not "otherwise declared" their own penalties will be as provided for in O.C.G.A. § 17-10-3; and (2) punishment for violations of sections that have criminalized certain acts and prescribed particular punishments will be controlled by the specific penalties imposed by such sections. Chastain v. State, 231 Ga. App. 225, 498 S.E.2d 792 (1998).

Fine of $1,000 proper for speeding. - Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant to a $1,000 fine for speeding in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-181(b)(2) because the defendant did not object to the state's failure to admit certified copies of the defendant's prior convictions, nor did the defendant dispute that the defendant had multiple convictions for traffic violations; when the trial court asked the defendant whether any of the defendant's previous violations occurred while the defendant was operating a motorcycle, the defendant implicitly admitted at least one prior conviction for speeding. Jones v. State, 308 Ga. App. 99, 706 S.E.2d 593 (2011).

Violation of self-explanatory traffic- control device. - All traffic-control devices placed on the highway are presumed to be placed there by the authority of the State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board). Those which are self-explanatory are such that a violation thereof is a penal offense. Maxwell v. State, 97 Ga. App. 334, 103 S.E.2d 162 (1958).

Incremental speeds not material to charge. - Accusation specified that the defendant was charged with exceeding the speed limit on a certain road on a certain day which was sufficient to put the defendant on notice that the defendant was being tried for speeding, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-181(b); greater speeds by specified increment affected only the punishment and were therefore not material allegations to prove the crime of speeding so that the allegation that defendant was traveling 127 mph was not a material averment that had to be proven. Nye v. State, 279 Ga. App. 347, 631 S.E.2d 386 (2006).

Crossing yellow line. - In the absence of any properly placed sign explaining the meaning thereof, the crossing of a yellow line by a motorist to get in the opposite lane of traffic is not of itself a penal offense. Maxwell v. State, 97 Ga. App. 334, 103 S.E.2d 162 (1958).

Indictment naming wrong road did not support conviction. - Defendant's conviction for failure to keep the defendant's vehicle within a single lane of traffic could not stand; although there was evidence to support the charge, the accusation filed against the defendant stated the wrong road where the violation occurred, and therefore, there was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of the charge stated in the accusation. Thrasher v. State, 292 Ga. App. 566, 666 S.E.2d 28 (2008).

Sentence for speeding within authorized limits. - Defendant's sentence to serve 12 months for speeding in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-181(b)(2) was within authorized limits; O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1(b) simply sets limits on fines that can be imposed as punishment for a first offense of speeding and the statute does not restrict the available punishment for speeding to a fine. Jones v. State, 308 Ga. App. 99, 706 S.E.2d 593 (2011).

Cited in State v. Edwards, 236 Ga. 104, 222 S.E.2d 385 (1976); Berrian v. State, 139 Ga. App. 571, 228 S.E.2d 737 (1976); Peluso v. State, 147 Ga. App. 266, 248 S.E.2d 546 (1978); Gray v. State, 156 Ga. App. 117, 274 S.E.2d 115 (1980); Pfeiffer v. State, 173 Ga. App. 374, 326 S.E.2d 562 (1985); Ward v. State, 188 Ga. App. 372, 373 S.E.2d 65 (1988); Riddle v. State, 202 Ga. App. 194, 413 S.E.2d 494 (1991); Jones v. State, 258 Ga. App. 337, 574 S.E.2d 398 (2002); Smith v. State, 270 Ga. App. 759, 608 S.E.2d 35 (2004).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Official signs. - Official traffic control signs, such as "Men Working," "Watch for Mowers," and "Survey Party," afford the same legal protection that is afforded by other official traffic control devices. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-55.

All-terrain vehicles operating on the highways of the State of Georgia are governed by the Uniform Rules of the Road, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 et seq. 2007 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2007-3.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. - Right or duty to turn in violation of law of road to avoid traveler, or obstacle, 63 A.L.R. 277; 113 A.L.R. 1328.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Nix, 469 S.E.2d 497 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
cites § 40-6-1 8×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“The court also found that OCGA § 40-6-1 did not set out any specific violation, but merely stated that, unless otherwise provided for, it was a misdemeanor to violate any provisions of the Chapter.”
Later courts cite it for
“in resolving this issue, we look to the literal language of the statute, the rules of statutory construction and rules of reason and logic, the most important of which is to construe the statute so as to give effect to the legislature's intent.” · 4 citing courts
2
GREENBrooks v. Gray, 585 S.E.2d 188 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 40-6-1 4×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“[3] Indeed, the "Uniform Rules of the Road" are found at OCGA §§ 40-6-1 through 40-6-397, a distinct chapter from that devoted to the law concerning driver's licenses.”
The case’s holding
Crossing the centerline while driving without a proper license, or in violation of a restricted license's limits, does not warrant punitive damages absent a pattern or policy of dangerous driving.
Later courts cite it for
“that the collision here resulted 'from a pattern or policy of dangerous driving,” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENJones v. State, 706 S.E.2d 593 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 40-6-1 10×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“OCGA § 40-6-1 (a) provides that “unless otherwise declared in this chapter with respect to particular offenses, it is a misdemeanor for any person to do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required in this chapter.”
Later courts cite it for
“the requirement that prior convictions be proved by certified copies thereof is really an application of the best evidence rule, which may be waived” · 1 citing court
4
GREENChastain v. State, 498 S.E.2d 792 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 40-6-1 6×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“On appeal, the State argues that the trial court acted within its discretion in sentencing Chastain to probation under OCGA § 17-10-3 (a) (1) because all violations of the Uniform Rules of the Road (OCGA § 40-6-1 et seq.), including violations of the open container law, are…”
Later courts cite it for
“under these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting photocopies.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENGregg v. State, 558 S.E.2d 729 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 40-6-1 6×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“2 OCGA § 40-6-1 (a); see OCGA § 40-13-26. 3 See OCGA § 40-13-60.”
6
GREENPhillips v. State, 789 S.E.2d 421 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
cites § 40-6-1 3×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“Here, some evidence supports the trial court’s findings that the officer’s testimony was credible and that Phillips crossed the fog line – a violation of OCGA §§ 40-6-1 and 40-6-48. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the officer had reasonable…”
7
GREENState v. Tousley, 611 S.E.2d 139 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 40-6-1 2×cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“08ormore, OCGA§ 40-6-391 (a) (5); and failure to maintain lane, OCGA §§ 40-6-1; 40-6-48. After a hearing, the trial court granted Tousley’s motion to exclude evidence regarding her performance on the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, finding that the arresting officer failed…”
The case’s holding
Admissibility of horizontal gaze nystagmus test results requires a foundation of scientific validity and substantial compliance with standardized procedures by the person performing the test.
Later courts cite it for
“that (1) the general scientific principles and techniques involved are valid and capable of producing reliable results, and (2) the person performing the test substantially performed the scientific procedures in an acceptable manner.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENState v. COPELAND (Three Cases), 850 S.E.2d 736 (Ga. 2020).
cites § 40-6-1 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“See OCGA § 40-6-1 (a). Under Terry, if either Deputy Howell or Deputy Copeland had 19 reasonable suspicion to investigate Martin for the offense of walking upon the highway, then this suspected crime would have formed the basis for a second-tier encounter.”
The case’s holding
A trial court must make individualized determinations and apply distinct legal standards for self-defense and arrest justification when ruling on immunity motions under OCGA 16-3-24.2.
Later courts cite it for
“on appeal from an order on a motion under ocga 16-3-24.2, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, and we generally accept the trial court's findings with regard to questions of fact and credibility if there is any evidence to support them.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENThornton v. State, 851 S.E.2d 564 (Ga. 2020).
cites § 40-6-1 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“Do the provisions of OCGA § 40-6-1 et seq. apply generally to privately owned shopping centers, parking lots, or other similar areas that are not customarily used by the public as through streets or connector streets, see OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2)? As we explain below, the answer to…”
The case’s holding
Municipal officers may not make arrests beyond corporate limits unless local or other law grants that jurisdiction, and the statute on misdemeanor traffic charges empowers game wardens to enforce Rules of the Road.
Later courts cite it for
“when . . . confronted with a statute having several parts, we must endeavor to harmonize those parts so as to give a sensible and intelligent effect to each part.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Ogilvie, 734 S.E.2d 50 (Ga. 2012).
cites § 40-6-1 2×cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“OCGA § 40-6-1 says, “It is unlawful and, unless otherwise declared in this chapter with respect to particular offenses, it is a misdemeanor for any person to do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required in this chapter,” and OCGA § 16-1-3 (9) defines a “misdemeanor”…”
The case’s holding
The accident defense applies to strict liability traffic offenses only when evidence negates criminal intent by showing the prohibited act was committed involuntarily.
Later courts cite it for
“the accident defense applies where the evidence negates the defendant's criminal intent, whatever that intent element is for the crime at issue.” · 5 citing courts
11
GREENGordon v. State, 780 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
cites § 40-6-1 2×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“Specifically, the State contends that the rule-of-lenity argument is not ripe for discussion because the indictment does not charge Gordon “with the statement that the other person, whom stuck [sic] his vehicle, left the scene and failed to exchange the information required…”
The case’s holding
The rule of lenity applies when the same conduct can be proved with the same evidence under two different statutes that carry different penalties for the same offense.
12
GREENBeneke v. Parker, 684 S.E.2d 243 (Ga. 2009).
cites § 40-6-1 2×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“A violation of one of the Uniform Rules of the Road, such as the rule that a driver must not follow another vehicle too closely, is a misdemeanor, OCGA § 40-6-1 (a), and a misdemeanor is “any crime other than a felony.”
13
GREENCrossley v. State, 582 S.E.2d 204 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 40-6-1 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“378, 380 (1) ( 384 SE2d 902 ) (1989) (OCGA § 40-6-1 et seq., inclusive of DUI and reckless driving).”
Later courts cite it for
“a trial judge sitting alone is presumed to know the law.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENHoffer v. State, 384 S.E.2d 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
cites § 40-6-1 2×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“This charge was given by the trial court: “Criminal intent does not mean an intention to violate the law or to violate a penal statute but means simply to intend to commit the act which is prohibited by a statute.”
The case’s holding
Evidence regarding a victim's failure to wear a seatbelt is irrelevant to a homicide by vehicle charge because the issue is whether the defendant's unlawful act caused the death.
Later courts cite it for
“not whether the death would or could have been made less likely by wearing a seatbelt,” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENState v. Lockett, 576 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 40-6-1 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“…the contrary. Lockett was accused of violating OCGA §§ 40-6-181 and 40-6-180, which are defined as misdemeanors under OCGA § 40-6-1 (a).. Therefore, in accordance with OCGA § 17-7-52, Lockett was entitled to the rights provided in OCGA § 45-11-4. 4 The state contends that the…”
16
GREENState v. Dixon, 599 S.E.2d 284 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 40-6-1 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“08 or more, OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5); and failure to maintain lane, OCGA §§ 40-6-1; 40-6-48. Following the partial grant of Dixon’s motion to suppress evidence obtained at a traffic stop, the State appeals, contending the trial court erred in finding Dixon was in custody when the…”
17
GREENGodlewski v. State, 567 S.E.2d 704 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 40-6-1 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“OCGA § 40-6-1 (a); Chastain v. State, 231 Ga.”
Later courts cite it for
“the state may carry this burden by showing a valid waiver through either a trial transcript or other extrinsic evidence.” · 1 citing court
18
GREENKeller v. State, 544 S.E.2d 511 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 40-6-1 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“rd shows that, during the early morning hours of June 3, 1999, Keller was pulled over for alleged erratic driving, and he was ultimately charged with: (1) driving under the influence (OCGA § 40-6-391); (2) driving after having been declared a habitual violator (OCGA § 40-5-58);…”
19
GREENPage v. State, 553 S.E.2d 176 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 40-6-1 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“Following a bench trial, Robin Benjamin Page was convicted in the State Court of DeKalb County of driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for him to drive, OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1); failure to maintain lane, OCGA §§ 40-6-1, 40-6-48; driving an…”
20
GREENNye v. State, 631 S.E.2d 386 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 40-6-1 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 40-6-1
“See OCGA § 40-6-1 (b).” Jones v. State, 258 Ga.”
Later courts cite it for
“in the absence of a transcript, we generally presume that the trial court acted properly” · 1 citing court

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198520052026

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 2001. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.35Ga.411th Cir.1N.D. Ga.1
By subsection
(a)1 case
Kenneth B. Cameron v. JMP Pizza, Inc., 927 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 2026).

Show all 41 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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