O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 (2019)

Annotations

Law reviews. - For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 433 (2004). For annual survey on commercial transportation, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 41 (2017).

Cross references. - For surcharges to or apportionment of fines in certain traffic offense cases, §§ 15-21-73, 15-21-93, 15-21-112, 15-21-131, 15-21-149, 36-15-9, 47-11-51, 47-14-50, 47-16-60, and 47-17-60. Provision that offenses under jurisdiction of traffic violations bureau

JUDICIAL DECISIONS of the collision then, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-203(c), the driver and the employer could not have been found negligent. Sinclair Disposal Serv. v. Ochoa, 265 Ga. App. 172, 593 S.E.2d 358 (2004). Familiarity with state highway manual. - Interpretation of signs and signals as provided by the manual of the State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board) is not a matter of which the court can take judicial cognizance, nor one which the court can presume that every motorist is familiar with to the extent of imposing penal sanctions for disobedience thereof. Maxwell v. State, 97 Ga. App. 334, 103 S.E.2d 162 (1958). Punishment for violations. - Punishment schemes contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 are: (1) punishment for violations of sections that have not ‘‘otherwise declared’’ their own penalties will be as provided for in O.C.G.A. § 17-10-3; and (2) punishment for violations of sections that have criminalized certain acts and prescribed particular punishments will be controlled by the specific penalties imposed by such sections. Chastain v. State, 231 Ga. App. 225, 498 S.E.2d 792 (1998). Fine of $1,000 proper for speeding. - Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant to a $1,000 fine for speeding in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-181(b)(2) be-

Legislative intent. - Legislature has expressly limited the punishment prescribed in Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1. United States v. Walter, 484 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1980). O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 cannot be the sole basis for a charge since the statute does not set out any proscribed conduct, but, instead, specifies the penalty for a violation of any provisions in O.C.G.A. Ch. 6, T. 40 which do not provide their own penalty. State v. Nix, 220 Ga. App. 651, 469 S.E.2d 497 (1996). State court jurisdiction. - State court has jurisdiction over all misdemeanor offenses in county including violations of the Uniform Rules of the Road Act (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 et seq.). Diamond v. State, 151 Ga. App. 690, 261 S.E.2d 434 (1979). Compliance did not necessarily show ordinary care. - Compliance with Georgia’s Uniform Rules of the Road, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 et seq., did not necessarily demonstrate that a defendant exercised ordinary care; in a case seeking damages for injuries arising from an accident in which an auto struck a parked garbage truck, a trial court did not err in admitting evidence regarding a safer location for the stop of the truck or in refusing to instruct the jury that if the truck’s flashing hazard lights were on at the time

cause the defendant did not object to the state’s failure to admit certified copies of the defendant’s prior convictions, nor did the defendant dispute that the defendant had multiple convictions for traffic violations; when the trial court asked the defendant whether any of the defendant’s previous violations occurred while the defendant was operating a motorcycle, the defendant implicitly admitted at least one prior conviction for speeding. Jones v. State, 308 Ga. App. 99, 706 S.E.2d 593 (2011). Violation of self-explanatory trafficcontrol device. - All traffic-control devices placed on the highway are presumed to be placed there by the authority of the State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board). Those which are self-explanatory are such that a violation thereof is a penal offense. Maxwell v. State, 97 Ga. App. 334, 103 S.E.2d 162 (1958). Incremental speeds not material to charge. - Accusation specified that the defendant was charged with exceeding the speed limit on a certain road on a certain day which was sufficient to put the defendant on notice that the defendant was being tried for speeding, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-181(b); greater speeds by specified increment affected only the punishment and were therefore not material allegations to prove the crime of speeding so that the allegation that defendant was traveling 127 mph was not a material averment that had to be proven. Nye v. State, 279 Ga. App. 347, 631 S.E.2d 386 (2006). Crossing yellow line. - In the absence of any properly placed sign explain-

ing the meaning thereof, the crossing of a yellow line by a motorist to get in the opposite lane of traffic is not of itself a penal offense. Maxwell v. State, 97 Ga. App. 334, 103 S.E.2d 162 (1958). Indictment naming wrong road did not support conviction. - Defendant’s conviction for failure to keep the defendant’s vehicle within a single lane of traffic could not stand; although there was evidence to support the charge, the accusation filed against the defendant stated the wrong road where the violation occurred, and therefore, there was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of the charge stated in the accusation. Thrasher v. State, 292 Ga. App. 566, 666 S.E.2d 28 (2008). Sentence for speeding within authorized limits. - Defendant’s sentence to serve 12 months for speeding in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-181(b)(2) was within authorized limits; O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1(b) simply sets limits on fines that can be imposed as punishment for a first offense of speeding and the statute does not restrict the available punishment for speeding to a fine. Jones v. State, 308 Ga. App. 99, 706 S.E.2d 593 (2011). Cited in State v. Edwards, 236 Ga. 104, 222 S.E.2d 385 (1976); Berrian v. State, 139 Ga. App. 571, 228 S.E.2d 737 (1976); Peluso v. State, 147 Ga. App. 266, 248 S.E.2d 546 (1978); Gray v. State, 156 Ga. App. 117, 274 S.E.2d 115 (1980); Pfeiffer v. State, 173 Ga. App. 374, 326 S.E.2d 562 (1985); Ward v. State, 188 Ga. App. 372, 373 S.E.2d 65 (1988); Riddle v. State, 202 Ga. App. 194, 413 S.E.2d 494 (1991); Jones v. State, 258 Ga. App. 337, 574 S.E.2d 398 (2002); Smith v. State, 270 Ga. App. 759, 608 S.E.2d 35 (2004).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Official signs. - Official traffic control signs, such as ‘‘Men Working,’’ ‘‘Watch for Mowers,’’ and ‘‘Survey Party,’’ afford the same legal protection that is afforded by other official traffic control devices. 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 70-55.

All-terrain vehicles operating on the highways of the State of Georgia are governed by the Uniform Rules of the Road, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 et seq. 2007 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2007-3.

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Right or duty to turn in violation of law of road to avoid traveler, or obstacle, 63 A.L.R. 277; 113 A.L.R. 1328.