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2018 Georgia Code 40-6-1 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 40 MOTOR VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC

Section 6. Uniform Rules of the Road, 40-6-1 through 40-6-397.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

40-6-1. Violations of chapter a misdemeanor unless otherwise stated; maximum fines for speed limit violations.

  1. It is unlawful and, unless otherwise declared in this chapter with respect to particular offenses, it is a misdemeanor for any person to do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required in this chapter.
  2. Unless a different maximum fine or greater minimum fine is specifically provided in this chapter for a particular violation, the maximum fine which may be imposed as punishment for a first offense of violating any lawful speed limit established by or pursuant to the provisions of Article 9 of this chapter by exceeding a maximum lawful speed limit:
    1. By five miles per hour or less shall be no dollars;
    2. By more than five but not more than ten miles per hour shall not exceed $25.00;
    3. By more than ten but not more than 14 miles per hour shall not exceed $100.00;
    4. By more than 14 but less than 19 miles per hour shall not exceed $125.00;
    5. By 19 or more but less than 24 miles per hour shall not exceed $150.00; or
    6. By 24 or more but less than 34 miles per hour shall not exceed $500.00.

(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 23; Code 1933, § 68A-102, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5; Ga. L. 2001, p. 770, § 1.)

Cross references.

- For surcharges to or apportionment of fines in certain traffic offense cases, §§ 15-21-73,15-21-93,15-21-112,15-21-131,15-21-149,36-15-9,47-11-51,47-14-50,47-16-60, and47-17-60.

Provision that offenses under jurisdiction of traffic violations bureau shall be classified as traffic violations rather than as misdemeanors, § 40-13-60.

Law reviews.

- For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 433 (2004). For annual survey on commercial transportation, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 41 (2017).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Legislative intent.

- Legislature has expressly limited the punishment prescribed in Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1. United States v. Walter, 484 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1980).

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 cannot be the sole basis for a charge since the statute does not set out any proscribed conduct, but, instead, specifies the penalty for a violation of any provisions in O.C.G.A. Ch. 6, T. 40 which do not provide their own penalty. State v. Nix, 220 Ga. App. 651, 469 S.E.2d 497 (1996).

State court jurisdiction.

- State court has jurisdiction over all misdemeanor offenses in county including violations of the Uniform Rules of the Road Act (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 et seq.). Diamond v. State, 151 Ga. App. 690, 261 S.E.2d 434 (1979).

Compliance did not necessarily show ordinary care.

- Compliance with Georgia's Uniform Rules of the Road, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 et seq., did not necessarily demonstrate that a defendant exercised ordinary care; in a case seeking damages for injuries arising from an accident in which an auto struck a parked garbage truck, a trial court did not err in admitting evidence regarding a safer location for the stop of the truck or in refusing to instruct the jury that if the truck's flashing hazard lights were on at the time of the collision then, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-203(c), the driver and the employer could not have been found negligent. Sinclair Disposal Serv. v. Ochoa, 265 Ga. App. 172, 593 S.E.2d 358 (2004).

Familiarity with state highway manual.

- Interpretation of signs and signals as provided by the manual of the State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board) is not a matter of which the court can take judicial cognizance, nor one which the court can presume that every motorist is familiar with to the extent of imposing penal sanctions for disobedience thereof. Maxwell v. State, 97 Ga. App. 334, 103 S.E.2d 162 (1958).

Punishment for violations.

- Punishment schemes contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 are: (1) punishment for violations of sections that have not "otherwise declared" their own penalties will be as provided for in O.C.G.A. § 17-10-3; and (2) punishment for violations of sections that have criminalized certain acts and prescribed particular punishments will be controlled by the specific penalties imposed by such sections. Chastain v. State, 231 Ga. App. 225, 498 S.E.2d 792 (1998).

Fine of $1,000 proper for speeding.

- Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant to a $1,000 fine for speeding in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-181(b)(2) because the defendant did not object to the state's failure to admit certified copies of the defendant's prior convictions, nor did the defendant dispute that the defendant had multiple convictions for traffic violations; when the trial court asked the defendant whether any of the defendant's previous violations occurred while the defendant was operating a motorcycle, the defendant implicitly admitted at least one prior conviction for speeding. Jones v. State, 308 Ga. App. 99, 706 S.E.2d 593 (2011).

Violation of self-explanatory traffic- control device.

- All traffic-control devices placed on the highway are presumed to be placed there by the authority of the State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board). Those which are self-explanatory are such that a violation thereof is a penal offense. Maxwell v. State, 97 Ga. App. 334, 103 S.E.2d 162 (1958).

Incremental speeds not material to charge.

- Accusation specified that the defendant was charged with exceeding the speed limit on a certain road on a certain day which was sufficient to put the defendant on notice that the defendant was being tried for speeding, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-181(b); greater speeds by specified increment affected only the punishment and were therefore not material allegations to prove the crime of speeding so that the allegation that defendant was traveling 127 mph was not a material averment that had to be proven. Nye v. State, 279 Ga. App. 347, 631 S.E.2d 386 (2006).

Crossing yellow line.

- In the absence of any properly placed sign explaining the meaning thereof, the crossing of a yellow line by a motorist to get in the opposite lane of traffic is not of itself a penal offense. Maxwell v. State, 97 Ga. App. 334, 103 S.E.2d 162 (1958).

Indictment naming wrong road did not support conviction.

- Defendant's conviction for failure to keep the defendant's vehicle within a single lane of traffic could not stand; although there was evidence to support the charge, the accusation filed against the defendant stated the wrong road where the violation occurred, and therefore, there was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of the charge stated in the accusation. Thrasher v. State, 292 Ga. App. 566, 666 S.E.2d 28 (2008).

Sentence for speeding within authorized limits.

- Defendant's sentence to serve 12 months for speeding in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-181(b)(2) was within authorized limits; O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1(b) simply sets limits on fines that can be imposed as punishment for a first offense of speeding and the statute does not restrict the available punishment for speeding to a fine. Jones v. State, 308 Ga. App. 99, 706 S.E.2d 593 (2011).

Cited in State v. Edwards, 236 Ga. 104, 222 S.E.2d 385 (1976); Berrian v. State, 139 Ga. App. 571, 228 S.E.2d 737 (1976); Peluso v. State, 147 Ga. App. 266, 248 S.E.2d 546 (1978); Gray v. State, 156 Ga. App. 117, 274 S.E.2d 115 (1980); Pfeiffer v. State, 173 Ga. App. 374, 326 S.E.2d 562 (1985); Ward v. State, 188 Ga. App. 372, 373 S.E.2d 65 (1988); Riddle v. State, 202 Ga. App. 194, 413 S.E.2d 494 (1991); Jones v. State, 258 Ga. App. 337, 574 S.E.2d 398 (2002); Smith v. State, 270 Ga. App. 759, 608 S.E.2d 35 (2004).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Official signs.

- Official traffic control signs, such as "Men Working," "Watch for Mowers," and "Survey Party," afford the same legal protection that is afforded by other official traffic control devices. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-55.

All-terrain vehicles operating on the highways of the State of Georgia are governed by the Uniform Rules of the Road, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 et seq. 2007 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2007-3.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Right or duty to turn in violation of law of road to avoid traveler, or obstacle, 63 A.L.R. 277; 113 A.L.R. 1328.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1

Total Results: 4  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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State v. Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 5, 2012 | 734 S.E.2d 50, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 3459

...(a) The Court of Appeals premised its reasoning on the proposition that there is no criminal intent element for the “strict *8liability” traffic offenses set forth in Chapter 6 of Title 40 of the Georgia Code. That premise is incorrect. Violations of Chapter 6’s Uniform Rules of the Road are crimes. OCGA § 40-6-1 says, “It is unlawful and, unless otherwise declared in this chapter with respect to particular offenses, it is a misdemeanor for any person to do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required in this chapter,” and OCGA § 16-1-...
...ire the defendant to have voluntarily committed the act that the statute prohibits, which typically involves driving at a particular time and place (e.g., through a red light, see OCGA § 40-6-20 (a)) or in a particular way (e.g., too fast, see OCGA § 40-6-181). (b) OCGA § 16-2-2 says that “[a] person shall not be found guilty of any crime committed by misfortune or accident where it satisfactorily appears there was no criminal scheme or undertaking, intention, or criminal negligence.” Th...
...A detailed account of the evidence is provided in the Court of Appeals’s opinion. See Ogilvie, 313 Ga. App. at 305-307. Some offenses set forth in Chapter 6 are not strict liability offenses but contain a specific intent or fault element. See, e.g., OCGA § 40-6-10 (c) (“Any person who knowingly makes a false statement or certification under Code Section 40-5-71 or this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor....”); OCGA § 40-6-397 (a) (“Aperson commits the offense of aggressive driving...
.... .”). We do not address those offenses in this opinion. OCGA § 40-6-393 (o) states: Any person who causes the death of another person, without an intention to do so, by violating any provision of this title other than subsection (a) of Code Section 40-6-163, subsection (b) of Code Section 40-6-270, Code Section 40-6-390 or 40-6-391, or subsection (a) of Code Section 40-6-395 commits the offense of homicide by vehicle in the second degree when such violation i's the cause of said death a...
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Beneke v. Parker, 684 S.E.2d 243 (Ga. 2009).

Cited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 28, 2009 | 285 Ga. 733, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 3043

...[Cits.] At the same time, we must seek to effectuate the intent of the legislature. [Cit.] Slakman v. Continental Casualty Co., 277 Ga. 189, 191, 587 S.E.2d 24 (2003). A violation of one of the Uniform Rules of the Road, such as the rule that a driver must not follow another vehicle too closely, is a misdemeanor, OCGA § 40-6-1(a), and a misdemeanor is "any crime other than a felony." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 16-1-3(9)....
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State v. COPELAND (Three Cases), 850 S.E.2d 736 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 2, 2020 | 310 Ga. 345

...shoulder is available, any pedestrian standing or striding along and upon a highway shall stand or stride only on the shoulder, as far as practicable from the edge of the roadway.” A violation of OCGA § 40- 6-96 (c) is a misdemeanor. See OCGA § 40-6-1 (a). Under Terry, if either Deputy Howell or Deputy Copeland had 19 reasonable suspicion to investigate Martin for the offense of walking upon the highway, then this suspected crime would have formed the basis for a second-tier encounter....
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Thornton v. State, 310 Ga. 460 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 12, 2020

...led to establish that the game warden was in the lawful discharge of his official duties at the time of the incident. In particular, Thornton argued that a game warden has no authority to enforce the Uniform Rules of the Road2 — including OCGA § 40-6-14,3 which limits the volume of sound that can be emitted from a stereo in a motor vehicle — in the parking lot of a gas station....
...633, § 1 (“Uniform Rules of the Road” enacted as Title 68A of the Code of 1933, the predecessor of Title 40, Chapter 6 of the current Code). In this opinion, we refer to the Uniform Rules of the Road simply as the “Rules of the Road.” 3 Section 40-6-14 (a) provides: It is unlawful for any person operating or occupying a motor vehicle on a street or highway to operate or amplify the sound produced by a radio, tape player, or other mechanical sound- making device or instrument from within the motor vehicle so that the sound is plainly audible at a distance of 100 feet or more from the motor vehicle. A violation of OCGA § 40-6-14 (a) is a misdemeanor. See OCGA § 40-6-14 (e). 2 differs somewhat from that of the Court of Appeals, we likewise conclude that the obstruction convictions can stand....
...es to address these two questions: 1. Does OCGA § 40-13-30 grant statewide arrest powers to Department of Natural Resources game wardens for violations of the Uniform Rules of the Road? 2. Do the provisions of OCGA § 40-6-1 et seq....
...officers identified in the first part of OCGA § 40-13-30. 11 As such, the game warden in this case was authorized under the second part of OCGA § 40-13-30 to enforce the Rules of the Road, including the provision of OCGA § 40-6-14 (a) limiting the sound emitted by a car stereo, with respect to a misdemeanor violation of the rules subject to the procedures of Article 2 of Chapter 13 of Title 40....
...Even though the game warden in this case was authorized to enforce the Rules of the Road pursuant to Article 2 of Chapter 13 of Title 40, if the Rules of the Road did not apply in the parking lot in which the game warden encountered Thornton, his attempts to enforce OCGA § 40-6-14 against Thornton would not have been in the lawful discharge of his official duties for purposes of an obstruction conviction....
...although privately owned, was customarily used by the public as a through street or connector street. As such, the jury properly could have found that the game warden was in the lawful discharge of his official duties when he attempted to enforce OCGA § 40-6-14 against Thornton in the parking lot. 4....