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Call Now: 904-383-7448(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 83; Code 1933, § 68A-701, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5; Ga. L. 2003, p. 484, § 9; Ga. L. 2018, p. 354, § 1/SB 409.)
The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, inserted "or other on-track equipment" throughout; added subsection (a); redesignated former subsection (a) as present subsection (b) and inserted "or she" near the end of the introductory paragraph; and redesignated former subsections (b) through (f) as present subsections (c) through (g), respectively.
- Provisions of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-140 must be construed with provisions of Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-6-141). Central of Ga. R.R. v. Sellers, 129 Ga. App. 811, 201 S.E.2d 485 (1973).
- Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556 certainly puts a duty on the operator of a motor vehicle to look, but it puts no duty on the operator to listen and no duty to stop, unless there is a signaling device or unless the train is "plainly visible." Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Hall Livestock Co., 116 Ga. App. 227, 156 S.E.2d 396 (1967).
- Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556 makes failure to use one's sense of sight and to stop under given circumstances the equivalent of negligence as a matter of law. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Hall Livestock Co., 116 Ga. App. 227, 156 S.E.2d 396 (1967).
As a jury could have determined that an employee for a tractor company was negligent per se pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-140(f) (now (g)) for driving a tractor-trailer over a railroad crossing, whereupon the tractor trailer got stuck due to insufficient undercarriage clearance, the jury's subrogation award to an insurer whose insured suffered damages from the incident was supported by the evidence as was the award of litigation expenses under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11; accordingly, it was proper to deny a motion by the insurer for the tractor company, against which the judgment was entered, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Universal Underwriters Group v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 297 Ga. App. 587, 677 S.E.2d 760 (2009).
- Trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury that O.C.G.A. § 40-6-140 "puts a duty on the operator of a motor vehicle to look, but it puts no duty on him to listen and no duty to stop unless there is a signaling device or unless the train is 'plainly visible'"; the requested charge, while appropriate in a civil action, was not adjusted to the facts of a criminal case. Decker v. State, 217 Ga. App. 803, 459 S.E.2d 586 (1995).
In a motorcycle-vehicle collision case, which occurred when a motorcycle crossed a railroad crossing and struck a car as the other driver was making a U-turn to avoid having to wait at the crossing for an oncoming train, the trial evidence supported the giving of jury charges on O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-140 and40-6-180 because these sections addressed approaching railroad crossings. Young v. Griffin, 329 Ga. App. 413, 765 S.E.2d 625 (2014).
Cited in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Gaither, 148 Ga. App. 251, 251 S.E.2d 66 (1978); Terry v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 152 Ga. App. 583, 263 S.E.2d 475 (1979).
- 74 C.J.S., Railroads, § 786 et seq.
- Traveler's ignorance of existence of railroad crossing as affecting liability for injury, 40 A.L.R. 1309.
Duty of automobilist to shut off motor at railroad crossing, 54 A.L.R. 542.
No results found for Georgia Code 40-6-140.