O.C.G.A. § 40-6-2 (2019)
Obedience to authorized persons directing traffic
No person shall fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any police officer, firefighter, police volunteer authorized under Code Section 35-1-11, or school-crossing guard designated by a local law enforcement agency invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic.
History
(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 24; Code 1933, § 68A-104, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 516, § 2; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5; Ga. L. 1999, p. 654, § 2; Ga. L. 2002, p. 660, § 4; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1259, § 11.)
Annotations
Cross references. - Provisions regarding refusal to obey official request at fire or other emergency, § 16-10-30. Authority of school-crossing guards to direct
traffic, § 20-2-1131. Refusal to display driver’s license upon demand by law enforcement officer, § 40-5-29.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Order to move vehicle lawful if given to owner, operator, or controller. - Order of the deputy sheriff to the defendant to move the wrecker was not a lawful order unless the defendant at the time was the owner, operator, or otherwise in control of the wrecker in question. Carroll v. State, 157 Ga. App. 112, 276 S.E.2d 265 (1981). Attempt to comply with motorist’s wishes provides no defense to failure to obey lawful directions of the deputy sheriff. Carroll v. State, 157 Ga. App. 113, 276 S.E.2d 267 (1981). Directing traffic is official police function. - Because a police officer was directing traffic, and this activity necessarily is a police function, the officer was acting in the officer’s official capacity at the time of a traffic accident, and the officer was entitled to assert official immunity as a defense to a claim of negligent conduct. Sommerfield v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 235 Ga. App. 375, 509 S.E.2d 100 (1998). Stop proper after defendant ignored ‘‘stop’’ command. - Officer properly stopped the defendant after the defendant ignored the ‘‘stop’’ command of the
officers on the other side of the intersection who were performing the police function of directing traffic. Williams v. State, 334 Ga. App. 195, 778 S.E.2d 820 (2015). Fact issue on whether officer gave order. - Because a genuine issue of fact existed on whether the defendant officer ever told the plaintiff arrestee to park on the street in response to the arrestee’s request that the officer move the police car so that the arrestee could enter the arrestee’s driveway, and if the officer never did tell the arrestee to park on the street, or if the officer knew the arrestee could not hear the officer, not even arguable probable cause existed under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-2 for an arrest and granting the officer summary judgment on a false arrest claim was reversed. Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir. 2007). Jury properly instructed on statute. - In a suit by a driver who was injured when the driver ran into a house that was being moved, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury as to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-2; there was evidence that the driver failed to yield the right of way when confronted by a police car with
flashing blue lights that was escorting the house. Hersh v. Griffith, 284 Ga. App. 15, 643 S.E.2d 309 (2007). Cited in Easterling v. City of
Glennville, 694 F. Supp. 911 (S.D. Ga. 1986); United States v. Benitez-Macedo, 129 Fed. Appx. 506 (11th Cir. 2005).
RESEARCH REFERENCES C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 838.