O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-200 (2019)

How vehicles to be parked; powers of Department of Transportation and local authorities

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Code section, every vehicle stopped or parked upon a two-way roadway shall be stopped or parked with the right-hand wheels parallel to and within 12 inches of the right-hand curb or as close as practicable to the right edge of the right-hand shoulder. (b) Except when otherwise provided by local ordinance, every vehicle stopped or parked upon a one-way roadway shall be stopped or parked parallel to the curb or edge of the roadway, in the direction of authorized traffic movement, with its right-hand wheels within 12 inches of the right-hand curb or as close as practicable to the right edge of the right-hand shoulder or with its left-hand wheels within 12 inches of the left-hand curb or as close as practicable to the left edge of the left-hand shoulder. (c) Local authorities may by ordinance permit angle parking on any roadway, except that angle parking shall not be permitted on any federal-aid or state highway unless the Department of Transportation has determined that the roadway is of sufficient width to permit angle parking without interfering with the free movement of traffic. (d) The department, with respect to highways under its jurisdiction, may place signs prohibiting, restricting, or limiting the stopping, standing, or parking of vehicles on any highway where, in its opinion, as evidenced by resolution or order entered in its minutes, such stopping, standing, or parking is dangerous to those using the highway or where the stopping, standing, or parking of vehicles would unduly interfere with the free movement of traffic thereon. Such signs shall be official signs, and no person shall stop, stand, or park any vehicle in violation of the restrictions on such signs.

History

(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 93; Ga. L. 1963, p. 254, § 6; Code 1933, § 68A-1004, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 68-303 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Limiting parking of vehicles on highways. - Department of Transporta-

tion may limit the parking of vehicles on any highways under the Department’s jurisdiction. Fabian v. Vincent, 155 Ga. App. 464, 270 S.E.2d 858 (1980). Stop of vehicle for suspicion of drug dealing. - After the police came upon the car described in the tip and

observed that the car was parked on the wrong side of the street with the car’s engine running, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-200(a), although the officers were certainly conscious of the anonymous tip when the officers stopped the defendant, the officers were not required to refrain from stopping the defendant for the traffic violation merely because the officers suspected the defendant of selling drugs; the officers were authorized to stop the defendant and check the defendant’s driver’s license and insurance card. Mack v. State, 212 Ga. App. 187, 441 S.E.2d 503 (1994). Temporary stops. - Under a reasonable construction, former Code 1933, § 68-303 should not apply to temporary stops made as a normal and reasonable incident to traffic conditions existing at the time. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Mathis, 83 Ga. App. 415, 63 S.E.2d 921 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-303). Applicability to state highways in municipalities. - Provisions of Ga. L. 1933, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556 apply to state highways in municipalities. Rhodes v.

Baker, 116 Ga. App. 157, 156 S.E.2d 545 (1967). Stop of defendant for parking in middle of road proper. - Trial court order suppressing drug evidence seized after a Terry stop of the defendant for parking in the middle of the road was error because O.C.G.A. § 40-6-200(a) made it improper to park in the middle of a two-way roadway and provided a proper basis for the officer’s decision to stop the defendant. Stafford v. State, 284 Ga. 773, 671 S.E.2d 484 (2008). Parking found in violation. - Parking of a vehicle so that a substantial portion thereof was within 12 feet of the highway’s center line was a violation of Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-6-203) and was negligence per se. Washington v. Kemp, 99 Ga. App. 635, 109 S.E.2d 294 (1959). Cited in Malpass v. State, 173 Ga. App. 690, 327 S.E.2d 753 (1985); Roberts v. State, 242 Ga. App. 120, 527 S.E.2d 617 (2000); Momodu v. State, No. A03A0567, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 629 (May 21, 2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 305, 314, 315. C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 751 et seq., 761, 762 et seq. ALR. - Right to admission to parking ground or to service at gas station or garages, 35 A.L.R. 557. Validity of automobile parking ordinances or regulations, 108 A.L.R. 1152; 130 A.L.R. 316.

Construction and effect in civil actions of statute, ordinance, or regulation requiring vehicles to be stopped or parked parallel with, and within certain distance of, curb, 17 A.L.R.2d 582. Duties and liabilities between owners or drivers of parked or parking vehicles, 25 A.L.R.2d 1224. Civil liability of mobile vendor for attracting into street child injured by another’s motor vehicle, 84 A.L.R.3d 826.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases, 1985–2008 · leading case: Stafford v. State, 671 S.E.2d 484 (Ga. 2008).
Stafford v. State, 671 S.E.2d 484 (Ga. 2008). · cites it 4× “In this case, Officer Bruton had a reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime had been committed, and this suspicion is supported by OCGA § 40-6-200 (a). 5 This statute makes it improper *775 to park in the middle of a two-way roadway.”
Phillips v. South West Mech. Contractors, Inc., 561 S.E.2d 471 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 2× “Appellants contend that South West violated OCGA §§ 40-6-200 (d) (proper parking) and 40-6-203 (a) (1) (I) (prohibited parking), but under OCGA § 40-6-204, these Code sections “shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is disabled while on the roadway in such a manner…”
Watson v. State, 544 S.E.2d 469 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 40-6-200 (b); Mack v. State, 212 Ga.”
Darwicki v. State, 661 S.E.2d 859 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “The court also found Darwicki guilty of impeding the flow of traffic, OCGA § 40-6-184 (a) (1), and failing to park as close as practicable to the curb, OCGA § 40-6-200 (a), but merged those convictions with the conviction for improper parking.”
Streicher v. State, 445 S.E.2d 815 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 2× “The State then amended the accusation against defendant Streicher charging him with improper parking or stopping in violation- of OCGA § 40-6-200, leaving a motor vehicle unattended in violation of OCGA § 40-6-201, improper stopping on a roadway in violation of OCGA § 40-6-202,…”
Roberts v. State, 527 S.E.2d 617 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 2× “Here, the trial court was authorized to conclude that Officer Moore observed Roberts commit the offense of improper parking, in violation of OCGA §§ 40-6-200 (a) and 40-6-203 (a) (3) (B).”
Cartwright v. State, 399 S.E.2d 736 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 4× “See generally OCGA § 40-6-200 et seq. Under the rationale advanced by the dissent, a driver could be parked in complete compliance with these statutes, as well as with all applicable departmental regulations and local ordinances governing the parking of motor vehicles at the…”
MacK v. State, 441 S.E.2d 503 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 2× “Here, the police came upon the car described in the tip and observed that it was parked on the wrong side of the street with its engine running, a violation of OCGA § 40-6-200 (a). Although the officers were certainly conscious of the anonymous tip when they stopped Mack, they…”
Malpass v. State, 327 S.E.2d 753 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 2× “(See OCGA § 40-6-200 (a) and § 40-6-40). That is, the officer had specific and reasonably articulable facts warranting the stop of defendant and request for identification.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.