O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
(a) A driver shall not back a vehicle unless such movement can be made with safety and without interfering with other traffic. (b) A driver of a vehicle shall not back a vehicle upon any shoulder or roadway of any controlled-access highway.
History
(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess.,
p. 556, § 94; Code 1933, § 68A-1102, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5.)
Annotations
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Backing must be ‘‘with safety’’ as well as without interference with traffic, and when a driver backs into another vehicle, the backing is not done ‘‘with safety,’’ regardless of whether that vehicle is moving or occupied. State v. Nichols, 225 Ga. App. 609, 484 S.E.2d 507 (1997). Sufficient evidence to convict. - Officer’s testimony provided sufficient evidence to support the conviction for improper backing under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-240(a) as the officer testified that the defendant backed 10 to 15 yards up a hill on a busy one-way street, and the defendant would have had difficulty seeing cars behind the defendant due to the crest of the hill. Jones v. State, 259 Ga. App. 506, 578 S.E.2d 165 (2003). As predicate for investigatory stop. - Sufficient circumstantial evidence was introduced to convict the defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(c)(1)(A) because a pistol was found, along with drugs, inside the defendant’s car along-
side the driver’s seat, after police stopped the car for improper backing, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-240(a). United States v. Hamilton, 299 Fed. Appx. 878 (11th Cir. 2008) (Unpublished). Suppression motion based on reasonable suspicion of violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-240(a). - Denial of the defendant’s suppression motion was upheld on appeal as: (1) the defendant’s vehicle was not stopped by the investigating officer; (2) the defendant voluntarily pulled into a driveway and stopped; (3) the officer did not prevent the defendant’s departure; and (4) the officer had a reasonable and objective basis to conclude that the defendant committed the traffic offense of improper backing in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-240(a). Collier v. State, 282 Ga. App. 605, 639 S.E.2d 405 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0542, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 217 (Ga. 2007). Cited in Pfeiffer v. State, 173 Ga. App. 374, 326 S.E.2d 562 (1985); Roberson v. State, 230 Ga. App. 179, 495 S.E.2d 643 (1998); Holland v. State, 240 Ga. App. 169, 523 S.E.2d 33 (1999).
RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 229. C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 695. ALR. - Duties and liabilities between owners or drivers of parked or parking vehicles, 25 A.L.R.2d 1224. Liability for injury occasioned by backing of motor vehicle in public street or highway, 63 A.L.R.2d 5.
Liability for injury occasioned by backing of motor vehicle from private premises into public street or highway, 63 A.L.R.2d 108. Liability for injury or damage occasioned by backing of motor vehicle within private premises, 63 A.L.R.2d 184.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
18
cases, 1983–2015 · leading case:
Collier v. State, 639 S.E.2d 405 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
Collier v. State, 639 S.E.2d 405 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 16× “OCGA § 40-6-240 (a) provides: “A driver shall not back a vehicle unless such movement can be made with safety and without interfering with other traffic.”
Jones v. State, 578 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 8× “Following a jury trial, Joseph Shannon Jones appeals his conviction for driving under the influence (OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1)) and improper backing (OCGA § 40-6-240), claiming that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of the traffic stop because…”
Richards v. State, 571 S.E.2d 172 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 6× “, Officer Burgan stopped Richards for a violation of OCGA § 40-6-240, improper backing, and because he believed that Richards was attempting to avoid the roadblock.”
Conyers v. State, 397 S.E.2d 423 (Ga. 1990).
· cites it 4× “Appellant was convicted of and sentenced for prohibited stopping on a controlled-access highway (OCGA § 40-6-203 (a) (1) (I)), and for homicide by vehicle in the second degree (OCGA § 40-6-393 (b)), the underlying traffic offense being backing a vehicle on a controlled-access…”
Holland v. State, 523 S.E.2d 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 6× “Holland appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, for homicide by vehicle in the second degree (OCGA § 40-6-393 (b)) and improper backing (OCGA § 40-6-240), contending that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal; (2) allowing…”
Williams v. State, 395 S.E.2d 399 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 4× “The officer testified that he arrested Williams for improper backing (violation of OCGA § 40-6-240 (a)) and disorderly conduct.”
State v. Nichols, 484 S.E.2d 507 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 4× “Thus, the officer was justified in following him into the house to arrest him for improper backing (OCGA § 40-6-240 (a)). Defendant’s argument that the “hot pursuit” doctrine applies only to felonies is also belied by Brown , in which the driver was driving without headlights, a…”
Roberson v. State, 495 S.E.2d 643 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 4× “” Roberson backed up a steep hill that had limited visibility on the same side of the road that was being heavily traveled by patrons exiting the Hill Top Lounge. The fact Roberson successfully backed up the roadway without colliding with other cars did not mean that this…”
Reliance Ins. v. Bridges, 311 S.E.2d 193 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
· cites it 2× “633, 679) (now OCGA § 40-6-240, effective November 1, 1982)) was not applicable to the evidence, as asserted by Cox.”
Commonwealth v. Metz, 602 A.2d 1328 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
· cites it 2× “Affirming the judgment of the lower court, the Court of Appeals of Georgia stated: [A]ppellant's evasive action upon seeing a police roadblock and his backing of the automobile in apparent violation of OCGA § 40-6-240(a) were `sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion that…”
Dryer v. State, 747 S.E.2d 895 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 2× “at 607-08 ; see OCGA § 40-6-240 (a) (“A driver shall not back a vehicle unless such movement can be made with safety and without interfering with other traffic.”
Hobbs v. State, 779 S.E.2d 15 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 2× “” OCGA § 40-6-240 (a) (“A driver shall not back a vehicle unless such movement can be made with safety and without interfering with other traffic.”
— 40-6-240(a) — 3 cases
Collier v. State, 639 S.E.2d 405 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
“OCGA § 40-6-240 (a) provides: “A driver shall not back a vehicle unless such movement can be made with safety and without interfering with other traffic.”
Commonwealth v. Metz, 602 A.2d 1328 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
“Affirming the judgment of the lower court, the Court of Appeals of Georgia stated: [A]ppellant's evasive action upon seeing a police roadblock and his backing of the automobile in apparent violation of OCGA § 40-6-240(a) were `sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion that…”
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