O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-271 (2019)

Duty upon striking unattended vehicle

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) The driver of any vehicle which collides with any vehicle which is unattended shall immediately stop and shall then and there either locate and notify the operator or owner of such vehicle of the name and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle striking the unattended vehicle or shall leave in a conspicuous place on the vehicle struck a written notice giving the name and address of the driver and the owner of the vehicle doing the striking. (b) Any person who fails to comply with the requirements of subsection (a) of this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

History

(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 43; Ga. L. 1980, p. 1059, § 1; Code 1981, § 40-6-272; Code 1981, § 40-6-271, as redesignated by Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Offense not subject to criminal prosecution. - Conduct proscribed is without express statutory punishment and is not an offense subject to criminal prosecution. United States v. Walter, 484 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1980) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, prior to amendment by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1059, § 1). Probable cause to arrest. - In defendant’s trial for hijacking a motor vehicle, the trial court did not err in finding that a gun and the keys to the vehicle were discovered during a search incident to a lawful arrest for hit and run in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-271(a), and therefore properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The officer had probable cause to arrest for hit and run based on an examination of the vehicle and a

witness’s identification of the defendant, by pointing to the defendant as the driver. Souder v. State, 301 Ga. App. 348, 687 S.E.2d 594 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0536, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 343 (Ga. 2010). Evidence sufficient. - Conviction for striking an unattended vehicle was affirmed since the record showed that, even though the victim was in the parking lot, the victim had walked away from the victim’s vehicle when the defendant struck the bumper of the victim’s vehicle; further, the defendant failed to provide the victim with the defendant’s name and address following the incident. Crutcher v. State, 267 Ga. App. 410, 599 S.E.2d 353 (2004). Evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was sufficient for a

rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, failure to stop upon striking an unattended vehicle, and failure to stop at or return to the scene of an accident, violations of O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-270(a), 40-6-271(a), and 40-6-395(a) and (b)(5)(A), when the defendant refused to stop a vehicle for two bicycle-patrol uniformed officers, drove the vehicle into one of the officers, struck two unattended vehicles, and struck an officer’s marked bicycle. Fairwell v. State, 311 Ga. App. 834, 717 S.E.2d 332 (2011). Evidence was amply sufficient for a ra-

tional finder of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-271 because the defendant struck two separate unattended vehicles in a parking lot, and both victims testified at trial that the victims saw the collisions occur and that the driver left the scene without speaking to either of the victims, leaving a note, or providing any contact information. Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga. App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333, cert. denied, No. S12C0968, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 612 (Ga. 2012). Cited in Adams v. State, 293 Ga. App. 377, 667 S.E.2d 186 (2008).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Requirement to stop not extended to trains and crews. - Requirement to stop at the scene of a motor vehicle inci-

dent does not extend to railroad trains and their operating crews. 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 70-32.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 331, 332. C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 46. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 1695. ALR. - Liability for injuries due to collision between street car and automobile at street intersection, 28 A.L.R. 217; 46 A.L.R. 1000. Constitutionality, construction, and effect of statute in relation to conduct of

driver of automobile after happening of an accident, 66 A.L.R. 1228; 101 A.L.R. 911. Criminal responsibility of one other than driver at time of accident, under ‘‘hit and run’’ statute, 62 A.L.R.2d 1130. Sufficiency of compliance with requirement of criminal ‘‘hit and run’’ statute that motorist identify himself, 48 A.L.R.3d 685.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 29 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1984–2023 · leading case: Sevostiyanova v. State, 722 S.E.2d 333 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
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Sevostiyanova v. State, 722 S.E.2d 333 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 6× “As to the first incident, she was convicted following a jury trial on June 15-16, 2009, of two counts of violation of OCGA § 40-6-271 (duty of a driver on striking an unattended vehicle).”
Fairwell v. State, 717 S.E.2d 332 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 8× “Fairwell claims the trial court improperly instructed the jury that a violation of OCGA § 40-6-271 (a) occurs when an individual fails to “immediately” stop, in light of the fact that the indictment did not allege that Fairwell failed to “immediately” stop and evidence showed…”
Griffith v. State, 322 S.E.2d 921 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 6× “The appellant next contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the duty to give information and render aid required of a driver of any vehicle involved in any accident resulting in injury to any person or vehicle, as provided in OCGA § 40-6-271. However, he…”
Souder v. State, 687 S.E.2d 594 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “See OCGA § 40-6-271 (a); 4 Smith, 188 Ga. App.”
Burden v. State, 371 S.E.2d 410 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 6× “Appellant maintains there is no evidence that he acted with crim *779 inal intent or that he did not comply with OCGA § 40-6-271 as soon as possible. A criminal intent is necessary to sustain a finding of guilt (OCGA § 16-2-2), and a person is not presumed to act with criminal…”
Waits v. State, 323 S.E.2d 624 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 6× “Appellant Jesse Frank Waits was tried before a jury and found guilty of failure to stop and render aid in violation of OCGA § 40-6-271 and not guilty of driving under the influence.”
Thomason v. State, 396 S.E.2d 79 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 6× “An essential element, of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident as set forth in OCGA § 40-6-270, is failing to return to the scene of an accident and remain until fulfilling the requirements of OCGA § 40-6-271 (Duty to give information and render aid).”
Walker v. State, 749 S.E.2d 663 (Ga. 2013). · cites it 2× “As Appellant points out, Count 3 of the indictment alleged that he committed homicide by vehicle based on his violation of “OCGA Section 40-6-271,” which deals with the duty of a driver who strikes an unattended vehicle.”
State v. Gehris, 528 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 4× “Andrews, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur. 1 Gehris also was charged with: (1) violating OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5) for being in physical control of a moving vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of 0.”
Adams v. State, 667 S.E.2d 186 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “20 See OCGA §§ 40-6-271 (striking an unattended vehicle); 40-6-391 (DUI).”
Brown v. the State, 793 S.E.2d 573 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 2× “729, 731 (1) ( 722 SE2d 333 ) (2012) (affirming defendant’s two convictions for fleeing the scene of an accident involving an unattended vehicle, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-271, where the evidence showed that defendant hit two different cars in a parking lot and then fled the…”
Knox v. State, 658 S.E.2d 819 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “Following a jury trial, Robert Charles Knox was convicted of four counts of failure of duty upon striking an unattended vehicle (in violation of OCGA § 40-6-271), two counts of failure to obey a traffic device (in violation of OCGA § 40-6-20), and a single count each of…”
Show all 29 citing cases →
— 40-6-271(a) — 2 cases
Duncan v. City of Sandy Springs (N.D. Ga. 2020).
Yolanda Duncan v. City of Sandy Springs (11th Cir. 2023).
— 40-6-271(b) — 1 case
Duncan v. City of Sandy Springs (N.D. Ga. 2020).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.