Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 68-1641 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

No absolute duty to avoid collision.

- No provision of law places an absolute duty on any driver to avoid a collision. All the circumstances and conditions at the time and place, including the conduct of other drivers, must be taken into account. Flanigan v. Reville, 107 Ga. App. 382, 130 S.E.2d 258 (1963) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-1641).

No provision of law places an absolute duty on any driver to avoid a collision. Malcom v. Malcolm, 112 Ga. App. 151, 144 S.E.2d 188 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-1641).

"Following" within meaning of subsection (d).

- An approaching vehicle is "following" the leading vehicle for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-49(d) only where the leading vehicle has stopped or slowed to make a lawful turn. Wilhelm v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 190 Ga. App. 869, 380 S.E.2d 276, cert. denied, 190 Ga. App. 899, 380 S.E.2d 276 (1989).

Following too closely violation of laws.

- Following too closely, without due regard for the speed of vehicles ahead and the traffic on and condition of the highway, is a violation of the Georgia motor vehicle laws. Wallace v. Yarbrough, 155 Ga. App. 184, 270 S.E.2d 357 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-1641).

In a negligence action, whether a driver cited with following too closely was acting with criminal negligence or intent was a question for the jury to decide for purposes of tolling the limitations period governing the cause of action. Beneke v. Parker, 293 Ga. App. 186, 667 S.E.2d 97 (2008), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 285 Ga. 733, 684 S.E.2d 243 (2009).

No right to assume road clear.

- Driver has no right to assume that road ahead of the driver is clear of traffic and it is the driver's duty to maintain a diligent lookout ahead. Wallace v. Yarbrough, 155 Ga. App. 184, 270 S.E.2d 357 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-1641).

Provisions furnish general rule of driving conduct.

- Trial court did not err in instructing the jury that former Code 1933, § 68A-310 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-6-49) and former Code 1933, § 68A-801 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-6-180) did not define precisely what constituted following too closely or driving at a prudent speed, and merely furnished a general rule of conduct. Forehand v. Pace, 146 Ga. App. 682, 247 S.E.2d 192 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-1641).

Violation as basis for traffic stop.

- Trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of drugs found in the defendant's vehicle was upheld. The stop of the defendant's vehicle was not pretextual in that two officers observed the defendant's vehicle with tinted windows and following another vehicle too closely, which provided a sufficient legal basis to effectuate the traffic stop. Pollack v. State, 294 Ga. App. 400, 670 S.E.2d 165 (2008).

There was no Fourth Amendment violation in an officer's search of the defendant's car because the officer executed a traffic stop after seeing the defendant follow another vehicle too closely, and the officer's request for consent-which occurred during pending computer check on the defendant's name-did not result from an unduly prolonged detention. Defendant's consent to search was thus valid. Proctor v. State, 298 Ga. App. 388, 680 S.E.2d 493 (2009).

When cocaine was found during a traffic stop after a dog sniff, suppression was not warranted, because the officer had probable cause to believe that the car was following too closely since it was not "contrary to the laws of nature" that a car traveling slower than the flow of traffic could position itself very closely to another car just after changing lanes. United States v. Whitlock, F.3d (11th Cir. Oct. 19, 2012)(Unpublished).

Investigative stop held proper.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress cocaine found during a search of the defendant's car as the officer's testimony authorized a finding that the officer saw the defendant committing traffic violations for which the defendant received either a warning or a citation - impeding traffic, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-184(a), and following too closely, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-49. Warren v. State, 314 Ga. App. 477, 724 S.E.2d 404 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1072, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 548 (Ga. 2012).

Leading vehicle has no absolute superior legal position.

- All drivers of vehicles using the highways are held to the exercise of due care; a leading vehicle has no absolute legal position superior to that of one following and each driver must exercise ordinary care in the situation in which that driver finds oneself. Malcom v. Malcolm, 112 Ga. App. 151, 144 S.E.2d 188 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-1641); Lynch v. Broom, 158 Ga. App. 52, 279 S.E.2d 302 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Chadwick v. Miller, 169 Ga. App. 338, 312 S.E.2d 835 (1983) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-1641).

Duties of leading and following vehicles.

- Driver of the leading vehicle must exercise ordinary care not to stop, slow up, or swerve from the driver's course without adequate warning to following vehicles of the driver's intention so to do; the driver of the following vehicle, in the driver's turn, must exercise ordinary care to avoid collision with vehicles, both those in front and those behind the driver. Lynch v. Broom, 158 Ga. App. 52, 279 S.E.2d 302 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Chadwick v. Miller, 169 Ga. App. 338, 312 S.E.2d 835 (1983) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-1641).

Jury determines whether section violated.

- Former Code 1933, § 68-1641 merely furnished a general rule of conduct, and it is for the jury to determine, in the light of all the attendant circumstances of the case, whether that section had been violated. Malcom v. Malcolm, 112 Ga. App. 151, 144 S.E.2d 188 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-1641).

Whether or not a driver was following too closely when the driver struck the other vehicle was clearly a jury question. White v. Cline, 174 Ga. App. 448, 330 S.E.2d 386 (1985).

Jury decides questions as to due care.

- Just how close to a vehicle in the lead a following vehicle ought, in the exercise of ordinary care, to be driven, just what precautions a driver of such a vehicle must, in the exercise of ordinary care, take to avoid colliding with a leading vehicle which slows, stops, or swerves in front of that driver, just what signals or warnings the driver of a leading vehicle must, in the exercise of due care, give before stopping or slowing up of the driver's intention to do so, may not be laid down in any hard and fast or general rule; in each case except when reasonable minds may not differ, what due care is required, and whether due care was exercised, is for the jury. Lynch v. Broom, 158 Ga. App. 52, 279 S.E.2d 302 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Chadwick v. Miller, 169 Ga. App. 338, 312 S.E.2d 835 (1983) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-1641).

Jury allowed to infer.

- When there was some evidence from which the jury was authorized to infer that the deceased was stopped to make a lawful left turn into a southbound lane of the highway, when the defendant approached the deceased's car from behind, the court did not err by charging O.C.G.A. § 40-6-49. Branch v. Maxwell, 203 Ga. App. 553, 417 S.E.2d 176, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 417 S.E.2d 176 (1992).

Guilty plea not conclusive that defendant negligent.

- Plea of guilty in traffic court to the charge of following too closely is only a circumstance to be considered along with all the other evidence in the civil action for damages, and is not conclusive of the fact that the defendant was negligent. Malcom v. Malcolm, 112 Ga. App. 151, 144 S.E.2d 188 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-1641).

An admission to the traffic offense of following too closely does not conclusively show liability; it is only a circumstance for the jury to consider with all the other evidence in a civil action for damages. Armandroff v. Cushing, 250 Ga. App. 105, 550 S.E.2d 674 (2001).

Finding of ordinary negligence must first be made.

- While a violation of former Code 1933, § 68-1641 has been called negligence per se, before a negligent act can be found to be negligence per se, a finding of ordinary negligence must in reality first be made. Dowis v. McCurdy, 109 Ga. App. 488, 136 S.E.2d 389, cert. dismissed, 220 Ga. 415, 139 S.E.2d 294 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-1641).

Evidence insufficient for conviction.

- After the defendant noticed a tractor trailer diagonally to the defendant's front and left swerve into the defendant's path of travel and, to avoid a collision the defendant swung the defendant's vehicle into the far left lane and struck the rear of a dump truck, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction on the charge of following too closely since the defendant had not been in the same lane as the dump truck. Torrance v. State, 217 Ga. App. 562, 458 S.E.2d 495 (1995).

Trial court properly denied the plaintiffs' JNOV motion pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50 in an action arising from an auto accident; a driver did not admit liability, the relevant facts were disputed, and the fact that the driver was unable to stop in time to avoid the collision did not demand a finding that the driver was following too closely in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-49. Cameron v. Peterson, 264 Ga. App. 1, 589 S.E.2d 834 (2003).

Evidence sufficient for conviction.

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for following too closely after the defendant rear-ended a car at four o'clock in the morning and witnesses smelled alcohol on the defendant's breath and observed the defendant's red eyes and slurred speech at the accident scene and later at a hospital. Belyeu v. State, 262 Ga. App. 682, 586 S.E.2d 396 (2003).

Evidence supported a conviction of following another vehicle too closely after an officer observed the defendant driving "right on the tail" of another car on an interstate highway, traveling approximately 70 m.p.h. and, at times, only five feet from the car in front of the driver. Totino v. State, 266 Ga. App. 265, 596 S.E.2d 749 (2004).

Motorist's identification of the defendant as the driver of a pick-up truck that hit the motorist's vehicle and then drove away was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) to establish the defendant's identity for purposes of defendant's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident and following too closely in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-49 and40-6-270(a)(1). Craig v. State, 276 Ga. App. 329, 623 S.E.2d 518 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for following too closely as an officer described the traffic conditions on the interstate and the length of the space the defendant was leaving between the defendant's truck and the truck ahead of the defendant; the officer also testified that a video recording of the defendant's stop shown to the jury demonstrated the traffic conditions; viewed in a light to favor the verdict, the evidence authorized the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had followed the lead truck more closely than was reasonable and prudent in light of the speed of the vehicles and traffic conditions. Buckholts v. State, 283 Ga. App. 254, 641 S.E.2d 246 (2007).

Evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty of violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-49 beyond a reasonable doubt because the defendant rear-ended a car and left the scene without providing the victim with any identifying information. Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga. App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333, cert. denied, No. S12C0968, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 612 (Ga. 2012).

Instructions.

- Because there was some evidence, even from the state's witnesses, that showed that the defendant committed an act of following too closely, a traffic violation other than the more culpable offense of DUI, that such evidence not only showed that the defendant committed the less-culpable offenses of following too closely and of failing to maintain the defendant's lane, that may have caused the collision and resulting death, the trial court erred in failing to give the defendant's written request for an instruction on second-degree vehicular homicide. Brown v. State, 287 Ga. App. 755, 652 S.E.2d 631 (2007).

Trial court distinguished between the counts charging the defendant with violating O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-49(d) and40-6-270 because the trial court fairly instructed the jurors that knowledge was an element of the hit-and-run count. Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga. App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333, cert. denied, No. S12C0968, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 612 (Ga. 2012).

Comma inadvertently added to the state's requested charge on O.C.G.A. § 40-6-49(d) was harmless because the trial court read the charges aloud and the jury did not see the written charge. Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga. App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333, cert. denied, No. S12C0968, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 612 (Ga. 2012).

Trial court did not err in charging the jury on O.C.G.A. § 40-6-49(a) because the trial court charged the jury and then explained the term "following" by the court's charge on § 40-6-49(d); there was no variance between the accusation and the proof at trial on the count charging the defendant with violating § 40-6-49. Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga. App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333, cert. denied, No. S12C0968, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 612 (Ga. 2012).

Cited in Peluso v. State, 147 Ga. App. 266, 248 S.E.2d 546 (1978); Avant Trucking Co. v. Stallion, 159 Ga. App. 198, 283 S.E.2d 7 (1981); U-Haul Co. v. Ford, 171 Ga. App. 744, 320 S.E.2d 868 (1984); United States v. Bates, 840 F.2d 858 (11th Cir. 1988); Johnstone v. Malone Office Equip. Co., 192 Ga. App. 137, 384 S.E.2d 208 (1989); Tam v. State, 225 Ga. App. 101, 483 S.E.2d 142 (1997); Furlong v. Dyal, 246 Ga. App. 122, 539 S.E.2d 836 (2000); Rucker v. State, 266 Ga. App. 293, 596 S.E.2d 639 (2004); Smith v. State, 270 Ga. App. 759, 608 S.E.2d 35 (2004); Roberts v. State, 280 Ga. App. 672, 634 S.E.2d 790 (2006); Garcia-Carrillo v. State, 322 Ga. App. 439, 746 S.E.2d 137 (2013).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 248.

C.J.S.

- 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 736.

ALR.

- Construction and application of statutes regulating or forbidding passing on hill by vehicle, 60 A.L.R.2d 211.

Driver's failure to maintain proper distance from motor vehicle ahead, 85 A.L.R.2d 613.

Automobiles: sudden emergency as exception to rule requiring motorist to maintain ability to stop within assured clear distance ahead, 75 A.L.R.3d 327.