O.C.G.A. § 40-6-72 (2019)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L. 1939, p. 295 are included in the annotations for this Code section. DOT without liability when stop sign present. - Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the Georgia Department of Transportation in a personal injury suit alleging the department negligently designed, maintained, and failed to provide proper traffic control devices at an intersection because the undisputed evidence showed that the clearly visible stop signs at the intersection were ignored by one driver, who was the proximate cause of the accident and the injures. Bennett v. Ga. DOT, 318 Ga. App. 369, 734 S.E.2d 77 (2012). Function of fixed red light. - Fixed red light is not traffic-control device; rather, it has same effect as stop sign, which requires a vehicle to stop and then proceed through the intersection only when it is safe to do so. Andrews v. Buckner, 143 Ga. App. 862, 240 S.E.2d 266 (1977).

Driver lawfully in lane. - Municipal court’s finding that the driver who was hit improperly entered the intersection had no bearing on the defendant’s guilt, although the defendant may have entered the intersection too soon, the evidence established that at the time the defendant entered the intersection the defendant was lawfully in the lane and the driver who was hit was obligated to yield to the defendant. Wilson v. City of Riverdale, 203 Ga. App. 250, 416 S.E.2d 825 (1992), overruled on other grounds, Brown v. City of Marietta, 214 Ga. App. 840, 449 S.E.2d 540 (1994). Entering safely into the intersection. - Driver of a vehicle on a roadway controlled by a stop sign may momentarily gain preference of right of way when, after coming to a complete stop at the stop sign and having diligently looked for oncoming traffic, enters safely into the intersection. Flournoy v. Brown, 226 Ga. App. 857, 487 S.E.2d 683 (1997). Partial compliance inadequate. - Even if the defendant did manage to stop

at a stop sign to let several cars go by, since the defendant failed to yield to victims when the victims were approaching an intersection on another roadway, the defendant was liable under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-72. Moss v. State, 209 Ga. App. 59, 432 S.E.2d 825 (1993). Probable cause for arrest for violation. - Officer had probable cause to justify an arrest for failure to stop at a stop sign under Georgia law after the officer saw a suspect fail to properly stop and observed the vehicle go past the white line at the stop sign. Williams v. Deal, No. 311-061, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114635 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2014). Violation prima facie establishes negligence. - Operation of a bus in a manner which constituted a violation of former Code 1933, § 68A-403 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-6-72) prima facie established negligence per se in the absence of a valid defense. Johnson v. McAfee, 151 Ga. App. 774, 261 S.E.2d 708 (1979). Matters submitted to jury. - Existence of a stop sign though unofficial, and the failure of the plaintiff to heed the sign are relevant matters in a consideration of the diligence and negligence of the parties and such matters should be submitted to the jury. Tyson v. Shoemaker, 208 Ga. 28, 65 S.E.2d 163 (1951) (decided under Ga. L. 1939, p. 295). Jury instruction upheld. - Instruction stating ‘‘that the defendant has no duty to yield the right of way if you find that the defendant, after stopping and looking, could not see the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding as the defendant entered the roadway’’ was a correct statement of law. Humphreys v. Kipfmiller, 237 Ga. App. 572, 515 S.E.2d 878 (1999). Evidence sufficient. - Police officer’s testimony that the officer observed the defendant run a stop sign that was ‘‘clearly visible’’ to oncoming traffic was sufficient to authorize the trial court’s finding that the defendant was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of disregarding a stop sign. Evans v. State, 235 Ga. App. 877, 510 S.E.2d 619 (1999). Police officer’s observation that the stop of the vehicle the defendant was driving was executed after the vehicle went

through an intersection without stopping at a stop sign was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for disregarding a stop sign and the state did not have to prove that the intersection did not have a ‘‘marked stop line,’’ ‘‘a crosswalk,’’ or a ‘‘point nearest the intersecting roadway’’ as described in O.C.G.A. § 40-6-72. Scott v. State, 254 Ga. App. 728, 563 S.E.2d 554 (2002). Evidence that the police observed the defendant running a stop sign just moments before the defendant engaged the police in a high-speed motor vehicle chase was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for failure to obey a stop sign. Arnold v. State, 262 Ga. App. 61, 584 S.E.2d 662 (2003). Evidence supported a defendant’s convictions for fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer as an underlying offense for felony murder, theft by taking, vehicular homicide, disregarding a traffic control device, failing to stop at a stop sign, and reckless driving as: (1) the defendant stole a vehicle and was spotted by an officer shortly after the vehicle was reported as stolen; (2) when the officer began to follow the vehicle, the vehicle rapidly accelerated; (3) the officer followed the stolen vehicle for several blocks, with both vehicles traveling between 60-70 miles per hour; (4) the vehicle continued to accelerate after the officer turned on the officer’s blue lights and siren; (5) when the stolen vehicle ran a red light, the stolen vehicle struck a car, killing the driver; and (6) the officer and the owner of the stolen vehicle identified the defendant as the person driving the stolen vehicle. Ferguson v. State, 280 Ga. 893, 635 S.E.2d 144 (2006). Appeals court found sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions for DUI to the degree of being a less-safe driver and of failing to stop at a stop sign as the evidence, although not overwhelming, showed that the defendant smelled of alcohol, had run a stop sign, and that the arresting officer believed that the defendant was a less-safe driver as a result of alcohol consumption. Sistrunk v. State, 287 Ga. App. 39, 651 S.E.2d 350 (2007). Cited in Holbrook Waterproofing Co. v. Cleaver, 132 Ga. App. 24, 207 S.E.2d 562

(1974); Jenkins v. Lampkin, 145 Ga. App. 746, 244 S.E.2d 895 (1978); Cannon v. Rithmire, 156 Ga. App. 360, 274 S.E.2d 746 (1980); Hensel v. Davis, 170 Ga. App.

153, 316 S.E.2d 479 (1984); DOT v. Jackson, 229 Ga. App. 321, 494 S.E.2d 20 (1997); Gilmore v. State, 242 Ga. App. 470, 530 S.E.2d 221 (2000).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 241, 285, 293. C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 837 et seq. ALR. - Right of way at street or highway intersections, 37 A.L.R. 493; 47 A.L.R. 595. Reciprocal duties of drivers of automobiles or other vehicles proceeding in the same direction, 47 A.L.R. 703; 62 A.L.R. 970; 104 A.L.R. 485. Right and duty of motorist on through, favored, or arterial street or highway to proceed where lateral view at intersection is obstructed by physical obstacle, 59 A.L.R.2d 1202. Motorist’s liability for collision at intersection of ordinary and arterial highways as affected by absence, displacement, or malfunctioning of stop sign or other traffic signal, 74 A.L.R.2d 242. Liability for automobile accident at in-

tersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of ‘‘yield’’ sign or signal, 2 A.L.R.3d 275. Liability for automobile accident at intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of unchanging stop signal or sign, 3 A.L.R.3d 180. Liability for automobile accident at intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of unchanging caution, slow, danger, or like sign or signal, 3 A.L.R.3d 507. Liability for collision of automobile with pedestrian at intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of traffic sign or signal other than stop-and-go signal, 3 A.L.R.3d 557. What is a street or highway intersection within traffic rules, 7 A.L.R.3d 1204. Automobiles: accidents arising from merger of traffic on limited-access highway with that from service road or ramp, 40 A.L.R.3d 1429.