O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-92 (2019)

Crossing roadway elsewhere than at crosswalk

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway unless he has already, and under safe conditions, entered the roadway. (b) Any pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point where a pedestrian tunnel or overhead pedestrian crossing has been provided shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway if he uses the roadway instead of such tunnel or crossing. (c) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic-control signals are in operation, pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk. (d) No pedestrian shall cross a roadway intersection diagonally unless authorized by official traffic-control devices. When authorized to

cross diagonally, pedestrians shall cross only in accordance with the official traffic-control devices pertaining to such crossing movements.

History

(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 79; Ga. L. 1967, p. 542, § 4; Code 1933, § 68A-503, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Defendant entitled to show child violated section. - Even though a child may not be chargeable with contributory negligence because of the child’s tender age, the defendant is entitled to show that the plaintiff was in fact violating Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1 when the child’s injury was sustained. Lewis v. Noonan, 142 Ga. App. 654, 236 S.E.2d 900 (1977). Pedestrian proceeding without care. - When the evidence revealed that the defendants had the right of way as the plaintiff proceeded heedlessly from the safety of the center median without using the nearby crosswalk, the defendant was not negligent per se and O.C.G.A. § 40-6-92 did not protect the plaintiff. Etheredge v. Kersey, 236 Ga. App. 243, 510 S.E.2d 544 (1998). Trial court did not err in finding that the defendant violated O.C.G.A. § 40-6-92(a) as it was undisputed that there was no marked crosswalk where the defendant was crossing the road, that the defendant was crossing other than at either a marked crosswalk or an unmarked crosswalk, and that the defendant entered the roadway when it was not safe to do so, given the traffic and weather conditions,

and failed to yield to motor vehicle traffic. Hill v. State, 341 Ga. App. 409, 801 S.E.2d 87 (2017). Crossing outside of crosswalk. - While O.C.G.A. § 40-6-92(a) does not absolutely prohibit a pedestrian from crossing the roadway outside of a crosswalk, the statute mandates that under those conditions, the pedestrian shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway unless the pedestrian has already, and under safe conditions, entered the roadway. Nelson v. State, 317 Ga. App. 527, 731 S.E.2d 770 (2012). Jury instruction. - When the pedestrian plaintiff entered the roadway in the crosswalk and in accordance with the pedestrian-control signal, it was error to charge the jury on subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-92. Gaffron v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 229 Ga. App. 426, 494 S.E.2d 54 (1997). Cited in Conner v. Mangum, 132 Ga. App. 100, 207 S.E.2d 604 (1974); Hill v. Copeland, 148 Ga. App. 232, 250 S.E.2d 822 (1978); Weathers v. Foote & Davies Transp. Co., 189 Ga. App. 134, 375 S.E.2d 97 (1988); Shilliday v. Dunaway, 220 Ga. App. 406, 469 S.E.2d 485 (1996).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 303. C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 895. ALR. - Crossing street elsewhere than at regular crossing as contributory negligence precluding recovery for injury from defect or obstruction, 3 A.L.R. 1113. Duty of pedestrian before crossing street to look for vehicles approaching on intersecting street, 9 A.L.R. 1248; 44 A.L.R. 1299. Liability for injury to pedestrian collid-

ing with side of automobile, 25 A.L.R. 1513. Liability for injury on park strip between sidewalk and curb, 59 A.L.R. 387; 61 A.L.R. 267; 19 A.L.R.2d 1053. Duty and liability to person struck by automobile while crossing street at unusual place or diagonally, 67 A.L.R. 313. Liability for injury on parking or strip between sidewalk and curb, 19 A.L.R.2d 1053. Liability for collision of automobile with pedestrian at intersection as affected by

reliance upon or disregard of traffic sign or signal other than stop-and-go signal, 3 A.L.R.3d 557. Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases,

of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from defect or obstruction on roadside parkway or parking strip, 98 A.L.R.3d 439.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13 cases, 1988–2019 · leading case: Nelson v. State, 731 S.E.2d 770 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
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Nelson v. State, 731 S.E.2d 770 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 20× “Nelson was charged, in pertinent part, with homicide by vehicle in the second degree under OCGA § 40-6-393 (c) and a pedestrian crossing violation under OCGA § 40-6-92 (a). Following the presentation of the evidence at trial, the jury found Nelson guilty of the charged offenses.”
Shilliday v. Dunaway, 469 S.E.2d 485 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 8× “The Shillidays complain of the trial court’s failure to charge OCGA § 40-6-92 (a). In its order denying the Shillidays’ motion for new trial, the trial court found that the request was not submitted in writing and that any ground for appeal was thus waived.”
Ireland v. Williams Et Al., 830 S.E.2d 538 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 4× “" 14 And under Georgia law, although a driver must exercise due care when operating a vehicle to avoid colliding with a pedestrian, 15 OCGA § 40-6-92 (a) provides that "[e]very pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked…”
Gaffron v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 494 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 4× “” OCGA § 40-6-92 (a) provides that “[e]very pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway unless he has already, and under safe…”
Kinlocke v. Benton, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1368 (N.D. Ga. 2017). · cites it 4× “Benton placed Kinlocke under arrest for crossing at other than a crosswalk — pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-92 — and for obstructing or hindering law enforcement officers — pursuant to O.”
Silvers v. Kimbell, 465 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 8× “1 On appeal, the Estate contends the trial court committed harmful error when it charged the jury the substance of OCGA § 40-6-92 (c) as follows: “Now, ladies and gentlemen, between adjacent intersections at which traffic control signals are in operation, pedestrians shall not…”
Bacon v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 525 S.E.2d 115 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 2× “On the day in question, Vemada overlooked her duty to yield to vehicular traffic, see OCGA § 40-6-92 (a), in her hurry to reach her father.”
Field v. Lowery, 686 S.E.2d 422 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 2× “Both parties moved for partial summary judgment, and the trial court granted Lowery’s motion, holding that OCGA § 40-6-92 requires pedestrians to walk on the shoulder of the road when no sidewalk was available.”
Etheredge v. Kersey, 510 S.E.2d 544 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 2× “Accordingly, Kersey was not negligent per se, and Etheredge is not protected by OCGA § 40-6-92 (a). “OCGA § 24-4-1 places the burden of proof upon the party who is asserting or affirming a fact and to the existence of whose case the proof of such fact is essential.”
Weathers v. Foote & Davies Transp. Co., 375 S.E.2d 97 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 2× “The trial court’s charges on the avoidance rule, on the assumption of risk, on comparative negligence and on the provisions of OCGA § 40-6-92 (a) were properly adjusted to and authorized by the evidence.”
Glass v. State, 598 S.E.2d 857 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 40-6-91 (c) explicitly recites that subsection (a) is inapplicable under the conditions set out in OCGA § 40-6-92 (b) concerning pedestrian tunnels and overhead pedestrian crossings.”
Hill v. the State, 801 S.E.2d 87 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 8× “After a bench trial, the State Court of Clayton County found Debra Hill guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a misdemeanor pedestrian violation, failing to yield the right of way to vehicles upon the roadway when crossing other than at a crosswalk, OCGA § 40-6-92 (a). Hill…”
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