Defendant entitled to show child violated section.

- Even though a child may not be chargeable with contributory negligence because of the child's tender age, the defendant is entitled to show that the plaintiff was in fact violating Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1 when the child's injury was sustained. Lewis v. Noonan, 142 Ga. App. 654, 236 S.E.2d 900 (1977).

Pedestrian proceeding without care.

- When the evidence revealed that the defendants had the right of way as the plaintiff proceeded heedlessly from the safety of the center median without using the nearby crosswalk, the defendant was not negligent per se and O.C.G.A. § 40-6-92 did not protect the plaintiff. Etheredge v. Kersey, 236 Ga. App. 243, 510 S.E.2d 544 (1998).

Trial court did not err in finding that the defendant violated O.C.G.A. § 40-6-92(a) as it was undisputed that there was no marked crosswalk where the defendant was crossing the road, that the defendant was crossing other than at either a marked crosswalk or an unmarked crosswalk, and that the defendant entered the roadway when it was not safe to do so, given the traffic and weather conditions, and failed to yield to motor vehicle traffic. Hill v. State, 341 Ga. App. 409, 801 S.E.2d 87 (2017).

Crossing outside of crosswalk.

- While O.C.G.A. § 40-6-92(a) does not absolutely prohibit a pedestrian from crossing the roadway outside of a crosswalk, the statute mandates that under those conditions, the pedestrian shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway unless the pedestrian has already, and under safe conditions, entered the roadway. Nelson v. State, 317 Ga. App. 527, 731 S.E.2d 770 (2012).

Jury instruction.

- When the pedestrian plaintiff entered the roadway in the crosswalk and in accordance with the pedestrian-control signal, it was error to charge the jury on subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-92. Gaffron v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 229 Ga. App. 426, 494 S.E.2d 54 (1997).

Cited in Conner v. Mangum, 132 Ga. App. 100, 207 S.E.2d 604 (1974); Hill v. Copeland, 148 Ga. App. 232, 250 S.E.2d 822 (1978); Weathers v. Foote & Davies Transp. Co., 189 Ga. App. 134, 375 S.E.2d 97 (1988); Shilliday v. Dunaway, 220 Ga. App. 406, 469 S.E.2d 485 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 303.

C.J.S.

- 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 895.

ALR.

- Crossing street elsewhere than at regular crossing as contributory negligence precluding recovery for injury from defect or obstruction, 3 A.L.R. 1113.

Duty of pedestrian before crossing street to look for vehicles approaching on intersecting street, 9 A.L.R. 1248; 44 A.L.R. 1299.

Liability for injury to pedestrian colliding with side of automobile, 25 A.L.R. 1513.

Liability for injury on park strip between sidewalk and curb, 59 A.L.R. 387; 61 A.L.R. 267; 19 A.L.R.2d 1053.

Duty and liability to person struck by automobile while crossing street at unusual place or diagonally, 67 A.L.R. 313.

Liability for injury on parking or strip between sidewalk and curb, 19 A.L.R.2d 1053.

Liability for collision of automobile with pedestrian at intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of traffic sign or signal other than stop-and-go signal, 3 A.L.R.3d 557.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from defect or obstruction on roadside parkway or parking strip, 98 A.L.R.3d 439.