Forbidding of business upon paved area of highway.

- For a pedestrian to choose the paved area of a highway for a place to stand and transact business, no matter how laudable the business itself might be, is certainly a privilege rather than a right, and therefore subject to regulation by the state, which may, if the state deems proper, forbid it entirely. Zeiger v. State, 140 Ga. App. 610, 231 S.E.2d 494 (1976).

Elements essential for conviction under subsection (b).

- There were three elements essential of proof for conviction of the offense in subsection (b) of former Code 1933, § 68A-507 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-6-97): (1) that the person accused be "on a highway"; (2) "for the purpose of soliciting"; and (3) "from the occupant of any vehicle." Crook v. State, 156 Ga. App. 756, 275 S.E.2d 794 (1980).

Person solicited standing away from car.

- Conviction under subsection (b) of former Code 1933, § 68A-507 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-6-97) cannot be sustained since the person from whom the defendant solicited business was standing five or six feet from that person's car at the time the defendant handed the person the defendant's business card. The person who was solicited was not the "occupant" of a vehicle. Thus, the state failed to prove an essential element of the offense. Crook v. State, 156 Ga. App. 756, 275 S.E.2d 794 (1980).

Passing out literature in support of presidential candidate while standing in a roadway did not fall within any proscription of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-97. Robinson v. State, 177 Ga. App. 848, 341 S.E.2d 497 (1986).

Cited in Carroll v. State, 157 Ga. App. 113, 276 S.E.2d 267 (1981).