CopyCited 42 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 9, 2010 | 287 Ga. 338, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 2748
...The analysis of such disparities may be more complicated, both because determining parole eligibility often requires looking beyond the terms of the charged offenses to consider the statutes, rules, and practices relating to parole, see, e.g., OCGA §§
17-10-6.1,
17-10-7,
42-9-39,
42-9-40, and because the Board of Pardons and Paroles is independent of the district attorneys and generally has broad discretion to grant or deny parole, as is correctly noted in Hewitt [v....
CopyCited 35 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 27, 2017 | 797 S.E.2d 478
... that plea counsel told him he would be eligible for parole in “30 years or so.”
Gomez assaulted a corrections officer while awaiting trial. At the time of his plea, he had also been cited for writing gang insignias on his shoes.
See OCGA §§
42-9-40,
42-9-43.
The trial court was authorized to credit plea counsel’s testimony and discredit Gomez’s testimony that counsel told him he would serve 22 or 25 years before becoming eligible for parole....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 25, 2008 | 284 Ga. 675, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 3868
...d with the power to grant parole, and the power to make parole decisions is discretionary. Daker v. Ray,
275 Ga. 205(2),
563 S.E.2d 429 (2002). While the General Assembly has required the Board to establish and use a parole guidelines system (OCGA §§
42-9-40(a),
42-9-42(c)), nothing in the applicable statutes mandates that the guidelines control the final parole decision....
CopyCited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 29, 2002 | 275 Ga. 205, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 1297
...In the alternative, he sought to compel the Board to consider him for parole because he had served more than one-third of his sentences, to reconsider him for parole on a periodic basis, and to adhere strictly to the parole guidelines mandated by OCGA §
42-9-40....
...Justice v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles,
234 Ga. 749, 751(2),
218 S.E.2d 45 (1975). In the exercise of its authority to determine parole eligibility, the General Assembly has required the Board to establish and use a parole guidelines system. OCGA §
42-9-40(a)....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 30, 2008 | 284 Ga. 24, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 2181
...at the same time exercise the functions of either of the others except as herein provided." Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III. The Board of Pardons and Paroles has executive power regarding the terms and conditions of paroles. See OCGA §§
42-9-40,
42-9-44....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 8, 1996 | 266 Ga. 141, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 174
...s the ability to determine who is *277 eligible for consideration of parole. 1983 Ga. Const., Art. IV, Sec. II, Para. II(a) and (b). The board is statutorily required to establish and use a parole guidelines system in determining parole action. OCGA §
42-9-40(a)....
...more consistent, soundly based and explainable parole decisions" (Rule 475-3-.05(5) of the Rules of State Board of Pardons and Paroles) concerning Georgia inmates not serving life sentences who are statutorily eligible for parole consideration. OCGA §
42-9-40....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 1, 2010 | 286 Ga. 434, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 253
...The analysis of such disparities may be more complicated, both because determining parole eligibility often requires looking beyond the terms of the charged offenses to consider the statutes, rules, and practices relating to parole, see, e.g., OCGA §§
17-10-6.1,
17-10-7,
42-9-39,
42-9-40, and because the Board of Pardons and Paroles is independent of the district attorneys and generally has broad discretion to grant or deny parole, as is correctly noted in Hewitt, 277 Ga....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 30, 2000 | 272 Ga. 659, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 2045
...hat there exist a direct relationship between the instruction and the criminal offense, and the authority to supervise all persons placed on parole. This process is clearly designed to serve the parole statute's primary goal to protect society, OCGA §
42-9-40(a), while fostering individualized decision making in parole actions....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 18, 1999 | 271 Ga. 663, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 3805
...Acting pro se, Griffin filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Baldwin County Superior Court seeking to set aside his guilty pleas based on the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, involuntariness of his guilty pleas, and unconstitutionality of OCGA §§
42-9-40 and
42-9-45 in that the statutes grant the Parole Board unfettered discretion to grant or deny parole....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 16, 2002 | 569 S.E.2d 542, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 2676
...the sentences, whichever is greater.”
The Board is also required by statute to adopt a parole guidelines system for determining its parole actions on all inmates who will become eligible for parole, except for inmates serving life sentences. OCGA §
42-9-40....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 15, 2002 | 562 S.E.2d 172, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 1172
...l sex and inflicted physically-scarring injuries on one of the woman’s breasts. See Massey v. State, supra,
265 Ga. 632 (1). Since the Parole Board is responsible for conditioning parole consistent with its primary goal of protecting society (OCGA §
42-9-40 (a)), it is not an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable act to condition the parole of one whose crimes had sexual overtones on participation in “sexual offender counseling.” The trial court did not err in refusing to issue a writ of mandamus.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.
Thurbert E....
...sed on parole and of fixing the time and conditions thereof. OCGA §
42-9-42 (d) (1) reiterates this discretion when it provides that “[a]ny person who is paroled shall be released on such terms and conditions as the board shall prescribe.” OCGA §
42-9-40 gives the Parole Board the authority to “adopt, implement, and maintain” a guideline for determining parole action that is consistent with the Parole Board’s “primary goal of protecting society” and takes into consideration “th...
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 29, 2024 | 319 Ga. 415
...23 A person convicted of voluntary manslaughter may be sentenced to as
little as one year imprisonment and to a maximum of 20 years imprisonment,
and, if sentenced to the maximum, may be considered for parole after serving
13 years. See OCGA §§
16-5-2 (a);
42-9-40; Ga....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 8, 2001 | 540 S.E.2d 189
...Griffin filed his first state habeas petition in 1998, after the State Board of Pardons and Paroles notified him he was no longer eligible for parole and would be required to serve his entire sentence. In that petition, Griffin asserted that OCGA §§
42-9-40 and
42-9-45 were “unconstitutional statutes that induce guilty pleas by statutory promises of leniency [parole and parole eligibility] but the statutes are not binding on the Parole Board....
...r parole. This Court reversed that ruling in Griffin I. Griffin then filed another habeas petition in the Superior Court of Baldwin County in which he asserted that his guilty plea was based upon “unfulfillable and unenforceable promises of OCGA §§
42-9-40 and
42-9-45 and those statutes are unconstitutional under the Georgia Constitution....
...on for interlocutory review, asking the parties to address “[w]hether the holding in Johnson v. Griffin, [supra], is res judicata as to all Griffin’s subsequent claims for habeas corpus relief based upon the alleged unconstitutionality of OCGA §§
42-9-40 and
42-9-45.”
1....
