CopyCited 53 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 6, 2000 | 272 Ga. 296, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 945
...Trulock was addicted to and used cocaine and that the use of that drug is always illegal. OCGA §§
16-13-26(1)(D);
16-13-30(a). Both the commission of a crime of moral turpitude and the use of illegal drugs are factors which can result in the loss of a physician's license to practice medicine in this state. OCGA §
43-34-37(a)(4), (13)....
CopyCited 31 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 28, 2020 | 310 Ga. 127
...be recognized
in Georgia absent a clear mandate for such recognition by the legislature.”
Abelson,
260 Ga. at 714. The Normans argue that the legislature has already
recognized such actions in the artificial insemination context by enacting
OCGA §
43-34-37 (b)....
...A.’s life as an injury, and the trial court was
right to dismiss those claims.
(c) Not all claims based on prenatal injuries to a child require
any civil liability arising from his or her own negligent
administration or performance of artificial insemination.
OCGA §
43-34-37 (b) (emphasis supplied).
This statute is codified in the Code section limiting the practice of
medicine, including artificial insemination, to licensed physicians and
surgeons. See generally OCGA §
43-34-37....
CopyCited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 16, 2017 | 806 S.E.2d 493
...See H.B. 1073 (1996 Session). Likewise, other portions of the 1964 Act have been amended since the development of IVF technology and continue to include the term “artificial insemination” without expansion. See OCGA §
31-10-9 (amended 2005); OCGA §
43-34-37 (amended 2010).
As we have said before, “courts cannot construe [statutes] to force an outcome that the legislature did not expressly authorize.” Turner v....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 19, 1989 | 259 Ga. 549
..."Next to the loss of freedom comes the loss of one's means of a livelihood." Schaffer v. State Bd. of Veterinary Medicine,
143 Ga. App. 68, 72 (237 SE2d 510) (1977). Statutory Analysis We do not agree with the Board that OCGA §§
43-1-19 (h) (2);
43-34-37 (d), [2] and this Court's holding in Morton v....
...Morton urged an interpretation of "hearing before the board" which would have included "the kind of public debate which flows from media publicity of an issue. ..." Morton, supra at 848. Rejecting this or any exception to the confidentiality requirements of the statute, we held that OCGA §
43-34-37 (d) "flatly prohibits release of the entire investigative file," Morton, supra at 847, and that "[o]ur statute expressly prohibits disclosure, without exceptions." Morton, supra at 849. However, the purpose for which Dr. Morton sought access to the file was not a "hearing before the board," OCGA §§
43-1-19 (h) (2) and
43-34-37 (d); rather, he sought access to the file for use in his collateral civil action, a purpose "other than a hearing before the board." See also Rogers v....
...ions. A licensee facing the possibility of the loss of a license/livelihood must, upon proper request, be allowed access to information held by the Board that is exculpatory in order for the application of the statutes, OGCA §§
43-1-19 (h) (2) and
43-34-37 (d), to reach a constitutional result....
...e board retaining the right to have access at any time to such records. No part of any such records shall be released, except to the board, for any purpose other than a hearing before the board. ... [Emphasis supplied.] OCGA §
43-1-19 (h) (2). OCGA §
43-34-37 (d), which addresses the specific powers of the joint-secretary to make investigations of physicians, states in pertinent part: The results of any investigations whatsoever shall be reported only to the board, and the records of such investigations shall be kept by the board; no part of any such record shall be released for any purpose other than a hearing before the board. ... [Emphasis supplied.] OCGA §
43-34-37 (d)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 1, 1987 | 257 Ga. 456
...is a "medical review committee" within the meaning of OCGA §
31-7-140 so that the notices are inadmissible under OCGA §
31-7-143; second, whether the notices are records of the investigations of the Board, and are therefore inadmissible under OCGA §
43-34-37 (d); and, finally, whether the notices are admissible as evidence of conduct by the defendant similar to that alleged in this case....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 14, 1994 | 441 S.E.2d 66, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 885
....
See also OCGA §
43-1-19 (a) (6). The criminal conduct with which appellant has been charged certainly falls within these parameters. Compare Composite State Bd. of Med. Examiners v. Hertell,
163 Ga. App. 665 (295 SE2d 223) (1982), involving OCGA §
43-34-37, which does not contain the qualifying language “need not be directly related to the practice.” See Annot., 34 ALR4th 609, §§ 9, 10....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 3, 1986 | 347 S.E.2d 581
Weltner, Justice.
Jackson, a licensed medical doctor whose practice included the treatment of obese patients by prescribing amphetamines, sought a declaratory judgment that OCGA §
43-34-37 (a) (7) is unconstitutional, and that Rule 360-2-.09 (h) of the Composite State Board of Medical Examiners is invalid.
OCGA §
43-34-37 (a) (7) provides: “The board shall have authority to refuse to grant a license to an applicant or to discipline a physician licensed under this chapter or any antecedent law upon a finding by the board that the licensee or applicant has ....
...particular treatment situations that are not specifically delineated. The statute and the rule are not vague. Nor are they unconstitutionally overbroad, as contended.
5. Jackson contends that the trial court erred in finding that the title of OCGA §
43-34-37 (a) (7) gives sufficient notice of its content pursuant to Art....
