O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 44-14-66 (2019)

Effect of liens against grantee on grantor’s right to reconvey; effect of reconveyance in event of grantor’s prior death

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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The grantor’s right to a reconveyance of the property upon complying with the contract shall not be affected by any liens, encumbrances, or rights which would otherwise attach to the property by virtue of the title being in the grantee; but the right of the grantor to a reconveyance shall be absolute and permanent upon his complying with his contract with the grantee according to the terms. In the event of the prior death of the grantor, such a reconveyance shall be valid and effective to vest title in the heirs, personal representatives, or successors in title of the deceased grantor as their interests may appear.

History

Ga. L. 1871-72, p. 44, § 2; Code 1873, § 1971; Code 1882, § 1971; Civil Code

1895, § 2775; Civil Code 1910, § 3310; Code 1933, § 67-1307; Ga. L. 1970, p. 176, § 1.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS The right of the mortgagee under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-66, will be defeated by payment of the secured debt, either by the vendor or the vendor’s assignee.

Gilliard v. Johnston & Miller, 161 Ga. 17, 129 S.E. 434, 1925 Ga. LEXIS 293 (1925). The original holders of the bond for title did not have either a fee simple or

mortgageable interest in the land which they could convey to the purchaser at the first sheriff’s sale, or those who were substituted for the first purchaser, and therefore were not protected by O.C.G.A. § 4414-66. Lanier v. Brooker, 65 Ga. 761, 1880 Ga. LEXIS 324 (1880). Land held by absolute deed as security for a debt still unpaid, is subject to levy and sale as the property of the vendee, under a judgment against the vendee, no matter whether the judgment creditor gave credit on the faith of the property so held or not. Parrott v. Baker, 82 Ga. 364, 9 S.E. 1068, 1889 Ga. LEXIS 384 (1889). Crops. - A security deed executed under O.C.G.A. §§ 44-14-60, 44-14-61, 4414-63, 44-14-66, and 44-14-67, after the passage of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-101, to convey cultivated farm land as security for debt, does not ordinarily comprehend

crops matured or unmatured on the land. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Larsen, 178 Ga. 255, 173 S.E. 125, 1934 Ga. LEXIS 26 (1934). Legal title automatically reverted. - Trial court did not err in holding that children acquired a collective two-thirds interest in property because pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-67(a), when the original security deeds were paid off and cancelled legal title automatically reverted to the father and the children, his assigns; the father had no authority thereafter to convey a greater interest than he held and, thus, only the father’s own one-third interest could be encumbered by the loan that was made to the father without any involvement by the children. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Shelton, 290 Ga. 544, 722 S.E.2d 743, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 190 (2012).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Ownership for annexation purposes. - The intent of the General Assembly in referring to “the record title holder of the fee simple title” in former O.C.G.A. § 36-36-22(d) was to give the grantor of a security deed the right to decide upon the question of annexation; thus, in determining ownership of land for

the purpose of determining the eligibility of a landowner to sign an application for annexation to a municipality, it should be done without regard to whether such land is encumbered by an outstanding deed to secure debt. 1967 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 6716.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages, §§ 362, 363.

C.J.S. 59 C.J.S., Mortgages, § 478.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 4 cases, 1989–2014 · leading case: Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Shelton, 722 S.E.2d 743 (Ga. 2012).
Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Shelton, 722 S.E.2d 743 (Ga. 2012). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 44-14-66. Shelton had no authority thereafter to convey a greater interest than he held.”
Vineville Capital Grp., LLC v. Mccook, 766 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “5 OCGA § 44-14-60 provides that deeds to secure debt convey title of the property to the grantee until the debt is paid and the grantor reserves a right to have the property reconveyed; OCGA § 44-14-66 has provisions regarding the right of the grantor of a security deed to have…”
Trail v. Saunders, 675 S.E.2d 514 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 44-14-66. Applied to the facts of this case, it is abundantly clear that the security deed was automatically extinguished upon Saunders’s payment of the underlying debt in 2005, as evidenced by Carswell’s cancellation of the promissory note.”
Cravey v. L'Eggs Prods., Inc. (In Re Cravey), 100 B.R. 119 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1989). · cites it 2× “However, the grantor of the security deed retains certain interest in the property conveyed. A security deed issued under the provisions of O.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.