Section applies to bills of sale and deeds to secure debts.

- O.C.G.A. § 44-14-63 by its express terms applies as well to a bill of sale of personalty to secure debt as to deeds of conveyance of realty to secure debt. Butler v. LaGrange Grocery Co., 29 Ga. App. 612, 116 S.E. 213 (1923).

Deed absolute in form.

- Although a deed may have been on its face an absolute deed and expressed a valuable consideration, yet if it was given to secure a debt, falls under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-63. Cabot v. Armstrong, 100 Ga. 438, 28 S.E. 123 (1897).

Chattel mortgages.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-63 a chattel mortgage to be valid as against other liens must be recorded. In re Smith, 281 F. 574 (N.D. Ga. 1922). See also Osborne v. Hill, 91 Ga. 137, 16 S.E. 965 (1893).

Necessity for record.

- Prior to the passage of the act from which O.C.G.A. § 44-14-63 was taken, recordation of a chattel mortgage was not required. Tift & Co. v. Dunn, 80 Ga. 14, 5 S.E. 256 (1887).

Effect of § 44-14-101. - A security deed executed under O.C.G.A. §§ 44-14-60,44-14-61,44-14-63,44-14-67, and44-14-66, after the passage of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-101, to convey cultivated farmland as security for debt, does not ordinarily comprehend crops matured or unmatured on the land. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Larsen, 178 Ga. 255, 173 S.E. 125 (1934).

Instrument in form of absolute deed.

- Where the instrument is written in the form of an absolute conveyance and does not within itself disclose that title is passed merely as security for a debt, the record of the conveyance puts the world upon notice that no interest or equity in the land remains in the grantor, and one subsequently dealing with the grantor could not be misled or injured by the statement of the consideration as contained therein. McClure v. Smith, 115 Ga. 709, 42 S.E. 53 (1902); McIntire v. Garmany, 8 Ga. App. 802, 70 S.E. 198 (1911); Bank of Chatsworth v. Patterson, 148 Ga. 367, 96 S.E. 996 (1918).

A parol agreement extending the security to an additional indebtedness is not to be taken as varying the written terms of the instrument, and is good, since where the form is that of an ordinary warranty deed, the mere naming of a consideration is not to be taken as stating any amount of security or limiting it to any particular sum. Hester v. Gairdner, 128 Ga. 531, 58 S.E. 165 (1907); Wiggs v. Hendricks, 147 Ga. 444, 94 S.E. 556 (1917); Troup Co. v. Speer, 23 Ga. App. 750, 99 S.E. 541, cert. denied, 23 Ga. App. 813 (1919).

Instrument specifying amount of loan.

- Where an instrument made in the form of a security deed by its own language specifies and thus limits a debt in a named amount as being the one which it is actually intended to secure, the record of the instrument will not suffice to give to the grantee thereunder any priority over third persons who may have subsequently and in good faith acquired a lien upon the same property, except as to the amount of the particular indebtedness thus specified. American Nat'l Bank v. Brooks, 143 Ga. 320, 85 S.E. 117 (1915); Skinner v. Elliott, 17 Ga. App. 511, 87 S.E. 759 (1916); Bank of Cedartown v. Holloway-Smith Co., 146 Ga. 700, 92 S.E. 213 (1917); A. Leffler Co. v. Lane, 146 Ga. 741, 92 S.E. 214 (1917).

As between the parties themselves the rule would be different, and although a deed may be given as security for a named indebtedness in a specified amount, it is competent for the parties to extend the security by agreement so that as between them it shall cover an additional indebtedness. Wylly v. Screven, 98 Ga. 213, 25 S.E. 435 (1896); Hester v. Gairdner, 128 Ga. 531, 58 S.E. 165 (1907); Troup Co. v. Speer, 23 Ga. App. 750, 99 S.E. 541, cert. denied, 23 Ga. App. 813 (1919).

Whether a conditional sale contract is properly attested is immaterial between the original parties or between the maker and a transferee. Carter v. Commercial Credit Co., 58 Ga. App. 470, 198 S.E. 792 (1938).

Cited in New England Mtg. Sec. Co. v. Gay, 145 U.S. 123, 12 S. Ct. 815, 36 L. Ed. 646 (1892); Donovan v. Simmons, 96 Ga. 340, 22 S.E. 966 (1895); Griffith v. Posey, 98 Ga. 475, 25 S.E. 515 (1896); Empire Cotton Oil Co. v. Continental Gin Co., 21 Ga. App. 16, 93 S.E. 525 (1917); DeLaigle v. Shuptrine, 28 Ga. App. 380, 110 S.E. 920 (1922); Randall v. Hamilton, 156 Ga. 661, 119 S.E. 595 (1923); First Nat'l Bank v. State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 163 Ga. 718, 137 S.E. 53, 51 A.L.R. 1524 (1927); Merchants' & Citizens' Bank v. Bogle, 174 Ga. 612, 163 S.E. 489 (1932); Webb v. United-American Soda Fountain Co., 59 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1932); People's First Nat'l Bank v. Coe Mfg. Co., 67 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1933); Georgia Power Co. v. Hand, 67 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1933); Walker County Fertilizer Co. v. Napier, 184 Ga. 861, 193 S.E. 770 (1937); Nightingale v. Juniata College, 186 Ga. 365, 197 S.E. 831 (1938); Valdosta Plywoods, Inc. v. Belote, 75 Ga. App. 616, 44 S.E.2d 128 (1947); Burgess v. Simmons, 207 Ga. 291, 61 S.E.2d 410 (1950); Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Fulmer, 84 Ga. App. 101, 65 S.E.2d 636 (1951); Adel Banking Co. v. Parrish, 84 Ga. App. 329, 66 S.E.2d 150 (1951); Parham v. Heath, 90 Ga. App. 26, 81 S.E.2d 848 (1954); Parham v. Heath, 92 Ga. App. 645, 89 S.E.2d 528 (1955); B.F. Avery & Sons Co. v. Davis, 226 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1955); Washburn Storage Co. v. Columbia Loan Co., 95 Ga. App. 552, 98 S.E.2d 147 (1957); Williams v. General Fin. Corp., 98 Ga. App. 31, 104 S.E.2d 649 (1958); Southeastern Equip. Co. v. Peoples Ins. & Fin. Co., 105 Ga. App. 539, 125 S.E.2d 114 (1962); Jeanes v. Moore, 240 Ga. 466, 241 S.E.2d 222 (1978); Palmer v. Forrest, Mackey & Assocs., 251 Ga. 304, 304 S.E.2d 704 (1983); Minor v. McDaniel, 210 Ga. App. 146, 435 S.E.2d 508 (1993).

The purpose of the recording statute is to protect against the negligent.

- O.C.G.A. § 44-14-63 made it the plain duty of a grantee to record the deed, thereby giving constructive notice to everyone of its existence and of the grantee's rights thereunder; and since it is thus made the duty of such grantee to supply notice, everyone is justified in relying upon an examination of the record and believing that a purchase of land will convey all title which the record fails to disclose is in another. As a means of implementing this protection that section provides that the negligent failure to record renders the unrecorded deed ineffectual as against bona fide purchasers for value and without notice. Archer v. Kelley, 194 Ga. 117, 21 S.E.2d 51 (1942).

O.C.G.A. § 44-14-63 was modified by O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2, subsequently enacted. Cross v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 160 Ga. 647, 128 S.E. 898 (1925).

The word "shall" here used is merely directory as to the place where such instruments may be recorded, if at all. City Whsle. Co. v. Harper, 100 Ga. App. 151, 110 S.E.2d 561 (1959).

A "bill of sale" as contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 44-14-63 is a "deed" to personalty, and is included in the meaning of the word "deeds" as employed in O.C.G.A. § 44-2-2; and consequently under that law bills of sale to secure debt are required to be recorded. Merchants & Mechanics' Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 134 S.E. 107 (1926).

The effect of recordation of conveyances to secure debt is by the law relating thereto made the same as the effect of the recordation of deeds of bargain and sale. City Whsle. Co. v. Harper, 100 Ga. App. 151, 110 S.E.2d 561 (1959).

Laws relating to mortgage registration govern.

- The registration and record of conditional bills of sale shall be governed in all respects by the laws relating to the registration of mortgages on personal property, except that they must be recorded within 30 days from their date, and in this respect they differ from mortgages, deeds and bills of sale to secure debt since these latter instruments date only from the time they are filed for record as to innocent purchasers without notice thereof. Scoggins v. General Fin. & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 847, 57 S.E.2d 686 (1950).

Recording not necessary to convey title.

- It is not essential under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-63, in order to convey title to land to secure a debt as between the maker and the grantee, that the deed should be recorded. As between the maker of the security deed and the grantee, the latter would get a good title. Cooper v. Bacon, 143 Ga. 64, 84 S.E. 123 (1915).

Serves as constructive notice.

- Under O.C.G.A. §§ 44-2-1 and44-14-63, when bills of sale to secure debt have been recorded in the county of residence of the maker thereof, such registration serves as constructive notice from the date the same are filed for record. General Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Bank of Wrightsville, 92 Ga. App. 808, 90 S.E.2d 93 (1955).

The record of a security deed is constructive notice to subsequent grantees. Constructive notice is notice to the world. Cummings v. Johnson, 218 Ga. 559, 129 S.E.2d 762 (1963).

Record from time of filing.

- In a contest between a bill of sale to secure a debt and a lien of a subsequently recorded general execution, the record of the bill of sale dates back from the time of its filing for record in the office of the clerk of the superior court. Merchants & Mechanics' Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 134 S.E. 107 (1926).

Fractions of a day.

- Where a priority as between a bill of sale to secure a debt and the lien of a subsequently recorded general execution depends upon whether the bill of sale was recorded first or the general execution was entered upon the execution docket first, such recording and such entry upon the execution docket having occurred on the same day, in determining such priority fractions of a day are to be considered. Merchants & Mechanics' Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 134 S.E. 107 (1926).

Where recorded.

- A retention-of-title contract attested by a person described as a commercial notary public of one county, although the caption of the instrument indicates that it was executed in a town in another county is presumably officially executed in the first county. It nevertheless is legally executed to record in county indicated in the caption, the residence of the maker. Smith v. Simmons, 35 Ga. App. 427, 133 S.E. 312 (1926).

Place of recording as effecting priority.

- Where evidence in trover action establishes that, at the time of execution of bills of sale in question, maker was resident of one county but had domicile in another, in view of fact that O.C.G.A. § 44-14-63 provides for such recording, in the county where the maker resided at the time of the execution of such instruments, and the law draws a clear distinction between residence and domicile, defendant who was holder of junior bill of sale recorded in county where maker was resident had title to property superior to that of plaintiff who was holder of senior bill of sale recorded in county where maker had domicile. Commercial Bank v. Pharr, 75 Ga. App. 364, 43 S.E.2d 439 (1947).

Recording in wrong place equivalent to no record.

- The recording of bills of sale in a court other than in the residence of the maker at the time of its execution is equivalent to no record. It will remain valid against persons executing it, but will be postponed to all liens, created or obtained or purchased, made prior to legal record thereof. Commercial Bank v. Pharr, 75 Ga. App. 364, 43 S.E.2d 439 (1947).

Chapter 7 trustee was allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 544 and O.C.G.A. § 44-14-63(a) to avoid a security deed which debtors gave to a bank before the debtors declared Chapter 7 bankruptcy because the bank filed the deed in the wrong county. There was no merit to the bank's claim that the trustee had inquiry notice of the bank's security interest because the debtors used the proceeds of a loan the debtors obtained from the bank to pay a debt to another bank and the other filed documents to cancel its loan that were defective under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-67(c); in addition, the doctrine of equitable subordination did not prevent the trustee from avoiding the bank's secured interest. Rogers v. M&I Bank FSB (In re Morgan), 449 Bankr. 821 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010).

Where a conditional bill of sale or retention title contract is executed in another state on property afterward brought into this state, and such instrument is not recorded in the county of the buyer's residence within the time allowed by the statute, bona fide valid liens subsequently created against the property by the buyer would be superior to the rights of such seller, there being no question of actual knowledge of the rights of the seller under the conditional sale contract, or any fraud. Allen v. Dickey, 54 Ga. App. 451, 188 S.E. 273 (1936).

Recorded deed not showing maturity.

- A duly filed and recorded deed, which plainly shows that it was given to secure a debt, but does not show when the same matures, is notice to one dealing with the grantor therein of all the rights which the grantee has under the contract performance of which is thereby secured. Mattlage v. Mulherin's Sons & Co., 106 Ga. 834, 32 S.E. 940 (1899).

Where subsequent purchaser or creditor has notice of sale.

- A sale of personal property to secure a debt, where the property remains in the possession of the vendor, is inoperative and void as against third persons, unless it is reduced to writing, in which event it will be good as to third persons when recorded under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-63, or, when not recorded, as to subsequent purchasers or creditors who have actual notice of such sale. Henry Vogt Mach. Co. v. Bailey, 2 Ga. App. 204, 58 S.E. 314 (1907).

Preference arose when security executing not recorded.

- Elements of a preference under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) were met since the mortgagee's claim based on the mortgagee's security deed arose when the security deed was executed, under O.C.G.A. 44-14-63, but the transfer occurred when the security deed was recorded, and thus was made on behalf of antecedent debt. Ogier v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. (In re Tanoh), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2011).

Priority despite deed not being recorded in proceeding under Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act.

- Judgment voiding a transfer of property as fraudulent under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA) (now Uniform Voidable Transactions Act), O.C.G.A. § 18-2-70 et seq., was reversed because, despite not being recorded, the 2002 security deed executed in favor of a former sister-in-law, pledging the property as collateral for a promissory note, gave the former sister-in-law, as one of the defendant's creditors, priority over the plaintiff's judgment, such that the property could not be characterized as the defendant's asset under the UFTA. Wallin v. Wallin, 341 Ga. App. 440, 800 S.E.2d 617 (2017).

Unrecorded bill of sale of crops to secure the debt was superior in rank to the subsequent judgment lien created by law. Cairo Banking Co. v. Citizens Bank, 63 Ga. App. 690, 11 S.E.2d 806 (1940).

Security deed superior to debt outstanding evidenced by unrecorded deed. Mortgage Guarantee Co. of Am. v. Atlanta Com. Bank, 166 Ga. 412, 143 S.E. 562 (1928).

The record of an agreement extending lien of recorded security deed to an additional debt, is not necessary to prevent a judgment for an unsecured from obtaining priority. McClure v. Smith, 115 Ga. 709, 42 S.E. 53 (1902).

Landlord's lien for rent and tenant's unrecorded bill of sale.

- A landlord's general lien for rent, arising upon the issuance and levy of a distress warrant, is superior to a tenant's unrecorded bill of sale of personalty to secure a debt, though the latter was executed and delivered prior to the date of the levy of the distress warrant upon the property covered by the bill of sale. Butler v. LaGrange Grocery Co., 29 Ga. App. 612, 116 S.E. 213 (1923).

Distress warrant levied on prior to recording of security deed had priority over deed. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co. v. Rylee, 139 Ga. 669, 78 S.E. 27 (1913).

A recorded quitclaim deed, when taken in good faith for a valuable consideration, without notice, will prevail over a prior unrecorded deed. This rule is not altered by the fact that the quitclaim deed conveys only the grantor's rights, title, and interest in and to the land, instead of conveying the land itself. Archer v. Kelley, 194 Ga. 117, 21 S.E.2d 51 (1942).

Where at the time that a security deed was executed and recorded a bond for title was not recorded, and the obligee on the bond for title was not in possession of the property, and where the grantee in the security deed had no actual notice of the outstanding bond for title, the rights conveyed by the security deed were superior to those held by the obligee in the bond for title. Kelley v. Spivey, 182 Ga. 507, 185 S.E. 783 (1936).

Foreclosure provisions unenforceable.

- The trial court did not err in finding that the foreclosure provisions of the deed to secure debt could not be enforced because the deed had never been delivered and recorded. Jones v. Phillips, 227 Ga. App. 94, 488 S.E.2d 692 (1997).

Recording of security deed not necessary to effect a transfer between debtors and lender.

- Because the security deed between the debtors and the lender was effective as between those parties at execution, it was not relevant that the security deed was recorded within 90 days prior to the debtors filing a petition in bankruptcy; under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, the security deed was not avoidable as a preferential transfer. Gordon v. NovaStar Mortg., Inc. (In re Hedrick), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 31, 2005), aff'd, 524 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 2008); modified and reh'g denied, 529 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2008).

No judgment lien shown.

- Trial court erred by granting summary judgment to a judgment lienholder because the lienholder did not establish as a matter of law that the lienholder had any legal or equitable interest in the property at any time after a quitclaim deed was executed; because the record did not establish that the lienholder had any ownership interest in the property upon which the right to seize assets could attach, the trial court erred in finding that the lienholder held a judgment lien against the property. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Twenty Six Properties, LLC, 325 Ga. App. 662, 754 S.E.2d 630 (2014).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Records and Recording Laws, §§ 59, 153 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 26A C.J.S., Deeds, § 155 et seq. 59 C.J.S., Mortgages, § 192 et seq.

ALR.

- Reinstatement and restoration of mortgages released or discharged without authorization, as against subsequent purchasers, lienholders, judgment creditors, and the like, without notice, 35 A.L.R.2d 948.