Legal title automatically reverted.

- Trial court did not err in holding that children acquired a collective two-thirds interest in property because pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-67(a), when the original security deeds were paid off and cancelled legal title automatically reverted to the father and the children, his assigns; the father had no authority thereafter to convey a greater interest than he held, and thus, only the father's own one-third interest could be encumbered by the loan that was made to the father without any involvement by the children. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Shelton, 290 Ga. 544, 722 S.E.2d 743 (2012).

It is the duty of the grantee, upon payment of the amount due under the terms of deed to secure debt, to surrender and deliver it to the grantor with a proper entry showing payment, and the grantor may thereafter have it "satisfied" of record. A petition seeking to have the above rule complied with by the grantee is based upon a statutory right. Hennessy v. Woodruff, 210 Ga. 742, 82 S.E.2d 859 (1954).

Alternate methods.

- If an instrument by which title is conveyed to the creditor is of such a character as to pass into the creditor an absolute title, it can be revested only by a reconveyance to the grantor, or by compliance with the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-67. Burckhalter v. Planters' Loan & Sav. Bank, 100 Ga. 428, 28 S.E. 236 (1897). See also Ashley v. Cook, 109 Ga. 653, 35 S.E. 89 (1900).

Nature of interest revested.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-67 the payment of a debt secured by deed to land revests in the grantor in such deed such interest and title therein as can be levied upon under an execution issuing upon a judgment junior in date to such deed, without a reconveyance of the land to the grantor, and, in case of cancellation, without the record of the cancellation of the security deed. Citizens' Mercantile Co. v. Easom, 158 Ga. 604, 123 S.E. 883 (1924).

Deed with reconveyance clause not mortgage.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-67 an instrument, in all respects in the form of a deed passing title, and executed for the purpose of securing the payment of a described debt is not, because containing the clause: "Reconveyance of said property to be made upon fulfillment of all the conditions of this instrument," properly to be treated as a mere mortgage. Pitts v. Maier, 115 Ga. 281, 41 S.E. 570 (1902).

A written instrument which by its terms passes title from the vendor to the vendee as security for a debt and which contains no defeasance clause is a deed or bill of sale to secure a debt and is not a mortgage. The title conveyed thereunder does not automatically revert to the vendor upon the payment of the debt, but continues thereafter in the vendee, and is not divested until the performance of some act, as a reconveyance from the vendee to the vendor, or the cancellation and surrender of the instrument by the vendee as required by O.C.G.A. § 44-14-67. Grady v. T.I. Harris, Inc., 41 Ga. App. 111, 151 S.E. 829 (1930).

Distinction between cancellation and record of cancellation.

- O.C.G.A. § 44-14-67 deals with the cancellation of the security deed as a separate and distinct thing from the record of such cancellation; and the record of such cancellation as a separate and distinct thing from the cancellation itself. The language of that section, "cancellation of such deed in the same manner that mortgages are now canceled," may mean that such cancellation shall consist of an acknowledgment of the payment of the debt and an order from the grantee authorizing or directing the cancellation of the instrument. The proper construction may be, that, when such order is entered upon the security deed, it is the cancellation thereof contemplated by the section. Citizens' Mercantile Co. v. Easom, 158 Ga. 604, 123 S.E. 883 (1924).

Voluntary cancellation without consideration.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-67, the cancellation of a security deed and its delivery to the grantor, who had it canceled of record, was held binding and effective, though the cancellation was voluntary and without consideration. In re Hitchcock, 283 F. 447 (N.D. Ga. 1922).

Effect of failure to record cancellation.

- If record of cancellation is not effected according to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-67, the security deed appearing of record to be valid, a purchaser without notice acquires title. Ellis v. Ellis, 161 Ga. 360, 130 S.E. 681 (1925).

Sufficiency of deed cancellation.

- Chapter 7 trustee was allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 544 and O.C.G.A. § 44-14-63(a) to avoid a security deed which debtors gave to a bank before the debtors declared Chapter 7 bankruptcy because the bank filed the deed in the wrong county. There was no merit to the bank's claim that the trustee had inquiry notice of the bank's security interest because the debtors used the proceeds of a loan the debtors obtained from the bank to pay a debt to another bank and the other filed documents to cancel the bank's loan that were defective under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-67(c); in addition, the doctrine of equitable subordination did not prevent the trustee from avoiding the bank's secured interest. Rogers v. M&I Bank FSB (In re Morgan), 449 Bankr. 821 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010).

Erroneous cancellation of security deed.

- Trial court did not err in reinstating the security deed after the bank erroneously cancelled the security deed as the recorded cancellation did not reconvey title since the debt was not fully satisfied and, thus, the bank retained the bank's right to non-judicial foreclosure. Patel v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 327 Ga. App. 321, 757 S.E.2d 460 (2014).

Transfer of bond to reconvey.

- Where an owner of land made a conveyance of it to secure a loan, taking bond for reconveyance upon payment, and transferred the bond to another, in the absence of fraud, one who subsequently obtained judgment against the assignor of the bond, and who was not shown to have been a creditor when the transfer was made, did not have the right to subject the land after the payment of the secured debt by the transferee of the bond, the cancellation of the security deed under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-67, and the subsequent making of a quitclaim deed by the secured creditor to the transferee. Burney Tailoring Co. v. Cuzzort, 132 Ga. 852, 65 S.E. 140 (1909).

Payee of a note authorizing retention of any of maker's collateral then or thereafter acquired and application to the same or other debts, which took a transfer of a note and security deed executed by maker to a bank, was entitled to a special lien on the land described in the security deed only for the amount of the balance due by the debtor to the bank, and upon payment of such balance the debtor was entitled to have the security deed canceled and surrendered to the debtor. Mitchell v. Mandeville Mills, 180 Ga. 791, 180 S.E. 828 (1935).

No reconveyance where secured debt not paid in full.

- Because the debt to the bank was not paid, the title of the property could not have been reconveyed to the successor of the grantor of the bank's security interest pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-67(a). Therefore, the bank's security interest was never reconveyed and the bank held a senior position based on the bank's 1997 mortgage to the grantor. Mak v. Argent Mortg. Co., LLC, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2009).

In a case in which (1) a creditor's security interest was inadvertently released before the mortgage on the debtor's residence was paid in full; (2) the debtor sought declaratory relief as to secured status, to avoid preferential transfer, and for monetary damages for wrongful foreclosure; and (3) the creditor moved for summary judgment, the creditor's inadvertent filing of a rescission of cancellation of the creditor's security interest in the debtor's residence did not result in a transfer of an interest of the debtor in the property. Under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-67(a), filing a notice of cancellation did not terminate the creditor's lien; the satisfaction of the debt did so. In re Poff, Bankr. (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 2010).

Fraudulent deed was facially regular and operated to release security interest.

- A 2003 warranty deed that operated to release a prior lender's security interest in the property was not a forgery but was signed by someone fraudulently assuming the authority of an officer of the prior lender and was regular on the deed's face. Therefore, a subsequent lender that foreclosed on the property and purchased the property at the foreclosure sale was a bona fide purchaser for value entitled to take the property free of the prior lender's security interest. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 307 Ga. App. 307, 704 S.E.2d 823 (2010).

Failure to provide a separate statement swearing to fate of original document.

- According to In re Morgan, 449 Bankr. 821 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. 2010), the failure to provide a separate statement swearing to the fate of the original document does not, by itself, put a hypothetical bona fide purchaser on inquiry notice because "given the plain language of the statute, the presentation of an instrument of cancellation conforming to this form with an attested, witnessed signature in and of itself evidences a sworn statement that the original security deed to be cancelled is unavailable." Though the Morgan decision did not address ownership, the reasoning plainly extends to it; the statute (in the context of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-67(c)), provides a form, so that the form clearly complies with the requirements of the statute. Gordon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Ingram), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 5, 2013).

Summary judgment proper once security deed paid in full.

- In an action to remove a cloud from title, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to a bank and cancelled a recorded deed in favor of a holder, as: (1) the holder could no longer claim any legal title to the subject property once the underlying debt thereto was paid; (2) no evidence of valid renewal or extension of the note existed; and (3) the holder lacked standing to challenge any foreclosure on the debt. Northwest Carpets, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 280 Ga. 535, 630 S.E.2d 407 (2006).

Cited in Cumming v. McDade, 118 Ga. 612, 45 S.E. 479 (1903); Webb v. Harris, 124 Ga. 723, 53 S.E. 247 (1906); Turner v. Woodward, 133 Ga. 467, 66 S.E. 160 (1909); Massell v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 38 Ga. App. 631, 144 S.E. 806 (1928); Blumenfeld v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 168 Ga. 327, 147 S.E. 581 (1929); Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Larsen, 178 Ga. 255, 173 S.E. 125 (1934); Waldroup v. State, 198 Ga. 144, 30 S.E.2d 896 (1944); Farmers Fertilizer Co. v. J.R. Watkins Co., 199 Ga. 49, 33 S.E.2d 294 (1945); Burgess v. Simmons, 207 Ga. 291, 61 S.E.2d 410 (1950); Bank of LaFayette v. Giles, 208 Ga. 674, 69 S.E.2d 78 (1952); Wilson v. Whitmire, 212 Ga. 287, 92 S.E.2d 20 (1956); Strickland v. Miles, 131 Ga. App. 300, 205 S.E.2d 880 (1974); Davis v. Johnson, 241 Ga. 436, 246 S.E.2d 297 (1978); Coleman Road Assocs. v. Culpepper, 214 Ga. App. 475, 448 S.E.2d 83 (1994); Stearns Bank, N.A. v. Mullins, 333 Ga. App. 369, 776 S.E.2d 485 (2015); Brown v. Tucker, 337 Ga. App. 704, 788 S.E.2d 810 (2016).

Recordation requirements.

- When a paid mortgage or security deed is filed with an order of cancellation upon it, clerks of superior court may record the canceled instrument or only the part which bears the order; the part recorded should be sufficient to identify the transaction; clerks should index cancellations of security instruments with the name of the borrower (mortgagor) in the "grantee" index, make all notations required by statute in the indices and on the recordings, and charge a fee of $3.50, unless the cancellation is by new deed, in which case the fee for recording a deed should also be charged. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. U89-19.

Cancellation of security deeds and writs of execution from record. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U72-79.

A clerk must obtain a written authorization executed by or on behalf of grantee in order to cancel a security instrument and, in case of real property, may require additional formalities such as attestations to assure against forgery. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U81-50.

Sufficiency of deed cancellation.

- Under Ga. L. 1986, p. 754, amending O.C.G.A. §§ 44-14-3 and44-14-67 dealing with deeds to secure debt and their cancellation, the release of corporate security interests in real property or security interests under the UCC, signed by an officer or delegated agent, as provided in O.C.G.A. § 14-5-7(b), will continue to constitute conclusive evidence of corporate authorization for the release, and when the clerk is presented with such a release apparently so signed, in the absence of overt signs of impropriety, it should be accepted for recording. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 86-17.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages, §§ 359 et seq., 430.

C.J.S.

- 59 C.J.S., Mortgages, § 451 et seq.

ALR.

- Excessive security for debt as affecting question of fraud upon creditors, 138 A.L.R. 1051.

Requiring security as condition of canceling of record mortgage or lien, or of recording payment, 2 A.L.R.2d 1064.

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 1995, p. 1198, § 4(b), not codified by the General Assembly, provides that where the record of conveyance states or fixes the maturity of the debt or debts or the maturity of the last installment thereof and the parties by affirmative statement contained in the record of conveyance evidence their intention to establish a perpetual or indefinite security interest, section 2 of the Act shall be applicable and effective with respect to all such conveyances even though they may be dated prior to July 1, 1995.

Law reviews.

- For article surveying developments in Georgia real property law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 219 (1981). For annual survey of real property law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 367 (2006). For note on the 1995 amendment of this section, see 12 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 313 (1995).

Section constitutional as applied to deeds to secure debt executed after effective date.

- O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80, as applied to deeds to secure debt executed after its effective date, does not offend constitutional provisions prohibiting retrospective legislation. Smith v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 226 Ga. 715, 177 S.E.2d 249 (1970).

O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80 is unconstitutional in instances where security deed predates it because it would be retroactive and it would impair the obligation of a contract since the powers granted in a security deed could have been exercised so long as the debt secured remained unpaid, regardless of whether the evidence of the debt was barred by the statute of limitations. Drake v. Barrs, 225 Ga. 597, 170 S.E.2d 684 (1969).

What constitutes "affirmative statement."

- Use of the words "forever, in fee simple" in a security deed were not an "affirmative statement" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80(a)(2) such that title to the property did not revert to the grantor for 20 years, rather than seven years, because those words related to the estate granted rather than the duration of the security interest. Parol evidence was not admissible and § 44-14-80 controlled over O.C.G.A. § 44-6-21. Vineville Capital Group, llc v. McCook, 329 Ga. App. 790, 766 S.E.2d 156 (2014).

Deed more than 20 years past due cannot be foreclosed.

- When the debt secured by an unforeclosed deed is more than 20 years past due, title conveyed by the deed shall revert to the grantor. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80 further denies any right to foreclose, to sell under such deed, or to sue for the land therein. Williams v. O'Connor, 208 Ga. 39, 64 S.E.2d 890 (1951).

Reversion period was 20 years.

- Trial court erred in finding that title to the real property reverted to an ex-husband and by setting aside a security deed on that basis because the security deed contained a sufficient statement that the parties intended to establish a perpetual or indefinite security interest in the real property such that the applicable reversion period was 20 years from the date of the conveyance as set forth in O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80(a)(1). Stearns Bank, N.A. v. Mullins, 333 Ga. App. 369, 776 S.E.2d 485 (2015), cert. denied sub nom. Hawkins v. Stearns Bank, N.A., No. S15C1827, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 855 (Ga. 2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1821, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 868 (Ga. 2015),.

Extension of reversion of title period.

- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment in the appellee's favor on the appellant's wrongful foreclosure claim because the record contained no evidence showing whether the written renewals of the loan from the bank were recorded; thus, the appellate court could not determine from the record before the court whether title reverted to the appellant as a matter of law on November 10, 2010, seven years after the security deed was first filed, or whether the recording of any of the subsequent loan renewals extended the reversion period. Matson v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 339 Ga. App. 890, 795 S.E.2d 195 (2016).

Promissory note secured under the dragnet clause of a previously executed security deed must be entered of record under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80 in order to prevent title from reverting to the grantor at the expiration of 20 years from maturity of the original debt. Minor v. Neely, 247 Ga. 147, 273 S.E.2d 853 (1981).

Notes and security deeds maturing before effective date of section not affected.

- O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80 is not applicable to a note and security deed given to secure the same where the note matured before that section, according to its provisions, became effective. Hames v. Hames, 220 Ga. 595, 140 S.E.2d 844 (1965).

O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80 will not be applied retroactively to loan deed made prior to 1941. McCreary v. Wright, 132 Ga. App. 500, 208 S.E.2d 373 (1974).

For case where O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80 not retroactive, see Todd v. Morgan, 215 Ga. 220, 109 S.E.2d 803 (1959).

Exclusion from evidence of deed to secure debt when more than 20 years past due.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80, a deed to secure debt upon which the plaintiffs rely in a common-law action in ejectment should be excluded from the evidence when objected to, when the debt secured is more than 20 years past due and that section also provides that in such a case title in the deed reverts to the grantor. Williams v. O'Connor, 208 Ga. 39, 64 S.E.2d 890 (1951).

Notice requirements in security deed.

- Issue of whether a grantee properly served notice to cure to a promisor 60 days prior to initiating foreclosure proceedings, as stipulated in the grantee's security deed, was not waived because once the foreclosure sale the grantee conducted was completed, a bank properly amended the bank's petition to include the issue of whether the foreclosure sale was validly conducted; the pre-trial order in the case specifically listed as substantive issues whether the foreclosure sale was validly conducted and, if not, whether title under the grantee's security deed reverted to the promisor pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80(a)(1), and the 60-day notice issue directly related to whether the foreclosure sale was validly conducted because the grantee was legally required to advertise and sell the property according to the terms of the security deed. MPP Invs., Inc. v. Cherokee Bank, N.A., 288 Ga. 558, 707 S.E.2d 485 (2011).

Special master, in accordance with the special master's complete jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-66, was entitled to review the pleadings and evidence to determine the valid interests in real property because an amended pleading properly filed by a bank included claims that a grantee's foreclosure sale was improper and that title under the grantee's security deed reverted to a promisor pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80(a)(1). MPP Invs., Inc. v. Cherokee Bank, N.A., 288 Ga. 558, 707 S.E.2d 485 (2011).

No affirmative statement of perpetual or indefinite security interest.

- Title to real property that the debtors conveyed by a deed to secure a debt reverted to the debtors seven years after the maturity date because the deed did not contain an affirmative statement of intent to establish a perpetual or indefinite security interest. Lyons v. Taylor (In re Lyons), Bankr. (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Jan. 31, 2018).

Incorporation by reference.

- Presence in a deed to secure debt of a date that was referenced in a note as the maturity date of the loan, and the incorporation by reference of the note into the deed sufficed to fulfill the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80(a)(1) that the maturity date of a debt be stated in the record of the conveyance; there is no reason that the terms of a note cannot be incorporated by reference into a deed. United Bank v. West Cent. Ga. Bank, 275 Ga. App. 418, 620 S.E.2d 654 (2005).

Estoppel.

- Bank was not estopped from asserting that title to real property reverted to a promisor under a grantee's security deed because an investment company had constructive and actual knowledge of the bank's assertion of superior title and the possibility that title to the property pursuant to the grantee's security deed had reverted, and there was no evidence that the company relied in any way upon the bank's actions, silence, or inactions; the bank filed suit claiming superior title to the property and recorded a notice of lis pendens well in advance of the foreclosure sale, the company, which purchased the property, admitted at the hearing before the special master that the company knew of the suit against the property but decided to purchase the property anyway, and the company also admitted at that hearing that since the grantee's security deed was public record, the company had notice of both the maturity date on the security deed and the date on which automatic reversion could occur pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80(a)(1). MPP Invs., Inc. v. Cherokee Bank, N.A., 288 Ga. 558, 707 S.E.2d 485 (2011).

Entitlement to excess funds after tax sale.

- Trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the property owner because the trial court erred by holding that the security deed holder lost the holder's right to excess funds that arose from the tax sale as the relevant date under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80 when considering who was entitled to the excess funds from the tax sale was the tax sale date, not the fund distribution date. Worthwhile Investments, LLC v. Higgins, 337 Ga. App. 183, 787 S.E.2d 245 (2016).

No showing of reversion of title.

- Trial court did not err in denying the appellant's motion for summary judgment because, while the security deed was recorded, and seven years had passed from the maturity date of the note, the evidence showed without dispute that the note was renewed; and, in the absence of evidence that those renewals were not placed in the public record, the appellant did not yet make a prima facie showing of reversion of title. Matson v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 339 Ga. App. 890, 795 S.E.2d 195 (2016).

Cited in Sampson v. Vann, 203 Ga. 612, 48 S.E.2d 293 (1948); Flynt v. Dumas, 205 Ga. 702, 54 S.E.2d 429 (1949); Thomas v. Stedham, 208 Ga. 603, 68 S.E.2d 560 (1952); McKenney v. Woodbury Banking Co., 208 Ga. 616, 68 S.E.2d 571 (1952); Williams v. O'Connor, 208 Ga. 801, 69 S.E.2d 726 (1952); Routon v. Woodbury Banking Co., 209 Ga. 706, 75 S.E.2d 561 (1953); Morgan v. Todd, 214 Ga. 497, 106 S.E.2d 37 (1958); Milam v. Adams, 101 Ga. App. 880, 115 S.E.2d 252 (1960); Milam v. Adams, 216 Ga. 440, 117 S.E.2d 343 (1960); Newman v. Newman, 234 Ga. 297, 216 S.E.2d 79 (1975); Pannell v. Continental Can Co., 554 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977); Stith v. Morris, 241 Ga. 247, 244 S.E.2d 817 (1978); Minton v. Raytheon Co., 222 Ga. App. 85, 473 S.E.2d 177 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages, § 642 et seq. 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Records and Recording Laws, §§ 48, 157.

C.J.S.

- 59 C.J.S., Mortgages, § 192.

ALR.

- Extension of existing real estate mortgage or deed of trust by subsequent agreement to cover additional indebtedness, 76 A.L.R. 574.

Who may take advantage of failure to renew real estate mortgage as provided by statute, 97 A.L.R. 739.

Renewal by one spouse without the other's participation, of lien on homestead, 143 A.L.R. 1369.

Increase or renewal of mortgage debt without insurer's consent as violation of policy provisions as to mortgages or encumbrances, 163 A.L.R. 1402.

Validity, and applicability to causes of action not already barred, of a statute enlarging limitation period, 79 A.L.R.2d 1080.