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2018 Georgia Code 44-2-4 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 44-2-4 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 44-2-4

TITLE 44 PROPERTY

Section 2. Recordation and Registration of Deeds and Other Instruments, 44-2-1 through 44-2-253.

ARTICLE 1 RECORDING

44-2-4. Protection of good faith purchases and liens without notice against unrecorded liens or conveyances.

  1. All innocent persons, firms, or corporations acting in good faith and without actual notice which purchase real or personal property for value or obtain contractual liens on the property from distributees, devisees, legatees, or heirs at law holding or apparently holding real or personal property by will or inheritance from a deceased person shall be protected in the purchase of the property or in acquiring such a lien thereon as against unrecorded liens or conveyances created or executed by the deceased person upon or to the property in like manner and to the same extent as if the property had been purchased or the lien acquired from the deceased person.
  2. All innocent persons, firms, or corporations which purchase real or personal property for value or obtain contractual liens on the property from a surviving joint tenant, or surviving joint tenants, holding or apparently holding real or personal property as a surviving joint tenant, or surviving joint tenants, shall be protected in the purchase of the property or in acquiring such a lien thereon as against unrecorded liens or conveyances created or executed by a deceased joint tenant upon or to the property, and as against other unrecorded instruments resulting in a severance of any joint tenant's interest, in like manner and to the same extent as if the property had been purchased or the lien acquired from the deceased joint tenant and surviving joint tenant, or surviving joint tenants.

(Ga. L. 1912, p. 143, § 1; Code 1933, § 67-2502; Ga. L. 1984, p. 1335, § 1.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Statute cannot be extended beyond the statute's terms to aid bona fide purchaser from life tenant as against a remainderman who does not join in the conveyance. Mathis v. Solomon, 188 Ga. 311, 4 S.E.2d 24 (1939); Harper v. Paradise, 233 Ga. 194, 210 S.E.2d 710 (1974) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-4).

Wife of deceased life estate holder was not a bona fide purchaser.

- Trial court erred in determining that a second wife acquired a one-half interest in property quitclaimed to her by her husband because the husband had only a life estate in the property, and she was not a bona fide purchaser. The parties' lender, however, was a bona fide purchaser for value pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 44-2-1,44-2-2, and44-2-4(b). Price v. Price, 286 Ga. 753, 692 S.E.2d 601 (2010).

Impact of failure to probate a will.

- Trial court did not err in granting a bank's motion for summary judgment in the bank's quiet title action against a testator's niece and great-niece on the ground that under O.C.G.A. § 44-2-4(a), the priority of a security deed the testator's stepson gave to a mortgage company, which assigned its interest in the property to the bank, was protected from the interests the niece and great-niece held that were grounded in the testator's unrecorded will because there was nothing in the record that would render O.C.G.A. § 44-2-4(a) inapplicable since the notice created by the possession of the niece and great-niece was only constructive notice, and there was no evidence that the company had any actual notice of the will or of the interests created thereby; the statute applies equally to give protection to those who take an interest in realty when there are other interests that exist, but are not of record, because of a failure to probate a will. Riggins v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 288 Ga. 850, 708 S.E.2d 266 (2011).

Cited in Michael v. Poss, 209 Ga. 559, 74 S.E.2d 742 (1953).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Records and Recording Laws, § 144.

ALR.

- Priority, as between holder of unfiled or unrecorded chattel mortgage who secures possession of goods on chattels, and subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer, 53 A.L.R.2d 936.

Construction and effect of "marketable record title" statutes, 31 A.L.R.4th 11.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 44-2-4

Total Results: 2  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Price v. Price, 692 S.E.2d 601 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 22, 2010 | 286 Ga. 753, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 869

...eath and did not take priority over the later-recorded divorce decree. See Coleman v. Thomasson, 160 Ga. 81, 127 S.E. 129 (1925). 3. The trial court did not err when it determined MERS to be an innocent purchaser for value. OCGA §§ 44-2-1, 44-2-2, 44-2-4(b); McDonald v....
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Riggins v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 708 S.E.2d 266 (Ga. 2011).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 18, 2011 | 288 Ga. 850, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 751

...in interest; Deutsche Bank moved for summary judgment on January 13, 2010. Walker and Riggins responded and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. In granting Deutsche Bank's motion and denying Riggins's, the trial court relied primarily on OCGA § 44-2-4(a), which reads: All innocent persons, firms, or corporations acting in good faith and without actual notice which purchase real or personal property for value or obtain contractual liens on the property from distributees, devisees, legatee...
...[4] The trial court concluded that under this statute, the priority of the security deed given to Ameriquest was protected from the interests Walker and Riggins held that were grounded in the unrecorded will of October 27, 2003. 1. Riggins first contends that OCGA § 44-2-4(a) can have no application, as the language of the statute gives protection to purchasers and lenders "as against unrecorded liens or conveyances created or executed by the deceased"; Riggins notes that the unrecorded document here is the will of October 27, 2003, which is neither a lien nor a conveyance. However, a gift of realty by will is similar to a gift by deed. See Smith v. Smith, 243 Ga. 56, 252 S.E.2d 484 (1979). See also Hinkel, Pindar's Georgia Real Estate Law and Procedure, Vol. I, § 16-27 (5th ed.1998). And, the purpose of OCGA § 44-2-4(a) is clearly to protect those who take interests in real property from unrecorded interests created by the decedent....
...ere, take an interest in realty when there are other interests that exist, but are not of record because of a failure to probate a will. See Hadden v. Stevens, 181 Ga. 165, 181 S.E. 767 (1935). 2. Riggins urges that even under an application of OCGA § 44-2-4(a), Ameriquest cannot claim the statute's protection because Walker and Riggins were in possession *269 of the property at the time of Eugene's execution of the security deed, and that their possession provided notice to the world of their rights in the property....
...acts affecting the title of which he would have learned by an inspection of the premises. . . .' [Cit.]"). Accordingly, the notice created by the possession of Walker and Riggins was only constructive notice. However, the protection afforded by OCGA § 44-2-4(a) is extended to those who act "in good faith and without actual notice....
...." (Emphasis supplied.) Of course, the General Assembly's use of the term "actual notice" must be given meaning. Brown v. Liberty Co., 271 Ga. 634, 635, 522 S.E.2d 466 (1999). Accordingly, if Ameriquest acted with only constructive notice of any claim of Walker and Riggins, the protection of OCGA § 44-2-4(a) is still available here. There is no evidence that Ameriquest had any actual notice of the will of October 27, 2003, or of the interests created thereby. Thus, there is nothing in the record that would render OCGA § 44-2-4(a) inapplicable on this basis. 3. Nonetheless, Riggins also contends that Ameriquest was put on specific notice of the possession of Walker and Riggins, and urges that Ameriquest had a duty to inquire into the nature of that possession if it is to meet OCGA § 44-2-4(a)'s standard of being a "corporation[ ] acting in good faith." Although "good faith" is not statutorily defined in the context of OCGA § 44-2-4(a), this Court has previously noted that "Webster defines `good faith' as `a state of mind indicating honesty and lawfulness of purpose; belief that one's conduct is not unconscionable or that known circumstances do not require further investigation.'" Anderson v....
...tice of the petition to probate the will, stated that she offered no objection, and that she knew of no reason why it should not be probated. [3] Ameriquest eventually assigned its interest in the property to Deutsche Bank. [4] In its entirety, OCGA § 44-2-4 reads: (a) All innocent persons, firms, or corporations acting in good faith and without actual notice which purchase real or personal property for value or obtain contractual liens on the property from distributees, devisees, legatees, or...