Scope of prescription by mere possession.

- Prescription by mere possession does not extend beyond the actual possessio pedis of the prescriber. Kerlin v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 191 Ga. 663, 13 S.E.2d 790 (1941); Robertson v. Abernathy, 192 Ga. 694, 16 S.E.2d 584 (1941), later appeal, 195 Ga. 704, 25 S.E.2d 424 (1943); Arnold v. Shackelford, 219 Ga. 839, 136 S.E.2d 384 (1964).

Facts as set out by the trial court and as recited by the brothers were insufficient as a matter of law to establish that the brothers were in such notorious possession that the brothers acquired title to the riverbed by prescriptive easement or adverse possession; all of the brothers' actions were consistent with their 1976 easement, and therefore did not give notice that claimed the entire riverbed to the exclusion of others. Thomas v. Henry County Water & Sewerage Auth., 317 Ga. App. 258, 731 S.E.2d 66 (2012).

Requirement of continuity of possession is one of substance, not of absolute mathematical continuity, provided there is no break so as to make a severance of two possessions. Chamblee v. Johnson, 200 Ga. 838, 38 S.E.2d 721 (1946).

Payment of taxes is not itself evidence of title, yet it is admissible as a circumstance tending to prove adverse possession. Chamblee v. Johnson, 200 Ga. 838, 38 S.E.2d 721 (1946).

Outstanding recorded title will not prevent ripening of title by prescription if the possessor enters in good faith under written evidence of title from another. Hearn v. Leverette, 213 Ga. 286, 99 S.E.2d 147 (1957).

Because the heirs produced evidence raising a material question of fact as to whether their ancestors possessed certain property for the requisite period of time under a claim of right pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 44-5-161(a),44-5-163, and44-5-165, the record owner was not entitled to summary judgment. Walker v. Sapelo Island Heritage Auth., 285 Ga. 194, 674 S.E.2d 925 (2009).

Cited in Hunt v. Pond, 67 Ga. 578 (1881); Burr v. Toomer, 103 Ga. 159, 29 S.E. 692 (1897); Knight v. Isom, 113 Ga. 613, 39 S.E. 103 (1901); Walker v. Steffes, 139 Ga. 520, 77 S.E. 580 (1913); Connasauga River Lumber Co. v. Shippen, 293 F. 579 (5th Cir. 1923); Beeland v. Butler Payne Lumber Co., 48 Ga. App. 619, 173 S.E. 436 (1934); Sewell v. Sprayberry, 186 Ga. 1, 196 S.E. 796 (1938); Poole v. Atlanta Joint Stock Land Bank, 189 Ga. 59, 5 S.E.2d 368 (1939); Bradley v. Shelton, 189 Ga. 696, 7 S.E.2d 261 (1940); Flournoy v. United States, 115 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1940); Dyal v. Sanders, 194 Ga. 228, 21 S.E.2d 596 (1942); Holloway v. Woods, 195 Ga. 55, 23 S.E.2d 254 (1942); Strickland v. Padgett, 197 Ga. 589, 30 S.E.2d 167 (1944); Elliott v. Robinson, 198 Ga. 811, 33 S.E.2d 95 (1945); Toms v. Knighton, 199 Ga. 858, 36 S.E.2d 315 (1945); Smith v. Jefferson County, 201 Ga. 674, 40 S.E.2d 773 (1946); Powell v. Moore, 202 Ga. 62, 42 S.E.2d 110 (1947); Rogers v. Moore, 207 Ga. 182, 60 S.E.2d 359 (1950); Phillips v. Wheeler, 212 Ga. 603, 94 S.E.2d 732 (1956); Spillers v. Jordan, 96 Ga. App. 426, 100 S.E.2d 483 (1957); Davis v. Palmer, 213 Ga. 862, 102 S.E.2d 478 (1958); Pridgen v. Coffee County Bd. of Educ., 218 Ga. 326, 127 S.E.2d 808 (1962); Durand v. Reeves, 219 Ga. 182, 132 S.E.2d 71 (1963); Harrison v. Morris, 108 Ga. App. 566, 133 S.E.2d 899 (1963); Reid v. Wilkerson, 222 Ga. 282, 149 S.E.2d 700 (1966); Herrington v. City of Atlanta, 224 Ga. 465, 162 S.E.2d 420 (1968); Barnett v. Holliday, 228 Ga. 361, 185 S.E.2d 397 (1971); Guagliardo v. Jones, 238 Ga. App. 668, 518 S.E.2d 925 (1999).

Evidence of defendant's actual adverse possession.

- Evidence of color of title, continuous occupation, use of property to the exclusion of all others, construction of improvements on the land, payment of annual taxes and fire insurance premiums, cultivation of annual crops, and keeping of livestock and penalty shows that the defendant had actual adverse possession. Hughes v. Heard, 215 Ga. 156, 109 S.E.2d 510 (1959) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-165).

Prescriptive title generally.

- In a dispute over two subdivision lots, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence that was cumulative to properly admitted evidence showing a legal property owner's record title, and the evidence was not hearsay, as alleged by a claimant who sought title to the property by prescription; further, the evidence was relevant to the issue of whether a claimant's adverse possession ripened into title by prescription. Smith v. Stacey, 281 Ga. 601, 642 S.E.2d 28 (2007).

Building a driveway insufficient.

- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment on prescription and acquiescence grounds to the contestants to a tract of land without determining the validity or sufficiency of the legal descriptions of either deed to the property as there was insufficient evidence of possession and support for prescriptive title, and the construction of a driveway, apparently on the disputed tract was interrupted by a quiet title action filed within seven years by the heirs of the property. Henson v. Tucker, 278 Ga. App. 859, 630 S.E.2d 64 (2006).

Occasional cleanup and mowing insufficient.

- Trial court did not err when the court concluded that a buyer's tax deed did not ripen by prescription into a fee simple title because neither the buyer's payments of taxes nor occasional cleanup and mowing areas were sufficiently notorious or exclusive as to constitute actual possession. Washington v. McKibbon Hotel Group, Inc., 284 Ga. 262, 664 S.E.2d 201 (2008).

Sporadic repairs insufficient.

- Trial court properly granted a renter summary judgment and removed an affidavit asserting adverse possession filed by the owner of the first floor of a building with regard to a 1,350 square foot space on the second floor of the building as the renter established that title was acquired via a quit claim deed, that the renter changed the door at the base of the stairwell and had sole access to the second floor space, as well as posted no trespassing signs. The owner of the first floor failed to establish a continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the space based on sporadic repairs made to the roof of the entire building. MEA Family Invs., LP v. Adams, 284 Ga. 407, 667 S.E.2d 609 (2008).

Installation of sprinkler system insufficient.

- Property owners could not establish that the alleged installation of a sprinkler system on the disputed property by a prior owner of the owners' property somehow bolstered the owners' claim of adverse possession because there was no evidence as to how long any previous owner allegedly maintained adverse possession of the disputed property, and the installation of a sprinkler system, by itself, would not establish adverse possession under the circumstances presented in the case. Campbell v. Landings Ass'n, 289 Ga. 617, 713 S.E.2d 860 (2011).

Occasional mowing and clearing of vegetation insufficient.

- Trial court did not err in denying a landowner's claim that the landowner held prescriptive title to certain property by possession for a period of more than 20 years under O.C.G.A. § 44-5-163 because neither the landowner nor the landowner's spouse cultivated the property or erected any structure or fence upon the property pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-5-165, and the clearing of vegetation did not require a finding that possession had been established; photographs submitted in support of the landowner's claim that a pre-existing fence situated at one end of the property, together with the vegetation lines caused by the clearing and periodic mowing of the property, constituted an enclosure of the property so as to evidence possession and could allow the special master to conclude that the asserted enclosure was not so notorious as to attract the attention of every adverse claimant and so exclusive as to prevent actual occupation by another. Bailey v. Moten, 289 Ga. 897, 717 S.E.2d 205 (2011).

Occasional maintenance and use did not amount to exclusive possession.

- Evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that the landowners did not own the disputed property because the landowners' occasional maintenance and use of the disputed property did not amount to the type of exclusive possession for twenty years that would support a claim for prescriptive title under O.C.G.A. §§ 44-5-161 and44-5-165. Washington v. Brown, 290 Ga. 477, 722 S.E.2d 65 (2012).

Successor in interest to the owner of property successfully redeemed the property from the purchaser of a tax deed by tendering an adequate amount, O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40(2), although it was refused by the purchaser; the court rejected the purchaser's claim that the purchaser had acquired title by prescription under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-48 because the prescriptive period was not met and the purchaser's possession of the unfenced, uninhabited property was not sufficiently adverse. Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, LLC, 300 Ga. 91, 793 S.E.2d 402 (2016).

Building of pond and dam sufficient.

- In a boundary dispute, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that a landowner was entitled to judgment pursuant to prescriptive title under O.C.G.A. § 44-5-161(a) because a dam creating the disputed pond broke in 1994, and the landowner reconstructed the dam at the landowner's sole cost; the neighbors raised no objection to this act of actual possession and ownership. These acts extended to the property line set forth in the landowner's deed even though some of the disputed land was not enclosed or cultivated. Mathews v. Cloud, 294 Ga. 415, 754 S.E.2d 70 (2014).

When there is no evidence of enclosure or cultivation, notoriety and exclusivity became questions of fact for the jury. Friendship Baptist Church, Inc. v. West, 265 Ga. 745, 462 S.E.2d 618 (1995).

Claim of prescriptive title to property failed.

- Trial court erred in finding that a neighbor was the rightful owner of certain property because there was no evidence to support the conclusion that the neighbor owned the disputed property either by deed or by adverse possession; the legal description of the property contained in the neighbor's deed did not include the disputed property, and since the evidence showed that, at most, the neighbor made a claim to the disputed property for only eighteen years before being challenged by the landowners, the neighbor's claim to have gained prescriptive title to the property through adverse possession under O.C.G.A. §§ 44-5-161 and44-5-165 failed as a matter of law. Washington v. Brown, 290 Ga. 477, 722 S.E.2d 65 (2012).

Failure to maintain fence prevents required notice.

- Even though the adverse possessor may have taken possession of property by fencing the property at the time the possessor purchased the property, if in fact the possessor had not maintained the fence, it did not constitute notice such as is required by the provisions of this statute. Turner v. McKee, 97 Ga. App. 531, 103 S.E.2d 658 (1958) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-165).

Planting trees on boundary lines and corners may be sufficient earmarks of possession. Howell v. United States, 519 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

To constitute actual possession by enclosure, the land must be completely enclosed, but it is not necessary that the land should be completely enclosed, on every side, by artificial means, such as fences. Fitzpatrick v. Massee-Felton Lumber Co., 188 Ga. 80, 3 S.E.2d 91 (1939).

Natural barriers.

- Natural barriers in part may be utilized in connection with fences provided that the barriers constitute a complete enclosure which indicates complete and notorious dominion over the land. Fitzpatrick v. Massee-Felton Lumber Co., 188 Ga. 80, 3 S.E.2d 91 (1965).

Telephone poles and wires outline general area in use.

- When poles and wires were used in the operation of a telephone line or lines over the lands of another, they should be considered as having marked or outlined a general area in use according to the usual and ordinary manner; and if the outer limits of this space remained the same for the prescriptive period of 20 years, the resulting easement would apply at least to such general area, so that the stringing of additional wires anywhere therein consistently with customary location would be permissible as territorially within the easement, whether or not the identical space to be physically occupied by such wires had ever before been so occupied by other wires. Kerlin v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 191 Ga. 663, 13 S.E.2d 790 (1941).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Adverse Possession, §§ 10 et seq., 296 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 2 C.J.S., Adverse Possession, § 34 et seq.

ALR.

- Act of trespasser as interrupting adverse possession, 22 A.L.R. 1458.

Adverse possession of railroad right of way, 50 A.L.R. 303.

Interval between crops as affecting continuity of adverse possession, 76 A.L.R. 1492.

Grantor's continued possession of land after execution of deed as notice of his claim adverse to title conveyed, 105 A.L.R. 845.

Length of period of possession before accrual of rights of person sought to be affected by notice as affecting the rule regarding constructive notice from possession of real property, 105 A.L.R. 892.

Purchase of, or offer to purchase or to settle, outstanding title, interest, or claim as interrupting continuity of adverse possession as regards another title, interest, or claim, 125 A.L.R. 825.

Cutting of timber as adverse possession, 170 A.L.R. 887.

Adverse possession: sufficiency, as regards continuity, of seasonal possession other than for agricultural or logging purposes, 24 A.L.R.2d 632.

Acquisition of title to mines or minerals by adverse possession, 35 A.L.R.2d 124.

Grantor's possession as adverse possession against grantee, 39 A.L.R.2d 353.

Adverse possession based on encroachment of building or other structure, 2 A.L.R.3d 1005.

Acquisition of title to land by adverse possession by state or other governmental unit or agency, 18 A.L.R.3d 678.

Grazing of livestock or gathering of natural crop as fulfilling traditional elements of adverse possession, 48 A.L.R.3d 818.