Deed sufficient if makes known transaction between parties.

- If the deed is sufficient in itself to make known the transaction between the parties, no want of form will invalidate the deed. Very informal instruments have been held sufficient under this statute to pass title. Horton v. Murden, 117 Ga. 72, 43 S.E. 786 (1903); Caraker v. Brown, 152 Ga. 677, 111 S.E. 51 (1922). See also Sterling v. Park, 129 Ga. 309, 58 S.E. 828, 121 Am. St. R. 224, 13 L.R.A. (n.s.) 298, 12 Ann. Cas. 201 (1907); Price v. Gross, 148 Ga. 137, 96 S.E. 4 (1918); Nasworthy v. James, 152 Ga. 368, 110 S.E. 7 (1921) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-33).

Form found sufficient in Caldwell v. Hammons, 40 Ga. 342 (1869); Allgood v. State, 87 Ga. 668, 13 S.E. 569 (1891); Vizard v. Moody, 119 Ga. 918, 47 S.E. 348 (1904); Georgia & A. Ry. v. Shiver, 121 Ga. 708, 49 S.E. 700 (1905); Reeves v. Allgood & Co., 133 Ga. 835, 67 S.E. 81 (1910); Swint v. Swint, 147 Ga. 467, 94 S.E. 571 (1917); Boyd v. Sanders, 148 Ga. 839, 98 S.E. 490 (1919); Nasworthy v. James, 152 Ga. 368, 110 S.E. 7 (1921); Crider v. Woodward, 162 Ga. 743, 135 S.E. 95 (1926), later appeal, 165 Ga. 407, 141 S.E. 76 (1927); Citizens & S. Bank v. Farr, 164 Ga. 880, 139 S.E. 658 (1927).

Valid and binding deed.

- Limited warranty deed signed by the seller, which contained a description of two parcels of property, was valid and binding between the parties and the seller's failure to read the deed did not affect the conveyance of title as: (1) the seller signed the deed without reading the deed; (2) the seller's signature was notarized; (3) the deed was delivered to the buyer; and (4) there was no allegation that the seller could not read or that the buyer defrauded the seller or otherwise prevented the seller from reading the deed before the seller signed it. Z & Y Corp. v. Indore C. Stores, Inc., 282 Ga. App. 163, 638 S.E.2d 760 (2006).

Cited in O'Neill v. Myers, 148 Ga. App. 749, 252 S.E.2d 638 (1979); Vineville Capital Group, llc v. McCook, 329 Ga. App. 790, 766 S.E.2d 156 (2014).

Technical terms not necessary to create estate.

- No particular form is essential to the validity of a deed, and technical words are not necessary to create an estate in land. On the other hand, such an estate will not be created by the mere use of technical terms, if from the instrument construed as a whole it is apparent that the parties did not so intend. P.H. Snook & Austin Furn. Co. v. Steiner & Emery, 117 Ga. 363, 43 S.E. 775 (1903).

Deed conveying property described, but not containing formal language, sufficient.

- When a debtor gave a security deed to the debtor's creditor which did not contain formal language, but did convey the property described in the deed, the deed was sufficient to invest the creditor with such title that the creditor could execute a valid reconveyance to the debtor for the purpose of levy and sale. Woodward v. La Porte, 181 Ga. 731, 184 S.E. 280 (1936).

Signature upon note related to deed by internal references applicable to entire contract.

- Note and a security deed were so related by internal references that the signature upon the note should, as between the parties and in equity, be treated as applying to the entire contract, including the part contained in the security deed. Cocke v. Bank of Dawson, 180 Ga. 714, 180 S.E. 711 (1935).

Inquiry notice established following signature on waiver.

- Even though recorded, an unsigned security deed did not provide constructive notice to a bona fide purchaser under O.C.G.A. §§ 44-5-30 and44-14-33 as in effect in 2014 when the security deed was recorded. However, the security deed referenced and incorporated a waiver, which was properly executed and attested, and the waiver referenced and incorporated the security deed and, thus, the security deed and waiver were effective under Georgia law to provide inquiry notice to a subsequent purchaser and, accordingly, the trustee could not avoid the defendant's interest because the trustee did not qualify as a bona fide purchaser of real property. Kelley v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank (In re Jones), 580 Bankr. 916 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2017).

As between parties, deed binding without witnesses.

- In order that a deed may be properly entered of record, it must be executed in the presence of at least two witnesses, but, as between the parties, the deed is binding without witnesses. Blue Ridge Apt. Co. v. Telfair Stockton & Co., 205 Ga. 552, 54 S.E.2d 608 (1949).

Assumption that deed attested when appears duly recorded.

- When it appears that a deed was duly recorded, it will be assumed that the deed was properly executed and attested. Tietjen v. Meldrim, 172 Ga. 814, 159 S.E. 231 (1931).

Agreement properly construed as valid deed.

- Trial court did not err by determining that the original Redemption Agreement could be construed as a valid deed because O.C.G.A. §§ 44-2-15 and44-5-30 do not provide that unless so attested, a deed is void and O.C.G.A. § 44-5-33 provides that no prescribed form is essential to the validity of a deed to lands. Bagwell v. Trammel, 297 Ga. 873, 778 S.E.2d 173 (2015).

Deed cannot convey title without language indicating intent to transfer.

- Function of a deed is to convey title in presenti, and this cannot be accomplished without the use of language indicating an intention to transfer title. Horton v. Murden, 117 Ga. 72, 43 S.E. 786 (1903); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 140 Ga. 736, 79 S.E. 853 (1913). See also Bell v. McDuffie, 71 Ga. 264 (1883).

Necessity of language not dispensed with by law.

- This statute does not dispense with the necessity of using language indicating an intention of the maker to convey a present estate in specific land to a named grantee. Caldwell v. Caldwell, 140 Ga. 736, 79 S.E. 853 (1913); Tyson v. Hutchinson, 164 Ga. 661, 139 S.E. 519 (1927) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-33).

Deed not void if deed affords key by which land definitely located.

- Deed is sufficient to pass title, and will not be declared void for uncertainty of description, if the descriptive averments contained therein are certain, or if the averments afford a key by which the land can be definitely located by the aid of extrinsic evidence. Gainesville M.R.R. v. Tyner, 204 Ga. 535, 50 S.E.2d 108 (1948).

Descriptive words in a deed, to be sufficient as a key, must lead unerringly to the land in question. Savannah River Lumber Corp. v. Sharpe, 213 Ga. 72, 97 S.E.2d 303 (1957).

Key must locate boundaries at time of conveyance's execution.

- Insofar as the identity of the land attempted to be conveyed is concerned, the key must lead to the establishment and the location of the boundaries as of the time of the execution of the conveyance. McMichael Realty & Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Tysinger, 155 Ga. App. 131, 270 S.E.2d 88 (1980).

Provision in a deed for a subsequent survey does not cure indefinite description. McMichael Realty & Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Tysinger, 155 Ga. App. 131, 270 S.E.2d 88 (1980).

Identification may be supplied by extrinsic evidence. Holder v. Jordan Realty Co., 170 Ga. 764, 154 S.E. 353 (1930).

No identification key furnished where demarcation line between lands not established.

- Deed which purported to convey "all of the river swamp land" located on a larger tract of land was not sufficient to furnish a key to identification when the verbal testimony was not sufficient to establish a line of demarcation between "river swamp lands" and other lands. Savannah River Lumber Corp. v. Sharpe, 213 Ga. 72, 97 S.E.2d 303 (1957).

No action on purchase option when no key to land's identification.

- Neither specific performance, nor damages for its breach, will be decreed in an action on a written option to purchase land since the land is so vaguely described that the writing furnishes no key to the land's identification. McMichael Realty & Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Tysinger, 155 Ga. App. 131, 270 S.E.2d 88 (1980).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds, § 12 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 26A C.J.S., Deeds, § 34 et seq.

ALR.

- Effect of designating grantee in deed or mortgage by firm name, 1 A.L.R. 564; 8 A.L.R. 493.

Validity and effect of deed to "heirs" of living person, 22 A.L.R. 713.

Validity and effect of deed executed in blank as to name of grantee, 32 A.L.R. 737; 175 A.L.R. 1294.

Sufficiency and construction of description in deed or mortgage as "all" of grantor's property, or "all" of his property in certain locality, 55 A.L.R. 162.

Acknowledgment or oath over telephone, 58 A.L.R. 604.

Sufficiency of execution of instrument by agent or attorney in fact in name of principal without his own name appearing, 96 A.L.R. 1251.

Fee simple conditional, 114 A.L.R. 602.

Time limitation for attack on tax title as affected by defective description of property in the assessment or the tax deed, 133 A.L.R. 570.

Validity and effect of deed which identifies tract conveyed only by reference to its area and a specified corner or other part of a larger tract from which it is to be taken, 139 A.L.R. 1180.

Deed or mortgage as affected by uncertainty of description of excepted area, 162 A.L.R. 288.

Record of instrument without sufficient acknowledgment as notice, 59 A.L.R.2d 1299.