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Call Now: 904-383-7448(Ga. L. 1973, p. 200, § 9.)
- For article, "Administrative Law," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 81 (2001). For annual survey on administrative law, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2009). For article, "The Chevron Two-Step in Georgia's Administrative Law," see 46 Ga. L. Rev. 871 (2012).
- The exemption in subsection (a) of Ga. L. 1973, p. 200, § 9 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-3-8) allowing large load customers free choice was not arbitrary, capricious, or wholly unreasonable but based upon real differences between two groups of customers and between the effects upon electric utilities and the communities in which they locate. Therefore, that subsection is not a denial of equal protection prohibited by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III (Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II). City of Calhoun v. North Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 233 Ga. 759, 213 S.E.2d 596 (1975).
- Ga. L. 1973, p. 200, § 9 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-3-8) does not attempt to interfere with either the municipality or the electric membership corporation in the establishment of their rate levels. Therefore, it is clear that the section does not constitute an unlawful attempt to regulate or fix the charges of municipal utilities prohibited by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Para. IX (Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V), subject to the exception in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VIII, Para. I (Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I, II; Art. XI, Sec. I, Para. IV). City of Calhoun v. North Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 233 Ga. 759, 213 S.E.2d 596 (1975).
Subsection (a) of Ga. L. 1973, p. 200, § 8 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-3-8) not shown to be unconstitutional under Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII. City of Calhoun v. North Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 233 Ga. 759, 213 S.E.2d 596 (1975).
- Multi-building office park did not qualify for the benefit of the "large load" exception of O.C.G.A. § 46-3-8(a), where the premises was not conceived as a unified rental premises for its entire useful life and the metering arrangement for the premises did not comply in substance with the single-meter requirement of the exception. City of Norcross v. Georgia Power Co., 197 Ga. App. 891, 399 S.E.2d 725 (1990).
- The "large load" exception of O.C.G.A. § 46-3-8(a), being an exception to the general rule of competitive restriction, must be strictly construed. City of Norcross v. Georgia Power Co., 197 Ga. App. 891, 399 S.E.2d 725 (1990).
- An individually-metered apartment complex in which the complex's owner installed separate meters that were combined under a master or pass-through meter, notwithstanding that the owner paid the bill for the entire complex and employed an outside company to read the separate meters and bill each tenant for their individual usage did not qualify for the large load exception. Sawnee Elec. Mbrshp. Corp. v. Georgia PSC, 273 Ga. 702, 544 S.E.2d 158 (2001).
- Under the Georgia Territorial Act, a large load customer's choice of an electrical supplier must be evidenced by a binding contract with the supplier, reached through mutual assent and meeting the other requirements for contract formation under Georgia law. Jackson Elec. Mbrshp. Corp. v. Ga. PSC, 294 Ga. App. 253, 668 S.E.2d 867 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0356, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 201 (Ga. 2009).
- An electric membership corporation alleged that an electric utility company, a consumer's designated territorial supplier, falsely told the consumer it did not qualify as a large load consumer under O.C.G.A. § 46-3-8(a) and thus had to select the utility as the consumer's provider, and that the consumer's request-for-services form was void because the form was based on this misrepresentation. As the hearing officer's findings - that the allegations of misrepresentation were untenable and that the consumer and utility had a binding contract - were supported by the evidence, the findings were upheld. Jackson Elec. Mbrshp. Corp. v. Ga. PSC, 294 Ga. App. 253, 668 S.E.2d 867 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0356, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 201 (Ga. 2009).
- Subsection (b) of Ga. L. 1973, p. 200, § 9 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-3-8) does not empower the city to supply electricity to one who does not want any electricity at all. Frier v. City of Douglas, 233 Ga. 775, 213 S.E.2d 607 (1975).
- Subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 46-3-8, the grandfather clause, does not authorize a supplier of temporary electrical services to a large load consumer the exclusive right to later furnish permanent services to the consumer; therefore, a city's provision of temporary electrical service to a large load consumer at a construction site does not preclude the consumer under paragraph (a)(4) and subsection (f) from choosing another authorized supplier for permanent service to the completed site. City of LaGrange v. Georgia Power Co., 185 Ga. App. 60, 363 S.E.2d 286 (1987), cert. denied, 185 Ga. App. 909, 363 S.E.2d 286 (1988).
- A city, which had been providing electricity to a high school, argued that a utility could not continue to service the school's ball field lights because the utility did not comply with the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 46-3-8(c)(2). This argument failed because § 46-3-8(c)(2) pertains to the transfer of electric service as opposed to the continuance of service. City of LaGrange v. Ga. PSC, 296 Ga. App. 615, 675 S.E.2d 525 (2009).
- The fact that a consumer later builds a formerly uncontemplated structure in an area which would qualify the consumer for service by a secondary supplier does not abrogate the provision of O.C.G.A. § 46-3-8(f) that the electrical supplier is determined at the moment the consumer makes an application for service. City of Marietta Bd. of Lights & Water v. Georgia Power Co., 176 Ga. App. 123, 335 S.E.2d 467 (1985).
- Commission properly found city's plan to provide service to its own facility outside of service area did not violate Territorial Agreement. See North Ga. Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Calhoun, 195 Ga. App. 382, 393 S.E.2d 510 (1990).
- Trial court properly upheld an agency decision that a power company had the right to continue service to an apartment complex under the grandfather clause to the Territorial Act, O.C.G.A. § 46-3-8(b), after individual meters were installed to replace one master meter because none of the exceptions to the grandfather clause existed and the challenging electric corporation failed to raise the corporation's challenge to the application of the grandfather clause before the agency. Excelsior Elec. Mbrshp. Corp. v. Ga. PSC, 322 Ga. App. 687, 745 S.E.2d 870 (2013).
- A new jail built on land owned by a county and on which an existing correctional facility is also located, although connected by permanent enclosed covered walkways to a new, free-standing dining facility which was built at the same time as the new jail was not an addition to or extension of the existing correctional facility, but was a new premises physically separate from the existing facility, physically distinct with a separate electric system. The two facilities constituted two separate entities in terms of purpose and operation with two different legal entities responsible for operating the different facilities. Colquitt Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Moultrie, 197 Ga. App. 794, 399 S.E.2d 497 (1990).
Under O.C.G.A. § 46-3-8(a), a utility was entitled to provide electrical service to a high school's new auditorium, even though a city had been providing service to the school itself, as the utility was providing service to new premises. O.C.G.A. § 46-3-3(6) defined "premises" as separately metered structures; the auditorium was separately metered from the school, and the city could not explain how the facilities could properly be billed through a single master meter. City of LaGrange v. Ga. PSC, 296 Ga. App. 615, 675 S.E.2d 525 (2009).
Cited in Greensboro Lumber Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 643 F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Jackson Elec. Membership Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 257 Ga. 772, 364 S.E.2d 556 (1988); Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Ga. PSC, 278 Ga. App. 239, 628 S.E.2d 658 (2006).
- Duty to extend electrical service or supply individual applicant as affected by cost involved, 58 A.L.R. 537.
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