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Short title
Courts have cited this section in 17 opinions since 1986.
This article may be cited as the "Georgia Electric Membership Corporation Act."
(Ga. L. 1937, p. 644, § 1; Code 1933, § 34C-101, enacted by Ga. L. 1981, p. 1587, § 1.)
Cross references. - Nonprofit corporations generally, Ch. 3, T. 14.
Extension of jurisdiction of commission over electric membership corporations to same extent as commission has jurisdiction over electric light and power companies, § 46-3-12.
Nonprofit electric corporations not excluded from class of electric companies generally. - The word "profit" as employed both in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV (Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I-IV) and the Rural Electrification Act (7 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.) did not, when construed in pari materia with former Code 1933, § 94-1101 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-1-2) and Ga. L. 1937, p. 644 (see O.C.G.A. Art. 4, Ch. 3, T. 46), exclude the electric corporations created under that Act from the class of electric companies engaged in the business of generating and transmitting electricity. Lamar Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carroll, 89 Ga. App. 440, 79 S.E.2d 832 (1953).
Liability for punitive damages. - Power corporation failed to show that it was a public service corporation and, accordingly, shielded from liability for punitive damages as a matter of law; an electrical membership, under the Georgia Electric Membership Corporation Act, is vested with the power to sue and be sued and is provided with no express statutory immunity from liability for punitive damages. Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Sheriff, 210 Ga. App. 299, 436 S.E.2d 14 (1993).
Mandamus unavailable for nominee seeking to serve on electric membership corporation. - Trial court erred by granting a nominee's writ of mandamus because under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-23, mandamus did not lie to enforce purely private contract rights and the nominee's efforts to be qualified as a person to sit on the board of an electric membership corporation was a private right as board members were not public officers within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20. Rigby v. Boatright, 294 Ga. 253, 751 S.E.2d 851 (2013).
Cited in Troup County Elec. Membership Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 229 Ga. 348, 191 S.E.2d 33 (1972); Greensboro Lumber Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 643 F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Ga. 1986), aff'd, 844 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1988).
The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.
One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 1986. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.
Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.
Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.
Edition shown: Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.