Requirements as to residence and domicile.

- Requirement in former Code 1933, § 92-233(h) (see now subparagraph (3)(K) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-40) that the exempted homestead be the legal residence and domicile of such person for all purposes means no more than is required by Ga. Const. 1877, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. VII (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I-IV) which requires actual occupancy primarily as a residence or homestead. Turner v. Board of County Tax Assessors, 71 Ga. App. 374, 31 S.E.2d 61 (1944).

Exemption when applicant's dependents occupy claimed property.

- When an applicant for exemption maintains a house as a permanent residence, home, and place of abode, though the applicant's father and mother who are dependent on the applicant for support, although the applicant personally only occupies the house twice a year, the applicant is entitled to the homestead exemption, unless facts are shown which would deprive the applicant of the right to the exemption. Turner v. Board of County Tax Assessors, 71 Ga. App. 374, 31 S.E.2d 61 (1944).

There is no limitation as to size or physical proportions of property to be embraced within the homestead provision, and it would seem that the purpose of Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I-IV) and former Code 1933, § 92-219 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-44) in fixing a maximum valuation was to equalize the exemption as between applicants on the basis of value, regardless of the extent of the tract involved. Jones v. Johnson, 80 Ga. App. 340, 55 S.E.2d 904 (1949).

Effect of use to which rural or farm homestead is put.

- Reasonable intent of the homestead exemption provisions of the Constitution of Georgia and its statutes is to include in rural homesteads the entire tract of land upon which the house is situated, regardless of whether the land surrounding the dwelling is used simply as an extended approach to the building or put to agricultural uses. Jones v. Johnson, 80 Ga. App. 340, 55 S.E.2d 904 (1949).

Farming not considered commercial or business enterprise for purposes of homestead exemption.

- Owner of a farm located in this state, who resides in a house on the farm, is entitled to a homestead exemption as to the entire tract of land upon which the house is situated, to a value of $2,000.00 notwithstanding the fact that the owner devotes the land to agricultural purposes, since this is not such a use of the land as to amount to a commercial or business enterprise. Jones v. Johnson, 80 Ga. App. 340, 55 S.E.2d 904 (1949).

Exempt charitable institutions must be both pure charity and public charity.

- Constitution of Georgia restricts tax exemption of institutions of charity to those and those only that are "purely" charity and also that are "public" charity. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp. v. Alford, 217 Ga. 663, 124 S.E.2d 402 (1962).

Exemption of property used by charitable institution to produce money for charitable purposes.

- Interpreting "private or corporate income" to mean any income which is not public, productive property used as capital to raise money to expend in charity is used for private income when the owner is a private individual, and for corporate income when the owner is a corporation. It is no more allowable under the Constitution for a charitable association to accumulate money by the use of exempt property, which money is to be disbursed in charity, than it is for a common citizen to do it. Richardson v. Executive Comm., 176 Ga. 705, 169 S.E. 18 (1933).

Terms "private or corporate" are employed in contradistinction to "public."

- Public property is not taxed, whether income is derived from the property or not; but private or corporate property, though the property is connected with the external, visible "institution," is not exempt if used for income since the income from such property must, by reason of the property's ownership, be either private or corporate; these terms being comprehensive enough to include all income whatsoever that is not public. Richardson v. Executive Comm., 176 Ga. 705, 169 S.E. 18 (1933).

Exemption of hospital neither chartered as charity nor using property exclusively as such.

- When a hospital is not chartered as a purely public charity, and when the hospital's property is not put to use as a purely public charity, and neither the hospital's income nor the hospital's surplus is used exclusively for purely public charity, the hospital does not bring itself within the strict requirements for the ad valorem tax exemption sought. St. Joseph Hosp. v. Bohler, 229 Ga. 577, 193 S.E.2d 603 (1972).

For a nursing home to be tax exempt the nursing home must be purely charitable and public. Central Bd. on Care of Jewish Aged, Inc. v. Henson, 120 Ga. App. 627, 171 S.E.2d 747 (1969).

To qualify as public a nursing home need not be open to the entire public. It is sufficient that the nursing home be open to the classes for whose relief the nursing home is intended. Central Bd. on Care of Jewish Aged, Inc. v. Henson, 120 Ga. App. 627, 171 S.E.2d 747 (1969).

Effect of Act which expressly exempted hospitals of purely public charity.

- When, by enacting former Code 1933, § 92-201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41), the General Assembly exempted from taxation all of the property enumerated in Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I-IV), using the identical language there employed, it fully exhausted its constitutional power to make exemptions, and the amending Act, Ga. L. 1947, p. 1183, which expressly exempted from taxation all hospitals of purely public charity added nothing to what the General Assembly had previously done by Ga. L. 1946, p. 12, § 1. Elder v. Henrietta Egleston Hosp. for Children, 205 Ga. 489, 53 S.E.2d 751 (1949).

Independent-living units exempt as home for aged.

- Nonprofit charitable institution's independent-living units for the elderly were entitled to share the institution's longstanding tax exemption as a home for the aged because: (1) the institution was clearly a nonprofit home for the aged, which was defined in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-40(2) as a facility which provides residential services, health care services, or both residential services and health care services to the aged; (2) the institution had neither stockholders nor distributed income to private persons, was subject to Georgia laws regulating nonprofit and charitable corporations, and had been determined to be a tax-exempt organization under both federal and Georgia law; (3) the institution was a charitable one because supplying care for aged people was a charitable and benevolent purpose; and (4) the independent-living units were not held by the institution primarily for investment purposes. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Baptist Vill., Inc., 269 Ga. App. 848, 605 S.E.2d 436 (2004).

Hospital exempt when all income used for maintenance, operations, and furtherance of charitable purposes.

- When a hospital is organized for charitable purposes, and uses all of the hospital's income from all sources including income from pay patients, exclusively for maintenance, operation, enlarging the hospital's charitable facilities, and for furtherance of the hospital's charitable purposes, with no part of the same distributable to anyone having an interest therein, the hospital is exempt within the meaning of Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I-IV), an interpretation of that constitutional provision which accords with the intention of the framers of that document as shown in the Records of the Constitutional Commission 1943-1944, Vol. I, pp. 138-141, 388-395, 397, 528-531; Vol. II, pp. 58-59. Elder v. Henrietta Egleston Hosp. for Children, 205 Ga. 489, 53 S.E.2d 751 (1949).

Home for mentally handicapped held not exempt.

- When over 70 percent of the operating costs of a home for mentally handicapped persons comes from the government or client fees, and private donations account for only 15 percent of the expenditures of the home, and when the families or residents or government agencies pay monthly fees on behalf of each resident, it is not sufficiently "public" in nature to be considered an institution of purely public charity. Annandale at Suwanee, Inc. v. Gwinnett County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 242 Ga. 241, 248 S.E.2d 640 (1978).

Hospital with paying patients held not exempt.

- When a hospital receives charitable patients without pay but it also charges for patients able to pay, the proportion being vastly in favor of the latter, the property in question is used for corporate income, and is not exempted from taxation. Richardson v. Executive Comm., 176 Ga. 705, 169 S.E. 18 (1933).

Hospital which charges off uncollectable bills to charity.

- When a hospital is operated generally for profit, and while there is some evidence that it does on occasion treat indigent patients, the general practice of the institution is to collect all that it can from its patients, and only charge off as charity those bills it is unable to collect, the hospital is engaged principally for noncharitable purposes and apparently chiefly for the benefit of its staff, and is not exempt from taxation. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp. v. Alford, 217 Ga. 663, 124 S.E.2d 402 (1962).

Life tenant with remainderman responsible for ad valorem taxes.

- Covenant contained in a deed conveying a life estate which makes the remainder interest responsible for paying the ad valorem taxes does not alter the ownership interests in the property for purposes of eligibility to claim the homestead exemptions allowed for the elderly. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-71.

Homestead exemption fixes a person's residence for voting purposes. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-33.

Exemption on automobile claimed by military personnel stationed in Georgia.

- Member of the military stationed in Georgia may claim an exemption on the member's automobile pursuant to the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act [50 U.S.C. App. § 574] regardless of the member's spouse's claiming homestead exemption on the spouse's house in Georgia, unless other conduct on the member's part establishes an intent to change the member's residency to Georgia. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U90-15.

Applicant must have duly recorded fee title, estate for life, or contract of purchase.

- Applicant for a homestead exemption must have a right to possession under a bona fide claim of ownership, which contemplates duly recorded fee title, estate for life, or contract of purchase. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 370.

Exemption when owner occupies property on January 1, but not for entire year.

- An applicant who owned and occupied real property as a home on January 1 of the taxable year and otherwise qualified for homestead exemption would be entitled to claim the property as exempt, even though the applicant ceased to occupy the property at any time after January 1 of the taxable year. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 750.

Exemption when owner occupies property less than full time.

- Any person who owns and maintains a home, evidenced by the home being furnished, whose legal residence is in that particular county, and who may actually live outside of the county a part of the time in carrying out the person's work, is still entitled to a homestead exemption when the person has properly made application as provided by law. 1950-51 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 173.

Taxpayer who owns a residence and land surrounding the residence, but because of duties in occupation is required to be in another county except on weekends when the taxpayer occupies such residence is nevertheless entitled to a homestead exemption on property. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 750.

Applicability of other provisions as to exemption of joint interest.

- Former Code 1933, § 92-110 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-9) was not applicable in determining the extent of the homestead which should be granted to an occupant who owned a joint interest in the property. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 735.

Effect of failure of house loan to go through until after January 1.

- When one moves into a house prior to January 1, but the loan does not go through until after January 1, one is entitled to the homestead exemption. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 344.

Since a husband and wife constitute one immediate family group, they are entitled to only one homestead exemption, even though each owns property which was previously entitled to an exemption. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 343.

Exemptions allowed to separated husband and wife.

- Husband and wife who are separated, each residing on one's own property on January 1, are not each entitled to apply for a homestead exemption. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 344.

Taxpayer may claim a homestead exemption when members of the taxpayer's family occupy the home. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 295.

Exemption when house is occupied partly by owner and partly by tenant.

- Person who with the person's family occupies a portion of the person's house as a dwelling may receive a homestead exemption, although the remainder is occupied by the person's tenants. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 563; 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 731.

When owner stores personal possessions in a home which is rented to another while owner resides elsewhere, the owner is not entitled to a homestead exemption since the owner does not live in or occupy the property upon which the exemption is claimed. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 344.

Taxpayer who rents out property, but who retains portion for storage and visits the property several times weekly, is not entitled to a homestead exemption on the property. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 749.

Effect of operation of store in building occupied as a home.

- Fact that an applicant for homestead exemption conducts a store in a building occupied by the applicant as a home would not affect the applicant's eligibility for such exemption. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 437.

Full homestead exemption is granted on tourist courts when the owner occupies a certain portion as a home. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 731.

Exemption of hotel to which is attached an apartment for owner's use.

- When the owner of a hotel builds an apartment attached to the hotel and occupies the apartment as a home, the apartment attached to the hotel would become a part of the hotel. Therefore, the applicant who owns and occupies a portion of the hotel would be entitled to a homestead exemption up to the value of $2,000.00. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 731.

Exemption of farm lands rented to another.

- Party who owns a farm, the assessed value of which does not exceed $2,000.00, and who rents the farm lands, but reserves the farmhouse and occupies the farmhouse as the party's home, is entitled to the homestead exemption on the farm lands. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 731.

Homestead exemption does not apply to other buildings not actually occupied by the taxpayer, although the total value of such buildings and the buildings so occupied by the taxpayer are not equal to the amount allowed the taxpayer as a homestead exemption. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 209.

Intent of provisions for persons in military service.

- Former Code 1933, § 92-233(k) (see now subparagraph (3)(I) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-40) was enacted to preserve the homestead exemption of a member of the armed services who is forced to be away from home during the member's military service. It is not intended to grant a homestead exemption to members of the armed services on property never occupied by the members or their families as a residence. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 296.

Persons in military service who establish domicile in this state are entitled to homestead exemption, and are liable for ad valorem taxation on personal property. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 737.

Both career and drafted members of the military services are entitled to a homestead exemption on property owned by the member's, but not occupied by the members due to such service. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 738.

Availability of homestead exemption to members of armed forces not residents of this state.

- No person, whether a member of the armed services or not, who maintains a legal residence and votes in another state is eligible to claim a homestead exemption in this state since the homestead exemption law specifically states that the homestead shall be the legal residence and domicile of such person for all purposes whatsoever. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 737.

Exemption of property rented out while on military duty elsewhere.

- Members of the armed services can continue to claim a homestead exemption on property rented out while stationed elsewhere because of service in the armed forces. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 736; 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-131.

Effect of homestead claim by military personnel on liability for personal property tax.

- Military personnel who claim a homestead exemption on real property owned in this state are declaring their intentions to become residents of this state and thus are subject to personal property tax. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 741; 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-97.

Failure of person in military service to return to personal property in a county does not deprive a person of homestead exemption. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 739.

Owner who works farm but resides elsewhere cannot claim homestead exemption on farm. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 729.

Homestead exemption does not extend to rented property or vacant lots adjoining a homestead. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 339.

Exemption of land which is divided into lots.

- Taxpayer is entitled to homestead exemption on residence and land immediately surrounding the residence, whether such land is divided into one or more lots. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 747.

Exemption of property which lies in more than one county.

- If land lies in two counties, the applicant for homestead exemptions would have the right to file an application in each county in proportion to the value of the land located in such county, so long as the exemption does not exceed the total amount allowable by law. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 745; 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 746.

Exemption of properties which are divided by railroads, rivers, or highways.

- Fact that lands owned and occupied by the taxpayer are crossed by a highway would not affect the eligibility of a taxpayer for a homestead exemption thereon. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 437.

An island separated from a farm by a natural navigable tidewater river cannot be included as part of a homestead exemption. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 744.

Even though a portion of a tract of land is separated from the remainder by a railroad track, the owner is entitled to claim a homestead exemption on the entire tract. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 745.

Division of a tract of land by a public road, by a railroad, or by some other public utility would not affect the rights of the owner to claim as the owner's homestead exemption the property so divided. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 293.

Duplex dwelling would come under this statute; therefore, the exemption would be allowable to the owner of such a dwelling. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 363.

Owner who occupies a duplex will be entitled to claim a homestead exemption on the entire property regardless of the number of entrances thereto. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 731.

Test for exemption of duplex.

- It is possible for two people to each claim an exemption of $2,000.00 on a duplex when the line of division follows a natural and bona fide plan as to both land and building, and the two units thus formed are separately owned and occupied. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 731.

House trailer and land immediately surrounding it qualify if owned and occupied by applicant.

- Statute states that "homestead" means real property. Although a house trailer is not real property, when a person owns a trailer and the land on which it is located, and occupies the trailer as a home, the person would be entitled to claim the trailer and the land immediately surrounding the trailer as a homestead. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 729; 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 887; 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 342.

When the owner of a house trailer uses the trailer as the owner's residence and has the trailer mounted on a foundation similar to the foundation of a house but on land the owner does not own, the owner is not entitled to a homestead exemption. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 491.

Land qualifies when owned by applicant even if trailer not on permanent foundation.

- If the house trailer is not on a permanent foundation but is located on land owned by the person residing in the trailer, the owner is entitled to a homestead exemption on the value of the land. A house trailer is not real property but moveable personal property; therefore, unless a house trailer has been mounted on a foundation similar to the foundation of a house, the trailer remains personal property. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 491.

When land on which trailer is parked is rented.

- Person who owns a house trailer and rents the land on which the trailer is parked is not entitled to claim a homestead exemption on the house trailer. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 730; 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 342.

When a farm has been incorporated there can be no homestead exemption either to the corporation or the owner of the stock. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-3.

Nature of homestead exemption granted to certain persons 65 or older.

- Homestead exemption allowed under Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I-IV) to persons 65 years of age or over, provided the income limitation is met, is a personal right of only those persons 65 or over. When the homestead property is jointly owned, each owner may assert that owner's claim as an applicant for an exemption based only upon the interest the owner holds in the property. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-60.

C.J.S.

- 40 C.J.S., Homesteads, § 83 et seq. 84 C.J.S., Taxation, § 252 et seq.

ALR.

- Hospital as within tax exemption provision not specifically naming hospitals, 144 A.L.R. 1483.

Tax on property held under executory contract with exempt vendor, 166 A.L.R. 595.

Garage or parking lot as within tax exemption extended to property of educational, charitable, or hospital organizations, 33 A.L.R.3d 938.

Homes for the aged as exempt from property taxation, 37 A.L.R.3d 565.

Receipt of pay from beneficiaries as affecting tax exemption of charitable institutions, 37 A.L.R.3d 1191.

Prospective use for tax-exempt purposes as entitling property to tax exemption, 54 A.L.R.3d 9.

Availability of tax exemption to property held on lease from exempt owner, 54 A.L.R.3d 402.

Qualification of health care entities for federal tax exemption as charitable organization under 26 USCS § 501(c)(3), 134 A.L.R. Fed 395.