Effect of Act not providing for enumerated exemptions.

- Failure of an Act providing for a general tax, ad valorem on all property, to make any reference to the property permanently exempted from taxation by this statute, does not render the Act unconstitutional or make such property taxable thereunder. Blount v. Munroe, 60 Ga. 61 (1878).

Exemptions strictly construed and must follow intent of General Assembly.

- Exemptions from taxation must be strictly construed, and an exemption will not be held to be conferred unless the terms under which the exemption is granted clearly and distinctly show that such was the intention of the General Assembly. Gold Kist, Inc. v. Jones, 231 Ga. 881, 204 S.E.2d 584 (1974).

Construction following 2007 amendment.

- In order for an institution to be granted a property tax exemption pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(4), the institution must satisfy certain factors (the owner must be an institution devoted entirely to charitable pursuits, the charitable pursuits of the owner must be for the benefit of the public, and the use of the property must be exclusively devoted to those charitable pursuits) and O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41 because the General Assembly must have intended to allow those institutions that otherwise qualify as a purely public charity to use their property to raise income from activities that are not necessarily charitable in nature so long as the primary purpose of the property was charitable and any income is used exclusively for the operation of that charitable institution, O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(d)(1), (2); when the General Assembly passed the 2007 amendment, the General Assembly did not intend a change to the effect of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(d)(2) but only sought to make clear that, in order to be granted an exemption, any charitable institution must be otherwise qualified as a purely public charity, which includes meeting the requirement that the property be used exclusively for the charitable pursuits of the institution, and the 2007 amendment does not effect a change to existing law since a charitable institution, even before the 2007 amendment, had to qualify as a purely public charity under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(4) because, according to the statutory terms, O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(d)(2) would not even apply unless the former provision was first satisfied. Nuci Phillips Mem. Found. v. Athens-Clarke County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 288 Ga. 380, 703 S.E.2d 648 (2010).

Statute is to be strictly construed. Brenau Ass'n v. Harbison, 120 Ga. 929, 48 S.E. 363, 1 Ann. Cas. 836 (1904); Mayor of Gainesville v. Brenau College, 150 Ga. 156, 103 S.E. 164 (1920).

Since taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception, tax exemptions are to be strictly construed. Leggett v. Macon Baptist Ass'n, 232 Ga. 27, 205 S.E.2d 197 (1974).

All exemptions from taxation must be strictly construed in favor of taxing authorities and against the taxpayer. Collins v. Mills, 198 Ga. 18, 30 S.E.2d 866 (1944); Presbyterian Ctr., Inc. v. Henson, 221 Ga. 750, 146 S.E.2d 903 (1966); Johnson v. Wormsloe Found., Inc., 228 Ga. 722, 187 S.E.2d 682 (1972); Annandale at Suwanee, Inc. v. Gwinnett County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 242 Ga. 241, 248 S.E.2d 640 (1978).

Exemptions not to be unreasonably construed.

- While it is the rule that all grants of exemption from taxation must be strictly construed in favor of the state, and that nothing passes by implication, this rule must not be pushed to unreasonableness. Roberts v. Atlanta Baptist Ass'n, 240 Ga. 503, 241 S.E.2d 224 (1978).

Requirements of subsections (c) and (d) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41 must also be complied with by any institution that qualifies under paragraph (a)(4) as an institution of purely public charity in order to entitle that institution to exemption from ad valorem taxation. York Rite Bodies v. Board of Equalization, 261 Ga. 558, 408 S.E.2d 699 (1991).

Property not exempt during renovation.

- Given the statutory language, binding precedents interpreting that language, and governing principles applicable when discerning entitlement to tax exemptions, the court was without authority to effectively expand upon the reaches of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(4). The organization's cited "use" of the property during the property's renovation did not bring the property within the ambit of § 48-5-41(a)(4). H.O.P.E. Through Divine Interventions, Inc. v. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 318 Ga. App. 592, 734 S.E.2d 288 (2012).

Until property gets into form of enumerated items or articles, no exemption obtains. Trustees of Academy v. Bohler, 80 Ga. 159, 7 S.E. 633 (1887).

Exemption is not release in personam, but in rem, and the res to which the release applies must be found and identified by the officer, or no exemption can be recognized. Trustees of Academy v. Bohler, 80 Ga. 159, 7 S.E. 633 (1887).

Reviewing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

- Reviewing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider value and uniformity in an appeal of a decision of the Hall County Board of Equalization (BOE) as a hospital did not present those issues in the underlying administrative tax case, which was limited to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(5), and its application; further, as there was no Hall County Board of Tax Assessors decision concerning value and uniformity that could have been appealed to the BOE, there was no appeal to the BOE on those issues that could have been waived by mutual agreement and initiated, instead, in the reviewing court under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(1). Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Northeast Ga. Health Sys., 317 Ga. App. 389, 730 S.E.2d 715 (2012).

It is the use made of private property which renders the property exempt or nonexempt, and not the purchase and sale thereof. Georgia Mausoleum Co. v. City of Dublin, 147 Ga. 652, 95 S.E. 233 (1918).

Use of income derived from private property is not determinative of the property's exempt status. Trustees of Academy v. Bohler, 80 Ga. 159, 7 S.E. 633 (1887); Massenburg v. Grand Lodge, F. & A.M., 81 Ga. 212, 7 S.E. 636 (1888); Mundy v. Van Hoose, 104 Ga. 292, 30 S.E. 783 (1898).

It is not the declared purpose of incorporation which determines whether corporate property is exempt. Baggett v. Georgia Conference Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 157 Ga. 488, 121 S.E. 838 (1924).

Extent of land exempted.

- Buildings which are exempt from taxation under this statute embrace the land upon which such buildings are located and the land adjacent thereto necessary for their proper use. Mayor of Gainesville v. Brenau College, 150 Ga. 156, 103 S.E. 164 (1920); Hurlbutt Farm v. Medders, 157 Ga. 258, 121 S.E. 321 (1924); Baggett v. Georgia Conference Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 157 Ga. 488, 121 S.E. 838 (1924).

Scheme of exemption as to other than public property seems to be this: to exempt all that is used immediately and directly as a part of the establishment in the conduct of the regular business there carried on, but not such as may be devoted to other uses, such as farming, merchandising, manufacturing, etc., and from which profit or income is derived. Trustees of Academy v. Bohler, 80 Ga. 159, 163, 7 S.E. 633 (1887).

Municipal bonds.

- Bonds issued by a municipal corporation of this state, as evidence of a loan made to it, are instrumentalities of the government which creates the municipal corporation and are not taxable by this state or any county thereof while in the hands of a resident of this state. Penick v. Foster, 129 Ga. 217, 58 S.E. 773, 12 L.R.A. 1159, 12 Ann. Cas. 346 (1907).

City not entitled to exemption.

- When real property owned by a tax-exempt development authority was sold to a city, the city was not entitled to piggyback onto the authority's exemption; furthermore, the city's lease of the property to another city was not a governmental purpose under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41, as there was nothing in the record to indicate that the city entered into the lease in anything other than the city's proprietary capacity, and the lease was a profit-generating undertaking for the city. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. City of Atlanta, 286 Ga. App. 193, 648 S.E.2d 701 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1645, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 111 (Ga. 2008); overruled on other grounds by Gilmer County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Spence, 309 Ga. App. 482, 711 S.E.2d 51 (2011).

In a declaration suit, a city was properly determined not to be a local authority as that term is used in O.C.G.A. § 48-13-13(5) and, thus, was subject to the levy of occupation taxes by another municipality for the city's proprietary operations at the city's airport, which was in the other municipality's city limits, because the terms local authority and municipality were not the same under the statute. City of Atlanta v. City of College Park, 292 Ga. 741, 741 S.E.2d 147 (2013).

Burden of proving a tax exemption under this statute is on party seeking exemption. See Thomas v. Northeast Ga. Council, Inc. BSA, 241 Ga. 291, 244 S.E.2d 842 (1978).

Trial court's determination that a county board of tax assessors did not have to prove the board's assessment on a ministry's property by a preponderance of the evidence, under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(c), was proper as the appellate procedure for assessments was based on both O.C.G.A. §§ 48-5-41 and48-5-311(c), which were read in pari materia; under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41, the ministry which was seeking the exemption had the burden of proof to show its entitlement, and the board had the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that its assessment was correct under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(c). Lamad Ministries, Inc. v. Dougherty County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 268 Ga. App. 798, 602 S.E.2d 845 (2004).

Whether property is subject to execution of judgment depends on whether subject to taxation.

- It has been held that since the public welfare is a dominant consideration as to both exemption from taxation and immunity from suit, and since it is the prerogative of the legislature to declare the policy of the state touching the general welfare, the test as to whether property is subject to execution of a judgment is whether the property is subject to taxation. Mack v. Big Bethel A.M.E. Church, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 713, 188 S.E.2d 915 (1972).

Mandamus for levy in case of illegal exemption.

- If there has been an illegal exemption, and a refusal to levy, the levy may be compelled by mandamus. Ford v. Mayor of Cartersville, 84 Ga. 213, 10 S.E. 732 (1890).

Attorney's law library.

- An attorney's law library, which is maintained in connection with the practice of his or her profession, is not exempted from ad valorem taxation by Georgia's constitution, nor is the attorney's library exempted by any legislation enacted pursuant to the constitution. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. King, 260 Ga. 495, 397 S.E.2d 293 (1990).

Lending money to partnership is not charity.

- Because an owner gave a limited partnership - in which an entity controlled by the owner had a nominal interest - a loan that was not expected to be repaid, the loan did not serve a charitable purpose and violated the owner's articles of incorporation; therefore, the owner was not entitled to an ad valorem tax exemption under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(4). P'ship Hous. Affordable to Soc'y Everywhere, Inc. v. Decatur County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 312 Ga. App. 663, 719 S.E.2d 556 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0523, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 667 (Ga. 2012).

Collateral estoppel.

- Collateral estoppel prevented redundant litigation of the same question of a statute's application to a taxpayer's status; an earlier decision finding that an owner's real property was exempt from ad valorem taxes barred relitigation of the owner's tax exempt status. Davis v. Birdsong, 275 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1960).

Cited in Teachers Retirement Sys. v. City of Atlanta, 249 Ga. 196, 288 S.E.2d 200 (1982); J.A.T.T. Title Holding Corp. v. Roberts, 173 Ga. App. 902, 328 S.E.2d 770 (1985); Marathon Inv. Corp. v. Spinkston, 281 Ga. 888, 644 S.E.2d 133 (2007); Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. City of Atlanta, 299 Ga. App. 233, 682 S.E.2d 328 (2009).

Purpose of exemption.

- Public property is not subject to taxation. This immunity rests upon the most fundamental principles of government; being necessary, that the functions of government be not unduly impeded, and that the government be not forced into the inconsistency of taxing itself in order to raise money to pay over to itself. Penick v. Foster, 129 Ga. 217, 58 S.E. 773, 12 L.R.A. 1159, 12 Ann. Cas. 346 (1907); State v. Western & A.R.R., 136 Ga. 619, 71 S.E. 1055 (1911).

What constitutes public property.

- "Public property," in the sense it is used in the provision for rendering property exempt, means property belonging to the state, or the political divisions thereof, such as counties, cities, towns, and the like. Mundy v. Van Hoose, 104 Ga. 292, 30 S.E. 783 (1898).

Public property embraces only such property as is owned by the state or some political division thereof, and title to which is vested directly in the state or one of the state's subordinate political divisions, or in some person holding exclusively for the benefit of the state or subordinate public corporation. Board of Trustees v. City of Atlanta, 113 Ga. 883, 39 S.E. 394, 54 L.R.A. 806 (1901); Culbreth v. Southwest Ga. Regional Hous. Auth., 199 Ga. 183, 33 S.E.2d 684 (1945).

When property deemed dedicated to public use.

- Mere use of one's property by a small portion of the public, even for an extended period of time, will not amount to a dedication of the property to a public use, unless it appears clearly that there was an intention to dedicate and that this dedication was accepted by the public for public use. Johnson v. Wormsloe Found., Inc., 228 Ga. 722, 187 S.E.2d 682 (1972).

Showing of intent to dedicate to the public use.

- An intention on the part of the owner to dedicate the owner's property to the public use must be shown in order to claim a tax exemption, whether such dedication is express or implied. When an implied dedication is claimed, the facts relied on must be such as to clearly indicate a purpose on the part of the owner to abandon the owner's personal dominion over the property and to devote the property to a definite public use. Johnson v. Wormsloe Found., Inc., 228 Ga. 722, 187 S.E.2d 682 (1972).

Public property not taxed whether income derived or not.

- Proviso in paragraph (5) (see now subsection (c)) of this statute, which excludes property used for purposes of private or corporate profit or income, does not apply to public property. Public property is not taxed, whether income be derived from the property or not. Trustees of Academy v. City Council, 90 Ga. 634, 17 S.E. 61, 20 L.R.A. 151 (1892).

Total acreage owned by one political subdivision inside another.

- Tax exemption provided by subsection (a)(1)(B)(ii) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41 refers to total acreage owned by one political subdivision inside another, and not to the size of the individual tract of land under consideration. The total quantity of land owned within the territory must be aggregated for purposes of determining whether it amounts to 300 acres or less. City of Atlanta v. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 189 Ga. App. 50, 375 S.E.2d 75 (1988), cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 911, 375 S.E.2d 75 (1989).

Exemption of 300-acre parcels not an arbitrary classification.

- Exemption of 300 acres or less from the provision for taxation of public real property owned by a city outside the city's territorial limits is not an arbitrary classification of property for taxation, because the quantity of land held by a city in a county which contains no part of the city has a reasonable relationship to the right of the county to subject the land to taxation. Since the finances of a county could be adversely affected by large quantities of tax exempt land within the county's boundaries, there must be some limit of acreage in order to distinguish a smaller tract from a larger tract, and consequently, such a classification does not offend Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. II). City of Atlanta v. Spence, 242 Ga. 194, 249 S.E.2d 554 (1978).

Leasehold estate severed from a fee in public property can be taxed. See Delta Air Lines v. Coleman, 219 Ga. 12, 131 S.E.2d 768, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 904, 84 S. Ct. 195, 11 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1963), for comment see 26 Ga. B.J. 201 (1963).

Lease of property in public airport.

- Operation of central food and beverage commissary to furnish concessionaires open to the public within airport complex constituted a use of property for public purposes and was exempt from taxation. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. City of Atlanta, 164 Ga. App. 864, 298 S.E.2d 544 (1982).

Public airport property leased to corporation, which property was used for provision of inflight meals, was subject to taxation where provisions of lease did not preserve the public's "rightful, equal, and uniform use" of the property as required by O.C.G.A. § 6-3-25. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. City of Atlanta, 164 Ga. App. 864, 298 S.E.2d 544 (1982).

Expansion of city airport.

- Parcel of land purchased by a city as part of a carefully orchestrated, governmentally approved plan to expand the city's airport was exempt from ad valorem taxation, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(1)(B), despite little activity on that particular parcel; the parcel should be considered a part of all of the land in conjunction with the airport since 25 percent of the airport was developed and contained facilities used for public purposes. City of Atlanta v. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 284 Ga. App. 871, 645 S.E.2d 42 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 708 (Ga. 2007); overruled on other grounds by Gilmer County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Spence, 309 Ga. App. 482, 711 S.E.2d 51 (2011).

Property leased to airline for airport facilities was public use.

- Five parcels of property at a city-owned airport that were leased to an airline and used for hangars, flight kitchens, and air cargo were reasonably and uniformly used for the public convenience and welfare to facilitate the effective operation of the airport, and were therefore exempt from ad valorem taxation under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(1)(B)(i). City of Atlanta v. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 306 Ga. App. 381, 702 S.E.2d 704 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0342, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 222 (Ga. 2011); overruled on other grounds by Gilmer County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Spence, 309 Ga. App. 482, 711 S.E.2d 51 (2011).

Public nature of authorities.

- No private interest exists in the property of an authority. The members thereof may not use the property for private gain or income. An authority holds title only for the benefit of the state and the public, and an authority is an instrumentality of the state or a subordinate public authority or corporation of the state. Hospital Auth. v. Stewart, 226 Ga. 530, 175 S.E.2d 857 (1970).

Hospital authority's leasehold interest in retirement facility was exempt.

- Hospital authority's leasehold interest in a continuing care retirement facility was public property exempt from ad valorem taxation under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(1); an earlier, unappealed superior court bond validation order found that it was a public project within the scope of the Hospital Authorities Law, O.C.G.A. § 31-7-70 et seq., and this finding was final and binding. Columbus, Ga. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Medical Ctr. Hosp. Auth., 338 Ga. App. 302, 788 S.E.2d 879 (2016).

Property held by a hospital authority is public property.

- Property, the title to which is held directly by a hospital authority, is public property and, therefore, exempt from ad valorem taxation. Hospital Auth. v. Stewart, 122 Ga. App. 497, 177 S.E.2d 270 (1970).

Effect of legal title vested in a trustee for the authority.

- That legal title to property is vested in a trustee for a hospital authority does not deprive the property of the property's tax-exempt status. Hospital Auth. v. Stewart, 122 Ga. App. 497, 177 S.E.2d 270 (1970).

Nonprofit hospital need not meet the definition of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-40(5) before the hospital can qualify for an exemption under paragraph (a)(5) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41, since nonprofit hospitals qualifying under subsection (a)(5) are not a subclass wholly subsumed by the definition in § 48-5-40(5). Douglas County v. Anneewakee, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 270, 346 S.E.2d 368 (1986).

Fact that the children accepted by a psychiatric care hospital had to meet certain requirements before the children were eligible to be admitted and, thus, the facility was not open to the whole public, did not disqualify the hospital from tax exempt status since it was uncontroverted that the hospital was open to the whole of the classes for whose relief the hospital was intended or adapted. Douglas County v. Anneewakee, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 270, 346 S.E.2d 368 (1986).

Building and stock of liquors owned by municipal corporation and operated by the corporation as a dispensary are "public property" within the meaning of this statute and, as such, are exempt from taxation. This is so although the town has no legal authority to maintain and operate a dispensary. Walden v. Town of Whigham, 120 Ga. 646, 48 S.E. 159 (1904).

Armory.

- Armory "owned" and occupied by a command of the volunteer military forces of the state is not within the exemption. Board of Trustees v. City of Atlanta, 113 Ga. 883, 39 S.E. 394, 54 L.R.A. 806 (1901).

Motor vehicle registration fee not considered tax on public property.

- License fee provided for in the motor vehicle registration law is nothing more than a license fee and is not in essence a revenue raising measure, and, therefore, does not amount to the levying of a tax against public property. Burkett v. State, 198 Ga. 747, 32 S.E.2d 797 (1945).

Construction of term "religious worship."

- Words "religious worship" import a concept of a congregation assembling in a place open to the public to honor the Deity through reverance and homage. Leggett v. Macon Baptist Ass'n, 232 Ga. 27, 205 S.E.2d 197 (1974).

Unorthodoxy will not serve to disqualify a religious group from tax exemption, as long as the group holds a sincere and meaningful belief in God occupying in the life of its possessors a place parallel to that occupied by God in traditional religions, and dedicates itself to the practice of that belief. Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca, 249 Ga. 348, 292 S.E.2d 657 (1982).

What constitutes a place of religious worship.

- A building is not necessary for a place to qualify as a place of worship. Neither is it necessary for a complete congregation to hold regularly scheduled services at one location. All one must show is that the property is used exclusively as a "place of religious worship." Columbus, Ga., By Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Outreach For Christ, Inc., 241 Ga. 2, 243 S.E.2d 42 (1978) disapproved to the extent that it suggests that property must be used exclusively, rather than primarily, for religious worship in order to qualify for tax exemption, Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca, 249 Ga. 348, 292 S.E.2d 657 (1982).

A place of public worship is not necessarily a church, nor is the term synonymous with a church. In the connection in which the words are used, the words mean the gathering of individuals for public worship, at whatever place the individuals may be, whether in the open air, under a tent, beneath an arbor, in a warehouse, and sometimes in an opera house. Roberts v. Atlanta Baptist Ass'n, 240 Ga. 503, 241 S.E.2d 224 (1978).

Mere absence of some element of worship does not, alone or automatically, negative the place as a place of religious worship. Roberts v. Atlanta Baptist Ass'n, 240 Ga. 503, 241 S.E.2d 224 (1978).

Only church properties enumerated in this statute are exempt from taxes, and all references to income relate solely to such exempted property. Church of God of Union Ass'y, Inc. v. City of Dalton, 216 Ga. 659, 119 S.E.2d 11 (1961).

Primary use of property determines exempt status.

- In applying the exemption authorized by Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I-IV) and former Code 1933, § 92-201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41) to the facts in the individual case, the court must look to the use of the property, not merely the property's ownership, and must also look to the primary use of the property to determine whether the property is exempt from taxation. Leggett v. Macon Baptist Ass'n, 232 Ga. 27, 205 S.E.2d 197 (1974).

Trial court's determination that a ministry was not entitled to the "place of religious worship" and "property owned and operated exclusively by a church" exemptions under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41 was clearly erroneous as the trial court should have made a separate determination of exemption as to those portions of the ministry's property that were used primarily for a home for the elderly from those parts of the parcels of property which were primarily used as a place of religious worship; the exemption for a "place of religious worship" depended upon the primary purposes for which that property was used, which was shown to be within the exemption. Lamad Ministries, Inc. v. Dougherty County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 268 Ga. App. 798, 602 S.E.2d 845 (2004).

Use of property, not ownership, determines exemption status.

- Court of Appeals of Georgia finds no statutory requirement that the owner be the user of the property when dealing with a place of religious worship tax exemption; rather, it is the use of the property that governs the analysis of religious worship tax exemptions. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, Inc., 320 Ga. App. 312, 739 S.E.2d 764 (2013).

Trial court properly granted a property owner summary judgment because the non-cemetery portion of the property at issue qualified for a religious tax exemption under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(2.1)(A) since no profit was realized from the lease of the property to another religious non-profit corporation. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, Inc., 320 Ga. App. 312, 739 S.E.2d 764 (2013).

Recreational facilities on land used for religious worship.

- Land owned by a religious association was exempt from taxation as a place of religious worship, since, although recreational facilities on the property were secular in nature and fees were charged for their use, such use was shown to be intimately connected and intertwined with the religious activities to which the property was primarily dedicated. Pickens County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Atlanta Baptist Ass'n, 191 Ga. App. 260, 381 S.E.2d 419 (1989).

Exemption of property used primarily for profit or purposes other than operation of institution.

- When church property is used primarily for either profit or purposes other than the operation of the institution, that property is not exempt from taxes. The fact that the property is used to make profit which will in turn be given or used by the church for church purposes in no degree confers tax exemption thereupon. Church of God of Union Ass'y, Inc. v. City of Dalton, 216 Ga. 659, 119 S.E.2d 11 (1961).

Exemption primarily applies to buildings where public religious services are held.

- Exemptions from taxation of places of religious worship, unless stated otherwise, are intended primarily to apply to buildings where congregations come together in a public forum for religious services. Leggett v. Macon Baptist Ass'n, 232 Ga. 27, 205 S.E.2d 197 (1974).

When only a portion of a building is used for tax-exempt purpose, comparative value of portion used for tax-exempt purpose should be distinguished from remainder, with only that part used for tax-exempt purpose being spared taxation. Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca, 249 Ga. 348, 292 S.E.2d 657 (1982).

Fact that residents of place of religious worship are charged a rental toward operating expenses does not destroy the religious nature of an otherwise religious institution. Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca, 249 Ga. 348, 292 S.E.2d 657 (1982).

Test of whether requirements for exemption met.

- Church falls squarely within statutory and constitutional exemptions when no dividends, income, or profits have been, or will be, distributable for profit or personal gain, since the property upon which the execution has been levied is a place of religious worship, used in maintaining and operating a church, since the income derived therefrom is used exclusively for religious purposes, and since the primary purpose of such real estate is not that of securing an income thereon, but of providing a meeting place and quarters for members of affiliate churches. Church of God v. City of Dalton, 213 Ga. 76, 97 S.E.2d 132 (1957), later appeal, 216 Ga. 659, 119 S.E.2d 11 (1961).

What constitutes real property used for profit.

- Real property owned for profit by a church such as: (1) apartment buildings leased for rent by church; (2) property formerly used as a dining hall but now as an apartment rented to a widow who sometimes pays rent; and (3) lot and dwelling house rented sometimes to a widow who pays rent when the widow can is not exempt from taxation. Church of God of Union Ass'y, Inc. v. City of Dalton, 216 Ga. 659, 119 S.E.2d 11 (1961).

City is authorized to impose sanitary service charges upon places of public worship because such charges are not within the exemption of this statute for places of religious worship. First Pentecostal Church v. City of Atlanta, 144 Ga. App. 718, 242 S.E.2d 357 (1978).

Exemption from assessments.

- Property occupied by a church and used solely for church purposes is not exempt from payment of local street improvement assessments. City of Atlanta v. First Presbyterian Church, 86 Ga. 730, 13 S.E. 252, 12 L.R.A. 852 (1891).

Rental of church parking lot did not qualify for tax exempt status.

- Grant of summary judgment was affirmed because the parking lot lease agreement and its impact upon the church's use of the property supported the conclusion that the property was real estate rented, leased, or otherwise used for the primary purpose of securing an income thereon as contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(d)(1). First Congregational Church v. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 320 Ga. App. 868, 740 S.E.2d 798 (2013).

Property to which exemptions for cemeteries is applicable.

- Exemption accorded to cemetery lands may extend to all property used or held exclusively for the burial of the dead or for the care, maintenance, or upkeep of such property, and ordinarily applies to a columbarium, crematory, mausoleum or unsold lots, crypts, or niches, and covers permanent improvements placed on the land and necessary to the land's use as a burying ground. City of Atlanta v. Crest Lawn Mem. Park Corp., 218 Ga. 497, 128 S.E.2d 722 (1962).

There is a distinction between those structures in which bodies are prepared for burial, and buildings necessary for the administration of the cemetery and maintenance of the burying grounds. The latter are exempt from taxation. City of Atlanta v. Crest Lawn Mem. Park Corp., 218 Ga. 497, 128 S.E.2d 722 (1962).

Tombs or crypts in mausoleum, owned by a private corporation, having no value except for burial purposes, cannot be used for purposes of private or corporate profit or income, and are exempt from taxation, together with the ground where located. Georgia Mausoleum Co. v. City of Dublin, 147 Ga. 652, 95 S.E. 233 (1918).

Exemption of area of cemetery tract for future needs.

- When the evidence indicated that the number of burials was increasing each year, and that the undeveloped area of cemetery tract was not disproportionate to the future needs of the area from which the burials were made, the trial judge did not err in holding that the undeveloped portion of the area was exempt from taxation. City of Atlanta v. Crest Lawn Mem. Park Corp., 218 Ga. 497, 128 S.E.2d 722 (1962).

Taxes to which exemptions applicable.

- Unless the assessment is for general revenue purposes, it is not a tax for which the law grants an exemption to places of religious worship or burial. Crestlawn Mem. Park v. City of Atlanta, 235 Ga. 194, 219 S.E.2d 122 (1975).

Special assessments not for revenue purposes are radically different from ad valorem taxes, and are not taxes within the meaning of the Constitution of Georgia. Crestlawn Mem. Park v. City of Atlanta, 235 Ga. 194, 219 S.E.2d 122 (1975).

Sanitary service charge assessments levied by a city upon cemetery property are not taxes as contemplated by this statute. Crestlawn Mem. Park v. City of Atlanta, 235 Ga. 194, 219 S.E.2d 122 (1975).

Preservation of a historical site in a tract of land dedicated to burial purposes would not change the land's character as a place of burial. City of Atlanta v. Crest Lawn Mem. Park Corp., 218 Ga. 497, 128 S.E.2d 722 (1962).

Exemption when deed restricts use but land reserved for future use.

- Under Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I-IV) and former Code 1933, § 92-201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41) exempting "places of burial" from taxation, land acquired by a cemetery corporation under a deed containing a restriction that the land was to be used as a cemetery for human beings and for no other purpose was, under the facts stipulated, exempt from taxation, despite the fact that the land in question was being reserved for future needs. Suttles v. Hill Crest Cem., 87 Ga. App. 343, 73 S.E.2d 760 (1952).

Constitutional restrictions on exemption of institutions of charity.

- Constitution of Georgia restricts tax exemption of institutions of charity to those and those only that are purely charity and also that are public charity. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp. v. Alford, 217 Ga. 663, 124 S.E.2d 402 (1962).

Scope of term "charity."

- "Charity," as used in this statute, is not restricted to the relief of the sick or indigent, but extends to other forms of philanthropy or public beneficence, such as practical enterprises for the good of humanity, operated at moderate cost to the beneficiaries, or enterprises operated for the general improvement and happiness of mankind. Tharpe v. Central Ga. Council of BSA, 185 Ga. 810, 196 S.E. 762 (1938); Peachtree on Peachtree Inn, Inc. v. Camp, 120 Ga. App. 403, 170 S.E.2d 709 (1969); Central Bd. on Care of Jewish Aged, Inc. v. Henson, 120 Ga. App. 627, 171 S.E.2d 747 (1969).

A familiar meaning of the word "charity" is almsgiving, but as used in the law it may include substantially any scheme or effort to better the condition of society or any considerable part of society. Tharpe v. Central Ga. Council of BSA, 185 Ga. 810, 196 S.E. 762 (1938); Peachtree on Peachtree Inn, Inc. v. Camp, 120 Ga. App. 403, 170 S.E.2d 709 (1969); Central Bd. on Care of Jewish Aged, Inc. v. Henson, 120 Ga. App. 627, 171 S.E.2d 747 (1969).

Term "charity" used in this statute is to be construed in the statutes broad sense. The meaning includes substantially any scheme or effort to better the condition of society or any considerable part thereof. Camp v. Fulton County Medical Soc'y, 219 Ga. 602, 135 S.E.2d 277 (1964).

What constitutes charitable institution generally.

- Hospitals, almshouses, asylums for the insane, for the deaf and dumb, or the blind, orphan asylums, homes of various kinds, souphouses, etc., permanently established and open, without charge, to the whole public, or to the whole of the classes for whose relief they are intended or adapted, are institutions of the exempt order, irrespective of their ownership, and without regard to whether they have behind them, or connected with them, any institution in the personal or ideal sense of the term, or not. Trustees of Academy v. Bohler, 80 Ga. 159, 161, 7 S.E. 633 (1887).

In determining whether property qualifies for exemption as an institution of "purely public charity" as set forth in paragraph (a)(4) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41, three factors must be considered and must coexist. First, the owner must be an institution devoted entirely to charitable pursuits; second, the charitable pursuits of the owner must be for the benefit of the public; and, third, the use of the property must be exclusively devoted to those charitable pursuits. York Rite Bodies v. Board of Equalization, 261 Ga. 558, 408 S.E.2d 699 (1991).

That the owner of property is a nonprofit institution, that its charter declares it to be a charitable institution, and that the institution serves a benevolent purpose does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the institution is exempted from ad valorem taxation by paragraph (a)(4) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41. The facts of each case must be viewed as a whole and all of the circumstances surrounding the institution must be considered. York Rite Bodies v. Board of Equalization, 261 Ga. 558, 408 S.E.2d 699 (1991).

Charitable nature of institutions for the elderly.

- Concept of charity is not confined to relief of the needy and destitute, for aged people require care and attention apart from financial assistance, and the supply of this care and attention is as much a charitable and benevolent purpose as the relief of their financial wants. Peachtree on Peachtree Inn, Inc. v. Camp, 120 Ga. App. 403, 170 S.E.2d 709 (1969); Central Bd. on Care of Jewish Aged, Inc. v. Henson, 120 Ga. App. 627, 171 S.E.2d 747 (1969).

Nonprofit charitable institution's independent-living units for the elderly were entitled to share the institution's longstanding tax exemption as a home for the aged because: (1) the institution was clearly a nonprofit home for the aged, which was defined in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-40(2) as a facility which provides residential services, health care services, or both residential services and health care services to the aged; (2) the institution had neither stockholders nor distributed income to private persons, was subject to Georgia laws regulating nonprofit and charitable corporations, and had been determined to be a tax-exempt organization under both federal and Georgia law; (3) the institution was a charitable one because supplying care for aged people was a charitable and benevolent purpose; and (4) the independent-living units were not held by the institution primarily for investment purposes. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Baptist Vill., Inc., 269 Ga. App. 848, 605 S.E.2d 436 (2004).

"Charity" is broad enough to include use of property by Boy Scouts.

- Word "charity," as used in former Code 1933, § 92-201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41), and in Ga. Const. 1877, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. II (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I-IV) was broad enough to include the use of property by the Boy Scout organization. Tharpe v. Central Ga. Council of BSA, 185 Ga. 810, 196 S.E. 762 (1938).

An institution may be public even though the institution is not open to the whole public, if the institution is open to the whole of the classes for whose relief the institution is intended or adapted. Tharpe v. Central Ga. Council of BSA, 185 Ga. 810, 196 S.E. 762 (1938); Peachtree on Peachtree Inn, Inc. v. Camp, 120 Ga. App. 403, 170 S.E.2d 709 (1969); Central Bd. on Care of Jewish Aged, Inc. v. Henson, 120 Ga. App. 627, 171 S.E.2d 747 (1969).

Benevolent purpose alone insufficient.

- An institution which serves a benevolent purpose is not necessarily a purely public charity. In order for an institution to qualify as a charitable institution for tax exemption under this statute, it must have as the institution's sole purpose and activity the dispensing of public charity. Camp v. Fulton County Medical Soc'y, 219 Ga. 602, 135 S.E.2d 277 (1964).

An institution which serves a benevolent purpose is not necessarily a purely public charity. Rabun Gap-Nacoochee Sch. v. Thomas, 228 Ga. 231, 184 S.E.2d 824 (1971); Georgia Congress of Parents & Teachers, Inc. v. Boynton, 239 Ga. 472, 238 S.E.2d 113 (1977).

What property and obligations of a charity are exempt.

- Property of an institution of purely public charity, and all debentures and revenue bonds issued by the institution, are exempt from all state and local taxation. Smith v. Hayes, 217 Ga. 94, 121 S.E.2d 113 (1961).

Test for charitable immunity from taxation is nature of source of income.

- Test for charitable immunity from suit is not the use to which the income is put, but the nature of the source from which the income is derived. This is the same test applied in determining the taxability of property. The scheme of exemption as to other than public property seems to be this: To exempt all that is used immediately and directly as a part of the establishment in the conduct of regular business there carried on, but not such as may be devoted to other uses, such as farming, merchandising, manufacturing, etc., and from which profit or income is derived. Mack v. Big Bethel A.M.E. Church, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 713, 188 S.E.2d 915 (1972).

Sufficiency of allegation that property is exempt as that of a purely public charity.

- Petition which alleges that property is dedicated to the education, uplift, and advancement of the early history of Atlanta, and is not used for any commercial purpose, fails to allege how the property is being used. In the absence of such allegation, the petition does not allege that the property is used for purely public charity, and fails to state a cause of action for exemption from taxation. Historic House Museum Corp. v. Camp, 223 Ga. 510, 156 S.E.2d 361 (1967).

Property must be dedicated to charity and used exclusively as such.

- Test for exemption as an institution of purely public charity under this statute is not whether the plaintiff is an organization of purely public charity, but whether the property itself is dedicated to charity and used exclusively as an institution of purely public charity. Mu Beta Chapter Chi Omega House Corp. v. Davison, 192 Ga. 124, 14 S.E.2d 744 (1941); Georgia Osteopathic Hosp. v. Alford, 217 Ga. 663, 124 S.E.2d 402 (1962); Historic House Museum Corp. v. Camp, 223 Ga. 510, 156 S.E.2d 361 (1967); Johnson v. Wormsloe Found., Inc., 228 Ga. 722, 187 S.E.2d 682 (1972).

No matter how high the ideals of an institution, nor how lofty the institution's purposes, in order to qualify as a charitable institution for tax purposes, the institution must have the sole purpose and activity of dispensing public charity. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations v. Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 236 Ga. App. 48, 510 S.E.2d 844 (1999).

When the plaintiff's primary purpose was to collect, analyze, and disseminate industry lessons learned based on highly confidential surveys, since there was not a single disinterested director on the board, since members paid dues, since the plaintiff's offices were restricted to members and their guests, and since the public was expressly excluded from meetings, the facts indicated that the plaintiff did not exist for the sole purpose and activity of dispensing purely public charity. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations v. Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 236 Ga. App. 48, 510 S.E.2d 844 (1999).

Nonexempt uses of property generally.

- When property is used primarily for either profit or purposes other than the operation of the institution, the property is generally not exempt from taxes. Leggett v. Macon Baptist Ass'n, 232 Ga. 27, 205 S.E.2d 197 (1974).

Income used for charitable purposes.

- Under the Constitution of Georgia, productive property is taxable, even though the income be used for charitable purposes. Atlanta Masonic Temple Co. v. City of Atlanta, 162 Ga. 244, 133 S.E. 864 (1926).

Insofar as charitable organizations are administrators and disbursers of purely public charity, their property permanently in use for that purpose is exempt from taxation. Richardson v. Executive Comm., 176 Ga. 705, 169 S.E. 18 (1933).

When charitable organizations are capitalists or proprietors engaged in acquiring money or effects to be disbursed, property of any and every kind from which their income is derived is subject to be taxed the same as property generally. Richardson v. Executive Comm., 176 Ga. 705, 169 S.E. 18 (1933).

Latent ownership of property as basis for exemption.

- Property owned by a charitable institution is not exempt from taxation unless the property is used for the purposes for which that institution was established. Mere latent ownership of property by an institution of public charity will not entitle the institution to an exemption in the absence of the required application of the property to the charitable goals of the owner. Thomas v. Northeast Ga. Council, Inc. BSA, 241 Ga. 291, 244 S.E.2d 842 (1978).

Mere latent ownership of property by an institution of public charity will not entitle the property to an exemption. York Rite Bodies v. Board of Equalization, 261 Ga. 558, 408 S.E.2d 699 (1991).

Property used to produce income to be expended in charity is not exempt since it is too remote from the ultimate charitable object. If property is allowed to be used as taxed property, it also is to be taxed. If the property competes in the common business and occupations of life with the property of other owners, the property must bear the tax which theirs bears, and the property is a noncharitable asset, not immune from execution of a judgment. Rabun Gap-Nacoochee Sch. v. Thomas, 228 Ga. 231, 184 S.E.2d 824 (1971); Mack v. Big Bethel A.M.E. Church, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 713, 188 S.E.2d 915 (1972).

Property used to produce income to be expended in charity is too remote from the ultimate charitable object to be exempt. Trustees of Academy v. Bohler, 80 Ga. 159, 164, 7 S.E. 633 (1887).

Lands held in trust to appropriate the annual product to the erection of a poorhouse and the support of its inmates forever are not exempt. The poorhouse, when erected, will be exempt, but not detached property from which its support is to be derived. Trustees of Academy v. Bohler, 80 Ga. 159, 7 S.E. 633 (1887).

Interpreting "private or corporate income" to mean any income which is not public, productive property used as capital to raise money to expend in charity is used for private income when the owner is a private individual, and for corporate income when the owner is a corporation. It is no more allowable under the Constitution of Georgia for a charitable association to accumulate money by the use of exempt property, which money is to be disbursed in charity, than it is for a common citizen to do it. Richardson v. Executive Comm., 176 Ga. 705, 169 S.E. 18 (1933).

Terms "private or corporate" are employed in contradistinction to "public."

- Public property is not taxed, whether income be derived from the property or not; but private or corporate property, though it be connected with the external, visible "institution," is not exempt if used for income, since the income from such property must, by reason of the property's ownership, be either private or corporate; these terms being comprehensive enough to include all income whatsoever that is not public. Richardson v. Executive Comm., 176 Ga. 705, 169 S.E. 18 (1933).

Exemption of property which produces incidental income from operation of institution.

- Provision that the exempt property not be used for purposes of private or corporate profit or income is not intended to destroy the exemption already granted when incidental income is derived from the operation of the charitable or educational institution. Richardson v. Executive Comm., 176 Ga. 705, 169 S.E. 18 (1933).

Exemption of property used partly for income-producing purposes.

- When the property of an institution of purely public charity is used partly for purposes of corporate income, the most that the corporation can claim is that the comparative value of the part used for income, and the part not so used, may be distinguished in making the institution's tax returns, and that the latter part by due apportionment of value, shall be spared from taxation. Massenburg v. Grand Lodge, F. & A.M, 81 Ga. 212, 7 S.E. 636 (1888); Hurlbutt Farm v. Medders, 157 Ga. 258, 121 S.E. 321 (1924).

When an institution is a purely public charity and meets the requirements of this statute, the portion of the institution's property which is being used as a home for the aged is tax exempt. However, if part of the building consists of two retail stores which are leased, that part would not be tax exempt, since the area where the stores are located is being used to gain rental and not for the primary purpose of operating the inn. Peachtree on Peachtree Inn, Inc. v. Camp, 120 Ga. App. 403, 170 S.E.2d 709 (1969).

Use of real estate as affecting exemption for taxes.

- "Used for the operation of such institution" means that the charitable institution itself must be carrying on an operation on the institution's real estate for the benefit of the public or for some other legitimate charitable purpose in order for such property to be exempt. Johnson v. Wormsloe Found., Inc., 228 Ga. 722, 187 S.E.2d 682 (1972).

Merely making real estate available to other public or charitable institutions for their use is not sufficient to qualify for the tax exemption. Instead, the use of the property must be exclusively devoted to conduct that benefits the public by furthering the charitable pursuits of the property's owner. York Rite Bodies v. Board of Equalization, 261 Ga. 558, 408 S.E.2d 699 (1991).

Income-producing real estate, not used directly in charitable activities, is a noncharitable asset and the defendant is liable to the extent of such noncharitable assets. Mack v. Big Bethel A.M.E. Church, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 713, 188 S.E.2d 915 (1972).

Exemption of real property furnished to other public or charitable institutions.

- Merely making real estate available to other public or charitable institutions for their use is not sufficient to qualify the property of a charitable institution for the tax exemption. Atlanta Masonic Temple Co. v. City of Atlanta, 162 Ga. 244, 133 S.E. 864 (1926); Johnson v. Wormsloe Found., Inc., 228 Ga. 722, 187 S.E.2d 682 (1972).

Use of property controls over declarations in charter in determining taxability.

- Use to which property is put, not the declaration of purpose in the property owner's charter, determines the question of exemption from taxation. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp. v. Alford, 217 Ga. 663, 124 S.E.2d 402 (1962); Georgia Congress of Parents & Teachers, Inc. v. Boynton, 239 Ga. 472, 238 S.E.2d 113 (1977).

No matter how high the ideals of an institution, nor how lofty the institution's purposes, in order for the institution to qualify as a charitable institution for tax exemption under paragraph (a)(4) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41, the institution must have the sole purpose and activity of dispensing public charity. York Rite Bodies v. Board of Equalization, 261 Ga. 558, 408 S.E.2d 699 (1991).

Character of a corporation, as disclosed by the corporation's charter provisions and other evidence, will be considered in determining whether the use of the property is such as to exempt the property from taxation. Tharpe v. Central Ga. Council of BSA, 185 Ga. 810, 196 S.E. 762 (1938).

Effect of declarations in charter and of nonprofit and noncommercial status.

- That the organization is nonprofit, is not used for commercial purposes, and the organization's charter declares the organization to be a charitable and benevolent institution, does not make the organization a charitable institution. Nor does the fact that the organization may serve a benevolent purpose make the organization such. Historic House Museum Corp. v. Camp, 223 Ga. 510, 156 S.E.2d 361 (1967).

Institution's efforts properly found not purely charitable.

- Such diffuse public benefit as promoting excellence and the highest safety standards within the commercial nuclear power industry was secondary to the immediate pecuniary benefit of the plaintiff's members, predominantly commercial suppliers, and their shareholders, in an industry generating $12 billion in net profits, and the superior court correctly determined that the plaintiff's efforts were not purely charitable. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations v. Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 236 Ga. App. 48, 510 S.E.2d 844 (1999).

Property of a private firefighting service was exempt as a "purely public charity." Chatham County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Southside Communities Fire Protection, Inc., 217 Ga. App. 361, 457 S.E.2d 267 (1995).

Exemption of hospital neither chartered as charity nor using property or income exclusively as such.

- When a hospital is not chartered as a purely public charity, and when the hospital's property is not put to use as purely public charity, and neither the hospital's income nor the hospital's surplus is used exclusively for purely public charity, the hospital does not bring itself within the strict requirements for the ad valorem tax exemption sought. St. Joseph Hosp. v. Bohler, 229 Ga. 577, 193 S.E.2d 603 (1972).

Tax exemption for health services corporation.

- When appellee health services corporation offered evidence that the corporation provided the corporation's services to all in need, not just to those who could pay and evidence that, while most patients had some source of funds, their needs often exceeded those sources, and they were treated as uncompensated patients, some evidence supported the jury's verdict that the corporation qualified for a tax exemption as an institution of "purely public charity" under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(4); thus, the appellant tax board's motions for a directed verdict against the corporation or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were properly denied. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Visiting Nurse Health Sys. of Metro. Atlanta, Inc., 256 Ga. App. 475, 568 S.E.2d 798 (2002).

That residents of an institution pay rent according to the residents' ability to pay does not destroy the charitable nature of the institution. Central Bd. on Care of Jewish Aged, Inc. v. Henson, 120 Ga. App. 627, 171 S.E.2d 747 (1969).

That residents of an inn for the elderly are charged rental toward operating expenses does not necessarily destroy the charitable nature of the institution, especially if payments made by the residents are insufficient to cover the direct operating expenses of the inn and all income is used for operation, maintenance, and enlarging the facilities, with no part of its income being distributed to any person with an interest therein. Peachtree on Peachtree Inn, Inc. v. Camp, 120 Ga. App. 403, 170 S.E.2d 709 (1969).

Effect of Act which expressly exempted hospitals of purely public charity.

- When, by enacting former Code 1933, § 92-201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41), the General Assembly exempted from taxation all of the property enumerated in Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I-IV) using the identical language there employed, it fully exhausted its constitutional power to make exemptions, and the amending Act, Ga. L. 1947, p. 1183, which expressly exempted from taxation all hospitals of purely public charity (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-40) added nothing to what the General Assembly had previously done by Ga. L. 1946, p. 12, § 1. Elder v. Henrietta Egleston Hosp. for Children, 205 Ga. 489, 53 S.E.2d 751 (1949) (commented on in 1 Mercer L. Rev. 111 (1949).

Hospital exempt when all income used for maintenance, operations, and furtherance of charitable purposes.

- When a hospital is organized for charitable purposes, and uses all of the hospital's income from all sources, including income from pay patients, exclusively for maintenance, operation, enlarging the hospital's charitable facilities, and for furtherance of the hospital's charitable purposes, with no part of the same distributable to anyone having an interest therein, it is exempt within the meaning of Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I-IV), an interpretation of that constitutional provision which accords with the intention of the framers of that document as shown in the Records of the Constitutional Commission 1943-1944, Vol. I, pp. 138-141, 388-395, 397, 528-531; Vol. II, pp. 58-59. Elder v. Henrietta Egleston Hosp. for Children, 205 Ga. 489, 53 S.E.2d 751 (1949), (commented on in 1 Mercer L. Rev. 111 (1949).

Home for mentally handicapped when private donations only a small percentage of income held not exempt.

- Since over 70 percent of the operating costs of a home for mentally handicapped persons comes from the government or client fees, and private donations account for only 15 percent of the expenditures of the home, and since the families or residents or government agencies pay monthly fees on behalf of each resident, it is not sufficiently "public" in nature to be considered an institution of purely public charity. Annandale at Suwanee, Inc. v. Gwinnett County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 242 Ga. 241, 248 S.E.2d 640 (1978).

Exempt status of hospital when proportion of paying patients vastly greater than charitable patients.

- When a hospital receives charitable patients without pay but the hospital also charges for patients able to pay, the proportion being vastly in favor of the latter, the property in question is used for corporate income, and is not exempted from taxation. Richardson v. Executive Comm., 176 Ga. 705, 169 S.E. 18 (1933).

Hospital which collects some patient fees and charges off uncollectable bills to charity held not exempt.

- When a hospital is operated generally for profit, and while there is some evidence that the hospital does on occasion treat indigent patients, the general practice of the institution is to collect all that the institution can from the institution's patients, and only charge off as charity those bills the institution is unable to collect, the hospital is engaged principally for noncharitable purposes and apparently chiefly for the benefit of the institution's staff, and is not exempt from taxation. Central Bd. on Georgia Osteopathic Hosp. v. Alford, 217 Ga. 663, 124 S.E.2d 402 (1962).

For a nursing home to be tax exempt, the nursing home must be purely charitable and public. Central Bd. on Care of Jewish Aged, Inc. v. Henson, 120 Ga. App. 627, 171 S.E.2d 747 (1969).

Charges paid by Boy Scouts do not destroy charitable nature of that organization.

- Under Georgia decisions, the fact that Boy Scouts are charged a sum sufficient only to pay for their food does not destroy the charitable nature of the institution nor prevent its exemption. Tharpe v. Central Ga. Council of BSA, 185 Ga. 810, 196 S.E. 762 (1938).

Exemption of a headquarters facility available only to dues-paying members.

- Use made of property sought to be exempt from ad valorem taxes is not such as could be said to be "purely public" charitable use when the property is a headquarters available only to those who pay dues. Georgia Congress of Parents & Teachers, Inc. v. Boynton, 239 Ga. 472, 238 S.E.2d 113 (1977).

Legislative intent as to religious groups or institutions.

- General Assembly did not intend that religious groups or institutions be considered charitable institutions for the purpose of this exemption. Presbyterian Ctr., Inc. v. Henson, 221 Ga. 750, 146 S.E.2d 903 (1966).

Although religious institutions are, for some purposes, considered to be matters of charity, religious institutions are not necessarily considered such for all purposes, and the word "charity" itself is given a narrower meaning in tax exemption cases. Presbyterian Ctr., Inc. v. Henson, 221 Ga. 750, 146 S.E.2d 903 (1966).

Since this statute elsewhere specifically exempts certain property owned by a seminary of learning and then exempts "all institutions of purely public charity," it appears that it was the intention of the drafters of the Constitution of Georgia that a seminary of learning not be considered as an institution of purely public charity for the purpose of this exemption. Rabun Gap-Nacoochee Sch. v. Thomas, 228 Ga. 231, 184 S.E.2d 824 (1971).

Masons not qualified.

- Although the Masons serve a benevolent purpose and pursue many public charities, because many of their activities and resources are used exclusively for the personal benefit of their group, it cannot be said that the group has the sole purpose and activity of dispensing public charity so as to qualify as a charitable institution for tax exemption under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(4). Board of Equalization v. York Rite Bodies of Freemasonry, 209 Ga. App. 359, 433 S.E.2d 299 (1993).

Home health care services organization was not a purely public charitable institution because the organization charged for services rendered, the amount of revenue generated suggested that the organization was not a purely public charity, and there was no evidence to support the conclusion that the organization used all the property at issue for charitable pursuits. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Visiting Nurse Health Sys. of Metro. Atlanta, Inc., 243 Ga. App. 64, 532 S.E.2d 416 (2000).

Georgia School Board Association, a not for profit organization providing needed services to local school boards in exchange for fees and dues, is not a "purely public charity." Gwinnett County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Georgia Sch. Bd. Ass'n, 211 Ga. App. 437, 439 S.E.2d 666 (1994).

Garden center was not dispensing purely public charity because the evidence showed that the payment of member club dues and rent to the center resulted in the provision of substantial services and benefits not available to the general public. Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Marietta Educ. Garden Ctr., Inc., 239 Ga. App. 740, 521 S.E.2d 892 (1999).

Home for the aged exemption.

- Ministry was entitled to a "home for the aged" exemption under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(12)(A) as the ministry met all of the statutory conditions and there was no requirement that the home had to be a separate tax exempt corporation from the tax exempt organization that operated both a home for the aged and other tax exempt operations, such as a church, a radio ministry, and a counsel center. A Georgia nonprofit tax exempt corporation may receive tax exemption from ad valorem taxes when the corporation operates a home for the aged exclusively or when the corporation operates a home for the aged as well as other tax exempt activities. Lamad Ministries, Inc. v. Dougherty County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 268 Ga. App. 798, 602 S.E.2d 845 (2004).

Memorial foundation exempt from ad valorem taxation.

- Court of appeals erred in reversing an order affirming a decision of a county board of equalization to grant a memorial foundation an exemption from ad valorem taxation for the property on which the foundation's facility was located because the foundation established that the foundation qualified as a purely public charity pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(4) and fulfilled the requirements in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(c), (d)(1), and (2). The property the foundation owned was devoted entirely to charitable purposes; the charitable purposes of the foundation were for the benefit of the public, the foundation qualified as a purely public charity, the foundation provided evidence that all income obtained from the property was used in furtherance of the foundation's charitable services or to offset expenses incurred in the maintenance of the organization's property, and no part of the foundation's income was being distributed to any person with an interest therein. Nuci Phillips Mem. Found. v. Athens-Clarke County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 288 Ga. 380, 703 S.E.2d 648 (2010).

Discretion of institution as to what is necessary and proper to further the institution's objectives.

- Some discretion must be given to the governing authorities of the institution to determine what buildings are necessary or proper to further their educational objectives. Elder v. Trustees of Atlanta Univ., 194 Ga. 716, 22 S.E.2d 515 (1942).

Use of property controls over declarations in charter in determining taxability.

- Use to which property of an educational institution is put, rather than the declaration of the institution's purpose found in the institution's charter, determines the question of exemption from taxation. Rabun Gap-Nacoochee Sch. v. Thomas, 228 Ga. 231, 184 S.E.2d 824 (1971).

Effect of fees charged and used for institution.

- Grounds, buildings, and other property occupied and used by the owner or owners thereof for conducting a college or school, for attendance upon which charges for board and tuition are arbitrarily made without any reference to the actual cost of conducting the school, are subject to taxation. Mundy v. Van Hoose, 104 Ga. 292, 30 S.E. 783 (1898).

All buildings erected for and used as a college, incorporated academy, or other seminary of learning are exempt from taxation, even if in the operation of the institution, income is derived from tuition fees, since the fees themselves are not used for the purpose of private or corporate profit or income, but are appropriated to the maintenance of the institution. Linton v. Lucy Cobb Inst., 117 Ga. 678, 45 S.E. 53 (1903); Brewer v. American Missionary Ass'n, 124 Ga. 490, 52 S.E. 804 (1905).

Effect of right to convey property at will and make any desired use of income.

- Property of a corporation having a capital stock formed for the business of conducting an educational institution, and which has the absolute ownership of all the realty and personalty employed in such enterprise, with the right to convey it at will and to make any desired disposition of the income derived from the fees charged for tuition and board is not exempt from taxation. Brenau Ass'n v. Harbison, 120 Ga. 929, 48 S.E. 363, 1 Ann. Cas. 836 (1904).

Institution for education of poor boys and girls.

- Property of an institution for the education of worthy but poor boys and girls, instructing the boys and girls in general educational and agricultural subjects, if used for purely religious, charitable, and educational purposes, is not taxable, provided the institution's income is not used, nor intended to be used, as dividends or profits. City of Waycross v. Waycross Sav. & Trust Co., 146 Ga. 68, 90 S.E. 382 (1916); See also, Hurlbutt Farm v. Medders, 157 Ga. 258, 121 S.E. 321 (1924); Baggett v. Georgia Conference Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 157 Ga. 488, 121 S.E. 838 (1924).

Exemption of college fraternity houses.

- Fraternity houses are buildings erected for and used as a college, and not used for the purpose of making either private or corporate income or profit for the university. The law of this state says that fraternity houses shall be exempt from taxes. Alford v. Emory Univ., 216 Ga. 391, 116 S.E.2d 596 (1960).

Private corporation operating a fraternity on land owned in fee simple by that corporation was not entitled to the same tax exemptions as those fraternities and sororities located on real property belonging to the "college," and therefore constitutional equal protection rights were not implicated. Zach, Inc. v. Fulton County, 235 Ga. App. 478, 509 S.E.2d 746 (1998), aff'd, 271 Ga. 411, 520 S.E.2d 899 (1999).

Exemption found in paragraph (a)(6) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41 applies only to residential property owned by an educational institution or an "arm or extension" and did not apply to property owned by a company for use as a fraternity house. Zach, Inc. v. Fulton County, 271 Ga. 411, 520 S.E.2d 899 (1999), affirming Zach, Inc. v. Fulton County, 235 Ga. App. 478, 509 S.E.2d 746 (1998).

Residential buildings on university property.

- When the university owns the property, residential buildings thereon may be "used as a college" and qualify for ad valorem tax exemption under paragraph (a)(6) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41. Johnson v. Southern Greek Hous. Corp., 251 Ga. 544, 307 S.E.2d 491 (1983).

Exemption of fraternity and sorority houses.

- Property of nonprofit corporation, organized as an instrument of a state university, used to erect fraternity and sorority houses was exempt from ad valorem taxation under paragraph (a)(6) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41. Johnson v. Southern Greek Hous. Corp., 251 Ga. 544, 307 S.E.2d 491 (1983).

Private, nonprofit corporation owning a fraternity house on a college campus was not an "arm or extension" of the college and was not entitled to an ad valorem tax exemption. Zach, Inc. v. Fulton County, 226 Ga. App. 842, 487 S.E.2d 602 (1997).

Term "seminary of learning," as applied in its general meaning, does not exclude an institution such as the Mechanical Trades Institute. J.A.T.T. Title Holding Corp. v. Roberts, 258 Ga. 519, 371 S.E.2d 861 (1988).

Taxation of grounds and buildings.

- While an educational institution may be exempt, some of the institution's grounds and buildings may be taxed if those grounds or buildings generate a private profit. J.A.T.T. Title Holding Corp. v. Roberts, 258 Ga. 519, 371 S.E.2d 861 (1988).

Building used by aspiring artists to develop their abilities by practicing their craft did not qualify for a tax exemption. Atlanta Artists Ctr., Inc. v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 245 Ga. App. 253, 537 S.E.2d 701 (2000).

Effect upon other laws.

- Exemption does not change the general rule and policy of the state that personal property is taxable only at the domicile of the owner if a resident of this state. City of Blakely v. Hilton, 150 Ga. 27, 102 S.E. 340 (1920).

No exemption for farm products sold or transferred for future sale.

- Language of this statute does not contemplate an exemption for farm products either after an outright sale, or when placed in the hands of another for future sale or processing with advance payment to the producer. Gold Kist, Inc. v. Jones, 231 Ga. 881, 204 S.E.2d 584 (1974).

Farm products may be levied on and sold for taxes due on other property.

- Farm products which are themselves exempt from taxation may nevertheless be levied on and sold for taxes due upon other property of the same owner. Sumter County v. Hollis, 51 Ga. App. 410, 180 S.E. 750 (1935).

Farm products already sold to a bona fide purchaser not subject to levy and sale.

- While farm products which are themselves exempt from taxation for the next year after their production may nevertheless be levied on and sold for taxes due upon other property of the same owner, the products are not subject to such levy when there was a bona fide sale of the products by the grower to a third person within the exempted period, and if the fi. fa. against the producer was levied on the products after such sale. Sumter County v. Hollis, 51 Ga. App. 410, 180 S.E. 750 (1935).

Taxability presumed if product not ordinarily classified as farm product.

- Since according to its usual signification, the term "lumber" would not ordinarily be classified as a farm product; it would be presumed prima facie that it was not such a product and in the circumstances, it was not sufficient to allege in mere general terms that this lumber was a farm product and as such exempt from taxation. Collins v. Mills, 198 Ga. 18, 30 S.E.2d 866 (1944).

For effect of failure to allege crop was grown by holder or upon holder's land, see City of Blakely v. Hilton, 150 Ga. 27, 102 S.E. 340 (1920).

Whether hospital authority's property public depended on purpose.

- Two bond validation orders pertaining to a hospital authority's establishment of a continuing care retirement center did not conclusively determine, for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(1)(A), that the property was public property exempt from ad valorem taxation; remand was required for the trial court to address taxability. Columbus Board of Tax Assessors v. Medical Ctr. Hosp. Auth., 302 Ga. 358, 806 S.E.2d 525 (2017).

Editor's notes.

-.

Effect of claim of two or more similar exemptions.

- If a taxpayer is qualified for and chooses to invoke the benefits of any one of the exemptions from any one of the types of ad valorem taxes, the taxpayer necessarily triggers the limitation clause of that exemption. Any attempt to take two or more similar exemptions would violate the limitation clause of each of the exemptions and cannot be done. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-83.

Corporation organized for both exempt and nonexempt purposes is not entitled to property tax exemption. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 515.

Effect of owner's character in determining use to which property put.

- Owner's character, while not controlling, does play an important part in determining the nature of the use to which property is put. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 495.

Exemption of property owned by a mutual fund.

- Neither former Code 1933, § 92-201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41), Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 156, § 4 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-6-27 (now repealed)), nor Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. V (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. V) exempt from ad valorem taxation taxable property owned by a mutual fund. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-195.

Intangibles belonging to the trust fund administered by the Peace Officers' Association of Georgia are exempt from ad valorem taxes imposed by Georgia Law upon intangibles. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-338.

Discussion of what educational and religious institution property is exempt from taxation.

- See 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 181.

Taxation of property transferred to municipality after January 1.

- Property returned for taxation on January 1 and later sold to a municipality is not subject to be levied on for taxes in the hands of the municipality. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 680.

Liability for taxes on condemned property.

- Under the law of eminent domain as the law now exists in this state, the payment of city or county taxes is not a proper element of damages in a condemnation case. The payment of property taxes is a responsibility of the landowner only so long as the landowner, in fact, owns the property. The property owner or condemnee would be responsible for payment of taxes up to the date of taking. After that time, the responsibility for the payment of these taxes would lie upon the condemning body, if in fact that body is an entity which would have the responsibility for payment of these taxes; all public property, however, is exempt from taxation by virtue of this statute. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-494.

Georgia Development Authority is exempt from the intangibles tax on its property, including its direct long term mortgage notes. The holder of long term mortgage notes is not exempt from paying intangibles tax on those notes when the Georgia Development Authority merely guarantees or insures payment. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 31.

Property held by the various agricultural commodity commissions is public property within the meaning of this statute and is exempt from taxation. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-29.

Exemption of property of the Agricultural Commodity Commission for Peanuts.

- Property owned by the Agricultural Commodity Commission for Peanuts, a public corporation and an instrumentality of the state according to Ga. L. 1961, p. 301, § 8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 2-8-15), is public property, not used for the purpose of private or corporate profit and income and, therefore, it is exempt under former Code 1933, § 92-201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41) from city and county ad valorem taxes. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 390.

Georgia Regional Hospital at Atlanta is not subject to DeKalb County property taxation because the hospital is owned by the state. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-205.

Corporation organized under the Cooperative Marketing Act, Ga. L. 1921, p. 139, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 10, T. 2), is required to make ad valorem tax returns. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 180.

Exemption of land leased for commercial purposes.

- Land owned by a religious organization, which is normally tax exempt, is subject to taxation when leased for commercial purposes. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 716.

Exemption of camps for physical, mental, moral, and spiritual development of children.

- Camp operated for the physical, mental, moral, and spiritual growth and development of young boys and girls is dedicated to a charitable use. That use is public if the camp is open to boys and girls generally or to all those of a particular religious faith. The fact that a charge is made does not destroy the charitable nature of the camp, provided the following conditions are met: (1) the camp property must not be used for the primary purpose of producing income; (2) any income received from the camp's use must be used exclusively for camp operation and maintenance; (3) such income must not be distributed to shareholders in the corporation owning camp, if owned by a corporation, or to other owners if not owned by a corporation; and (4) if the property was donated, the donation must not have been based upon an agreement providing that the donor shall receive any part of the net or gross income from the property's use. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 495.

Camp grounds owned and operated by Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists are exempt from taxation as an institution of purely public charity. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 499.

Motor vehicles owned by churches are not exempt from taxation.

- 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 287.

Cars used for transportation to and from church functions are not places of religious worship, and are, therefore, not exempt from state, county, and municipal property taxes. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 464.

Motor vehicles furnished by religious groups to ministers are not exempt from taxation. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 507.

Character of owner as affecting exemption of cemetery property.

- Property utilized as a cemetery or place of burial is exempt from taxation without regard for the fact that the property is owned by either a public or private corporation, or by individuals, collectively or severally. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-15.

Exemption of more than one residence.

- Single family residence owned by a church is exempt from ad valorem taxes as long as no income is derived therefrom; the same rule applies when the church owns two or more residences. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-172.

Two single-family residences owned by a church, one of which is occupied rent-free by the pastor as the pastor's residence, and the other of which is occupied rent-free by the minister of education as that minister's residence, are both exempt from ad valorem taxes. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-94.

Trailer owned by a church, situated on church land, and used as a parsonage, is exempt from taxation. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 715.

Exemption of fraternal organizations.

- Fraternal organizations, such as American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, and Moose are not exempt from payment of ad valorem taxes since they are not purely charitable organizations. 1962, Op. Att'y Gen. p. 481; 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 501.

Masonic hall is exempt from state and county taxation. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 715.

Uses to which American Legion clubhouses are normally put are neither exclusively charitable nor public in nature. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 495.

American Legion clubs are not institutions of purely public charity as contemplated by this statute and, therefore, are not exempt from taxation. 1950-51 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 154; 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 338.

Hall used to carry on normal activities of a fraternal benefit society is not exempt under this statute. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 495.

Test as to taxation of property belonging to private clubs depends upon property's use.

- If the property itself is dedicated to and used for purely public charity, the property is not taxable, but if the property is used for purposes other than purely public charity, the property is taxable. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 338.

Exemption of property used for social purposes.

- When the property of an organization, the nature of which is in part social, is used for social purposes, the property is not exempt since the property furthers the interest of the organization's members even though the property incidentally serves the community. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-392.

That a community swimming pool is operated by a nonprofit corporation does not authorize a municipality to exempt the facility from ad valorem taxes when the facility is not used as a purely public charity. The mere nonprofit nature of the operation is not sufficient to exempt the operation under this statute. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U71-46.

Exemption of fraternity houses.

- Although a corporation's petition for charter describes the corporation as an institution of purely public charity, the corporation's property is not exempt from taxation under this statute, the property involved being a dwelling purchased for use as a place of residence by members of the local chapter of a Greek letter college fraternity, its use and occupancy being limited to those who are active members of the fraternity, who become members by invitation, and each member of the local chapter who resides at such chapter house paying to the local chapter a monthly fee for room and board, which charge is identical with the charges made by the educational institution at which such chapter is located for the use of its dormitories, where meals are furnished as well as rooms. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 338.

Nonprofit corporation which charges for furnishing housing to service organizations, the receipts from which are used for maintenance and mortgage payments, is not a public charity as to be exempt from city and county ad valorem taxes. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-34.

"Farm products" does not include buildings and equipment used in farm operations.

- Chickens, eggs, and honey are exempt from taxation for the year next after their production. However, the buildings and equipment used in these operations are not exempt from taxation. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 481.

When corporation buys eggs from third parties and sells the eggs to the public, the eggs would not be exempt from taxation because the eggs did not remain in the hands of the producer but were purchased from the producer by that corporation. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-159.

When corporation leases farms on which laying hens owned by the corporation are kept, and the farmer-lessor cares for the hens and oversees the egg production, but the farmer receives for the farmer's services a salary which is not dependent on egg production or price, the eggs are not subject to ad valorem taxation when in the hands of that corporation. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-159.

When corporation owns hens, and keeps the hens on the corporation's lands, and hires individuals to oversee the hens, the eggs would be exempt from ad valorem taxation for the year next after production. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-159.

Farm products in the hands of warehousemen who are not producers are not exempt from property taxation. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-283.

Baled cotton stored in a warehouse and owned by a warehouseman on January 1 is subject to ad valorem taxation. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 429.

Exemption of farm products owned by producer and stored by federal government.

- Since farm products in the hands of the producer, within the year next after their production, and all property within the scope of federal ownership are exempt from taxation, farm products owned by the producer and stored by the federal government are not within the classification of properties taxable by a municipal corporation. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 238.

No exemption for agricultural property.

- Municipality does not have the authority to exempt from city taxes real property located within the municipality's corporate limits and held for agricultural purposes. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U84-21.

Eligibility for exemption to be determined from all circumstances, not merely expressed intent.

- Question of whether or not the property was installed or constructed for the primary purpose of reducing or eliminating air or water pollution rather than primarily for another purpose, such as increasing production, is not to be determined solely from the expressed intention of the taxpayer, but from all the circumstances of the case. The dominant purpose of the taxpayer is to be considered. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-325.

Incidental intent to control pollution insufficient for exemption.

- Board of tax assessors must exempt property used in or as part of any facility which has been certified by a pollution control agency as necessary and adequate to eliminate or reduce air or water pollution, if the board of tax assessors finds from all the circumstances surrounding the case that the facility was installed for the primary purpose of eliminating or reducing pollution. If the board finds that the facility, even though certified, was not installed or constructed for that primary purpose, but for another purpose, such as increasing production with only an incidental intent to control pollution, then it must find that the exemption does not apply. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-325.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 71 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, § 234 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 84 C.J.S., Taxation, §§ 293 et seq., 334 et seq.

ALR.

- Necessity of acceptance of dedicated street to relieve it from taxation, 5 A.L.R. 1537.

Taxation: exemption of parsonage or residence of minister or priest, 13 A.L.R. 1196.

Construction of exemption of religious body or society from taxation or special assessment, 17 A.L.R. 1027.

Exemption from taxation of property of fraternal or relief association, 22 A.L.R. 907; 83 A.L.R. 773.

Exemption from taxation of property of labor organization, 23 A.L.R. 813; 172 A.L.R. 1070.

Exemption of charitable organization from taxation or special assessment, 34 A.L.R. 634; 62 A.L.R. 328; 108 A.L.R. 284.

Bond or warrant of governmental subdivision as subject of taxation or exemption, 44 A.L.R. 510.

State or political subdivision as subject to license or sales tax, 60 A.L.R. 878; 67 A.L.R. 1310; 159 A.L.R. 365.

Exemption from taxation of the property of a Y.M.C.A. or Y.W.C.A., 81 A.L.R. 1453.

Property of one municipality within territorial limits of another as subject to taxation by latter, 81 A.L.R. 1518; 99 A.L.R. 1143.

Injunction as proper remedy against tax on exempt property, 84 A.L.R. 1315.

What are educational bodies or schools within contemplation of tax exemption provision, 95 A.L.R. 62.

Reservation of option or conditions in conveyance which may operate to defeat or extinguish title of exempt grantee as affecting exemption of real estate from taxation, 98 A.L.R. 1372.

Property located in one state, political subdivision, or municipality, but belonging to another, as subject to taxation therein, 99 A.L.R. 1143.

Cooperative corporations or associations formed by producers of agricultural products as within provisions of taxing statute regarding agricultural products or producers, 100 A.L.R. 439.

Who as between grantor and grantee, immediate or remote, is entitled to refund of tax or assessment for public improvement against land, 105 A.L.R. 698.

Exemption of charitable organization from taxation or special assessment, 108 A.L.R. 284.

What is a municipal corporation within constitutional or statutory tax exemption provisions, 108 A.L.R. 577.

Tax exemption as affected by failure to claim or delay in claiming it for past years, 115 A.L.R. 1484.

Exemption from taxation of property of Boy Scout or Girl Scout organization, 116 A.L.R. 378.

Exemption of part of real property assessed or levied upon as a whole as affecting tax upon nonexempt part, 118 A.L.R. 861.

Taxation of property owned by public body but not devoted to public or governmental use, 129 A.L.R. 480.

Exemption of property or bonds of housing authority from taxation, 133 A.L.R. 365; 152 A.L.R. 239.

Extent of area within tax exemption extended to property used for educational, religious, or charitable purposes, 134 A.L.R. 1176.

Tax exemption of educational institutions as extending to athletic fields or property used for social or recreation purposes, 143 A.L.R. 274.

Hospital as within tax exemption provision not specifically naming hospitals, 144 A.L.R. 1483.

Tax exemption of property as affecting its inclusion in determining requisite consent of property owners to annexation territory, local improvement, bond issue, and other public activity, 146 A.L.R. 1260.

Tax exemption of property of religious, educational, or charitable body as extending to property or income thereof used for publication or sale of literature, 154 A.L.R. 895.

Distinction between governmental and proprietary functions of state or its agency as affecting taxation, 155 A.L.R. 423.

Equitable title under executory contract for purchase of real property as sustaining exemption from taxation, 156 A.L.R. 1301.

Exemption of part of building or part of its value from taxation, 159 A.L.R. 685.

Property acquired by a taxing unit for delinquent taxes as exempt from taxation by another taxing unit, 162 A.L.R. 1119.

Tax on property held under executory contract with exempt vendor, 166 A.L.R. 595.

Scope and application of exemption of cemeteries from taxation, 168 A.L.R. 283.

Consent to state taxation of federal property or instrumentalities as affecting exemption thereof under provision of State Enabling Act, Constitution, or statute, 168 A.L.R. 547.

Construction of exemption of religious body or society from taxation or special assessment, 168 A.L.R. 1222.

What is within tax exemption of machinery, tools, apparatus, etc., used in manufacturing, 172 A.L.R. 313.

Exemption from taxation of property of labor organization, 172 A.L.R. 1070.

Property used by personnel as living quarters or for recreation purposes as within contemplation of tax exemptions extended to property of religious, educational, charitable, or hospital organizations, 15 A.L.R.2d 1064; 55 A.L.R.3d 356; 55 A.L.R.3d 485; 61 A.L.R.4th 1105.

Exemption from taxation of municipally owned or operated stadium, auditorium, and similar property, 16 A.L.R.2d 1376.

Power to remit, release, or compromise tax claim, 28 A.L.R.2d 1425.

What is a "scientific institution" within property tax exemption provisions, 34 A.L.R.2d 1221.

Tax exemption of real property as affected by time of acquisition of title by private owner entitled to exemption, 54 A.L.R.2d 996.

Exemption from taxation of college fraternity or sorority house, 66 A.L.R.2d 904.

Property used as dining rooms or restaurants as within tax exemptions extended to property of religious, educational, charitable, or hospital organizations, 72 A.L.R.2d 521.

Exemption from taxation of property of agricultural fair society or association, 89 A.L.R.2d 1104.

Exemption of public school property from assessments for local improvements, 15 A.L.R.3d 847.

Garage or parking lot as within tax exemption extended to property of educational, charitable, or hospital organizations, 33 A.L.R.3d 938.

Receipt of pay from beneficiaries as affecting tax exemption of charitable institutions, 37 A.L.R.3d 1191.

Tax exemption of property used by fraternal or benevolent association for clubhouse or similar purposes, 39 A.L.R.3d 640.

Prospective use for tax-exempt purposes as entitling property to tax exemption, 54 A.L.R.3d 9.

Availability of tax exemption to property held on lease from exempt owner, 54 A.L.R.3d 402.

Taxation: exemption of parsonage or residence of minister, priest, rabbi, or other church personnel, 55 A.L.R.3d 356.

Property tax: exemption of property leased by and used for purposes of otherwise tax-exempt body, 55 A.L.R.3d 430.

Tax exemption of property of educational body as extending to property used by personnel as living quarters, 55 A.L.R.3d 485.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance allowing tax exemption for property used in pollution control, 65 A.L.R.3d 434.

What constitutes church, religious society, or institution exempt from property tax under state constitutional or statutory provisions, 28 A.L.R.4th 344.

What are educational institutions or schools within state property tax exemption provisions, 34 A.L.R.4th 698.

Exemption of public golf courses from local property taxes, 41 A.L.R.4th 963.

Exemption of nonprofit theater or concert hall from local property taxation, 42 A.L.R.4th 614.

Property tax: Effect of tax-exempt lessor's reversionary interest on valuation of nonexempt lessee's interest, 57 A.L.R.4th 950.

Exemption from real-property taxation of residential facilities maintained by hospital for patients, staff, or others, 61 A.L.R.4th 1105.

Nursing homes as exempt from property taxation, 34 A.L.R.5th 529.

When is property owned by state or local governmental body put to public use so as to be eligible for property tax exemption, 114 A.L.R.5th 561.