Syfert Injury Law Firm

Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation

Call Now: 904-383-7448

2018 Georgia Code 49-5-183 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 49 SOCIAL SERVICES

Section 5. Programs and Protection for Children and Youth, 49-5-1 through 49-5-281.

ARTICLE 8 CENTRAL CHILD ABUSE REGISTRY

49-5-183. Division to update registry upon notification of substantiated case; notice to alleged abuser; representation of alleged minor child abuser; hearing on expungement of name from registry.

  1. Upon receipt of an investigator's report of a substantiated case pursuant to Code Section 49-5-182 naming an alleged child abuser, the division:
    1. Shall include in the child abuse registry the name of the alleged child abuser, the classification of the abuse as provided in paragraph (4) of Code Section 49-5-182, and a copy of the investigator's report; and
    2. Shall mail to such alleged child abuser in such report a notice regarding the substantiated case via certified mail, return receipt requested. It shall be a rebuttable presumption that any such notice has been received if the return receipt has been received by the division. The notice shall further inform such alleged child abuser of his or her right to a hearing to appeal such determination. The notice shall further inform such alleged child abuser of the procedures for obtaining the hearing and that an opportunity shall be afforded all parties to be represented by legal counsel and to respond and present evidence on all issues involved.
  2. Any alleged child abuser who has not attained the age of majority set forth by Code Section 39-1-1 at the time of the hearing requested pursuant to subsection (d) of this Code section shall be entitled to representation at the hearing either by the alleged child abuser's parent or other legal guardian or by an attorney employed by such parent or guardian. In the event the administrative law judge conducting the hearing determines that any such alleged minor child abuser will not be so represented at the hearing, or that the interests of any such alleged minor child abuser may conflict with the interests of the alleged minor child abuser's parent or other legal guardian, the administrative law judge shall order the division to apply to the superior court of the county in which the alleged act of child abuse was committed to have counsel appointed for the alleged minor child abuser. Payment for any such court appointed representation shall be made by such county.
  3. In order to exercise such right to a hearing, the alleged child abuser shall file a written request for a hearing with the division within ten days after receipt of such notice. The written request shall contain the alleged child abuser's current residence address and, if he or she has a telephone, a telephone number at which he or she may be notified of the hearing.
  4. If the division receives a timely written request for a hearing under subsection (c) of this Code section, it shall transmit that request to the Office of State Administrative Hearings within ten days after such receipt. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Office of State Administrative Hearings shall conduct a hearing upon that request in accordance with Chapter 13 of Title 50, the "Georgia Administrative Procedure Act," and the rules of the Office of State Administrative Hearings adopted pursuant thereto, except as otherwise provided in this article. The hearing shall be for the purpose of an administrative determination regarding whether, based on a preponderance of evidence, there was child abuse committed by the alleged child abuser to justify the investigator's determination of a substantiated case. The Office of State Administrative Hearings shall give notice of the time and place of the hearing to the alleged child abuser by first-class mail to the address specified in the written request for a hearing and to the division by first-class mail at least ten days prior to the date of the hearing. It shall be a rebuttable presumption that any such notice is received five days after deposit in the United States mail with the correct address of the alleged child abuser and the division, respectively, and proper postage affixed. Unless postponed by mutual consent of the parties and the administrative law judge or for good cause shown, such hearing shall be held within 30 business days following receipt by the Office of State Administrative Hearings of the request for a hearing, and a decision shall be rendered within five business days following such hearing. A motion for an expedited hearing may be filed in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the Office of State Administrative Hearings. The hearing may be continued as necessary to allow the appointment of counsel. A telephone hearing may be conducted concerning this matter in accordance with standards prescribed in paragraph (5) of Code Section 50-13-15. Upon the request of any party to the proceeding or the assigned administrative law judge, venue may be transferred to any location within this state if all parties and the administrative law judge consent to such a change of venue. Otherwise, the hearing shall be conducted in the county in which the alleged act of child abuse was committed. The doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata as applied in judicial proceedings are applicable to the administrative hearings held pursuant to this article.
  5. At the conclusion of the hearing under subsection (d) of this Code section, upon a finding that there is not a preponderance of evidence to conclude that the alleged child abuser committed an act of child abuse, the administrative law judge shall order that the alleged child abuser's name be removed from the child abuse registry. The general public shall be excluded from hearings of the Office of State Administrative Hearings held pursuant to this article, and the files and records relating thereto shall be confidential and not subject to public inspection.
  6. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the decision of the administrative law judge under subsection (e) of this Code section shall constitute the final administrative decision. Any party shall have the right of judicial review of such decision in accordance with Chapter 13 of Title 50, the "Georgia Administrative Procedure Act," except that the petition for review shall be filed within ten days after such decision and may only be filed with and the decision appealed to the superior court of the county where the hearing took place or, if the hearing was conducted by telephone, the Superior Court of Fulton County. The procedures for such appeal shall be substantially the same as those for judicial review of contested cases under Code Section 50-13-19 except that the filing of a petition for judicial review stays the listing of the petitioner's name upon the child abuse registry, and the superior court shall conduct the review and render its decision thereon within 30 days following the filing of the petition. The review and records thereof shall be closed to the public and not subject to public inspection.
  7. The administrative law judge shall transmit to the division his or her decision regarding the alleged child abuser and the investigator's report regarding such individual within ten days following that decision unless a petition for judicial review of that decision is filed within the permitted time period. If a timely petition for judicial review is filed within the permitted time period, the superior court shall transmit to the division its decision regarding the alleged child abuser and the investigator's report regarding such individual within ten days following that decision.
  8. With regard to a minor child alleged to have committed abuse, the division shall remove such individual's name from the registry if:
    1. He or she has reached 18 years of age;
    2. More than one year has passed from the date of the act or omission that resulted in a substantiated case and there have been no subsequent acts or omissions resulting in a substantiated case; and
    3. He or she can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has been rehabilitated.

(Code 1981, §49-5-183, enacted by Ga. L. 2015, p. 552, § 11/SB 138; Ga. L. 2016, p. 773, § 8/HB 905; Ga. L. 2016, p. 864, § 49/HB 737.)

The 2016 amendments. The first 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, deleted "subsection (a) of" preceding "Code Section 49-5-182" in the introductory paragraph of subsection (a); deleted "of subsection (a)" preceding "of Code Section 49-5-182" in paragraph (a)(1); substituted "his or her" for "such person's" in the third sentence of paragraph (a)(2); in subsection (c), substituted "child abuser shall" for "child abuser must" in the first sentence, and in the second sentence, substituted "if he or she has" for "the person has", and substituted "which he or she" for "which such person"; in subsection (d), substituted "such hearing" for "that hearing" in the middle of the sixth sentence, and substituted "this state" for "the state" in the middle of the tenth sentence; added a comma following "article" in the last sentence of subsection (e); and added subsection (h). The second 2016 amendment, effective May 3, 2016, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, revised punctuation in the last sentence of subsection (e).

Law reviews.

- For note on 1991 amendment of this Code section, see 8 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 194 (1992).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

DFCS investigator's determination of child abuse registry listing did not violate separation of powers.

- Under the Child Protective Services Information System, O.C.G.A. § 49-5-180 et seq., an alleged child abuser has the right to a hearing before an administrative law judge, who makes the final agency decision after hearing evidence and argument from the alleged abuser and from DFCS. The role of the abuse investigator in the determination of whether an incident should be in the child abuse registry does not violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Ga. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Steiner, 303 Ga. 890, 815 S.E.2d 883 (2018).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 49-5-183

Total Results: 6  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

Copy

State v. Jackson, 496 S.E.2d 912 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 20, 1998 | 269 Ga. 308, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 901

...Joy, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, for the State of Georgia et al. Gilbert J. Murrah, Bainbridge, for Bart Jackson. HINES, Justice. This is an appeal from an order of the superior court in a declaratory judgment action *914 finding that OCGA § 49-5-183.1 is unconstitutional. OCGA § 49-5-183.1 is part of a general statutory scheme providing for the establishment and maintenance of a central registry of confirmed, and unconfirmed, reports of child abuse, known as the "Child Protective Services Information System" ("CPSIS")....
..., confirmed (at least equal or greater credible evidence that abuse did occur), or unconfirmed (some credible evidence that abuse occurred, but not sufficient evidence to classify the report as confirmed). See OCGA § 49-5-180(6), (10), & (12); OCGA § 49-5-183(a). The report includes information identifying the abuse victim, the victim's parents or guardian, and the person who allegedly committed the abuse. OCGA § 49-5-183. Upon receiving a report of "confirmed" or "unconfirmed" child abuse, a county DFACS office is to notify the alleged abuser of the report classification. OCGA § 49-5-183.1 (b). The person so notified may request a hearing within ten days of receipt of the notice, which is presumed to have occurred five days after mailing. OCGA § 49-5-183.1(b) & (c). Any hearing is conducted before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") in accordance with the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act. See OCGA §§ 49-5-183.1(e); 50-13-1 et seq. The ALJ determines if the evidence meets the required standard for the classification. OCGA § 49-5-183.1(f). This constitutes the final administrative decision and may be appealed to the superior court; but the superior court's decision is not appealable. OCGA § 49-5-183.1(g)....
...Jackson was tried and acquitted on all five counts of child molestation, yet DFACS expressed its intention to continue its efforts to have Jackson listed on the CPSIS as "confirmed." Prior to the hearing before the ALJ, Jackson filed this action challenging the constitutionality of OCGA §§ 49-5-180, 49-5-183, and 49-5-183.1, and asking for an injunction against the scheduled hearing or any other efforts by DFACS to include him on the registry. The superior court granted a temporary injunction and ruled that OCGA § 49-5-183.1, the section containing the mechanism by which an alleged child abuser is placed on the CPSIS, is unconstitutional. The court also granted a permanent injunction. 1. The superior court determined that OCGA § 49-5-183.1 violated Jackson's due process rights to compel witnesses on his behalf and confront the witnesses against him, as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. [2] See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). OCGA § 49-5-183.1(i) provides in part that "[n]o child under the age of 14 shall be compelled to appear to testify at any hearing held pursuant to this Code section." Thus, on its face, the statute prohibits anyone who is alleged to have abused children...
...To the contrary, OCGA § 24-3-16 recognizes the importance of the rights to compel testimony and confront witnesses; it allows an out-of-court statement of a child victim to be admitted only if "the child is available to testify in the proceedings." See Reynolds v. *916 State, 257 Ga. 725(4), 363 S.E.2d 249 (1988). But OCGA § 49-5-183.1 would prohibit the accused child abuser from compelling the witness' presence, and therefore prohibits him from assuring the witness' availability. Fundamental rights of one so accused cannot be ignored, and the presence of OCGA § 24-3-16 does not save OCGA § 49-5-183.1. We must also determine whether we are faced with a facial challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA § 49-5-183.1, or a challenge to it "as applied." In United States v....
...To determine that a large fraction of the cases under the statute will implicate a protected interest, we need not find that a large portion will share Jackson's specific situation of acquittal on criminal charges that formed the basis of the proceeding under OCGA § 49-5-183.1....
...2094, 2108-2110, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977); Blackburn, supra. Parents have interests in the care, custody, companionship, and management of their children. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212-1213, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); Blackburn, supra. A statute such as OCGA § 49-5-183.1 can impact these interests by, among other things, effectively driving a wedge into the family and adversely affecting its integrity....
...The Act as a whole establishes and maintains the CPSIS, and does so for the protection of children. See Ga. L.1990, p. 1772. Barring an accused from compelling the testimony of a child is apparently in furtherance of that goal. However, such a laudable purpose cannot override fundamental constitutional protections. OCGA § 49-5-183.1 provides the procedure by which a person is classified as a child abuser, and is informed of and allowed to challenge that classification. The portion of OCGA § 49-5-183.1 that precludes an accused from compelling a child's testimony in the administrative proceedings is unconstitutional and central to the general scope of the Act; therefore, OCGA § 49-5-183.1 must be struck down in its entirety. Nor is it possible to limit the constitutional infirmity to OCGA § 49-5-183.1....
...OCGA § 49-5-181 requires the Division of Family and Children Services of the Department of Human Resources to establish and maintain a central registry. Those alleged under the Act to be child abusers must be afforded a constitutional procedure by which they can challenge their classification. OCGA § 49-5-183.1 is the only portion of the Act that provides the person so accused with any recourse....
...FLETCHER, Presiding Justice, specially concurring. Because the child abuse registry statute limits the right of persons placed on the list to appeal their classification, I agree that it violates due process and, therefore, is unconstitutional. 1. OCGA § 49-5-183.1 governs challenges by persons who are deemed to be "an alleged child abuser" under the act establishing the central child abuse registry....
...[9] The ALJ must determine whether there was sufficient credible evidence to justify the investigator's classification of the alleged abuse as confirmed or unconfirmed. [10] The ALJ's decision constitutes the final administrative decision and may be appealed to the superior court. OCGA § 49-5-183.1 specifically provides: "The decision of the superior court under this subsection shall not be subject to further appeal or review." Although the plain language of the statute suggests that no appeal of the superior court decision may be taken in any case involving the abuse registry, this court must give a narrowing construction to statutes whenever possible to save the statute from a constitutional challenge. [11] Interpreting OCGA § 49-5-183.1 narrowly, I would construe it to mean that the superior court's decision is final only on the issue of the person's classification on the child abuse registry as confirmed or unconfirmed....
...ated the report will provide the basis for confirming it." [23] Based on these flaws, I conclude that the statute provides inadequate procedural safeguards and thus fails to ensure against the risk of wrongful placement on the registry. Because OCGA § 49-5-183.1 limits the right of individuals to challenge a finding of confirmed or unconfirmed child abuse that is based on a flawed procedure, I agree that the statute denies due process in violation of the Federal Constitution....
...Despite requirements of confidentiality, see OCGA § 49-5-186, there is the clear potential for impairment of employment opportunities for those who are, or would attempt to be, employed by abuse investigators and others with registry access. [6] The superior court also found unconstitutional the final sentence of OCGA § 49-5-183.1(g) ("[t]he decision of the superior court under this subsection shall not be subject to further appeal or review") as violative of Ga....
...II, which sets forth the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this Court, including "all cases in which the constitutionality of a law, ordinance, or constitutional provision has been drawn in question." Although we need not address this ruling, we note that to the extent that OCGA § 49-5-183.1(g) can be construed to forbid a party from appealing to this Court a decision on the constitutionality of the statute itself, it would violate Ga....
...Court. See OCGA §§ 5-6-34(b), 5-6-35(a); City of Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment v. Midtown North, Ltd., 257 Ga. 496, 497(n.1), 360 S.E.2d 569 (1987) (holding that Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II, does not establish a right of direct appeal). [7] OCGA § 49-5-183.1(b). [8] OCGA § 49-5-183.1(d). [9] See OCGA §§ 49-5-183.1(e); 50-13-1 to 50-13-23. [10] See OCGA § 49-5-183.1(f)....
...ncy relied on its employees' recitation of what the three-year-old child stated without producing the victim, any independent corroborative evidence, or any recording or transcript of the victim's statement). [19] See id. 641 A.2d at 1152. [20] OCGA § 49-5-183(b)(3)....
Copy

Georgia Dep't of Human Servs., Div. of Fam. & Child. Servs. v. Steiner, 303 Ga. 890 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 18, 2018

...The Act requires that DFCS investigate reports of child abuse and, if the abuse investigator finds by a preponderance of the evidence that an act of child abuse occurred, information must be added to the registry about the abuse, the abuser, the child victim, and the child’s guardian. See OCGA §§ 49-5-182, 49-5-183....
...tion regarding substantiated cases of abuse; responding to inquiries from individuals seeking to find out whether the individual’s own name is included in the registry; and meeting federal funding requirements. See OCGA § 49-5-185. OCGA § 49-5-183 requires that DFCS must notify an alleged abuser when his or her name is added to the registry. See OCGA § 49-5-183 (a). The alleged abuser may then request an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) by submitting a written request for a hearing to DFCS within ten days after receiving the notice....
...The ALJ makes the final “administrative determination regarding whether, based on a preponderance of evidence, there was child abuse committed by the alleged child abuser to justify the investigator’s determination of a substantiated case.” OCGA § 49-5-183 (d). If not, the ALJ must order the alleged abuser’s name removed from the registry. OCGA § 49-5-183 (e). Either party may seek judicial review of the ALJ’s decision by filing a petition in the superior court of the county in which the administrative hearing was held. OCGA § 49-5-183 (f)....
...e very serious concerns regarding the constitutionality of the statute if the State were to assert that a person included in the registry could not raise a constitutional challenge to the Act after expiration of the ten-day period set out under OCGA § 49-5-183 (a) and (c) if a cognizable constitutional interest subsequently developed. 11 These other jurisdictions have reached differing conclusions about precisely what kind of factual showing is required for an effect on employment to meet the “plus” element of the stigma-plus test....
...without violating due process fairness principles). Instead, the alleged abuser has the right to request a hearing before an ALJ, who makes the final agency decision after hearing evidence and argument from the alleged abuser and from DFCS. OCGA § 49-5-183 (d)....
Copy

Ga. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Steiner, 815 S.E.2d 883 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 18, 2018

...The Act requires that DFCS investigate reports of child abuse and, if the abuse investigator finds by a preponderance of the evidence that an act of child abuse occurred, information must be added to the registry about the abuse, the abuser, the child victim, and the child's guardian. See OCGA §§ 49-5-182, 49-5-183....
...cal information regarding substantiated cases of abuse; responding to inquiries from individuals seeking to find out whether the individual's own name is included in the registry; and meeting federal funding requirements. See OCGA § 49-5-185. OCGA § 49-5-183 requires that DFCS must notify an alleged abuser when his or her name is added to the registry. See OCGA § 49-5-183 (a). The alleged abuser may then request an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") by submitting a written request for a hearing to DFCS within ten days after receiving the notice. See OCGA § 49-5-183 (a) & (c). The general public is excluded from the administrative hearing, and the associated records are kept under seal. See OCGA § 49-5-183 (e). The ALJ makes the final "administrative determination regarding whether, based on a preponderance of evidence, there was child abuse committed by the alleged child abuser to justify the investigator's determination of a substantiated case." OCGA § 49-5-183 (d). If not, the ALJ must order the alleged abuser's name removed from the registry. OCGA § 49-5-183 (e). Either party may seek judicial review of the ALJ's decision by filing a petition in the superior court of the county in which the administrative hearing was held. OCGA § 49-5-183 (f)....
...ion without violating due process fairness principles). Instead, the alleged abuser has the right to request a hearing before an ALJ, who makes the final agency decision after hearing evidence and argument from the alleged abuser and from DFCS. OCGA § 49-5-183 (d)....
...e very serious concerns regarding the constitutionality of the statute if the State were to assert that a person included in the registry could not raise a constitutional challenge to the Act after expiration of the ten-day period set out under OCGA § 49-5-183 (a) & (c) if a cognizable constitutional interest subsequently developed. These other jurisdictions have reached differing conclusions about precisely what kind of factual showing is required for an effect on employment to meet the "plus" element of the stigma-plus test....
Copy

Ga. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Addison, 819 S.E.2d 20 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 10, 2018 | 304 Ga. 425

...DFCS then mailed to each of the plaintiffs two to four separate notices "regarding the substantiated case" as to individual children, informing the plaintiff of his or her right to a hearing to appeal the determination and the procedure for obtaining a hearing. OCGA § 49-5-183 (a).2 The notices identified each allegedly neglected child only by initials and a number in parentheses that might indicate age....
...In most of the notices, the alleged neglect was said to have occurred during the broad time frame of October 2016 through *23February 2017; two notices said nothing at all about when the alleged neglect occurred. **427Following the procedure to initiate administrative review set forth in OCGA § 49-5-183 (c), each appellee filed a written request for a hearing within ten days of receipt of his or her notices.3 **428The administrative law judge (ALJ) consolidated the cases and scheduled *24them for a single hearing on September 29, 2017....
...ted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review ...."). Each of the plaintiffs initiated the administrative review process made available by OCGA § 49-5-183 by requesting a hearing before an ALJ, and at least some of them apparently raised their constitutional challenges to the Registry statutes and rules in their administrative filings. But the plaintiffs then truncated that process by filing suit in superior court before the **432ALJ - or a superior or appellate court later in the process provided by § 49-5-183 and the APA - had the chance to consider their arguments to decide whether relief should be granted. The plaintiffs contend that they were not required to exhaust their available administrative remedies because their constitutional challenges to the Registry statutes are entirely facial rather than as-applied....
...tiated cases." Id. (a) & (b). Access to the Registry is limited to certain groups, including "abuse investigator[s]," government agencies that license entities that have interactions with children, and "licensing entit[ies]." OCGA § 49-5-185. OCGA § 49-5-183 (a) says: Upon receipt of an investigator's report of a substantiated case pursuant to Code Section 49-5-182 naming an alleged child abuser, the division [i.e., DFCS]: (1) Shall include in the child abuse registry the name of the alleged...
...The notice shall further inform such alleged child abuser of the procedures for obtaining the hearing and that an opportunity shall be afforded all parties to be represented by legal counsel and to respond and present evidence on all issues involved. OCGA § 49-5-183 (c) says: In order to exercise such right to a hearing, the alleged child abuser shall file a written request for a hearing with the division within ten days after receipt of such notice....
...ing. The process for the administrative hearing and for judicial review of the agency's decision, both of which are generally governed by the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (APA), OCGA §§ 50-13-1 to 50-13-44, is specified in the rest of OCGA § 49-5-183, which says: (d) If the division receives a timely written request for a hearing under subsection (c) of this Code section, it shall transmit that request to the Office of State Administrative Hearings within ten days after such receipt....
Copy

Jenkins v. Walker, 700 S.E.2d 362 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 20, 2010 | 287 Ga. 783, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 3009

...Finally, Jenkins has failed to establish any violation of his due process rights with regard to the safety plans. In this regard, Jenkins' claims are based on the provisions of OCGA § 49-5-180 et seq. For example, Jenkins contends that his placement on the child abuse registry established by OCGA § 49-5-183.1 violates his due process rights because he did not have an adequate chance to defend against the claims made against him....
Copy

Georgia Dep't of Human Servs. v. Addison, 304 Ga. 425 (Ga. 2018).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 10, 2018

...Access to the Registry is limited to certain groups, including “abuse investigator[s],” government agencies that license entities that have interactions with children, and “licensing entit[ies].” OCGA § 49-5-185. 2 procedure for obtaining a hearing. OCGA § 49-5-183 (a).2 The notices identified each allegedly neglected child only by initials and a number in parentheses that might indicate age....
...In most of the notices, the alleged neglect was said to have occurred during the broad time frame of October 2016 through February 2017; two notices said nothing at all about when the alleged neglect occurred. Following the procedure to initiate administrative review set forth in OCGA § 49-5-183 (c), each appellee filed a written request for a hearing within ten days of receipt of his or her notices.3 The administrative law judge (ALJ) 2 OCGA § 49-5-183 (a) says: Upon receipt of an investigator’s report of a substantiated case pursuant to Code Section 49-5-182 naming an alleged child abuser, the division [i.e., DFCS]: (1) Shall include in the child abu...
...The notice shall further inform such alleged child abuser of the procedures for obtaining the hearing and that an opportunity shall be afforded all parties to be represented by legal counsel and to respond and present evidence on all issues involved. 3 OCGA § 49-5-183 (c) says: In order to exercise such right to a hearing, the alleged child abuser shall file a written request for a hearing with the division within ten days after receipt of such notice....
... be notified of the hearing. The process for the administrative hearing and for judicial review of the agency’s decision, both of which are generally governed by the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (APA), OCGA §§ 50- 13-1 to 50-13-44, is specified in the rest of OCGA § 49-5-183, which says: (d) If the division receives a timely written request for a hearing under subsection (c) of this Code section, it shall transmit that request to the Office of State Administrative Hearings within ten days after such receipt....
...all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review . . . .”). Each of the plaintiffs initiated the administrative review process made available by OCGA § 49-5-183 by requesting a hearing before an ALJ, and at least some of them apparently raised their constitutional challenges to the Registry statutes and rules in their administrative filings. But the plaintiffs then truncated that process by filing suit in superior court before the ALJ — or a superior or appellate court later in the process provided by OCGA § 49-5-183 and the APA — had the chance to consider their arguments to decide whether relief should be granted. The plaintiffs contend that they were not required to exhaust their available administrative remedies because their constitut...
...administrative proceedings, and we express no opinion as to whether those proceedings can be reopened or reinitiated at this point. 18 Decided September 10, 2018. OCGA § 49-5-183; constitutional question....