Computation.

- One becomes of full age on the day preceding the twenty-first (now eighteenth) anniversary of one's birth, on the first moment of that day. Thomas v. Couch, 171 Ga. 602, 156 S.E. 206 (1930) (decided under prior law).

Ordered support beyond eighteenth birthday a nullity.

- Any portion of a verdict and judgment intending to provide for support for any child beyond his or her eighteenth birthday is a nullity. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 242 Ga. 598, 250 S.E.2d 465 (1978).

Parental consent necessary for imposition of support obligation beyond 18.

- Without the consent of the husband-father in a child support controversy, neither the jury nor the court can require him to support his minor child beyond the child's eighteenth birthday, and an attempt to do so is a nullity. Ritchea v. Ritchea, 244 Ga. 476, 260 S.E.2d 871 (1979).

Support beyond reduced age of majority in accordance with original agreement.

- When the age of majority at the time of divorce was 21, it was proper to continue child support in accordance with the original agreement even though the statute reduced the age of majority to 18. Spivey v. Schneider, 234 Ga. 687, 217 S.E.2d 251 (1975).

Recovery of support by adult child barred.

- Right in an adult child to recover support from his father (now parent) beyond the age of majority was barred by former Code 1933, §§ 74-104 and 74-105 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 39-1-1 and19-7-2, respectively) which provide together that a father's (now parent's) obligation to provide for the maintenance, protection, and education of his child ceases when the child reaches majority. Crane v. Crane, 225 Ga. 605, 170 S.E.2d 392 (1969), (decided under prior law).

No modification of Juvenile Court Code.

- Reduction of the age of majority from 21 to 18 did not modify the provisions of the Juvenile Court Code, which still applies to those under the age of 21 years who have committed an act of delinquency before reaching the age of 17. W.F. v. State, 144 Ga. App. 523, 241 S.E.2d 631 (1978).

Minors may not refuse unwanted care.

- Georgia provides no "mature minor" exception to the state's general rule that only adults may refuse unwanted medical care. Novak v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 849 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd, 74 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 1996).

Workers' compensation.

- Provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., are manifestly general and not special laws and operate uniformly upon all minors who are employed under such circumstances as to come under the Workers' Compensation Act, who are 18 years of age or over, and who are not mentally incompetent or physically incapable of earning a livelihood. The legislature has ample power to regulate the age of minority or majority, and may divide minors into two classes, those above and those below a certain age, and endow all those above such age with all the rights of adults in reference to certain kinds of contracts without violating the provision of the Constitution. The effect of such an Act is merely to provide that in reference to certain kinds of contracts the age of majority shall be 18 instead of 21 years. Rourke v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 187 Ga. 636, 1 S.E.2d 728 (1939) (decided under prior law).

Confessions and statements of juveniles.

- West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1102, 89 S. Ct. 903, 21 L. Ed. 2d 795 (1969), which enumerates factors applying to confessions or statements of juveniles is inapposite if the defendant is 18 years or older. White v. State, 251 Ga. 482, 306 S.E.2d 636 (1983).

Cited in McDowell v. Georgia R.R., 60 Ga. 320 (1878); Dent v. Cock, 65 Ga. 400 (1880); Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932); Newton v. Newton, 222 Ga. 175, 149 S.E.2d 128 (1966); Ehrhart v. Brooks, 231 Ga. 272, 201 S.E.2d 464 (1973); Gould v. State, 131 Ga. App. 811, 207 S.E.2d 519 (1974); Choquette v. Choquette, 232 Ga. 759, 208 S.E.2d 848 (1974); Marchman v. State, 132 Ga. App. 677, 209 S.E.2d 88 (1974); State v. Gould, 232 Ga. 844, 209 S.E.2d 312 (1974); Whitworth v. Whitworth, 233 Ga. 53, 210 S.E.2d 9 (1974); Herring v. Herring, 233 Ga. 484, 211 S.E.2d 893 (1975); Welch v. State, 237 Ga. 665, 229 S.E.2d 390 (1976); Jones v. Jones, 244 Ga. 32, 257 S.E.2d 537 (1979); Nash v. Nash, 244 Ga. 749, 262 S.E.2d 64 (1979); Woodes v. Morris, 247 Ga. 771, 279 S.E.2d 704 (1981); State v. Hasty, 158 Ga. App. 464, 280 S.E.2d 873 (1981); Blalock v. Anneewakee, Inc., 206 Ga. App. 676, 426 S.E.2d 165 (1992); Penny v. McBride, 282 Ga. App. 590, 639 S.E.2d 561 (2006); Johnson v. Thompson, 286 Ga. App. 810, 650 S.E.2d 322 (2007).

Intent of age of majority law.

- Ga. L. 1972, p. 193, § 1 was intended to reduce the age at which an individual attained full legal capacity and thereby shed one's civil disabilities; it was not intended to necessarily affect all existing laws setting an age qualification of 21, unless such laws were tied directly to the age of majority. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-118.

Collection of court-ordered support payments existing prior to July 1, 1972.

- Department of Probation (now Department of Offender Rehabilitation) should collect child support payments for individuals between 18 and 21 when such payments arise out of court orders in existence prior to July 1, 1972. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U72-40.

Consent to abortion.

- Since the age of majority, and consequently the age of emancipation from legal custody and control of the parent, is 18 years of age, a person 18 years of age or older may consent to an abortion. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-118.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, §§ 1, 3 et seq., 28, 31.

C.J.S.

- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 2.

ALR.

- Liability of parent for necessaries furnished to adult child, 42 A.L.R. 150.

Age at which female attains majority, 95 A.L.R. 355.

Calculation of newborn child's age for purposes of life insurance policy requiring that specified age be reached before coverage begins, 37 A.L.R.3d 1448.

Burden of proof of defendant's age, in prosecution where attainment of particular age is statutory requisite of guilt, 49 A.L.R.3d 526.

Statutory change of age of majority as affecting preexisting status or rights, 75 A.L.R.3d 228.

Responsibility of noncustodial divorced parent to pay for, or contribute to, costs of child's college education, 99 A.L.R.3d 322.