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2018 Georgia Code 49-5-3 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 49-5-3 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 49-5-3

TITLE 49 SOCIAL SERVICES

Section 5. Programs and Protection for Children and Youth, 49-5-1 through 49-5-281.

ARTICLE 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES

49-5-3. Definitions.

As used in this article, the term:

  1. "Age or developmentally appropriate" means activities or items that are generally accepted as suitable for children of the same chronological age or level of maturity or that are determined to be developmentally-appropriate for a child, based on the development of cognitive, emotional, physical, and behavioral capacities that are typical for an age or age group. In the case of a specific child, such term also includes activities or items that are suitable for the child based on the developmental stages attained by the child with respect to the cognitive, emotional, physical, and behavioral capacities of the child.
  2. "Caregiver" means a foster parent with whom a child in foster care has been placed or a designated official for a child care institution in which a child in foster care has been placed.
  3. "Child-caring institution" means any institution, society, agency, or facility, whether incorporated or not, which either primarily or incidentally provides full-time care for children through 18 years of age outside of their own homes, subject to such exceptions as may be provided in rules and regulations of the board.
  4. "Child-placing agency" means any institution, society, agency, or facility, whether incorporated or not, which places children in foster homes for temporary care or for adoption.
  5. "Child welfare and youth services" means duties and functions authorized or required by this article to be provided by the department with respect to:
    1. Establishment and enforcement of standards for social services and facilities for children and youths which supplement or substitute for parental care and supervision for the purpose of preventing or remedying or assisting in the solution of problems which may result in neglect, abuse, exploitation, or delinquency of children and youths;
    2. Protecting and caring for dependent children and youths;
    3. Protecting and promoting the welfare of children of working mothers;
    4. Providing social services to children and youths and their parents and care for children and youths born out of wedlock and their mothers;
    5. Promotion of coordination and cooperation among organizations, agencies, and citizen groups in community planning, organization, development, and implementation of such services; and
    6. Otherwise protecting and promoting the welfare of children and youths, including the strengthening of their homes where possible or, where needed, the provision of adequate care of children and youths away from their homes in foster family homes or day-care or other child care facilities.
  6. "Children's transition care center" means a transition center which provides a temporary, home-like environment for medically fragile children, technology dependent children, and children with special health care needs, up to 21 years of age, who are deemed clinically stable by a physician but dependent on life-sustaining medications, treatments, and equipment and who require assistance with activities of daily living to facilitate transitions from a hospital or other facility to a home or other appropriate setting. Such centers are designated sites that provide child placing services and nursing care, clinical support services, and therapies for short-term stays of one to 14 days and for longer stays of up to 90 days to facilitate transitions of children to homes or other appropriate settings. Extended stays of up to 12 months may be approved by the department by waiver.
  7. "Dependent child or youth" means any person so adjudged under Chapter 11 of Title 15.
  8. "Group-care facility" means a place providing care for groups of children and youths, other than a foster family home.
  9. "Homemaker service" means a service provided by a woman selected for her skills in the care of children and home management and placed in a home to help maintain and preserve the family life during the absence or incapacity of the mother.
  10. "In loco parentis" means a quasi-parental relationship inferred from and implied by the fact that a child or youth has been taken into a family and treated like any other member thereof, unless an express contract exists to the contrary.
  11. "Legal custody" means a legal status created by court order embodying the following rights and responsibilities:
    1. The right to have the physical possession of the child;
    2. The right and the duty to protect, train, and discipline the child;
    3. The responsibility to provide the child with food, clothing, shelter, education, and ordinary medical care; and
    4. The right to determine where and with whom the child shall live,

      provided that these rights and responsibilities shall be exercised subject to the powers, rights, duties, and responsibilities of the guardian of the person of the child and subject to any residual parental rights and responsibilities. These rights shall be subject to judicial oversight and review pursuant to Code Section 15-11-212.

  12. "Maintenance" means all general expenses for care such as board; shelter; clothing; medical, dental, and hospital care; transportation; and other necessary or incidental expenses.
  13. "Maternity home" means any place in which any person, society, agency, corporation, or facility receives, treats, or cares for, within any six-month period, more than one pregnant woman whose child is to be born out of wedlock, either before, during, or within two weeks after childbirth. This definition shall not include women who receive maternity care in the home of a relative or in general or special hospitals, licensed according to law, in which maternity treatment and care is part of the medical services performed and the care of children is only brief and incidental.
  14. "Probation" means a legal status created by court order following adjudication in a delinquency case, whereby a child or youth is permitted to remain in the community, subject to supervision by the court or an agency designated by the court and subject to being returned to court at any time during the period of probation.
  15. "Protective supervision" means a legal status created by court order following adjudication in a dependency case, whereby a child's place of abode is not changed but assistance directed at correcting the dependency is provided through the court or an agency designated by the court.
  16. "Reasonable and prudent parent standard" means the standard characterized by careful and sensible parental decisions that maintain the health, safety, and best interests of a child while at the same time encouraging the emotional and developmental growth of the child, that a caregiver shall use when determining whether to allow a child in foster care under the responsibility of the department to participate in extracurricular, enrichment, cultural, and social activities.
  17. "Shelter" or "shelter care" means temporary care in a nonsecurity or open type of facility.

(Ga. L. 1963, p. 81, § 3; Ga. L. 1982, p. 706, §§ 2, 6-8; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1720, § 16; Ga. L. 1991, p. 408, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1983, § 25; Ga. L. 1994, p. 97, § 49; Ga. L. 2004, p. 645, § 7; Ga. L. 2007, p. 590, § 3/HB 153; Ga. L. 2008, p. 1145, § 1/HB 984; Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 4-54/HB 242; Ga. L. 2015, p. 552, § 5/SB 138.)

The 2013 amendment, effective January 1, 2014, substituted "dependent children" for "deprived children" in subparagraph (3)(B); substituted "'Dependent child or youth'" for "'Deprived child or youth'" in paragraph (5); substituted "Code Section 15-11-212" for "Code Section 15-11-55" in the last sentence of paragraph (12); and substituted "dependency" for "deprivation" twice in paragraph (16). See editor's note for applicability.

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, added paragraphs (1) and (2); redesignated former paragraphs (1) through (5) as present paragraphs (3) through (7), respectively; deleted former paragraphs (6), (7), and (8), each of which read "Reserved."; redesignated former paragraph (9) as present paragraph (8); deleted former paragraph (9.1), which read "Reserved."; redesignated former paragraphs (10) through (16) as present paragraphs (9) through (15), respectively; and added paragraph (16).

Code Commission notes.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, a hyphen was deleted from the phrase "child care" in subparagraph (3)(F).

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 5-1/HB 242, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall become effective on January 1, 2014, and shall apply to all offenses which occur and juvenile proceedings commenced on and after such date. Any offense occurring before January 1, 2014, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense and shall be considered a prior adjudication for the purpose of imposing a disposition that provides for a different penalty for subsequent adjudications, of whatever class, pursuant to this Act. The enactment of this Act shall not affect any prosecutions for acts occurring before January 1, 2014, and shall not act as an abatement of any such prosecutions."

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

"Legal custody."

- Visitation rights of a parent of a child in the custody of the Department of Family and Children Services are a residual "parental tie" which is not severed by the mere placement of the child in the temporary custody of the department without a specific finding as to that right. In re K.B., 188 Ga. App. 199, 372 S.E.2d 476 (1988).

Once temporary legal custody of a child was placed in the department under a shelter care order, the sole right to determine where and with whom the child would live vested with the department; the direction of the trial court to remove the child from the father's home was not binding, and the trial court's later contempt finding based on this order was improper. In re Tidwell, 279 Ga. App. 734, 632 S.E.2d 690 (2006).

Impact of 2003 amendment to O.C.G.A.

§ 15-11-55. - Juvenile court erred in awarding legal custody of two children to the Department of Family and Children Services (DFACS) and then ordering that physical custody be given to the maternal grandparents as: (1) once legal custody of a deprived child has been granted to DFACS, the juvenile court cannot dictate physical custody; (2) nothing in O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55(a)(2) allowed any redefinition of legal custody as defined in O.C.G.A. § 49-5-3(12); (3) using the rules of construction, § 15-11-55(a)(2) followed the statutory and legal precedent that the grant of legal custody to DFACS included the right to determine physical custody; and (4) the 2003 amendment to § 15-11-55 did not reject the statutory definition of legal custody. In the Interest of A.N., 281 Ga. 58, 636 S.E.2d 496 (2006).

Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55(a)(2) allows any redefinition of legal custody as defined in O.C.G.A. § 49-5-3(12). Instead, § 15-11-55(a)(2) follows the statutory and legal precedent that the grant of legal custody to the Department of Family and Children Services includes the right to determine physical custody; the 2003 amendment to § 15-11-55 does not reject the statutory definition of legal custody. In the Interest of A.N., 281 Ga. 58, 636 S.E.2d 496 (2006).

Joint legal and physical custody.

- Juvenile court exceeded the court's authority when the court awarded joint legal and physical custody of a deprived child jointly with the Department of Human Resources (DHR) and unrelated third parties when the DHR objected to such arrangement. In re J.N.T., 212 Ga. App. 498, 441 S.E.2d 918 (1994).

Authority to determine physical placement of children.

- Trial court erred in ordering the Department of Family and Children's Services (DFACS) to remove a foster child from the care of the child's foster parent because the order improperly infringed upon the authority of DFACS to determine the physical placement of children within the department's custody; DFACS had legal custody of the child since the child was born, and DFACS, as legal custodian, stood in loco parentis and had all legal rights of a natural parent, including the benefit of a prima facie right to custody. In re Goudeau, 305 Ga. App. 718, 700 S.E.2d 688 (2010).

Cited in Frances Wood Wilson Found., Inc. v. Bell, 223 Ga. 588, 157 S.E.2d 287 (1967); In re R.D., 141 Ga. App. 843, 234 S.E.2d 680 (1977); W.F. v. State, 144 Ga. App. 523, 241 S.E.2d 631 (1978); In re M.A.F., 254 Ga. 748, 334 S.E.2d 668 (1985); Brown v. Phillips, 178 Ga. App. 316, 342 S.E.2d 786 (1986); Ledford v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 189 Ga. App. 866, 377 S.E.2d 693 (1989).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 20 et seq. 79 Am. Jur. 2d, Welfare Laws, §§ 19, 20.

C.J.S.

- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 15.

Cases Citing Georgia Code 49-5-3 From Courtlistener.com

Total Results: 5

In the Interest of A. N.

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2006-10-04

Citation: 281 Ga. 58, 636 S.E.2d 496

Snippet: materia with OCGA § 49-5-3 (12) (A) does not support this finding. OCGA § 49-5-3 (12) (A) and (D) state

In Re An

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2006-10-04

Citation: 636 S.E.2d 496

Snippet: pari materia with OCGA § 49-5-3(12)(A) does not support this finding. OCGA § 49-5-3(12)(A) and (D) state

Darrell Dorminey Children's Home v. Georgia Department of Human Resources

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1990-03-01

Citation: 260 Ga. 25, 389 S.E.2d 211, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 72

Snippet: which requires “child caring institutions,” OCGA § 49-5-3 (1), to be licensed to operate by the Georgia Department

In re M. A. F.

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1985-10-01

Citation: 254 Ga. 748, 334 S.E.2d 668, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 858

Snippet: exists to the contrary.” (emphasis supplied); OCGA § 49-5-3 (11), and c) the fact that we have equated those

In Re MAF

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1985-10-01

Citation: 334 S.E.2d 668, 254 Ga. 748

Snippet: exists to the contrary." (emphasis supplied); OCGA § 49-5-3 (11), and c) the fact that we have equated those