O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 5-5-46 (2019)

Operation of rule nisi as supersedeas in criminal cases; superseding of sentence

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) The rule nisi on a motion for a new trial in a criminal case shall not operate as a supersedeas unless it is so ordered by the court. (b) When requested to do so by the defendant or his counsel, the judge trying the case shall grant an order superseding the sentence until the motion for a new trial is heard and decided.

History

(Orig. Code 1863, § 3649; Code 1868, § 3674; Code 1873, § 3724; Code 1882, § 3724; Ga. L. 1899, p. 77, § 1; Penal Code 1895, § 1066; Penal Code 1910, § 1093; Code 1933, § 70-308.)

Annotations

Cross references. - Stay of proceedings for enforcement of civil judgment, § 9-11-62. Termination of appeal bonds in criminal cases, § 17-6-1. Law reviews. - For article outlining

proposed revisions of appellate procedure rules with comments, prior to the adoption of T. 5, C. 6, A. 2, see 19 Ga. B.J. 145 (1956).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS When defendant is admitted to bail, forfeiture procedures of § 17-6-71 apply to bond. - Whether defendant was admitted to bail under former Code 1933, § 70-308 (see O.C.G.A. § 5-5-46), pending decision on motion for new trial, or under former Code 1933, § 6-1005 (see O.C.G.A. § 5-6-45), pending decision on appeal, forfeiture procedures of former Code 1933, § 27-906 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-6-71) applied to bond. Under either Code section, the trial judge exercises the judge’s discretion in permitting release on bail. State v.

Slaughter, 246 Ga. 174, 269 S.E.2d 446 (1980). Delay in paying costs. - Delay of slightly more than 30 days in paying the bill of costs because of appellant’s medical condition was properly found to be neither unreasonable nor inexcusable. Poythress v. Savannah Airport Comm’n, 229 Ga. App. 303, 494 S.E.2d 76 (1997). Cited in Johnson v. Aldredge, 192 Ga. 209, 14 S.E.2d 757 (1941); Phillips v. State, 95 Ga. App. 277, 97 S.E.2d 707 (1957).

RESEARCH REFERENCES C.J.S. - 66 C.J.S., New Trial, § 197.

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Date: 06/14/13 Time: 12:43:33