O.C.G.A. § 50-13-17 (2019)
Initial decisions in contested cases; review of initial decisions; final decisions and orders; Public Service Commission exceptions
(a) In contested cases in which the agency has not presided at the reception of the evidence, the agency representative who presided shall initially decide the case or the agency shall require the entire record before the agency representative to be certified to it for initial decision. When the representative makes the initial decision, and in absence of an application to the agency within 30 days from the date of notice of the initial decision for review, or an order by the agency within such time for review on its motion, the initial decision shall, without further proceedings, become the decision of the agency. On review from the initial decision of the representative, the agency shall have all the powers it would have in making the initial decision and, if deemed advisable, the agency may take additional testimony or remand the
case to the hearing representative for such purpose. When the agency makes the initial decision without having presided at the reception of evidence, the agency representative shall first recommend a decision, a copy of which shall be sent to each party and which shall be made a part of the record. (b) A final decision or order adverse to a party, other than the agency, in a contested case shall be in writing or stated in the record. A final decision shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated, and the effective date of the decision or order. Findings of fact shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings. Each agency shall maintain a properly indexed file of all decisions in contested cases, which file shall be open for public inspection with the exceptions provided in paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of Code Section 50-13-3. A copy of the decision or order and accompanying findings and conclusions shall be delivered or mailed promptly to each party or to his attorney of record. Nothing in this Code section shall prevent agencies from entering summary decisions or orders for contested cases informally disposed of under paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of Code Section 50-13-13. Moreover, nothing in this Code section shall prevent the parties to a contested case before the Public Service Commission from waiving the requirements of this Code section relating to findings of fact and conclusions of law, nor preclude the commission from adopting a rule or rules prescribing the procedure whereby parties to a contested case before it may waive such requirements. (c) Each agency shall render a final decision in contested cases within 30 days after the close of the record required by Code Section 50-13-13 except that any agency, by order, may extend such period in any case in which it shall find that the complexity of the issues and the length of the record require an extension of the period, in which event the agency shall render a decision at the earliest date practicable. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this law to the contrary, the procedures prescribed by Code Section 46-2-25, relating to procedure for utility rate changes, shall be applicable to and available to any person, firm, or corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission; and nothing contained herein shall be deemed to abrogate or limit, in any manner, such Code section as it pertains to any rate, charge, classification, or service which may constitute the basis of a contested case, proceeding, hearing, or matter before the Public Service Commission. (d) The Public Service Commission shall not be required to include findings of fact and conclusions of law in its orders and decisions in cases in which it presides at the reception of the evidence where no person appears in protest or opposition to the relief or authority sought;
provided, however, that such cases shall not include those in which the relief sought is an increase or decrease in the rate or rates of any person subject to its jurisdiction; and provided, further, that, if an aggrieved person files a petition seeking judicial review pursuant to Code Section 50-13-19 with respect to such an order or decision, the Public Service Commission shall nevertheless prepare such findings of fact and conclusions of law and include the same in the record of the proceedings transmitted to the reviewing court pursuant to subsection (e) of Code Section 50-13-19.
History
Ga. L. 1964, p. 338, § 18; Ga. L. 1966, p. 333, § 1; Ga. L. 1975, p. 404, §§ 5-7; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1936, § 1.
Annotations
Code Commission notes. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1988, ‘‘a’’ was inserted following ‘‘shall render’’ in the first sentence of subsection (c).
Law reviews. - For annual survey on administrative law, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 39 (2012). For article, ‘‘Researching Georgia Law,’’ see 34 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 741 (2015).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Construction with other statutes. - O.C.G.A. § 46-2-25 supercedes contrary provisions of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-17, with regard to the judicial review of decisions made by the Georgia Public Service Commission. Atmos Energy Corp. v. Ga. PSC, 290 Ga. App. 243, 659 S.E.2d 385 (2008). Natural gas distribution company could not challenge a rate change ruling by the Georgia Public Service Commission (PSC) because the order was not a final order under O.C.G.A. § 46-2-25(d) as the language indicated that it was only an interim decision; § 46-2-25 did not mandate the entry of a final order at the end of the six-month ‘‘file and suspend’’ period, and O.C.G.A. § 50-13-17(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act did not prevail over the more restrictive requirements imposed by § 46-2-25(d) as to the manner in which the PSC rendered a decision. Atmos Energy Corp. v. Ga. PSC, 285 Ga. 133, 674 S.E.2d 312 (2009). When initial decisions deemed final. - The 30-day period for an aggrieved party to act under subsection (a) prevents that party from keeping the initial decision in abeyance indefinitely. Also, it serves to activate that decision as the final agency decision without requiring the agency itself to review all cases decided
initially by a hearing officer, whether contested or not contested. Department of Pub. Safety v. MacLafferty, 230 Ga. 22, 195 S.E.2d 748 (1973). Aggrieved party cannot bypass agency review. - Subsection (a) does not allow a party dissatisfied with the initial decision rendered by a hearing officer to bypass the review available within the agency and directly seek judicial review in the courts. Department of Pub. Safety v. MacLafferty, 230 Ga. 22, 195 S.E.2d 748 (1973). Exhaustion of administrative remedies. - Superior court did not err in dismissing a taxpayer’s petition for judicial review of a decision of the Department of Revenue because the taxpayer failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available; the taxpayer never asked the commissioner of revenue to review the department’s initial decision. Alexander v. Dep’t of Revenue, 316 Ga. App. 543, 728 S.E.2d 320 (2012). Administrative Procedures Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 et seq., clearly contemplates applications to an agency to review initial decisions in contested cases; accordingly, even when an agency refers administrative proceedings to an administrative law judge with the Office of State Administrative Hearings for an initial decision pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41, a
person aggrieved by the initial decision can make application to the agency under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-17 for review of that initial decision. Alexander v. Dep’t of Revenue, 316 Ga. App. 543, 728 S.E.2d 320 (2012). Reasons for imposing more severe sanctions must appear in record. - It is necessary that whenever the Real Estate Commission ‘‘reviews’’ a hearing officer’s decision and imposes a more severe sanction than ‘‘recommended’’ the reasons for so doing must affirmatively appear as part of the record, otherwise the procedure of ‘‘review’’ under subsection (a) would have a ‘‘chilling’’ effect on a licensee’s decision to exercise the licensee’s right to review. Georgia Real Estate Comm’n v. Horne, 141 Ga. App. 226, 233 S.E.2d 16 (1977). Reversing agency decision on ground not raised before agency. - In a proceeding wherein a trial court affirmatively granted a peace officer’s reinstatement, the court held that the trial court erred by reversing the decision of the council based on grounds that were never urged before the trial court and that were not raised in the petition for judicial review or at the hearing on the petition. Ga. Peace Officer Standards and Training Council v. Hodges, 330 Ga. App. 145, 767 S.E.2d 286 (2014). Sufficiency of findings of fact. - When the Public Service Commission granted a rate increase, but disallowed some of the utility company’s costs in calculating the rate base for a fair increase because the commission concluded that some of the costs were the result of the company’s imprudent management of the project, the agency’s decision was within the agency’s authority, and was
supported by the facts. Georgia Power Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 196 Ga. App. 572, 396 S.E.2d 562 (1990). Validity of decision rendered more than 30 days after close of record. - Board of Dentistry’s decision to sanction a dentist was not void for want of jurisdiction, even though the decision was rendered more than 30 days following the close of the record since no harm was shown nor authority withdrawn. Thebaut v. Georgia Bd. of Dentistry, 235 Ga. App. 194, 509 S.E.2d 125 (1998). Scope of appeal officer’s review. - Since the credibility of witnesses is a question that must be decided by the factfinder who sees and hears the witnesses and is in a position to evaluate the witnesses’ demeanor, an administrative appeal officer’s substitution of an appeal officer’s judgment for that of the administrative hearing officer is impermissible. Atkinson v. Ledbetter, 183 Ga. App. 739, 360 S.E.2d 66 (1987). Cited in Smith v. UMW, 180 F. Supp. 796 (M.D. Ga. 1958); Hood v. Rice, 120 Ga. App. 691, 172 S.E.2d 170 (1969); Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594, 203 S.E.2d 206 (1974); Wall v. American Optometric Ass’n, 379 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Lee v. White Truck Lines, 143 Ga. App. 94, 238 S.E.2d 120 (1977); Department of Natural Resources v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Ga. 740, 238 S.E.2d 886 (1977); Carnes v. Crawford, 246 Ga. 677, 272 S.E.2d 690 (1980); Fluker v. Edwards, 161 Ga. App. 418, 288 S.E.2d 684 (1982); Safety Fire Comm’r v. U.S.A. Gas, Inc., 229 Ga. App. 807, 494 S.E.2d 706 (1997); Ga. Peace Officers Stds. & Training Council v. Anderson, 290 Ga. App. 91, 658 S.E.2d 840 (2008); Greene v. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 293 Ga. App. 201, 666 S.E.2d 590 (2008).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Receipt of notice of decision begins 30-day period. - The 30-day time period for seeking review of the initial decision by the agency does not begin to run until the date on which the respondent has notice of the decision. 1983 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 83-70.
Review of decision by agency. - If, after reviewing the initial decision, the agency issues a final decision, the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(b) and not O.C.G.A. § 50-13-17(a) govern the process of seeking review of that decision. 1983 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 83-70.
RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 368 et seq. C.J.S. - 73A C.J.S., Public Administrative Law and Procedure, § 272 et seq. U.L.A. - Model State Administrative Procedure Act (U.L.A.) § 4-201 et seq. ALR. - Necessity of some evidence at hearing to support decision of public board or official required to be made after or upon hearing, 123 A.L.R. 1349. Necessity, form, and contents of express finding of fact to support administrative determinations, 146 A.L.R. 209. Administrative decision or finding based on evidence secured outside of hearing, and without presence of interested party or counsel, 18 A.L.R.2d 552.
Administrative decision by officer not present when evidence was taken, 18 A.L.R.2d 606. Power of administrative agency to reopen and reconsider final decision as affected by lack of specific statutory authority, 73 A.L.R.2d 939. Applicability of stare decisis doctrine to decisions of administrative agencies, 79 A.L.R.2d 1126. Doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel as barring relitigation in state criminal proceedings of issues previously decided in administrative proceedings, 30 A.L.R.4th 856.