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2018 Georgia Code 50-13-1 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 50 STATE GOVERNMENT

Section 13. Administrative Procedure, 50-13-1 through 50-13-44.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

50-13-1. Short title; purpose.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Georgia Administrative Procedure Act." It is not intended that this chapter create or diminish any substantive rights or delegated authority, but this chapter is meant to provide a procedure for administrative determination and regulation where expressly authorized by law or otherwise required by the Constitution or a statute of this state.

(Ga. L. 1964, p. 338, § 1; Ga. L. 1965, p. 283, § 1.)

Law reviews.

- For article advocating consistency in statutory provisions governing review of administrative conduct in Georgia, prior to the enactment of O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50, see 15 Ga. B.J. 153 (1952). For article discussing procedural problems with judicial review of administrative conduct in Georgia prior to the enactment of O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50, see 15 Ga. B.J. 297 (1953). For article, "The Georgia Uniform Procedure Act," see 1 Ga. St. B.J. 269 (1964). For article discussing Georgia administrative law during 1975 to 1977, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (1977). For annual survey of administrative law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 31 (2004). For annual survey of administrative law, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2015). For note discussing application of procedural due process requirements to hearings by administrative tribunals, see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 359 (1980).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Exhaustion of administrative remedies.

- Intent of the legislature was to provide by Ga. L. 1964, p. 338, § 1 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50) an administrative procedure to resolve conflicts within the authority vested in administrative agencies and boards by statute without resort to courts of record in the first instance. Georgia State Bd. of Dental Exmrs. v. Daniels, 137 Ga. App. 706, 224 S.E.2d 820 (1976).

Alternative remedy available.

- Trial court properly denied the defendant's amended motion for a new trial holding that the administration of breath tests pursuant to Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 92-3-.06(12)(b) did not violate the due process clause under both U.S. Const., amend. 5 or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I given that: (1) the claim was raised for the first time in the new trial motion, and was thus untimely; (2) the defendant had an alternative remedy under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 et seq.; (3) the defendant failed to show that the Division of Forensic Sciences (DFS) eliminated meaningful procedures for conducting breath tests when the division promulgated the rule; and (4) the techniques and methods approved by DFS were sufficient to ensure fair and accurate testing. Palmaka v. State, 280 Ga. App. 761, 634 S.E.2d 883 (2006).

Civil Practice Act was inapplicable to proceedings under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, Ga. L. 1964, p. 338, § 1 et seq. Georgia State Bd. of Dental Exmrs. v. Daniels, 137 Ga. App. 706, 224 S.E.2d 820 (1976).

Provisions strictly construed.

- Ga. L. 1937, p. 806 (see O.C.G.A. § 34-8-222) and the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, Ga. L. 1964, p. 338, § 1 et seq., are in derogation of common law and must be strictly construed. Caldwell v. Corbin, 152 Ga. App. 153, 262 S.E.2d 516 (1979).

Administrative review precludes equitable relief.

- When a statute provides a party with a means of review by an administrative agency, such procedure is generally an adequate remedy at law so as to preclude the grant of equitable relief. Brogdon v. State Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, 244 Ga. 780, 262 S.E.2d 56 (1979).

Hearings on suspension of driver's license for refusal to submit to breath test.

- See Hardison v. Fayssoux, 168 Ga. App. 398, 309 S.E.2d 397 (1983).

Reversing agency decision on ground not raised before agency.

- In a proceeding wherein a trial court affirmatively granted a peace officer's reinstatement, the court held that the trial court erred by reversing the decision of the council based on grounds that were never urged before the trial court and that were not raised in the petition for judicial review or at the hearing on the petition. Ga. Peace Officer Standards and Training Council v. Hodges, 330 Ga. App. 145, 767 S.E.2d 286 (2014).

Compliance with appeal procedures of administrative decision required.

- In a case involving a white supremacist organization being denied a permit for the Adopt-A-Highway program administered by the Georgia Department of Transportation (Department), the court dismissed the Department's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the Department sought review of a decision of a state administrative agency and was required under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1) to bring the Department's appeal by way of an application for discretionary review, but failed to do so. State of Ga. v. International Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 299 Ga. 392, 788 S.E.2d 455 (2016).

Cited in Hood v. Rice, 120 Ga. App. 691, 172 S.E.2d 170 (1969); Department of Pub. Safety v. Byars, 127 Ga. App. 190, 192 S.E.2d 926 (1972); O'Neal v. Georgia Real Estate Comm'n, 129 Ga. App. 211, 199 S.E.2d 362 (1973); Sumter County Bd. of Educ. v. Mosley, 147 Ga. App. 478, 249 S.E.2d 284 (1978); Keramidas v. Department of Human Resources, 147 Ga. App. 820, 250 S.E.2d 560 (1978); Hicks v. Georgia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 553 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Johnsen v. Collins, 875 F. Supp. 1571 (S.D. Ga. 1994); Brown v. Barrow, 512 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2008); Atmos Energy Corp. v. Ga. PSC, 290 Ga. App. 243, 659 S.E.2d 385 (2008); Atmos Energy Corp. v. Ga. PSC, 290 Ga. App. 243, 659 S.E.2d 385 (2008); Carolina Tobacco Co. v. Baker, 295 Ga. App. 115, 670 S.E.2d 811 (2008); Longleaf Energy Assocs., LLC v. Friends of the Chattahoochee, Inc., 298 Ga. App. 753, 681 S.E.2d 203 (2009); Scarborough v. Hunter, 293 Ga. 431, 746 S.E.2d 119 (2013); DeKalb County Sch. Dist. v. Ga. State Bd. of Educ., 294 Ga. 349, 751 S.E.2d 827 (2013).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Purpose and intent of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, Ga. L. 1964, p. 338, § 1, is not to create additional substantive requirements in what is cause for revocations of a license by an administrative agency; rather, the purpose and intent of that law is to provide uniform, minimum procedural requirements to be followed by an administrative agency in determining the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party in a matter in which the particular agency regulates and to which the law applies. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-73.

Licensee momentarily complying but with history of noncompliance.

- Administrative agency may proceed to revoke license of licensee in conformity with the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, Ga. L. 1964, p. 338, § 1 and the fact that the licensee shows at the agency's proceedings that the licensee is momentarily complying with all lawful requirements for the retention of the license would be immaterial; the real question to be resolved by the agency's proceedings would be whether the licensee had been in noncompliance with all lawful requirements for the retention of the license at the time that the licensee is alleged to have been in noncompliance with such requirements. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-73.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

1A Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Administrative Law, § 1 et seq.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1

Total Results: 20  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Tibbles v. Teachers Ret. Sys. of Georgia, 297 Ga. 557 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 69 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 13, 2015 | 775 S.E.2d 527

...ency has given the question over a long period of time.” Barnhart, 535 U. S. at 222 (II). Here, the record reflects that the administrative rules at issue were promulgated under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), OCGA § 50-13-1 et seq., but the record does not disclose whether they were promulgated under the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking provisions.5 See OCGA § 50-13-4....
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State of Georgia v. Int'l Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 299 Ga. 392 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 47 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 5, 2016 | 788 S.E.2d 455

...In its order, the trial court concluded that sovereign immunity was no bar to claims for injunctive and declaratory relief concerning “an alleged illegal restriction on . . . constitutional speech rights.” The trial court found that 7 See OCGA § 50-13-1 et seq. 5 an injunction and declaratory judgment would be appropriate remedies for the wrong alleged in the lawsuit....
...In addition, the Department urged that its denial of the application in this case did not amount to an unconstitutional abridgement of the freedom of speech.9 The International Keystone Knights, on 8 The Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review in “contested cases.” See OCGA § 50-13-19 (a)....
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Love v. State, 517 S.E.2d 53 (Ga. 1999).

Cited 46 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 1, 1999 | 271 Ga. 398, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 2084

...and urine specimens. 1. Appellant contends the trial court erroneously failed to suppress the results of the tests conducted on his blood and urine because the testing methods had not been approved under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), OCGA § 50-13-1 et seq., and therefore were not "performed according to methods approved by the Division of Forensic Sciences of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation," as required by OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(1)(A)....
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Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast v. Coastal Marshlands Prot. Comm., 670 S.E.2d 429 (Ga. 2008).

Cited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 17, 2008 | 284 Ga. 736, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 3665

...ert agency analysis on two issues, though issued under the heading "Final Decision," was not, in substance, the Department's last word on whether it would grant or deny Point Peter, LLLP a marshlands permit, [6] and the sole narrow exception to OCGA § 50-13-19(a)'s "final decision" rule is not applicable here....
...direction to remand to the Committee to conduct the additional information gathering and analytical tasks ordered by the ALJ. Judicial review of agency action in a contested case is governed primarily by three provisions of the Georgia APA. [8] OCGA § 50-13-19(a) authorizes superior court review of an agency's "final decision" in a contested case, and the review contemplated is "appellate in nature." [9] "A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately reviewab...
...the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction to review the order only if review of the eventual final decision by the agency "would not provide an adequate remedy." We have consistently construed the "no[]... adequate remedy" language of OCGA § 50-13-19(a) as creating an extremely narrow exception to the final decision rule for superior court review of contested cases....
...o ignore its procedures." [21] In this case, there is no reason to think that superior court review after the further fact-finding and analysis by the Committee ordered by the ALJ "would not provide an adequate remedy" as that phrase is used in OCGA § 50-13-19(a)....
...However, CSC cites nothing in the record to support this contention, and this Court will not declare an exception to the normal rules of deference merely because an administrative agency issues a rule or regulation at a time when there is a pending dispute regarding the subject of that rule or regulation. [5] OCGA §§ 50-13-1 to 50-13-44....
...be rendered except one of dismissal; and when this court discovers from the record on appeal that a judgment has been rendered by a court having no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it will of its own motion reverse the judgment."). [8] See OCGA §§ 50-13-19 (judicial review of contested cases), 50-13-20 (appeals to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court), 50-13-20.1 (judicial review of decisions in contested cases issued pursuant to Code Section 50-13-41). [9] Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594, 594, 203 S.E.2d 206 (1974). Accord Ga. Pub. Svc. Comm. v. Southern Bell, 254 Ga. 244, 246, 327 S.E.2d 726 (1985). [10] OCGA § 50-13-19(a)....
...180, 182, 390 S.E.2d 846 (1990) (agency rules prohibited further hearings). [19] Hughey, supra, 278 Ga. at 740-741, 609 S.E.2d 324 (order calling for "remand" was, in reality, final determination that permit must be denied). [20] Dept. of Transp. v. Gibson, 251 Ga. 66, 69, 303 S.E.2d 19 (1983). See OCGA § 50-13-19(a) (requiring exhaustion of "all administrative remedies available within the agency" as prerequisite to judicial review in superior court)....
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Jud. Council of Ga. v. BROWN & GALLO, 702 S.E.2d 894 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 22, 2010 | 288 Ga. 294, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 3799

...[1] We hold that they are part of the judiciary as that term is used in OCGA § 50-13-2(1) and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. This appeal arose when Brown & Gallo, an independently-owned court reporting agency, filed an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to OCGA § 50-13-10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging that a portion of the code of professional ethics for court reporting adopted by appellant Board of Court Reporting of the Judicial Council of Georgia ("the Board") in 1994 and favorably revie...
...XXII (2009). [6] We granted the petition for a writ of certiorari filed by the Council and the Board to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss filed by the Council and the Board. OCGA § 50-13-10 is part of the Administrative Procedure Act and authorizes the filing of a declaratory judgment action questioning the validity of any rule that allegedly interferes with or impairs legal rights, without the petitioner having first requested the agency to pass upon the validity of the rule....
...We presume that a statute is constitutional and construe it as valid when possible. McNair v. State, 285 Ga. 514, 515, 678 S.E.2d 69 (2009); Garner v. Harrison, 260 Ga. 866(2), 400 S.E.2d 925 (1991). The General Assembly's overall purpose for enacting the Administrative Procedure Act is set out in OCGA § 50-13-1: "this chapter is meant to provide a procedure for administrative determination and regulation where expressly authorized by law or otherwise required by the Constitution or a statute of this state." There is no expressed legislative inten...
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State v. Jackson, 496 S.E.2d 912 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 20, 1998 | 269 Ga. 308, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 901

...e, which is presumed to have occurred five days after mailing. OCGA § 49-5-183.1(b) & (c). Any hearing is conducted before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") in accordance with the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act. See OCGA §§ 49-5-183.1(e); 50-13-1 et seq....
...of Zoning Adjustment v. Midtown North, Ltd., 257 Ga. 496, 497(n.1), 360 S.E.2d 569 (1987) (holding that Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II, does not establish a right of direct appeal). [7] OCGA § 49-5-183.1(b). [8] OCGA § 49-5-183.1(d). [9] See OCGA §§ 49-5-183.1(e); 50-13-1 to 50-13-23....
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Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found., Inc. v. State Election Bd., 654 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 21, 2007 | 282 Ga. 707, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 3588

...o. This result is the antithesis of what the General Assembly sought to achieve by enacting the Georgia APA and OCGA § 50-13-9. Accordingly, I dissent. I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice HUNSTEIN joins in this dissent. NOTES [1] OCGA §§ 50-13-1 to 50-13-44....
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DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Georgia State Bd. of Educ., 294 Ga. 349 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 25, 2013 | 751 S.E.2d 827

...least six months after the member was permanently removed, whichever is sooner. OCGA § 20-2-73 (c). The statute provides that any hearing on a petition for reinstatement is to be conducted pursuant to the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, OCGA § 50-13-1 et seq., and it provides as well for judicial review of a decision to permanently remove a member....
...or his or her designated agent in accordance with the APA. OCGA § 20-2-73 (c). This means, among other things, the member is afforded the opportunity to be represented by counsel, to respond, and to present evidence on all issues involved. See OCGA § 50-13-13....
...of fact are required which shall be based exclusively upon the evidence and the matters officially noticed. Id. at (a) (8). The rules of evidence generally must be followed, and the member is afforded the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. OCGA § 50-13-15. The final decision is subject to judicial review and appeal. OCGA §§ 50-13-19 and 50-13-20....
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Outdoor Advert. Ass'n of Georgia, Inc. v. Garden Club of Georgia, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 856 (Ga. 2000).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 6, 2000 | 272 Ga. 146, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 937

...The complaint alleged that the new statutes, implementing rules, and a DOT-created Manual of Guidance (Manual), [3] violate the gratuities clause, exceed the rule-making authority of the DOT under OCGA § 32-6-90, and contravene certain provisions of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, OCGA § 50-13-1 et seq....
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Ga. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Addison, 819 S.E.2d 20 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 10, 2018 | 304 Ga. 425

...titution itself specifically waives that immunity. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (e); Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 424-425, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017). The plaintiffs contend that the waiver required for their suit is provided by OCGA § 50-13-10, which establishes a cause of action for declaratory judgment to challenge the validity of an agency rule and requires that the pertinent agency be made a party to the action.6 This Court has held, however, that OCGA § 50-13-10 does not apply in cases where a plaintiff's "contention is that [a statute] is unconstitutional and hence the rules promulgated thereunder are unconstitutional." George v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 250 Ga. 491, 493, 299 S.E.2d 556 (1983). See also Ledford v. Dept. of Transp., 253 Ga. 717, 717, 324 S.E.2d 470 (1985) (" OCGA § 50-13-10 is inapplicable here, as in George, because in their complaint the plaintiffs attack the constitutionality of the statute pursuant to which the [agency] rule was promulgated, as well as the rule itself."). As in George and Ledford, the plaintiffs here argue only that the rules **431implementing the Registry statutes are unconstitutional because the Registry statutes themselves are unconstitutional, so § 50-13-10 does not apply....
...of Behavioral Health & Developmental Disabilities v. United Cerebral Palsy of Ga., Inc., 298 Ga. 779, 786, 784 S.E.2d 781 (2016) ("Under long-standing Georgia law, the failure of plaintiffs to exhaust their available administrative remedies ordinarily precludes judicial relief."). See also OCGA § 50-13-19 (a) (in cases subject to the APA, "[a]ny person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review ....")....
...one number at which he or she may be notified of the hearing. The process for the administrative hearing and for judicial review of the agency's decision, both of which are generally governed by the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (APA), OCGA §§ 50-13-1 to 50-13-44, is specified in the rest of OCGA § 49-5-183, which says: (d) If the division receives a timely written request for a hearing under subsection (c) of this Code section, it shall transmit that request to the Office of State Administrative Hearings within ten days after such receipt....
...the Office of State Administrative Hearings. The hearing may be continued as necessary to allow the appointment of counsel. A telephone hearing may be conducted concerning this matter in accordance with standards prescribed in paragraph (5) of Code Section 50-13-15....
...of the county where the hearing took place or, if the hearing was conducted by telephone, the Superior Court of Fulton County. The procedures for such appeal shall be substantially the same as those for judicial review of contested cases under Code Section 50-13-19 except that the filing of a petition for judicial review stays the listing of the petitioner's name upon the child abuse registry, and the superior court shall conduct the review and render its decision thereon within 30 days following the filing of the petition....
...Under OCGA § 9-11-25 (d) (1), Cagle's successor is automatically substituted as party in the suit against him in his official capacity, but, as explained in Division 2 below, this claim should have been dismissed by the trial court based on sovereign immunity. OCGA § 50-13-10 says, with emphasis added: (a) The validity of any rule, waiver, or variance may be determined in an action for declaratory judgment when it is alleged that the rule, waiver, or variance or its threatened application interferes with or impairs the legal rights of the petitioner....
...munity conferred by Article I, Section II, Paragraph IX (d) of the 1983 Georgia Constitution. See Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 443-444, 801 S.E.2d 867 (explaining that official immunity "does not limit the availability of prospective relief"). Although OCGA § 50-13-10 (a) says that "[a] declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the petitioner has first requested the agency to pass upon the validity of the rule, waiver, or variance in question," it does not give the plaintiffs a way around the exhaustion requirement because, as explained in Division 2 above, § 50-13-10 does not apply in this case....
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Scarborough v. Hunter, 293 Ga. 431 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 11, 2013 | 746 S.E.2d 119, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 2180

...uch public roads. The judges of the superior courts shall, by proper order, in the same proceedings compel the work done necessary to build, repair, and maintain such public roads up to the standard so prescribed. The trial court held that “OCGA § 50-13-19 provides for judicialreview of administrative hearings such as was conducted by [the Board] on June 28,2011.” That is incorrect. By its terms, *435the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), OCGA §§ 50-13-1 to 50-13-44, applies only to certain state agencies that are expressly authorized by law to make rules and regulations or to determine contested cases; the APA does not apply to local governments or local administrative bodies....
...evaluating a complaint for mandamus challenging a county’s decision under OCGA § 32-7-2 (b) (1) to abandon a road and the standard that courts must apply on judicial review of decisions by state administrative bodies in contested cases under OCGA § 50-13-19 (h) (6) of the APA....
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Georgia Power Co. v. Cazier, 303 Ga. 820 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 18, 2018

...zier, the Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal of the putative class action.2 As to whether the plaintiffs were required to exhaust administrative remedies, the Court of Appeals looked principally to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), OCGA § 50-13-1 et seq., which requires exhaustion when one aggrieved by an administrative decision seeks judicial review of that decision under the APA....
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Ga. Power Co. v. Cazier, 815 S.E.2d 922 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 18, 2018

...The plaintiffs appealed, and in Cazier, the Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal of the *925putative class action.2 As to whether the plaintiffs were required to exhaust administrative remedies, the Court of Appeals looked principally to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), OCGA § 50-13-1 et seq., which requires exhaustion when one aggrieved by an administrative decision seeks judicial review of that decision under the APA....
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Roberts v. Deal, 723 S.E.2d 901 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 19, 2012 | 290 Ga. 705, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 952

...olated OCGA § 45-10-3(8); and Culver violated OCGA § 45-10-3(8). On August 6, 2010, the Governor ordered that Roberts, Brown, and Culver be removed from office. As set forth in OCGA § 45-10-4 and the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, see OCGA § 50-13-1 et seq., Appellants appealed the Governor's order to the Superior Court of Fulton County, and the court allowed Cosby and the other original complainants to intervene as third-party defendants (collectively with the Governor, "Appellees")....
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State v. Ponce, 619 S.E.2d 682 (Ga. 2005).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 19, 2005 | 279 Ga. 651, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 2879

...s of commercial vehicles," with a footnote reference to the holding in Lemon v. *683 Martin, 232 Ga.App. 579, 581-582(1), 502 S.E.2d 273 (1998). Ponce, supra, 271 Ga. App. at 413, 609 S.E.2d 736. However, under the Administrative Procedure Act, OCGA § 50-13-1 et seq., "[t]he courts shall take judicial notice of any rule which has become effective pursuant to this chapter." OCGA § 50-13-8....
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Georgia Dep't of Med. Assistance v. Beverly Enter., Inc., 401 S.E.2d 499 (Ga. 1991).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 21, 1991 | 261 Ga. 59

...This appeal follows our grant of certiorari to consider the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the trial court's order compelling the Department of Medical Assistance of Georgia (DMA) to respond to requests for discovery filed in Beverly Enterprise's appeal under the Administrative Procedure Act (OCGA § 50-13-1 et seq.) of an administrative decision rendered by DMA. Dept. of Medical Assistance v. Beverly Enterprises, 195 Ga.App. 753, 395 S.E.2d 15 (1990). 1. Beverly's administrative appeal pursuant to the APA contained a request for declaratory judgment (OCGA § 50-13-10(a)), as well as a petition for judicial review of the administrative decision (OCGA § 50-13-19). We initially granted certiorari to consider whether OCGA § 50-13-10 was applicable to DMA in light of OCGA § 49-4-153(c)....
...Upon consideration of the entire record, we conclude that the issue of the applicability of the APA to DMA need not be determined to resolve the merits of the appeal: whether it was error to compel DMA to respond to discovery requests made pursuant to the action for declaratory judgment. 2. OCGA § 50-13-10(a), under which Beverly proceeded in its action for declaratory judgment, permits an action in which the validity of any "rule" may be determined....
...nditions relate to "benefits by the state or of an agency," they are specifically excluded from the statutory definition of "rule" contained in OCGA § 50-13-2(6). Therefore, the manual may not be reviewed in a declaratory judgment action under OCGA § 50-13-10. See Roy E. Davis & Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 256 Ga. 709, 353 S.E.2d 195 (1987). Thus, compelling DMA to respond to discovery pursuant to a declaratory judgment action under § 50-13-10 was error....
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Tompkins v. Bd. of Regents, 262 Ga. 208 (Ga. 1992).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 11, 1992 | 417 S.E.2d 153, 92 Fulton County D. Rep. 606

...nnel decisions for employees of the University System of Georgia. The trial court held: Petitioner alleges that in denying his petition for review, the Board of Regents fails to follow the mandates of Georgia’s Administrative Procedure Act, OCGA § 50-13-1 et seq specifically OCGA § 50-13-13 which requires a hearing in all contested cases....
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Georgia Dep't of Human Servs. v. Addison, 304 Ga. 425 (Ga. 2018).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 10, 2018

...Administrative Hearings. The hearing may be continued as necessary to allow the appointment of counsel. A telephone hearing may be conducted concerning this matter in accordance with standards prescribed in paragraph (5) of Code Section 50-13-15....
...court of the county where the hearing took place or, if the hearing was conducted by telephone, the Superior Court of Fulton County. The procedures for such appeal shall be substantially the same as those for judicial review of contested cases under Code Section 50-13-19 except that the filing of a petition for judicial review stays the listing of the petitioner’s name upon the child abuse registry, and the superior court shall conduct the review and render its decision thereon within 30 days following the filing of the petition....
...tution itself specifically waives that immunity. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (e); Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 424-425 (801 SE2d 867) (2017). The plaintiffs contend that the waiver required for their suit is provided by OCGA § 50-13-10, which establishes a cause of action for declaratory judgment to challenge the validity of an agency rule and requires that the pertinent agency be made a party to the action.6 6 OCGA § 50-13-10 says, with emphasis supplied: (a) The validity of any rule, waiver, or variance may be determined in an action for declaratory judgment when it is alleged that the rule, waiver, or variance or its threatened application interferes with or impairs the legal rights of the petitioner....
...Superior Court of Fulton County or in the superior court of the county where the petitioner maintains its principal place of doing business in this state. All actions for 9 This Court has held, however, that OCGA § 50-13-10 does not apply in cases where a plaintiff’s “contention is that [a statute] is unconstitutional and hence the rules promulgated thereunder are unconstitutional.” George v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 250 Ga. 491, 493 (299 SE2d 556) (1983). See also Ledford v. Dept. of Transp., 253 Ga. 717, 717 (324 SE2d 470) (1985) (“OCGA § 50-13-10 is inapplicable here, as in George, because in their complaint the plaintiffs attack the constitutionality of the statute pursuant to which the [agency] rule was promulgated, as well as the rule itself.”). As in George and Ledford, the plaintiffs here argue only that the rules implementing the Registry statutes are unconstitutional because the Registry statutes themselves are unconstitutional, so OCGA § 50-13-10 does not apply....
...11 Cerebral Palsy of Ga., Inc., 298 Ga. 779, 786 (784 SE2d 781) (2016) (“Under long-standing Georgia law, the failure of plaintiffs to exhaust their available administrative remedies ordinarily precludes judicial relief.”). See also OCGA § 50-13-19 (a) (In cases subject to the APA, “[a]ny person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review ....
...See United Cerebral Palsy, 298 Ga. at 786-787.8 4. The only claims left for our consideration are the plaintiffs’ facial constitutional challenges to the Registry statutes as enforced by Crittenden and 8 Although OCGA § 50-13-10 (a) says that “[a] declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the petitioner has first requested the agency to pass upon the validity of the rule, waiver, or variance in question[,]” it does not give the plaintiffs a way around the exhaustion requirement because, as explained in Division 2 above, OCGA § 50-13-10 does not apply in this case....

Tibbles v. Teachers Ret. Sys. of Georgia (Ga. 2015).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 13, 2015

...ency has given the question over a long period of time.” Barnhart, 535 U. S. at 222 (II). Here, the record reflects that the administrative rules at issue were promulgated under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), OCGA § 50-13-1 et seq., but the record does not disclose whether they were promulgated under the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking provisions.5 See OCGA § 50-13-4....
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James v. Davis, 280 Ga. 497 (Ga. 2006).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 8, 2006 | 629 S.E.2d 820, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 1416

...erly declined to order the Commissioner to issue James a driver’s license. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. In 2005, the Department of Motor Vehicle Safety became the Department of Driver Services. See Ga. Laws 2005, p. 334. OCGA§§ 50-13-1 to 50-13-44. See Miles v....