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2018 Georgia Code 50-21-26 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 50 STATE GOVERNMENT

Section 21. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity as to Actions Ex Contractu; State Tort Claims, 50-21-1 through 50-21-37.

ARTICLE 2 STATE TORT CLAIMS

50-21-26. Notice of claim against state; time for commencement of action; examination of records to facilitate investigation of claims; confidential nature of documents and information furnished.

  1. No person, firm, or corporation having a tort claim against the state under this article shall bring any action against the state upon such claim without first giving notice of the claim as follows:
    1. Notice of a claim shall be given in writing within 12 months of the date the loss was discovered or should have been discovered; provided, however, that for tort claims and causes of action which accrued between January 1, 1991, and July 1, 1992, notice of claim shall be given in writing within 12 months after July 1, 1992;
    2. Notice of a claim shall be given in writing and shall be mailed by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, return receipt requested, or delivered personally to and a receipt obtained from the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services.In addition, a copy shall be delivered personally to or mailed by first-class mail to the state government entity, the act or omissions of which are asserted as the basis of the claim.Each state government entity may designate an office or officer within that state government entity to whom a notice of claim is to be delivered or mailed;
    3. No action against the state under this article shall be commenced and the courts shall have no jurisdiction thereof unless and until a written notice of claim has been timely presented to the state as provided in this subsection;
    4. Any complaint filed pursuant to this article must have a copy of the notice of claim presented to the Department of Administrative Services together with the certified mail or statutory overnight delivery receipt or receipt for other delivery attached as exhibits. If failure to attach such exhibits to the complaint is not cured within 30 days after the state raises such issue by motion, then the complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice; and
    5. A notice of claim under this Code section shall state, to the extent of the claimant's knowledge and belief and as may be practicable under the circumstances, the following:
      1. The name of the state government entity, the acts or omissions of which are asserted as the basis of the claim;
      2. The time of the transaction or occurrence out of which the loss arose;
      3. The place of the transaction or occurrence;
      4. The nature of the loss suffered;
      5. The amount of the loss claimed; and
      6. The acts or omissions which caused the loss.
  2. No action may be commenced under this article following presentation of a notice of claim until either the Department of Administrative Services has denied the claim or more than 90 days have elapsed after the presentation of the notice of claim without action by the Department of Administrative Services, whichever occurs first.
  3. The Department of Administrative Services shall have the authority to examine and copy any records of any state government entity to facilitate the investigation of a claim. Each state government entity shall make available to the Department of Administrative Services, incidental to any investigation of a claim, all such records notwithstanding any other provision of law which designates such records as confidential or which prohibits disclosure of such records; provided, however, that the Department of Administrative Services shall be bound by such provision of law and shall not make further disclosure of such records except as permitted by such provision of law.The Department of Administrative Services may enforce the authority granted under this subsection by subpoena which may be enforced, upon application by the department, by the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, in the same manner as subpoenas issued under Chapter 13 of this title, the "Georgia Administrative Procedure Act," may be enforced.
  4. Any document or information gathered or prepared by the Department of Administrative Services in connection with the investigation undertaken as a result of the notice of claim shall be considered privileged and confidential and shall not be subject to discovery by any claimant in any proceeding under this article except as otherwise provided by law.

(Code 1981, §50-21-26, enacted by Ga. L. 1992, p. 1883, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1717, § 12; Ga. L. 1998, p. 128, § 50; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 3.)

Code Commission notes.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1992, "July 1, 1992" was substituted for "the effective date of this article" in two places in paragraph (a)(1).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1993, a comma was substituted for the period following the first occurrence of "July 1" in paragraph (a)(1).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2009, "that" was inserted following "however," in paragraph (a)(1).

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment to this Code section is applicable with respect to notices delivered on or after July 1, 2000.

Law reviews.

- For annual survey article discussing trial practice and procedure, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 447 (2000). For annual survey of administrative law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2005). For annual survey of tort law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 385 (2006). For survey article on administrative law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2007). For survey article on trial practice and procedure, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 423 (2007). For survey article on administrative law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2008). For survey article on trial practice and procedure, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 397 (2008). For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 211 (2014). For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 257 (2015).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Retroactivity.

- Notice and service provisions of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26 are procedural laws that could be applied retroactively to authorize dismissal of a claim against the Department of Transportation when the plaintiff did not serve the Director of the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services or mail a copy of the complaint to the Attorney General. Henderson v. DOT, 267 Ga. 90, 475 S.E.2d 614 (1996).

Local authorities.

- Chatham Area Transit Authority is a local authority and, therefore, the Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., does not apply to the authority. Holmes v. Chatham Area Transit Auth., 233 Ga. App. 42, 505 S.E.2d 225 (1998).

In a tort action brought by a passenger against a regional transportation authority, the reversal of the denial of the authority's motion for judgment on the pleadings was upheld because, by its terms, O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(d) permitted the tolling of the period of limitation only for claims against municipal corporations and it was not a municipal corporation. Foster v. Ga. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 297 Ga. 714, 777 S.E.2d 446 (2015).

Condition precedent was necessary.

- If a condition precedent to waiver of sovereign immunity was not satisfied, then the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and no valid action was pending to toll the running of the statute of limitations. Sylvester v. DOT, 252 Ga. App. 31, 555 S.E.2d 740 (2001).

Failure to state dollar amount.

- Pro se parent's ante litem notice to the state in a wrongful death case that stated that the amount of the loss suffered was the "monetary value of the decedent's life" was insufficient because the plain language of the ante litem statute required that a dollar amount be stated, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(5)(E), and the parent could have assigned a loss based on the parent's knowledge and belief. Dorn v. Ga. Dep't of Behavioral Health & Developmental Disabilities, 329 Ga. App. 384, 765 S.E.2d 385 (2014).

In the plaintiff's personal injury action under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20, et seq., against the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT), alleging that a DOT employee negligently caused a vehicle collision in which the plaintiff was injured, the DOT's motion to dismiss was improperly denied because the plaintiff's ante litem notice failed to state the amount of loss the plaintiff knew at the time of the notice; the plaintiff's statement that the plaintiff intended to claim the full amount of damages allowed by law failed to satisfy the definition of the amount of loss claimed as it referred to a cap on the amount the plaintiff might be allowed to recover without providing any information about the amount the plaintiff could claim to the jury. Georgia Department of Transportation v. King, 341 Ga. App. 102, 798 S.E.2d 492 (2017).

Prisoner who was injured when the prisoner slipped and fell during a work-release program failed to strictly comply with O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(5)(E)'s requirement that the prisoner's ante litem notice to the Georgia Department of Corrections specify the amount of the loss claimed because the notice did not provide a specific dollar amount or a range of losses. Farmer v. Dep't of Corr., 346 Ga. App. 387, 816 S.E.2d 376 (2018).

Failure to strictly comply with delivery requirement.

- Trial court erred in denying the Department of Transportation's motion to dismiss because the driver did not establish that the driver delivered the ante litem notice in strict compliance with O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26, by making sure that notice was delivered to the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services and, thus, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the suit. Department of Transportation v. Jones, Ga. App. , 816 S.E.2d 679 (2018).

Substantial compliance inadequate.

- Substantial compliance with the ante litem notice requirement is inadequate under the Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq. McGee v. State, 227 Ga. App. 107, 487 S.E.2d 671 (1997).

Since the plaintiff did not give notice of a claim to the Risk Management Division of the state Department of Administrative Services, as specifically set forth in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26, the plaintiff did not conform to the strict compliance requirements of that section, and the plaintiff's claim was properly dismissed under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(1). Kim v. DOT, 235 Ga. App. 480, 510 S.E.2d 50 (1998).

Because an injured motorist sent ante litem notice of a negligence action against the Georgia Department of Transportation to the Commissioner of the Department of Administrative Services, rather than to the Risk Management Division of that department, as required by O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26, the notice did not meet the strict compliance requirements of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq.; the trial court properly granted the state's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Shelnutt v. Ga. DOT, 272 Ga. App. 109, 611 S.E.2d 762 (2005).

Trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss by the Georgia Department of Transportation as the ante litem notice sent by a guardian did not name the governmental entity whose acts or omissions were the basis for the injured party's claims; substantial compliance with the Georgia Tort Claims Act, specifically O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a), did not waive sovereign immunity and the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Johnson v. E.A. Mann & Co., 273 Ga. App. 716, 616 S.E.2d 98 (2005).

Trial court did not err in granting the state transportation department's motion to dismiss on the ground that sovereign immunity barred the claimant's personal injury claim against the state because the claimant did not timely file a notice of claim as required by O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a) and substantial compliance was not sufficient to meet that statute's requirement of proper notice; since the claimant did not timely file the notice of claim, the trial court was not permitted to consider the claim because the state only waived the state's sovereign immunity to the extent of providing a limited time to file a claim against the state, and since the claimant did not meet that requirement the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Williams v. Ga. DOT, 275 Ga. App. 88, 619 S.E.2d 763 (2005).

Although a plaintiff injured on Ports Authority property properly sent the plaintiff's notice of claim to the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services, the plaintiff did not personally deliver or mail a copy of the notice to the Authority as required by O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(5); actual notice by way of a letter to the Authority's claims adjuster was insufficient. Callaham v. Georgia Ports Authority, 337 Ga. App. 120, 786 S.E.2d 505 (2016).

Actual receipt within period not required.

- An ante litem notice of claim mailed within 12 months from the date of loss satisfied the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26; actual receipt of the notice by the state agency before the end of the 12-month period was not required. Norris v. DOT, 268 Ga. 192, 486 S.E.2d 826 (1997), rev'g DOT v. Norris, 222 Ga. App. 361, 474 S.E.2d 216 (1996), overruling Hardy v. Candler County, 214 Ga. App. 627, 448 S.E.2d 487 (1994).

Ante litem notice is essential condition precedent.

- Before suit can be filed against the state, ante litem notice is an essential condition precedent. Horton v. Whitaker, 238 Ga. App. 312, 518 S.E.2d 712 (1999).

Inadequate compliance with ante litem notice requirement.

- Visitor's ante litem notice failed to strictly comply with the requirements that it identify the acts or omissions which caused the visitor's alleged loss and the nature of the loss, as the notice alleged that the visitor was injured when the visitor encountered water on the floor of the visitor's bathroom at the prison, while the complaint alleged that the visitor fell on uneven flooring, and the notice failed to specify the nature of the loss the visitor suffered, providing no information on the injuries the visitor sustained. Williams v. Wilcox State Prison, 341 Ga. App. 290, 799 S.E.2d 811 (2017).

Receipt not attached.

- Injured party's suit against Georgia Department of Corrections was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the injured party failed to comply with the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(2); no certified mail receipt to the Georgia Department of Administrative Services was attached to the amended complaint and the receipt that was attached was an almost illegible customer copy of a United States Postal Service Express Mail label, which bore no signature and no information in the block designated for "delivery" and "signature of addressee or agent." Baskin v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 272 Ga. App. 355, 612 S.E.2d 565 (2005).

Failure to send an ante litem notice to the state within 12 months of the date plaintiff's loss was discovered or should have been discovered barred the plaintiff's action against the state. Howard v. Miller, 222 Ga. App. 868, 476 S.E.2d 636 (1996).

Personal injury plaintiff's notice of suit 20 months after the date of loss was held untimely under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26; thus, summary judgment in favor of the university school board of regents was proper. Plaintiff could not rely on concealment per se absent evidence of fraud. Clark v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 250 Ga. App. 448, 552 S.E.2d 445 (2001).

Stone Mountain Memorial Association is a state department or agency for purposes of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX and, accordingly, a former inmate was required to file an ante litem notice in accordance with the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., for asserting the inmate's negligence claim; as the inmate failed to file such required notice, the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Association pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) was proper. Gay v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 270 Ga. App. 17, 606 S.E.2d 53 (2004).

After a truck driver became involved in an altercation with a Georgia Port Authority employee during a delivery and was barred from the Savannah River terminal for 30 days, the driver's claim under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., that the driver suffered severe economic loss as a result of being barred from the terminal was procedurally barred because the driver failed to comply with the Act's notice provision, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26. Gambell v. Ga. Ports Auth., 276 Ga. App. 115, 622 S.E.2d 464 (2005).

Motorcycle driver failed to comply with ante-litem-notice requirements of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a) as it was undisputed that the letter to the Department of Administrative Services was not mailed by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, return receipt requested, or delivered personally obtaining a receipt from the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services. DeFloria v. Walker, 317 Ga. App. 578, 732 S.E.2d 121 (2012).

Statutory notice.

- O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(2) placed no limitations on the persons allowed to make delivery of a notice of claim against the state, and thus delivery of appellee injured party's notice by an overnight air express company meant that valid notice of claim was served on the state. Ga. Ports Auth. v. Harris, 274 Ga. 146, 549 S.E.2d 95 (2001).

Trial court properly dismissed a former inmate's action against the Georgia Department of Corrections because the inmate failed to strictly comply with O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a) because the inmate did not send a letter to that department, nor did the inmate provide the specifics as to the time, place, or nature of the inmate's injuries. Camp v. Coweta County, 271 Ga. App. 349, 609 S.E.2d 695 (2005), vacated in part, 280 Ga. App. 852, 635 S.E.2d 234 (2006).

Because: (1) a patron's personal injury claim filed with the claims advisory board (CAB) in no way complied with the ante litem requirements of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq.; (2) the patron's claim to the CAB was made under a separate statutory scheme set up under Article 4 of Title 28 dealing with the financial affairs of the General Assembly, covered under O.C.G.A. § 28-5-60 et seq.; and (3) prior to filing suit, no notice was given to the risk management division of the Department of Administrative Services or the Department of Motor Vehicle Safety, and so to the extent that the trial court denied the motion of the state to dismiss the patron's claim of $5,000 or less, the court erred, but the order denying the patron's claim of $5,000 or more was upheld. State of Ga. v. Haynes, 285 Ga. App. 637, 647 S.E.2d 331 (2007).

State could not waive or be estopped from invoking statutory notice requirements.

- Plaintiff's ante litem notice warning that the notice would be presumed to comply with the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26 of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20, et seq., unless the state notified the plaintiff's attorney of any defect within 10 days of receipt was improper because the plaintiff pointed to no authority that permitted the plaintiff to unilaterally impose a duty on the state to respond to the plaintiff's letter or face a waiver of sovereign immunity; and the state could not waive or be estopped from invoking the statutory notice requirements. Silva v. Georgia Department of Transportation, 337 Ga. App. 116, 787 S.E.2d 247 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1640, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 818 (Ga. 2016).

Requirement of ante litem notice of claim under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26 was satisfied by the mailing of notices to the Department of Corrections and to the Department of Administrative Services, by certified mail, return receipt requested, within the time required for providing notice. Doe #102 v. Department of Cors., 268 Ga. 582, 492 S.E.2d 516 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1047, 118 S. Ct. 1363, 140 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1998).

Ante litem notice signed by plaintiff's attorney and physically delivered to the Department of Administrative Services by Federal Express on the anniversary of the date of the injury, with a copy sent by regular mail to the defendant, satisfied the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26. Georgia Ports Auth. v. Harris, 243 Ga. App. 508, 533 S.E.2d 404 (2000).

Ante litem notice requirement was not void for vagueness.

- Ante litem notice requirement contained in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a) was not void for vagueness since there was no dispute about when the time period began to run on the limitations period for filing against the state; thus, the trial court properly dismissed the claimant's personal injury claim against the state filed 14 months after the claimant was allegedly injured in a car accident because the date of the accident was the date the "loss was discovered or should have been discovered." Williams v. Ga. DOT, 275 Ga. App. 88, 619 S.E.2d 763 (2005).

Failure to set forth amount of claim in ante litem notice.

- Plaintiff's negligence suit against a college was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff's ante litem notice failed to set forth the amount of loss claimed, as required by O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(5)(E), and prior correspondence sent to the college by the plaintiff with a demand amount could not be considered part of the ante litem notice because, although nothing in the plain language of § 50-21-26 required the ante litem notice to be provided in one document, the prior correspondence was not sent by certified mail as required by § 50-21-26(a)(2). Perdue v. Athens Tech. College, 283 Ga. App. 404, 641 S.E.2d 631 (2007).

State university student's ante litem notice regarding the student's injuries suffered in a university parking lot failed to strictly comply with O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(5)(E) because the notice did not state any amount of loss whatsoever; the statute required notice of the amount of the loss claimed at that time, within the belief and knowledge of the student. The student had actually incurred medical expenses of $4,180 at the time the student gave notice. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Myers, 295 Ga. 843, 764 S.E.2d 543 (2014).

In a motor vehicle collision between the plaintiff and a driver employed by the Georgia Department of Transportation, the trial court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint for failure to comply with the ante litem notice provisions of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20, et seq., because the plaintiff did not specify the amount of loss the plaintiff claimed as required by O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(5)(E); and the case law requiring the plaintiff to give some notice of the amount of the loss claimed, even if it did involve future damages, applied retroactively. Silva v. Georgia Department of Transportation, 337 Ga. App. 116, 787 S.E.2d 247 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1640, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 818 (Ga. 2016).

Notice.

- Since the student's letter was inadequate notice and was not sent via approved means, the trial court correctly dismissed the suit for a claim for injuries received on a university campus. Dempsey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 256 Ga. App. 291, 568 S.E.2d 154 (2002).

Notice of a wrongful death action.

- Ante litem notice sent by the husband of a breast cancer victim was not sufficient to give the designated state agencies adequate notice of his wrongful death claim because the notice was sent before his wife's death, and while it identified her claim for pain and suffering allegedly caused by the failure of a nurse employed by the state to identify or treat the wife's condition or to refer her to a physician for treatment, as well as the husband's claim for loss of consortium, it did not provide notice of a wrongful death claim. Williams v. Department of Human Resources, 234 Ga. App. 638, 507 S.E.2d 230 (1998). See Williams v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 272 Ga. 624, 532 S.E.2d 401 (2000), aff'd, 272 Ga. 624, 532 S.E.2d 401 (2000).

Ante litem notice stating that the estates of deceased persons intended "to file a lawsuit against the State of Georgia and the Department of Transportation whose conduct is believed to have proximately caused the deaths of [deceased persons]" was not insufficient on the grounds that the notice did not specify that the surviving children would be bringing a claim. Delson v. Georgia DOT, 245 Ga. App. 100, 537 S.E.2d 381 (2000).

In a spouse's wrongful death suit against the Georgia Department of Transportation, the trial court did not err by dismissing the spouse's wrongful death claim based on the loss of an unborn child on the basis that the spouse's ante litem notice was deficient as the spouse failed to provide any mention of the wrongful death claim arising from the loss of the unborn child in the notice. DOT v. Baldwin, 292 Ga. App. 816, 665 S.E.2d 898 (2008).

Amendment of complaint inadequate.

- Injured party's attempt to amend a renewed complaint to attach copies of the letters and purported receipts required by the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a), was untimely as the amendment was filed one day beyond the 30-day requirement. Baskin v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 272 Ga. App. 355, 612 S.E.2d 565 (2005).

Amendment of ante litem notice untimely.

- For purposes of a claim under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20, et seq., the plaintiff's amendment of the plaintiff's ante litem notice was untimely because the amendment was not filed within 12 months of the injury. Silva v. Georgia Department of Transportation, 337 Ga. App. 116, 787 S.E.2d 247 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1640, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 818 (Ga. 2016).

Children.

- Requirement that notice be given within 12 months is itself a statute of limitation subject to the general law with respect to statutes of limitation; thus, even though a parent's action as next friend of the child was subject to dismissal for failure to comply with the notice requirement, the child's status tolled the limitation and the action brought by the child's parent was not barred. Howard v. State, 226 Ga. App. 543, 487 S.E.2d 112 (1997).

Dismissal proper.

- Trial court's dismissal of an injured party's renewed complaint was proper because, even though dismissal under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(4) was without prejudice, the injured party had renewed the action once and could not, under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a), do so again. Baskin v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 272 Ga. App. 355, 612 S.E.2d 565 (2005).

Because the injured parties sent their ante litem notice to the commissioner of the Department of Administrative Services (DOAS) instead of the Risk Management Division of DOAS, as required by O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a), the trial court properly dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Welch v. Ga. DOT, 276 Ga. App. 664, 624 S.E.2d 177 (2005).

Plaintiff's tort action against the Georgia Ports Authority complied with the statute of limitations and ante litem notice statute, O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-26(a)(4) and50-21-27(c), and the plaintiff's second action was proper under the renewal statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61, but was dismissed for failure to timely attach the ante litem notice. The plaintiff's third action was improper because dismissal of the first action occurred outside the statute of limitations, so only one renewal was authorized. Burroughs v. Georgia Ports Authority, 339 Ga. App. 294, 793 S.E.2d 538 (2016).

Notice held adequate despite being provided to incorrect agency.

- Trial court erred by dismissing a plaintiff's negligence complaint since the plaintiff complied with the plain language of the ante litem notice provision of the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA), O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26, even though, due to error on the plaintiff's part, the actual responsible agency was not provided with ante litem notice within the 12-month period; there was no evidence that the State of Georgia suffered any prejudice therefrom. Cummings v. Ga. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 282 Ga. 822, 653 S.E.2d 729 (2007).

Adequate compliance with ante litem notice.

- With regard to a trial court partially granting the Georgia Department of Transportation's motion to dismiss the complaint asserting damages from flooding brought by certain property owners, since the property owners did not know the precise times of the reportedly nearly constant flooding events at the property and given the contents of the notice, the continuing nature of the claims, and the inability to recall the specific times of the flooding incidents, the property owners complied with the plain language of the ante litem notice provisions. Under such circumstances, the trial court properly ruled that the property owners' claims were limited to damages for flooding occurring after a certain date since O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(1) required notice within 12 months of the date of the loss, or recovery was barred. Savage v. E. R. Snell Contr., Inc., 295 Ga. App. 319, 672 S.E.2d 1 (2008).

Patient sued the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia alleging the board failed to notify the patient that transfusions given at a college hospital might have exposed the patient to HIV. As the patient's ante-litem notice referenced the failure of state employees to take steps that would have led to an earlier detection of the patient's HIV infection, to the extent of the patient's knowledge and belief at the time the notice was given, the notice satisfied the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26.

Trial court did not err in denying the Department of Transportation's motion to dismiss the driver's action because the driver identified the portion of the highway on which the accident occurred to the extent that the driver knew it, the Department acknowledged that the Department could identify the locations of the storm drains and manholes along that part of the interstate, and the state investigated the claim after the ante litem notice was filed and made the driver an offer of settlement. Ga. DOT v. Griggs, 322 Ga. App. 519, 745 S.E.2d 749 (2013).

Student's ante litem notice stating that the amount of the student's full loss was unknown because the student was still incurring medical bills and did not know the full extent of the student's injury, met the requirement in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(5)(E) that the student state the amount of the loss to the extent known. Myers v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 324 Ga. App. 685, 751 S.E.2d 490 (2013).

Cited in Mattox v. Bailey, 221 Ga. App. 546, 472 S.E.2d 130 (1996); Brooks v. Barry, 223 Ga. App. 648, 478 S.E.2d 616 (1996); Premo v. Georgia Ports Auth., 227 Ga. App. 27, 488 S.E.2d 106 (1997); Board of Regents v. Frost, 233 Ga. App. 692, 505 S.E.2d 236 (1998); Fedorov v. Bd. of Regents, 194 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (S.D. Ga. 2002); Young v. Ga. Agric. Exposition Auth., 318 Ga. App. 244, 733 S.E.2d 529 (2012); Hartley v. Agnes Scott College, 295 Ga. 458, 759 S.E.2d 857 (2014); Ga. Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. McCoy, 340 Ga. App. 877, 798 S.E.2d 687 (2017).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Waiver of, or estoppel to assert, failure to give or defects in notice of claim against state or local political subdivision - modern status, 64 A.L.R.5th 519.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26

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Williams v. Dep't of Human Resources, 532 S.E.2d 401 (Ga. 2000).

Cited 46 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 5, 2000 | 272 Ga. 624, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 2493

...1994, but the health department's nurse did not examine Williams or refer her to a doctor for further evaluation. In November, Williams was diagnosed with breast cancer. On November 7, 1995, the couple gave written notice of their claims under OCGA § 50-21-26 of the Georgia Tort Claims Act....
...The trial court granted the motion as to the wrongful death claim, and the court of appeals affirmed. Williams' loss of consortium claim remains pending in the trial court, and the estate's claim for Sheila Williams' pain and suffering apparently has been filed in a separate action. OCGA § 50-21-26 of the Georgia Tort Claims Act prohibits any person, firm, or corporation from bringing a tort action against the state without first giving notice to the state of the claim....
...te as provided in subsection (a). [2] The court of appeals has consistently held that substantial compliance with the notice provisions is inadequate. [3] Unlike the Federal Tort Claims Act or the notice required before suing municipal corporations, § 50-21-26(a) specifies a detailed procedure for notifying the state of a *403 claim before filing a lawsuit against it....
...have looked to the plain meaning of the statutory language. In Norris v. Georgia Department of Transportation, [9] we held that the requirement of notice is satisfied when the plaintiff mails the notice of a claim in the manner specified under OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(2), rejecting the state's contention that it must receive actual notice....
...Thus, the court of appeals has dismissed claims when the plaintiff did not give any notice to the state, [10] failed to give notice within 12 months of the accident, [11] and failed to send notice to the Department of Administrative Services and the state agency responsible for the loss. [12] OCGA § 50-21-26(a) states that a person with a tort claim against the state shall not bring any lawsuit without first giving the state "notice of the claim." The term "claim" in the State Tort Claims Act is defined as "any demand against the State of Geo...
...The Georgia Tort Claims Act provides that "[n]o action against the state under this article shall be commenced and the courts shall have no jurisdiction thereof unless and until a written notice of claim has been timely presented to the state as provided in this subsection." OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(3)....
...he plain language of the statute, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice HUNSTEIN and Justice THOMPSON join in this dissent. NOTES [1] Williams v. Department of Human Resources, 234 Ga.App. 638, 507 S.E.2d 230 (1998). [2] OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(3) (1998). [3] See, e.g., Howard v. State of Georgia, 226 Ga. App. 543, 544, 487 S.E.2d 112 (1997). [4] Compare OCGA § 50-21-26 with 28 USCA § 2675 (claimant shall present claim to the appropriate federal agency) and OCGA § 36-33-5 (person shall present claim in writing to the governing authority stating the time, place and extent of injury and the negligence that caused the injury). See generally David J. Maleski, The 1992 Georgia Tort Claims Act, 9 Ga. St. U.L.Rev. 431, 436-438 (1993). [5] OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(1). [6] OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(2). [7] OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(5)....
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Cummings v. Georgia Dep't of Juv. Just., 282 Ga. 822 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 43 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 21, 2007 | 653 S.E.2d 729, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 3605

...Cummings’ claims. Georgia Dept. of Juvenile Justice v. Cummings, supra, 281 Ga. App. at 903. The GTCA requires a party with a potential tort claim against the State to provide the State with notice of the claim prior to filing suit thereon. OCGA § 50-21-26. Such notice must be given in writing within 12 months of the date the party’s loss was or should have been discovered. OCGA§ 50-21-26 (a) (1). The notice must identify, “to the extent of the claimant’s knowledge and belief and as may be practicable under the circumstances,” OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5), the state government entity whose acts or omissions are asserted as the basis for the claim, id....
...Division of the Department of Administrative Services. In addition, a copy shall be delivered personally to or mailed by first-class mail to the state government entity, the act or omissions of which are asserted as the basis of the claim. *824OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (2). Compliance with the ante litem notice provisions is a condition precedent to the claimant’s right to file suit against the State, and the courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate any such claims against the State “unless and until [the] written notice of claim has been timely presented to the state as provided in [OCGA § 50-21-26 (a)].” OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (3). A claimant may not initiate suit on her claim until the earlier of (1) the denial of her claim by DOAS or (2) 90 days from the date of presentation of the ante litem notice. OCGA§ 50-21-26 (b)....
...e GTCA’s notice provisions. See Georgia Ports Auth. v. Harris, 274 Ga. 146, 151 (2) (549 SE2d 95) (2001) (delivery of notice by Federal Express rather than personally by claimant sufficient to fulfill “personal delivery” requirement under OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (2), and fact that claimant did not obtain receipt at time of delivery not fatal where claimant ultimately obtained receipt “in a manner not disallowed by the [statute]”); Norris v....
...ted. Specifically, as set forth above, the statute requires only that the prescribed details regarding the potential claim be stated “to the extent of the claimant’s knowledge and belief and as may be practicable under the circumstances.” OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5)....
...dentification of the agency actually responsible.2 The claimant must then deliver the notice to the DOAS Risk Management Division and send a copy thereof to the agency “the act or omissions of which are asserted as the basis of the claim.” OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (2)....
...in the collision, including, inter alia, securing a copy of the accident report; obtaining photographs of the state vehicle; and discussing the accident with'various *826representatives or agents of the State.3 Consequently, in accordance with OCGA § 50-21-26, Cummings named DOT in her notice and mailed it to DOT within 12 months of the accident.4 Cummings complied with the statute in all other respects. Under these circumstances, we hold that Cummings did comply with the ante litem statute, and her error in identifying the responsible agency does not automatically subject her claims to dismissal. We note that construing OCGA § 50-21-26 to accommodate the possibility of a claimant’s error in identifying the responsible agency makes sense in light of the fact that the GTCA vests DOAS, rather than the responsible agency, with specific authority to investigate claims arising thereunder and with sole authority to settle such claims. See OCGA §§ 50-21-26 (c) and (d); 50-21-36....
...trated by the fact that the statute requires that DOAS get the original notice, while the responsible agency is only to receive a copy, and that delivery to DOAS must be provable by receipt, with no receipt required from the responsible agency. OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (2). Likewise, the statute requires the claimant who proceeds to file suit on her claim to attach to her complaint a copy of the notice to the DOAS but requires no proof regarding the notice to the responsible agency. OCGA§ 50-21-26 (a) (4)....
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West v. City of Albany, 300 Ga. 743 (Ga. 2017).

Cited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 6, 2017 | 797 S.E.2d 809

...The statute applicable to claims against municipalities requires the claimant to state “the negligence which caused the injury.” OCGA § 36-33-5. While the ante litem notice statute applicable to claims against the state contains no reference to “negligence,” it applies instead to “tort” claims. See OCGA § 50-21-26 (a). The claimant is required to state, among other things, “[t]he acts or omissions which caused the loss.” OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (F)....
...Wiley, for appellant. Elarbee, Thompson, Sapp & Wilson, William D. Deveney, Richard R. Gignilliat, Sydney Hu, for appellees. The Court of Appeals has already ruled that the ante litem notice requirement for tort claims against the State of Georgia in the Tort Claims Act, OCGA § 50-21-26, does not apply to a whistleblower claim....
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Norris v. Dep't of Transp., 486 S.E.2d 826 (Ga. 1997).

Cited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 14, 1997 | 268 Ga. 192, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 2588

...Angela Emerson, Waddell, Emerson & Buice, amicus curiae. THOMPSON, Justice. We granted certiorari to the Georgia Court of Appeals in Dept. of Transp. v. Norris, 222 Ga.App. 361, 474 S.E.2d 216 (1996), to determine whether an ante litem notice of claim under OCGA § 50-21-26 of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, requires actual receipt of a writing by the appropriate agent(s) of the State, or whether the notice requirement is satisfied upon proper mailing. We hold that mailing of the notice in the manner specified in OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(2), satisfies the statutory requirement....
...The legislature expressly declared as "the public policy of this state that the state shall only be liable in tort actions within the limitations of [the Act] and in accordance with the fair and uniform principles established" therein. OCGA § 50-21-21(a). One such limitation of the Act is contained in OCGA § 50-21-26(a), which prescribes that a tort claim may not be brought against the state "without first giving notice of the claim." Subsection (a)(1) requires that "[n]otice of a claim shall be given in writing within 12 months of the date the loss was discovered or should have been discovered...." The plain language of OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(2) provides two alternative methods of transmitting written notice—mailing or personal delivery....
...laim shall be deemed to have been presented, when the Department receives ...' such a claim. 29 C.F.R. § 15.4" Barlow, supra at 273. Applying such a definition to the Georgia Act is neither authorized nor required because the plain language of OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(2) provides as an alternative to actual delivery that notice of claim is given upon mailing....
...ithin the sender's control. The mailing requirement, therefore, comports with the stated legislative intent of achieving fairness and uniformity in the application of the Act. Since Norris mailed his ante litem notice in the manner specified by OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(2), and within the statutory time frame, he complied with the provisions of the Act....
...Candler County, supra, states otherwise, it is expressly overruled. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except BENHAM, C.J., and FLETCHER, P.J., and HINES, J., who dissent. HINES, Justice, dissenting. I must respectfully dissent because I believe that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that OCGA § 50-21-26(a) requires actual receipt of an ante litem notice of claim within twelve months of the date of the loss. The Georgia Tort Claims Act provides that an individual may not bring a tort claim against the state unless the individual first gives the state written notice of the claim within the time and in the manner specified by OCGA § 50-21-26....
...n against the state upon such claim without first giving notice of that claim as follows: (1) Notice of a claim shall be given in writing within 12 months of the date the loss was discovered or should have been discovered .... (Emphasis added). OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(3) prescribes that no action can proceed against the state unless such notice has been "presented" to the state. OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(2) specifies the methods for presenting notice: Notice of a claim shall be given in writing and shall be mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested, or delivered personally to and a receipt obtained from the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Service....
...Candler County, supra at 630-631, 448 S.E.2d 487. Such reasoning is sound and squares with the express language of the statute. Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(4) [4] explicitly require proof of actual receipt by the state and attachment of such proof to the complaint. The subsections of OCGA § 50-21-26(a) must be read as a whole and the construction of "language and words used in......
...240, 242, 104 S.E.2d 230 (1958); see also Board of Trustees, etc., Fund of Atlanta v. Christy, 246 Ga. 553, 554(1), 272 S.E.2d 288 (1980); Bennett Electric Co. v. Spears, 188 Ga.App. 502, 373 S.E.2d 286 (1988). Considering the subsections in tandem, the terms "given" and "presented" in the context of OCGA § 50-21-26(a) require actual receipt of the notice of claim within the requisite statutory period to insure a reliable and consistent method for notifying the state of potential liability. Otherwise merely a postmark would serve as verification that the notice of claim had been timely received by the state. Moreover, Norris' facsimile transmission failed to satisfy the writing requirements for notification pursuant to OCGA § 50-21-26(a). The legislature has plainly determined that notice of a claim filed pursuant to the Act must be given by a writing which is both delivered by the date required in OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(1) and delivered by the method provided in OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(2). It did not see fit to include facsimile transmission as an appropriate method for presenting written notification under OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(2), as it has in other legislation....
...sion that a facsimile transmission of the ante litem notice of claim would suffice. Because we find that the mailed notice of claim satisfied the statute, we do not decide whether the facsimile notice was sufficient under the circumstances. [2] OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(1). [3] OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(3)....
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Camp v. Coweta Cnty., 625 S.E.2d 759 (Ga. 2006).

Cited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 17, 2006 | 280 Ga. 199, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 152

...703, 703, 503 S.E.2d 597 (1998) (holding that in order to perfect service, plaintiff must serve only the chief executive officer of the involved State entity and the director of the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services). [5] OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(4) (giving plaintiff's a thirty-day window, following the filing of a motion to dismiss, to cure the failure to attach the ante-litem notice to the complaint)....
...[9] See OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b) (failure to file proper affidavit cannot be cured by amendment except in certain narrow circumstances). [10] OCGA § 9-11-11.1(b) (imposing a ten-day limit on plaintiff's right to cure failure to file written verification in cases implicating free speech rights). [11] OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(4); see also OCGA § 9-11-12(h)(1) (listing defenses that are waived if not raised in initial response)....
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Riddle v. Ashe, 495 S.E.2d 287 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 9, 1998 | 269 Ga. 65, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 468

...While a state actor is immune from suit if acting within the scope of his or her official duties, Keenan v. Plouffe, 267 Ga. 791(1), 482 S.E.2d 253 (1997), the GTCA does allow recourse against the state for the same conduct, if certain conditions have been satisfied. See OCGA §§ 50-21-23; 50-21-24; 50-21-26....
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Georgia Ports Auth. v. Harris, 549 S.E.2d 95 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 2, 2001 | 274 Ga. 146, 1 Fulton County D. Rep. 2064, 1 FCDR 2064

...We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the ante litem notice sent by appellee William Harris via Federal Express to appellant Georgia Ports Authority complied with the delivery and receipt requirements in OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(2)....
...urred on December 20, 1993. Appellee subsequently filed suit against GPA, [1] which GPA moved to dismiss for appellee's failure to provide it with timely ante litem notice. The record reflects that within 30 days after GPA filed its motion, see OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(4), appellee amended *99 his complaint to attach, inter alia, a copy of a December 16, 1994 letter from appellee's prior counsel to Douglas Williams of the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services (DOAS). The letter enclosed a document which set forth all the matters required by OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(5)....
...bility. Norris v. Dept. of Transp., 268 Ga. 192, 486 S.E.2d 826 (1997). The GTCA expressly provides that the State shall only be liable within the limitations of the Act, OCGA § 50-21-21(a), which includes the ante litem notice requirements in OCGA § 50-21-26. Norris, supra. Under the version of OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(2) applicable to this case, [3] the requisite written notice could be delivered "by certified mail, return receipt requested, or delivered personally to and a receipt obtained from the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services." We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Federal Express delivery of the December 16, 1994 letter and accompanying enclosure satisfied the personal delivery requirement of OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(2). Although OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(2) specifies that delivery must be personal, it sets forth no limitations on the persons allowed to make the delivery....
...GPA argues that the Federal Express delivery of appellee's notice was insufficient because of the lack of a receipt. While we agree with the Court of Appeals that the receipt requirement was intended to protect potential claimants, Ga. Ports Auth., supra, 243 Ga.App. at 512(1)(b), 533 S.E.2d 404, OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(2) nevertheless clearly requires potential claimants to comply with that requirement....
...That receipt was adduced into evidence in the form of the copy of the December 16, 1994 letter which appellee obtained when it was produced by DOAS during discovery proceedings. Although appellee did not obtain the receipt at the time of the personal delivery of the notice, the Court of *100 Appeals correctly noted that OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(2) "does not—literally—say when or how the receipt must be obtained." Ga....
...firmed the trial court's denial of GPA's motion to dismiss. Ga. Ports Auth., supra, 243 Ga.App. at 511(1)(b), 533 S.E.2d 404. 3. Because we find that the documents attached to appellee's amended complaint were sufficient to show compliance with OCGA § 50-21-26, we need not address whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled in Ga....
...The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that Ms. Harris failed to provide timely ante litem notice of her claim, Ga. Ports Auth., supra, 243 Ga.App. at 515(8), 533 S.E.2d 404, and no issue regarding that ruling is before this Court. [2] OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(2) also requires a copy of the notice to be delivered to "the state government entity, the act or omissions of which are asserted as the basis of the claim." The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's determination that appellee complied with this requirement. Ga. Ports Auth., supra, 243 Ga.App. at 511(1)(b), n. 5, 533 S.E.2d 404. [3] OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(2) was amended effective July 1, 2000 to provide for "statutory overnight delivery" as another acceptable means of delivery for the required ante litem notice....
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Hartley v. Agnes Scott Coll., 295 Ga. 458 (Ga. 2014).

Cited 25 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 16, 2014 | 759 S.E.2d 857, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 1513

...until the plaintiff has provided prior written notice of the tort claim to both the Risk Management Division of the State’s Department of Administrative Services (DOAS) and “the state government entity, the act or omissions of which are asserted as the basis of the claim.” OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (2). The ante litem notice must identify, among other things, “[t]he name of the state government entity, the acts or omissions of which are asserted as the basis of the claim.” OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (A)....
...employee was acting” when he committed the alleged tort to be named or substituted as the defendant, § 50-21-25 (b), so that there is no “state government entity, the act or omissions of which are asserted as the basis of the claim” to be notified of the claim, § 50-21-26 (a) (2), (a) (5) (A), with a chief executive officer who may be served as required by § 50-21-35, and which may be assessed insurance premiums by DOAS under § 50-21-33 (d) to cover judgments under § 50-21-34 (a)....
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Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia v. Myers, 295 Ga. 843 (Ga. 2014).

Cited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 6, 2014 | 764 S.E.2d 543

...ptember through December 2010. Thereafter, she continued to seek medical treatment because she had not yet completely recovered from her injuries. On October 11, 2010, Myers sent a Notice of Claim letter via certified mail pursuant to OCGA § 50-21-26 to the Georgia Department of Administrative Services (“DOAS”) and the University System’s Board of Regents (“Board”)....
...l anguish, as well as loss of earning capacity. The Board answered Myers’ complaint and moved to dismiss, arguing that Myers’ ante litem notice did not contain the “amount of the loss claimed,” and therefore, it failed to comply with OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (E)....
...established in this article”). In order to effectuate this waiver, certain prerequisites must be met. The GTCA requires a party with a potential tort claim against the State to provide the State with notice of the claim prior to filing suit thereon. OCGA § 50-21-26. Such notice must be given in writing within 12 months of the date the party’s loss was or should have been discovered. OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1). The notice must identify, “to the extent of the claimant’s knowledge and belief and as may be practicable under the circumstances,” OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5), the state government entity whose acts or omissions are asserted as the basis for the claim, id....
... Department of Administrative Services. In addition, a copy shall be delivered personally to or mailed by first-class mail to the state government entity, the act or omissions of which are asserted as the basis of the claim.” OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (2). Cummings v....
...192, 192 (486 SE2d 826) (1997) (quoting OCGA § 50-21-21 (a)). If the ante litem notice requirements are not met, then the State does not waive sovereign immunity, and therefore, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (3). As we have recognized, strict compliance with these ante litem notice requirements is necessary, and substantial compliance is insufficient. Cummings, 282 Ga....
...at 407. This case turns on the meaning of the statutory language requiring that a claimant must state the “amount of the loss claimed” “to the extent of the claimant’s knowledge and belief and as may be practicable under the circumstances.” OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (E)....
...I agree with the Court of Appeals that the language of the GTCA requires a statement of “the amount of the loss claimed,” and not an incomplete snapshot of the loss the claimant has sustained at the time of the ante litem notice. See OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (E)....
...In my opinion, then, Myers’s notice met the requirement of the GTCA that a notice of claim state the amount of loss claimed 2 “to the extent of the claimant’s knowledge and belief and as may be practicable under the circumstances.” OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5)....
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Dep't of Pub. Saf. v. Ragsdale, 839 S.E.2d 541 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 28, 2020 | 308 Ga. 210

...RAGSDALE. ELLINGTON, Justice. We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in Dept. of Public Safety v. Ragsdale, 347 Ga. App. 827 (821 SE2d 58) (2018), by holding that the time for filing an ante litem notice under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, see OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1), is subject to tolling under OCGA § 9-3-99, when the tort at issue arises from a crime....
... Ragsdale sent an ante litem notice to the Department of Administrative Services (“DOAS”) on December 3, 2014; however, it is undisputed at this point that the notice provided on that date failed to include all the information required by OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5). Ragsdale filed suit, but dismissed this initial filing based on the deficiency of his first ante litem notice....
...statutes apply to the period for filing ante litem notice as well as for filing suit.” Id. at 830 (footnote omitted). Thus, the Court of Appeals necessarily concluded that the time for filing an ante litem notice under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1), is subject to tolling under OCGA § 9-3-99....
...an action. See, e.g., Cleaveland v. Gannon, 284 Ga. 376, 381 (2) (667 SE2d 366) (2008) (defense of statute of limitation is an affirmative defense under OCGA § 9-11-8 (c)). The provision of the Tort Claims Act at issue in this case, OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1),2 concerns the time for giving ante litem notice — notice that must be given before the filing of a lawsuit. Under the Tort Claims Act, “a person may not bring a tort claim against the state unless the person first gives the state written notice of the claim within the time, and in the manner, specified in OCGA § 50-21-26.” Henderson v....
...of Human Resources, 272 Ga. 624, 625 (532 SE2d 401) (2000) (footnote omitted). “If the ante litem 2 “Notice of a claim shall be given in writing within 12 months of the date the loss was discovered or should have been discovered[.]” OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1). 5 notice requirements [of the Tort Claims Act] are not met, then the State does not waive sovereign immunity, and therefore, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (3).”3 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. System of Ga. v. Myers, 295 Ga. 843, 845 (764 SE2d 543) (2014). Thus, compliance with the ante litem notice requirements of OCGA § 50-21-26 is a condition precedent to an action under the Tort Claims Act. We have described the six-month ante litem notice provision applicable to certain claims against municipalities, see OCGA § 36- 33-5, as “a condition precedent...
...property,” and “not itself a six-month statute of limitations[.]” City of Chamblee v. Maxwell, 264 Ga. 635, 636 (452 SE2d 488) (1994) (citations omitted). Consistent with Maxwell, we conclude that the ante litem notice requirement of OCGA § 50-21-26, which performs 3 OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (3) provides: “No action against the state under this article shall be commenced and the courts shall have no jurisdiction thereof unless and until a written notice of claim has been timely presented to the state as provided in thi...
...6 a function different from that of a statute of limitation and compliance with which is a condition precedent to an action against the State, is not a statute of limitation. As the ante litem notice requirement of OCGA § 50-21-26 is not a statute of limitation, the Code’s statutory tolling provisions, such as OCGA § 9-3-99, do not apply to the Tort Claims Act’s 12-month ante litem notice period....
...section, OCGA § 50-21-27 (e) expressly provides that “[a]ll provisions relating to the tolling of limitations of actions, as provided elsewhere in this Code, shall apply to causes of action brought pursuant to [the Tort Claims Act].”4 OCGA § 50-21-26, on the other hand, contains no 4 OCGA § 50-21-27 (e) “means just what it says: statutory tolling provisions apply to claims under the Tort Claims Act in the same way, in the same manner, and to the same extent that those provisions would apply to claims not brought under the Tort Claims Act.” Foster v....
...section immediately following this section and also on some grounds in the case of the ante litem notice requirement applicable to actions against counties, but it did not do so. Compare OCGA § 36-11-1.5 Ragsdale argues that any interpretation by this Court of OCGA §§ 50-21-26 and 9-3-99 must take into account that the Court of Appeals has “treated ante litem notice provisions as ‘statutes of limitation’ for purpose of tolling statutes[.]” As Ragsdale notes, we presume that statutes are enacted “by...
...403, 406 (3) (b) (525 SE2d 433) (1999). 10 actions, as provided elsewhere in this Code,” within the Code section setting forth its two-year statute of limitation, OCGA § 50-21-27, but not in its ante litem notice provision, OCGA § 50-21-26....
...543, 546 (2) (487 SE2d 112) (1997), relying on Barrett’s holding regarding ante litem notices in suits against municipalities, concluded that the ante litem 11 notice requirement of the Tort Claims Act, OCGA § 50-21-26 (a), was likewise a statute of limitation and as such subject to OCGA § 9-3- 90 (a), thereby tolling the ante litem notice period until the appellant reached her majority....
...which implicitly disapproved Barrett’s conclusion that an ante litem notice requirement is a statute of limitation. Thus, Howard was incorrectly decided, and its erroneous holding has not, by any stretch, become a settled construction of OCGA § 50-21-26 (a).8 8 Before its decision in this case, the Court of Appeals had cited the pertinent part of Howard only three times, once in dicta, once describing the holding as limited, and once describing the holding (likely incorrectly) as dicta. More specifically, in Grant v. Faircloth, 252 Ga. App. 795, 795 (556 SE2d 928) (2001), the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Tort Claims Act, but noted in dicta, citing Howard, that “OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) ....
...general law of this State with respect to the tolling of statutes of limitation.” (Emphasis supplied.) 12 In light of the foregoing, we hold that the time for filing an ante litem notice under OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1) is not subject to tolling under OCGA § 9-3-99, and that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise.9 We acknowledge that in certain circumstances the lack of tolling of the Tort Claims Act...
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DOE 102 v. Dep't of Corr., 492 S.E.2d 516 (Ga. 1997).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 3, 1997 | 268 Ga. 582, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 4006

...ressly provided by the legislature in OCGA § 9-3-33. 3. In the recent case of Norris v. Georgia Dept. of Transp., 268 Ga. 192, 486 S.E.2d 826 (1997), a majority of this Court held that the GTCA's requirement of ante litem notice of claim under OCGA § 50-21-26 is satisfied upon mailing of the notice in the manner specified in OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(2)....
...ve Services, by certified mail, return receipt requested, on June 24, 1993, was within the statutory time requirements for providing notice. Therefore, the trial court's determination to dismiss Doe's state law claims for failure to comply with OCGA § 50-21-26 cannot stand....
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Henderson v. Dep't of Transp., 475 S.E.2d 614 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 9, 1996 | 267 Ga. 90, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 3213

...torney General. The notice provision of the Tort Claims Act provides that a person may not bring a tort claim against the state unless the person first gives the state written notice of the claim within the time, and in the manner, specified in OCGA § 50-21-26. It is undisputed that Henderson did not comply with § 50-21-26....
...All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] The Tort Claims Act is set forth in Article 2 of Chapter 21 of Title 50, OCGA § 50-21-20 to OCGA § 50-21-37. The service provisions of the Act are contained in OCGA § 50-21-35, while the notice provisions are codified at OCGA § 50-21-26. [2] OCGA § 50-21-35. [3] OCGA § 50-21-35. [4] Id. [5] Under § 50-21-26, Henderson had twelve months from July 1, 1992, to notify the state of her claim....
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Foster v. Georgia Reg'l Transp. Auth., 297 Ga. 714 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 14, 2015 | 777 S.E.2d 446

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Roberts v. Unison Behavioral Health, 863 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. 2021).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 21, 2021 | 312 Ga. 438

...eorgia community service board, she filed suit against Unison. As required by the Georgia Tort Claims Act (“GTCA”), OCGA § 50-21-20 et seq., Roberts provided an ante litem notice listing, among other things, the nature of her loss. See OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D)....
...App. XXVIII (Case No. A20A0595) (July 1, 2020) (unpublished). We granted Roberts’s petition for certiorari to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Roberts’s ante litem notice failed to meet the requirements of OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D). Because we conclude that Roberts’s notice was sufficient, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision. 1....
...not comply with OCGA § 50- 21-26 (a) (5) (D) and thus the lawsuit was barred by sovereign immunity.3 On June 21, 2019, the trial court denied Unison’s motion to dismiss, ruling that Roberts’s notice satisfied the requirement of OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D)....
...“description of the nature of her loss does not fulfill the requirement that she state the required information ‘to the extent of (her) knowledge and belief and as may be practicable under the circumstances.’” Roberts, slip op. at 5 (quoting OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5)). Quoting Bailey v. Georgia World Congress Center, 351 Ga. App. 629, 631 (832 SE2d 446) (2019), a case in which the Court of Appeals held that a similar notice of loss was insufficient under § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D), the court said: While (Roberts’[s]) ante litem notice specifies an amount of damages and indicates that she suffered various general types of damage and injury, it does not describe the nature of those...
...ents in the act are met. See OCGA § 50-21-23 (b) (“The state waives its sovereign immunity only to the extent and in the manner provided in this article and only with respect to actions brought in the courts of the State of Georgia.”). OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) requires a tort claimant who plans to file a lawsuit against the State to provide an ante litem notice within a certain time frame, in a certain manner, and including certain information. See OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1), (2), (5)....
...843, 845 (764 SE2d 543) (2014). However, “strict compliance [does not] ‘take precedence over the plain language or meaning of the statute.’” Id. at 846 (citation omitted). The particular ante litem notice requirement at issue in this case is found in OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5), which says: A notice of claim under this Code section shall state, to the extent of the claimant’s knowledge and belief and as may be practicable under the circumstances, the following:...
...170, 172 (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (citation omitted), we will analyze the language that the legislature used in this provision. (a) The “to the extent of the claimant’s knowledge and belief and as may be practicable under the circumstances” qualifier. OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) requires a claimant to state the information required by subparagraphs (A) through (F) “to the extent of the claimant’s knowledge and belief and as may be practicable under the circumstances.” Unison argues that this lan...
...the ‘complete loss,’ or the ‘total loss,’” “the extent of [the claimant’s] knowledge and belief at the time of notice included, at a minimum, the medical expenses she had incurred thus far.” Id. Although Myers held that OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) required the plaintiff to provide more information than she had provided in her notice because she knew more information, the key to that holding was that the information the plaintiff withheld — the amount she was claiming for her loss at the time of the notice — was responsive to the requirement set forth plainly in § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (E)....
...plain language of subparagraph (a) (5) (E). Thus, Myers does not support Unison’s argument that Roberts should have provided more information about her alleged loss in her ante litem notice simply because she knew more information at that time. OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D) says that a claimant must state the “nature of the loss suffered,” not everything she knows about her injuries. Unison’s argument on this point also does not offer any real guidance on how much detail Roberts was allegedly supposed to provide....
...Rather than developing such a test, we will rely on the plain language of subparagraph (a) (5) (D) to determine what information is needed to satisfy that element of the ante litem notice. (b) “The nature of the loss suffered.” OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D) requires a claimant to state only “[t]he nature of the loss suffered.” The GTCA does not define “nature,” so we look to the ordinary meaning of that word in context. See Duke v....
...As is clear from the definition of “loss,” however, an injury — such as personal injury — may be a kind of loss, but “loss” and “injury” are not entirely interchangeable. 11 suffered” in compliance with OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D)....
...tatutory definition of loss shows that Roberts did not merely copy the loss definition. Instead, she selected from the definition the types of loss that apply to her claim.7 This is an appropriate way of fulfilling the notice requirement in OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D).8 7 In her brief, Roberts highlights that her ante litem notices said “bodily injury” rather than “personal injury” and asserts that “bodily injury” is a clearer description than “personal injury” because “personal injury” could apply to many categories of loss....
...list the types of loss that she actually alleges she suffered. A true parroting of the entire definition of loss under the GTCA — without any tailoring to the specific loss the claimant suffered in her particular case — may not be deemed to comply with OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D) if it includes types of loss not allegedly suffered by the claimant....
...s recoverable in actions for negligence”). Nothing precludes a claimant from including in the description of her loss types of loss not expressly listed in the definition. 13 (c) The other parts of OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5). In considering the meaning of a statutory provision, we should not read it in isolation from the other statutory provisions of which it is a part. See Hartley v. Agnes Scott College, 295 Ga. 458, 462 (759 SE2d 857) (2014). As quoted above, OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) as a whole requires a claimant to provide information on six subjects related to her claim; “[t]he nature of the loss suffered” is only one of these. See OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (A)-(F)....
...of damages that she may seek at trial, including damages based on bodily injury, pain and suffering, medical bills, and lost wages. In sum, her ante litem notice adequately described the “nature of the loss” for her claim as required by OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D). 3....
...16 the plain meaning of the statute and is inconsistent with other case law, including Williams — this Court’s only prior decision considering the sufficiency of a “nature of the loss” description under OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D)....
...In any event, that part of the opinion is not relevant to this case, because Unison does not assert that Roberts is a surprise claimant. 21 contributing factors. Thus, this decision, like the others discussed above, supports our holding that OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D) requires a claimant to list only the types of her loss....
...Williams when the “ante litem notice described the nature of a husband’s and wife’s losses as pain, disfigurement, a reduced life expectancy, and a loss of consortium,” this Court said “the couple ‘gave written notice of their claims under OCGA § 50-21-26 of the Georgia Tort Claims Act.’” Bush, 352 Ga....
...cient. This was the correct conclusion. Accordingly, we overrule Bailey.13 4. For the reasons discussed above, we hold that Roberts’s ante litem notice, which listed the types of loss that she allegedly suffered, was sufficient under OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D)....
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Dates v. City of Atlanta, 321 Ga. 696 (Ga. 2025).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 10, 2025

...Ragsdale, 308 Ga. 210 (839 SE2d 541) (2020). See Dates v. City of Atlanta, 371 Ga. App. 824, 825 (1) (903 SE2d 289) (2024). In Ragsdale, this Court concluded that “[a]s the ante litem notice requirement of [the Georgia Tort Claims Act,] OCGA § 50-21-26[,] is not a statute of limitation, the Code’s statutory tolling provisions, such as OCGA § 9-3-99, do not apply to the Tort Claims Act’s 12-month ante litem notice period.” 308 Ga....
...minor tolling statute does not apply to the municipal ante litem notice statute. Ragsdale is instructive on how to resolve this textual question. In Ragsdale, we considered whether the time for filing an ante litem notice under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1), was subject to tolling under OCGA § 9-3-99, which provides for tolling of “[t]he running of the period of limitations” when the tort arises from a crime....
...holding that the tolling statutes apply to ante litem notice requirements. Id. at 215. Ultimately, we concluded that because OCGA § 9-3-99, by its own terms, only applied to toll statutes of limitation, “the time for filing an ante litem notice under OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1) is not subject to tolling under OCGA § 9-3-99.” Id....
...hat have long applied the tolling statutes to OCGA § 36-33-5, we should also follow those now-overruled Court of Appeals decisions. A similar argument was made and 11 the ante litem notice requirement of OCGA § 50-21-26 is not a statute of limitation, the Code’s statutory tolling provisions, such as OCGA § 9-3-99, do not apply to the Tort Claims Act’s 12-month ante litem notice period.”)....
...at 215 & n.8 (Court of Appeals decisions in contravention of Maxwell, which “implicitly disapproved Barrett’s conclusion that an ante litem notice requirement is a statute of limitation,” “ha[ve] not, by any stretch, become a settled construction of OCGA § 50-21-26 (a)”). 12 Decided June 10, 2025. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 371 Ga....

Fleureme v. City of Atlanta (Ga. 2025).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 24, 2025

...ed ante litem notice “shall be mailed by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, return receipt requested, or delivered personally” — an unambiguous reference to personal service as one of three permissible methods of service. See OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (2); Pandora Franchising, LLC v....