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2018 Georgia Code 6-3-21 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 6-3-21 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 6-3-21

TITLE 6 AVIATION

Section 3. Powers of Local Governments as to Air Facilities, 6-3-1 through 6-3-28.

ARTICLE 2 POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AS TO AIR FACILITIES

6-3-21. Lands acquired, owned, leased, controlled, or occupied by local governments deemed for public purposes; effect on ad valorem taxation.

Any lands acquired, owned, leased, controlled, or occupied by counties, municipalities, or other political subdivisions for the purpose or purposes enumerated in Code Section 6-3-20 shall be and are declared to be acquired, owned, leased, controlled, or occupied for public, governmental, and municipal purposes; provided, however, that with respect to facilities located on such lands, which lands are located outside of the territorial limits of the political subdivision that leases such lands and which are leased to, controlled, or occupied by private parties, the interests created in such private parties, for the purpose of ad valorem taxation only, are declared not to be used for public, governmental, or municipal purposes and said resulting interests, so long as the interests create an estate in land, are subject to ad valorem taxation; provided, further, that the underlying fee interest in such property which remains vested in the county, municipality, or other political subdivision shall be deemed to be used for public, governmental, and municipal purposes. The municipality's interest in lands and the facilities located thereon located inside the territorial limits of a municipality which are owned by that municipality for the purposes enumerated in Code Section 6-3-20, are declared to be used for public, governmental, or municipal purposes and are not subject to ad valorem taxation.

(Ga. L. 1933, p. 102, § 2; Code 1933, § 11-202; Ga. L. 1983, p. 647, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 1649, § 1; Ga. L. 2014, p. 824, § 1/HB 399.)

The 2014 amendment, effective April 29, 2014, substituted "so long as the interests create an estate in land" for "regardless of the extent of such interest, whether possessory or an estate in land" near the end of the first sentence.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Airports of state are invested with character of governmental institutions. Mayor of Savannah v. Lyons, 54 Ga. App. 661, 189 S.E. 63 (1936).

Lease of county property for use as airport is proprietary function.

- When a county through the county's proper authority leases property which the county owns for use as an airport, it is engaging in a proprietary and not a governmental function. Southern Airways Co. v. DeKalb County, 102 Ga. App. 850, 118 S.E.2d 234 (1960).

Binding nature of county's contract with private parties for operating airport.

- County owning an airport may properly contract with private parties for operating the airport, in whole or in part. In so doing, the governing authority of the county is engaged in a proprietary function and may, by such contract, bind the authority's successors in office for a period of years. Southern Airways Co. v. DeKalb County, 102 Ga. App. 850, 118 S.E.2d 234 (1960).

Section not intended to totally immunize municipalities from suit.

- This section, which provides that lands acquired, controlled, or occupied as landing fields for the use of aircraft shall be so acquired or controlled for public, governmental, and municipal purposes, was intended to be a declaration on the part of the legislature of the public purpose as to which the authorization was given, and not as a limitation immunizing such municipalities from suit regardless of circumstances. Southern Airways Co. v. DeKalb County, 102 Ga. App. 850, 118 S.E.2d 234 (1960).

Tort liability of municipality operating airport.

- Airport of City of Savannah was characterized under statutes (both local and general) authorizing its establishment and maintenance as a governmental institution in nature of a park and the city was not liable in damages to party sustaining personal injuries by reason of dangerous defect in pavement of a roadway inside of park, notwithstanding receipt by city of some incidental revenue from lessees or licensees of certain privileges therein, it not appearing that airport was operated primarily as a source of revenue. Mayor of Savannah v. Lyons, 54 Ga. App. 661, 189 S.E. 63 (1936).

Municipality operating an airport is engaged in a proprietary function and is liable for tortious acts of its servants and agents in operation of an airport from which substantial revenue is derived. Southern Airways Co. v. DeKalb County, 102 Ga. App. 850, 118 S.E.2d 234 (1960).

Lease of airport property to corporation.

- Airport property leased to corporation, which was used for provision of inflight meals, was subject to taxation since the provisions of lease did not preserve the public's "rightful, equal, and uniform use" of the property as required by O.C.G.A. § 6-3-25. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. City of Atlanta, 164 Ga. App. 864, 298 S.E.2d 544 (1982).

Trial court erred in granting a county's motion to dismiss a lessee's action to recover a refund of ad valorem taxes on the ground that the lessee's claims that O.C.G.A. § 6-3-21 was unconstitutional were barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because in the previous litigation between the parties, the trial court only decided that O.C.G.A. § 6-3-21 applied to the lessee's interest and did not decide on the merits whether the statute was constitutional; untimeliness was the basis of the trial court's ruling on the lessee's constitutionality argument in the prior action. Host Int'l, Inc. v. Clayton County, 311 Ga. App. 414, 715 S.E.2d 805 (2011).

Airline's property in hangar on political subdivision's property.

- Usufructs in hangar property and fuel tanks used by an airline were not subject to ad valorem taxes when the property taxed was owned by a political subdivision and located within that same political subdivision. Roberts v. Eastern Airlines, 257 Ga. 273, 357 S.E.2d 585 (1987).

Property leased to airline for airport facilities was public use.

- Five parcels of property at a city-owned airport that were leased to an airline and used for hangars, flight kitchens, and air cargo were reasonably and uniformly used for the public convenience and welfare to facilitate the effective operation of the airport, and were therefore exempt from ad valorem taxation under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(1)(B)(i). City of Atlanta v. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 306 Ga. App. 381, 702 S.E.2d 704 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0342, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 222 (Ga. 2011); overruled on other grounds by Gilmer County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Spence, 309 Ga. App. 482, 711 S.E.2d 51 (2011).

Cited in Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245 (1942); Caroway v. City of Atlanta, 85 Ga. App. 792, 70 S.E.2d 126 (1952); Southern Airways Co. v. De Kalb County, 216 Ga. 358, 116 S.E.2d 602 (1960); City of Macon v. Powell, 133 Ga. App. 907, 213 S.E.2d 63 (1975).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation, §§ 12 et seq., 82 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 2A C.J.S., Aeronautics and Aerospace, §§ 11 et seq., 53 et seq.

ALR.

- Air carrier's liability for injury from condition of airport premises, 14 A.L.R.5th 662.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 6-3-21

Total Results: 3  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Assessors v. Aldeasa Atlanta Jt. Venture, 304 Ga. 15 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 18, 2018

...The County filed this appeal, and asserts that four different taxable interests were created by the Concessions Agreement: an estate for years that may be taxed as real property pursuant to OCGA § 48-5-3; a possessory interest in the real property that may be taxed pursuant to OCGA § 6-3-21; a franchise interest that is subject to tax under OCGA § 48-5-421; and taxable leasehold improvements.1 As more fully set forth below, we affirm the trial court’s order. 1....
...nitially filed in the Court of Appeals, the case was transferred to this Court, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over constitutional matters, because the appeal of the trial court’s order draws into question the constitutionality of OCGA § 6-3-21. 2 The City of Atlanta is not subject to taxation for the real property it owns in this case because the Airport is public property....
...See OCGA § 48-5-41 (a) (1) (B). The parties agree that the City itself is exempt from Clayton County property taxes for its real property located in that county on which it operates the Atlanta Airport. The County argues, however, that the version of OCGA § 6-3-21 in effect at the time of the tax years at issue in this case disqualified, from that tax exemption, land that was leased to private parties. Prior to its 2014 amendment, OCGA § 6-3-21 (1985) provided that where a municipality owned land outside its territorial limits for the purpose of maintaining an airport, as set forth in OCGA § 6-3-20, and leased the land to private parties, the interests created in suc...
...airport land was subject to taxation during the tax years at issue in this case, it may impose ad valorem taxation on the value of Aldeasa’s possessory interest in the leased premises. (a) The trial court concluded that if former OCGA § 6-3-21 were interpreted, as Clayton County urges, to authorize Clayton County to impose a property tax on the usufruct created by the Concessions Agreement, the statute would violate the Georgia Constitution’s uniformity of taxation requirement. See Ga....
...The County stipulated below that the only usufructs or possessory interests that it taxed in the pertinent tax years are those located at the Airport. It also stipulated that other usufructs exist in Clayton County, including those held by private parties on government-owned property. If the former version of OCGA § 6-3-21 authorized the County to tax only usufructs at the Airport, then the statute would be unconstitutional, and we will not interpret it in that manner if another reasonable interpretation exists....
...Clayton County and not others, since all property within a taxing jurisdiction must be taxed uniformly. See Griggs, supra, 230 Ga. at 258 (2). (b) We agree with the trial court that the relied-upon language of the former version of OCGA § 6-3-21 was never intended to impose property taxes on usufructs at the Airport....
...That language — that the interests of a private party lessee of a municipality that owns land used as an airport, “whether possessory or an estate in land, are subject to ad valorem taxation” — was added to the statute by a 1983 amendment. Ga. L. 1983, p. 647, § 1. The predecessor to OCGA § 6-3-21 was enacted in 1933, and the original statute simply declared that lands owned or otherwise controlled by a municipality or other political subdivision for the purpose of operating an airport were owned for a public purpose....
...ed at the Atlanta Airport and leased to that party for operating a business that served the airport, where the lease was deemed to convey a usufruct and not an estate for years. A few months later, the General Assembly passed HB 492 to amend OCGA § 6-3-21....
...private parties were not considered to be used for public purposes and that “the resulting interests, regardless of the extent of such interest, whether possessory or an estate in land, are subject to ad valorem taxation . . . .” The language of former OCGA § 6-3-21 as it existed in tax years 2011 and 2012 did not impose a tax on usufructs at the Airport; it merely stated that certain lease interests were not exempt from taxation.5 3....
...at 64 (1). 4. May Clayton County tax Aldeasa’s purported leasehold improvements? Finally, we reject Clayton County’s assertion that the trial court erred by failing to find that Aldeasa owns taxable leasehold 5 We note that OCGA § 6-3-21 was amended again in 2014 to clarify that the type of lease interests that are not exempt from ad valorem taxation in the circumstances described by that Code section are limited to those that “create an estate in land ....
...attached to and passed with the real property it did not own. See Fulton County Bd. of Assessors v. McKinsey & Co., 224 Ga. App. 593, 595 (2) (481 SE2d 580) (1997). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. Decided June 18, 2018. OCGA § 6-3-21; constitutional question....
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Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Aldeasa Atlanta Jt. Venture, 815 S.E.2d 870 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 18, 2018

...The County filed this appeal, and asserts that four different taxable interests were created by the Concessions Agreement: an estate for years that may be taxed as real property pursuant to OCGA § 48-5-3 ; a possessory interest in the real property that may be taxed pursuant to OCGA § 6-3-21 ; a franchise interest that is subject to tax under OCGA § 48-5-421 ; and taxable leasehold improvements.1 As more fully set forth below, we affirm the trial court's order. 1....
...See OCGA § 48-5-41 (a) (1) (B). The parties agree that the City itself is exempt from Clayton County property taxes for its real property located in that county on which it operates the Atlanta Airport. The County argues, however, that the version of OCGA § 6-3-21 in effect at the time of the tax years at issue in this case disqualified, from that tax exemption, land that was leased to private parties. Prior to its 2014 amendment, OCGA § 6-3-21 (1985) provided that where a municipality owned land outside its territorial limits for the purpose of maintaining an airport, as set forth in OCGA § 6-3-20, and leased the land to private parties, the interests created in such private pa...
...terest in airport land was subject to taxation during the tax years at issue in this case, it may impose ad valorem taxation on the value of Aldeasa's possessory interest in the leased premises. *874(a) The trial court concluded that if former OCGA § 6-3-21 were interpreted, as Clayton County urges, to authorize Clayton County to impose a property tax on the usufruct created by the Concessions Agreement, the statute would violate the Georgia Constitution's uniformity of taxation requirement....
...The County stipulated below that the only usufructs or possessory interests that it taxed in the pertinent tax years are those located at the Airport. It also stipulated that other usufructs exist in Clayton County, including those held by private parties on government-owned property. If the former version of OCGA § 6-3-21 authorized the County to tax only usufructs at the Airport, then the statute would be unconstitutional, and we will not interpret it in that manner if another reasonable interpretation exists....
...on County and not others, since all property within a taxing jurisdiction must be taxed uniformly. See Griggs , supra, 230 Ga. at 258 (2), 197 S.E.2d 116. (b) We agree with the trial court that the relied-upon language of the former version of OCGA § 6-3-21 was never intended to impose property taxes on usufructs at the Airport....
...That language-that the interests of a private party lessee of a municipality that owns land used as an airport, "whether possessory or an estate in land, are subject to ad valorem taxation"-was added to the statute by a 1983 amendment. Ga. L. 1983, p. 647, § 1. The predecessor to OCGA § 6-3-21 was enacted in 1933, and the original statute simply declared that lands owned or otherwise controlled by a municipality or other political subdivision for the purpose of operating an airport were owned for a public purpose....
...owned at the Atlanta Airport and leased to that party for operating a business that served the airport, where the lease was deemed to convey a usufruct and not an estate for years. A few months later, the General Assembly passed HB 492 to amend OCGA § 6-3-21....
...ate parties were not considered to be used for public purposes and that "the resulting interests, regardless of the extent of such interest, whether possessory or an estate in land, are subject to ad valorem taxation...." The language of former OCGA § 6-3-21 as it existed in tax years 2011 and 2012 did not impose a tax on usufructs at the Airport; it merely stated that certain lease interests were not exempt from taxation.5 *8753....
...Although the notice of appeal was initially filed in the Court of Appeals, the case was transferred to this Court, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over constitutional matters, because the appeal of the trial court's order draws into question the constitutionality of OCGA § 6-3-21. The City of Atlanta is not subject to taxation for the real property it owns in this case because the Airport is public property....
...ovisions of the agreement must be objectively scrutinized to determine the legal effect of the agreement, despite its terms stating it creates a usufruct and not an estate in real property. See id. See Ga. L. 1985, p. 1649, § 1. We note that OCGA § 6-3-21 was amended again in 2014 to clarify that the type of lease interests that are not exempt from ad valorem taxation in the circumstances described by that Code section are limited to those that "create an estate in land...." See Ga....
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Roberts v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 257 Ga. 273 (Ga. 1987).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 9, 1987 | 357 S.E.2d 585

...did not intend to subject the usufructs to ad valorem taxation and we therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling. It is not necessary to go into the other enumerations of error. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. Original Act. “OCGA § 6-3-21....
...ode Section 6-3-20 *274shall be and are declared to be acquired, owned, leased, controlled, or occupied for public, governmental, and municipal purposes. (Ga. L. 1933, p. 102, § 2; Code 1933, § 11-202).” Original Act as amended in 1983. “OCGA § 6-3-21 (amendment emphasized)....
...rther, that the underlying fee interest in such property which remains vested in the county municipality, or other political subdivision shall be deemed to be used for public, governmental, and municipal purposes.” Amendment to 1983 Act. “OCGA § 6-3-21....