O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 6-3-21 (2019)

Lands acquired, owned, leased, controlled, or occupied by local governments deemed for public purposes; effect on ad valorem taxation

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Any lands acquired, owned, leased, controlled, or occupied by counties, municipalities, or other political subdivisions for the purpose or purposes enumerated in Code Section 6-3-20 shall be and are declared to be acquired, owned, leased, controlled, or occupied for public, governmental, and municipal purposes; provided, however, that with respect to facilities located on such lands, which lands are located outside of the territorial limits of the political subdivision that leases such lands and which are leased to, controlled, or occupied by private parties, the interests created in such private parties, for the purpose of ad valorem taxation only, are declared not to be used for public, governmental, or municipal purposes and said resulting interests, regardless of the extent of such interest, whether possessory or an estate in land, are subject to ad valorem taxation; provided, further, that the underlying fee interest in such property which remains vested in the county, municipality, or other political subdivision shall be deemed to be used for public, governmental, and municipal purposes. The municipality’s interest in lands and the facilities located thereon located inside the territorial limits of a municipality which are owned by that municipality for the purposes enumerated in Code Section 6-3-20, are declared to be used for public, governmental, or municipal purposes and are not subject to ad valorem taxation.

History

(Ga. L. 1933, p. 102, § 2; Code 1933, § 11-202; Ga. L. 1983, p. 647, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 1649, § 1.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Airports of state are invested with character of governmental institutions. Mayor of Savannah v. Lyons, 54 Ga. App. 661, 189 S.E. 63 (1936). Lease of county property for use as

airport is proprietary function. - When a county through the county’s proper authority leases property which the county owns for use as an airport, it is engaging in a proprietary and not a gov-

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ernmental function. Southern Airways Co. v. DeKalb County, 102 Ga. App. 850, 118 S.E.2d 234 (1960). Binding nature of county’s contract with private parties for operating airport. - County owning an airport may properly contract with private parties for operating the airport, in whole or in part. In so doing, the governing authority of the county is engaged in a proprietary function and may, by such contract, bind the authority’s successors in office for a period of years. Southern Airways Co. v. DeKalb County, 102 Ga. App. 850, 118 S.E.2d 234 (1960). Section not intended to totally immunize municipalities from suit. - This section, which provides that lands acquired, controlled, or occupied as landing fields for the use of aircraft shall be so acquired or controlled for public, governmental, and municipal purposes, was intended to be a declaration on the part of the legislature of the public purpose as to which the authorization was given, and not as a limitation immunizing such municipalities from suit regardless of circumstances. Southern Airways Co. v. DeKalb County, 102 Ga. App. 850, 118 S.E.2d 234 (1960). Tort liability of municipality operating airport. - Airport of City of Savannah was characterized under statutes (both local and general) authorizing its establishment and maintenance as a governmental institution in nature of a park and the city was not liable in damages to party sustaining personal injuries by reason of dangerous defect in pavement of a roadway inside of park, notwithstanding receipt by city of some incidental revenue from lessees or licensees of certain privileges therein, it not appearing that airport was operated primarily as a source of revenue. Mayor of Savannah v. Lyons, 54 Ga. App. 661, 189 S.E. 63 (1936). Municipality operating an airport is engaged in a proprietary function and is liable for tortious acts of its servants and agents in operation of an airport from which substantial revenue is derived. Southern Airways Co. v. DeKalb County, 102 Ga. App. 850, 118 S.E.2d 234 (1960). Lease of airport property to corporation. - Airport property leased to cor-

poration, which was used for provision of inflight meals, was subject to taxation since the provisions of lease did not preserve the public’s ‘‘rightful, equal, and uniform use’’ of the property as required by O.C.G.A. § 6-3-25. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. City of Atlanta, 164 Ga. App. 864, 298 S.E.2d 544 (1982). Trial court erred in granting a county’s motion to dismiss a lessee’s action to recover a refund of ad valorem taxes on the ground that the lessee’s claims that O.C.G.A. § 6-3-21 was unconstitutional were barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because in the previous litigation between the parties, the trial court only decided that O.C.G.A. § 6-3-21 applied to the lessee’s interest and did not decide on the merits whether the statute was constitutional; untimeliness was the basis of the trial court’s ruling on the lessee’s constitutionality argument in the prior action. Host Int’l, Inc. v. Clayton County, 311 Ga. App. 414, 715 S.E.2d 805 (2011). Airline’s property in hangar on political subdivision’s property. - Usufructs in hangar property and fuel tanks used by an airline were not subject to ad valorem taxes when the property taxed was owned by a political subdivision and located within that same political subdivision. Roberts v. Eastern Airlines, 257 Ga. 273, 357 S.E.2d 585 (1987). Property leased to airline for airport facilities was public use. - Five parcels of property at a city-owned airport that were leased to an airline and used for hangars, flight kitchens, and air cargo were reasonably and uniformly used for the public convenience and welfare to facilitate the effective operation of the airport, and were therefore exempt from ad valorem taxation under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(1)(B)(i). City of Atlanta v. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 306 Ga. App. 381, 702 S.E.2d 704 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0342, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 222 (Ga. 2011); overruled on other grounds by Gilmer County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Spence, 309 Ga. App. 482, 711 S.E.2d 51 (2011). Cited in Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d

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245 (1942); Caroway v. City of Atlanta, 85 Ga. App. 792, 70 S.E.2d 126 (1952); Southern Airways Co. v. De Kalb County, 216

Ga. 358, 116 S.E.2d 602 (1960); City of Macon v. Powell, 133 Ga. App. 907, 213 S.E.2d 63 (1975).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation, §§ 12 et seq., 82 et seq. C.J.S. - 2A C.J.S., Aeronautics and Aerospace, §§ 11 et seq., 53 et seq.

ALR. - Air carrier’s liability for injury from condition of airport premises, 14 ALR5th 662.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1987–2023 · leading case: Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Assessors v. Aldeasa Atlanta Jt. Venture, 304 Ga. 15 (Ga. 2018).
Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Assessors v. Aldeasa Atlanta Jt. Venture, 304 Ga. 15 (Ga. 2018). · cites it 24× “The County filed this appeal, and asserts that four different taxable interests were created by the Concessions Agreement: an estate for years that may be taxed as real property pursuant to OCGA § 48-5-3; a possessory interest in the real property that may be taxed pursuant to…”
Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Aldeasa Atlanta Jt. Venture, 815 S.E.2d 870 (Ga. 2018). · cites it 22× “The County filed this appeal, and asserts that four different taxable interests were created by the Concessions Agreement: an estate for years that may be taxed as real property pursuant to OCGA § 48-5-3 ; a possessory interest in the real property that may be taxed pursuant to…”
City of Atlanta v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 608 S.E.2d 710 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 36× “The General Assembly provided us with guidance on this issue in OCGA § 6-3-21, which provides: Any lands acquired, owned, leased, controlled, or occupied by counties, municipalities, or other political subdivisions for the purpose or purposes enumerated in Code Section 6-3-20…”
Host Int'l, Inc. v. Clayton Cnty., 715 S.E.2d 805 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 20× “rest that is not an estate in land) in the subject property, which it leases at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport for the purpose of operating food and beverage concessions; that usufruct interests in *415 property generally are not subject to ad valorem…”
Roberts v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 357 S.E.2d 585 (Ga. 1987). · cites it 6× ““OCGA § 6-3-21. Acquisition, etc., of lands by counties, municipalities, etc.”
Glenn v. The State., 827 S.E.2d 698 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “This Court has held that, even under the more general provisions of OCGA § 6-3-21 (6), "in order to stand upon the same footing of reason and justice, a defense of justification under OCGA § 16-3-20 (6) would still have to be premised upon the asserted prevention of imminent use…”
Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Aldeasa Atlanta Jt. Venture (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 12× “Aldeasa contended in the trial court that OCGA § 6-3-21 (1985)1 is unconstitutional if interpreted to impose an ad valorem tax on usufructs at the Airport, arguing that the statute would violate the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution of Georgia, Ga.”
City of Atlanta v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 702 S.E.2d 704 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 2× “7 OCGA § 6-3-21. 8 OCGA § 6-3-20. 9 164 Ga.”
Dekalb Cnty. v. City of Chamblee (Ga. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 4× “The County contends that it is not subject to occupancy taxes under the City Code for its revenue-generating activities at PDK because under OCGA § 6-3-21, its operation of the airport qualifies as a governmental function, not a business.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.